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Rashi on Sanhedrin 5a:12:3 | Sanhedrin 5a:12 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | מכפרי - מקום: | This incident raises several questions, which the Gemara asks in sequence. What is different concerning this Sage, Rabba bar Hana, that Rabbi Hiyya called him: My brother's son, and what is different concerning that Sage, Rav, that Rabbi Hiyya called him: My sister's son? And if you would say that this was the situation: Rabba bar Hana was his brother's son and Rav was his sister's son, but doesn't the Master say: Aivu, Rav's father, and Hana, the father of Rabba bar Hana, and Sheila, and Marta, and Rabbi Hiyya, were all sons of Abba bar Aha Karsala from Kafrei? Consequently, Rav would also be Rabbi Hiyya's brother's son. The Gemara answers: Rav was his brother's son who was also his sister's son, as Rabbi Hiyya's half-brother married Rabbi Hiyya's half-sister; while Rabba bar Hana was his brother's son who was not his sister's son. Therefore, he referred to Rav in a manner that emphasized the additional relationship. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 5a:1:1 | Sanhedrin 5a:1 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | דן אפילו ביחיד - דכתיב (ויקרא יט) בצדק תשפוט וקסבר אין כאן עירוב פרשיות: | But if one was a judge accepted as an expert for the public, then he may judge cases even as the lone judge. Rav Nahman said: One such as I may judge cases of monetary law as the lone judge. And similarly, Rabbi Hiyya said: One such as I may judge cases of monetary law as the lone judge. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 5a:2:1 | Sanhedrin 5a:2 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | דגמירנא - שמועות דינין מרבותי: | A dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the meaning of: Such as I, in the statements of these Rabbis? Did they intend to say: Such as I, in that I have studied and have the skills to extrapolate and derive new rulings on the basis of earlier decisions, and have also received permission to judge as the lone judge? But accordingly, if one has not received permission to judge as the lone judge, his judgment is not a valid judgment? Or perhaps this is not the correct reading of the statements, and the halakha is that even though he did not receive permission to judge as the lone judge, his judgment is nevertheless a valid judgment? |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 5a:2:2 | Sanhedrin 5a:2 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | וסבירנא - יודע אני להוסיף וליישב טעמים מדעתי: | A dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the meaning of: Such as I, in the statements of these Rabbis? Did they intend to say: Such as I, in that I have studied and have the skills to extrapolate and derive new rulings on the basis of earlier decisions, and have also received permission to judge as the lone judge? But accordingly, if one has not received permission to judge as the lone judge, his judgment is not a valid judgment? Or perhaps this is not the correct reading of the statements, and the halakha is that even though he did not receive permission to judge as the lone judge, his judgment is nevertheless a valid judgment? |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 5a:2:3 | Sanhedrin 5a:2 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | ונקיטנא רשותא - מריש גלותא דייננא דיני ממונות ביחידי: | A dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the meaning of: Such as I, in the statements of these Rabbis? Did they intend to say: Such as I, in that I have studied and have the skills to extrapolate and derive new rulings on the basis of earlier decisions, and have also received permission to judge as the lone judge? But accordingly, if one has not received permission to judge as the lone judge, his judgment is not a valid judgment? Or perhaps this is not the correct reading of the statements, and the halakha is that even though he did not receive permission to judge as the lone judge, his judgment is nevertheless a valid judgment? |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 5a:2:4 | Sanhedrin 5a:2 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | דיניה לאו דינא - והדר דינא לגמרי: | A dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the meaning of: Such as I, in the statements of these Rabbis? Did they intend to say: Such as I, in that I have studied and have the skills to extrapolate and derive new rulings on the basis of earlier decisions, and have also received permission to judge as the lone judge? But accordingly, if one has not received permission to judge as the lone judge, his judgment is not a valid judgment? Or perhaps this is not the correct reading of the statements, and the halakha is that even though he did not receive permission to judge as the lone judge, his judgment is nevertheless a valid judgment? |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 5a:3:1 | Sanhedrin 5a:3 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | דן דינא - ביחידי: | The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a solution to this dilemma from the following case: Mar Zutra, son of Rav Nahman, once adjudicated a certain case and erred in his ruling. Upon recognizing his error, he came before Rav Yosef to ask what he should do. Rav Yosef said to him: If the litigants accepted you upon themselves as the lone judge, and both had agreed that they would accept your ruling, you are not liable to pay restitution to the party who lost the case due to your erroneous ruling. But if they did not accept you on themselves, but were rather compelled to be judged before you, you must go and pay restitution. And learn from it that even in a case where one did not receive permission to judge as the lone judge, his ruling is a valid judgment. The Gemara affirms: Learn from it that this is the case. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 5a:3:2 | Sanhedrin 5a:3 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | אי קבלוך עלייהו - לגמרי לילך אחריך אם לדין אם לטעות ולא יתבעוך לא תשלם: | The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a solution to this dilemma from the following case: Mar Zutra, son of Rav Nahman, once adjudicated a certain case and erred in his ruling. Upon recognizing his error, he came before Rav Yosef to ask what he should do. Rav Yosef said to him: If the litigants accepted you upon themselves as the lone judge, and both had agreed that they would accept your ruling, you are not liable to pay restitution to the party who lost the case due to your erroneous ruling. But if they did not accept you on themselves, but were rather compelled to be judged before you, you must go and pay restitution. And learn from it that even in a case where one did not receive permission to judge as the lone judge, his ruling is a valid judgment. The Gemara affirms: Learn from it that this is the case. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 5a:3:3 | Sanhedrin 5a:3 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | ואי לא זיל שלים - ואי לא קבלו טעותך עליהם דאמרו לך דיינת לן דין תורה זיל שלים ומיהו מיהדר דינא לא אלמא גמיר וסביר וכי לא נקיט רשותא דיניה דינא ולא מהדר: | The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a solution to this dilemma from the following case: Mar Zutra, son of Rav Nahman, once adjudicated a certain case and erred in his ruling. Upon recognizing his error, he came before Rav Yosef to ask what he should do. Rav Yosef said to him: If the litigants accepted you upon themselves as the lone judge, and both had agreed that they would accept your ruling, you are not liable to pay restitution to the party who lost the case due to your erroneous ruling. But if they did not accept you on themselves, but were rather compelled to be judged before you, you must go and pay restitution. And learn from it that even in a case where one did not receive permission to judge as the lone judge, his ruling is a valid judgment. The Gemara affirms: Learn from it that this is the case. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 5a:4:1 | Sanhedrin 5a:4 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | לישקול רשותא - דכיון דברשות נחת לא משלם: | § Rav says: One who wants to adjudicate a case and wants to be exempt from payment of restitution if he errs in his judgment must receive permission from the Exilarch to judge cases. And similarly, Shmuel says: In such a case he must receive permission from the Exilarch. Once he receives permission, even an erroneous decision carries halakhic force and therefore it is as if he did not err. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 5a:5:1 | Sanhedrin 5a:5 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | מהכא להכא - מריש גלותא לבבל למידן דינא בבבל: | Since the Gemara mentioned the importance of a judge receiving authorization from the Exilarch, it now discusses the scope of this authority. It is obvious that from here to here, meaning relying on permission granted by the Exilarch in Babylonia in order to adjudicate cases within Babylonia, and from there to there, relying on permission granted by the Nasi in Eretz Yisrael in order to adjudicate cases within Eretz Yisrael, the authorization is effective. And it is also obvious that from here to there, relying on permission granted by the Exilarch to adjudicate cases within Eretz Yisrael, it is also effective, as the authority of the Exilarch is greater than that of the Nasi . This is so since the Exilarch here in Babylonia may be termed a scepter, i.e., a ruler with actual power of governance, and the Nasi there in Eretz Yisrael is only a staff, i.e., a legislator with limited power. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 5a:5:2 | Sanhedrin 5a:5 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | ומהתם להתם - מנשיא דארץ ישראל לדון בארץ ישראל: | Since the Gemara mentioned the importance of a judge receiving authorization from the Exilarch, it now discusses the scope of this authority. It is obvious that from here to here, meaning relying on permission granted by the Exilarch in Babylonia in order to adjudicate cases within Babylonia, and from there to there, relying on permission granted by the Nasi in Eretz Yisrael in order to adjudicate cases within Eretz Yisrael, the authorization is effective. And it is also obvious that from here to there, relying on permission granted by the Exilarch to adjudicate cases within Eretz Yisrael, it is also effective, as the authority of the Exilarch is greater than that of the Nasi . This is so since the Exilarch here in Babylonia may be termed a scepter, i.e., a ruler with actual power of governance, and the Nasi there in Eretz Yisrael is only a staff, i.e., a legislator with limited power. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 5a:5:3 | Sanhedrin 5a:5 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | שבט - לשון שררה ויש להן רשות להפקיר דהפקר ב"ד הפקר דכתיב (עזרא י) וכל אשר לא יבא וגו' ביבמות בהאשה רבה (יבמות דף פט:): | Since the Gemara mentioned the importance of a judge receiving authorization from the Exilarch, it now discusses the scope of this authority. It is obvious that from here to here, meaning relying on permission granted by the Exilarch in Babylonia in order to adjudicate cases within Babylonia, and from there to there, relying on permission granted by the Nasi in Eretz Yisrael in order to adjudicate cases within Eretz Yisrael, the authorization is effective. And it is also obvious that from here to there, relying on permission granted by the Exilarch to adjudicate cases within Eretz Yisrael, it is also effective, as the authority of the Exilarch is greater than that of the Nasi . This is so since the Exilarch here in Babylonia may be termed a scepter, i.e., a ruler with actual power of governance, and the Nasi there in Eretz Yisrael is only a staff, i.e., a legislator with limited power. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 5a:5:3 | Yevamot 89b:11 | null | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Yevamot | Talmud | Talmud | שבט - לשון שררה ויש להן רשות להפקיר דהפקר ב"ד הפקר דכתיב (עזרא י) וכל אשר לא יבא וגו' ביבמות בהאשה רבה (יבמות דף פט:): | As Rabbi Yitzhak said: From where is it derived that property declared ownerless by the court is ownerless? As it is stated: "And whoever does not come within three days, according to the council of the princes and the Elders, all his property should be forfeited, and himself separated from the congregation of the captivity" (Ezra 10:8). This verse indicates that the court can confiscate anyone's possessions. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 5a:5:4 | Sanhedrin 5a:5 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | מחוקק - שררה מועטת: | Since the Gemara mentioned the importance of a judge receiving authorization from the Exilarch, it now discusses the scope of this authority. It is obvious that from here to here, meaning relying on permission granted by the Exilarch in Babylonia in order to adjudicate cases within Babylonia, and from there to there, relying on permission granted by the Nasi in Eretz Yisrael in order to adjudicate cases within Eretz Yisrael, the authorization is effective. And it is also obvious that from here to there, relying on permission granted by the Exilarch to adjudicate cases within Eretz Yisrael, it is also effective, as the authority of the Exilarch is greater than that of the Nasi . This is so since the Exilarch here in Babylonia may be termed a scepter, i.e., a ruler with actual power of governance, and the Nasi there in Eretz Yisrael is only a staff, i.e., a legislator with limited power. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 5a:6:1 | Sanhedrin 5a:6 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | שרודים את העם - שיש להם כח ורשות מאת מלכי פרס: | This is as it is taught in a baraita : The verse states: "The scepter shall not depart from Judah nor the ruler's staff from between his feet until Shiloh comes" (Genesis 49:10). The term "Shiloh" is understood as a reference to the Messiah, and therefore the verse is interpreted as delineating the authority of Jewish rulers during the exile, before the Messiah comes. "The scepter shall not depart from Judah"; these are the Exilarchs in Babylonia, who are empowered by the government and consequently subjugate the Jewish people as with a scepter. "Nor the ruler's staff from between his feet"; These are the grandchildren of Hillel the Elder who hold the position of Nasi and teach Torah in public, but do not have authority to actually enforce their judgments. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 5a:6:2 | Sanhedrin 5a:6 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | בני בניו של הלל - הלל נשיא היה כדאמר בפסחים באלו דברים (פסחים דף סו.) הושיבוהו בראש ומינוהו נשיא עליהם: | This is as it is taught in a baraita : The verse states: "The scepter shall not depart from Judah nor the ruler's staff from between his feet until Shiloh comes" (Genesis 49:10). The term "Shiloh" is understood as a reference to the Messiah, and therefore the verse is interpreted as delineating the authority of Jewish rulers during the exile, before the Messiah comes. "The scepter shall not depart from Judah"; these are the Exilarchs in Babylonia, who are empowered by the government and consequently subjugate the Jewish people as with a scepter. "Nor the ruler's staff from between his feet"; These are the grandchildren of Hillel the Elder who hold the position of Nasi and teach Torah in public, but do not have authority to actually enforce their judgments. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 5a:7:1 | Sanhedrin 5a:7 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | דן דינא - בבבל וטעה: | If one has permission from there, from the Nasi , and wants to adjudicate cases here in Babylonia, what is the halakha ? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear an incident that occurred: Rabba bar Hana adjudicated a case in Babylonia and erred. He came before Rabbi Hiyya to ask what he should do. Rabbi Hiyya said to him: If the litigants accepted you upon themselves, you are not liable to pay restitution to the party who unjustly lost the case, but if not, go and pay. But Rabba bar Hana received permission from the Nasi in Eretz Yisrael; therefore, learn from this incident that permission from there to adjudicate cases here is not effective. The Gemara affirms: Learn from it that this is the case. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 5a:7:2 | Sanhedrin 5a:7 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | אתא - לא"י לקמיה דרבי חייא: | If one has permission from there, from the Nasi , and wants to adjudicate cases here in Babylonia, what is the halakha ? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear an incident that occurred: Rabba bar Hana adjudicated a case in Babylonia and erred. He came before Rabbi Hiyya to ask what he should do. Rabbi Hiyya said to him: If the litigants accepted you upon themselves, you are not liable to pay restitution to the party who unjustly lost the case, but if not, go and pay. But Rabba bar Hana received permission from the Nasi in Eretz Yisrael; therefore, learn from this incident that permission from there to adjudicate cases here is not effective. The Gemara affirms: Learn from it that this is the case. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 5a:7:3 | Sanhedrin 5a:7 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | ש"מ מהתם להכא לא מהני - דהא רבה בר חנה רשותא הוה נקיט מרבי דנשיא דא"י היה כדאמרן לקמן בשמעתין בן אחי יורד לבבל וכו': | If one has permission from there, from the Nasi , and wants to adjudicate cases here in Babylonia, what is the halakha ? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear an incident that occurred: Rabba bar Hana adjudicated a case in Babylonia and erred. He came before Rabbi Hiyya to ask what he should do. Rabbi Hiyya said to him: If the litigants accepted you upon themselves, you are not liable to pay restitution to the party who unjustly lost the case, but if not, go and pay. But Rabba bar Hana received permission from the Nasi in Eretz Yisrael; therefore, learn from this incident that permission from there to adjudicate cases here is not effective. The Gemara affirms: Learn from it that this is the case. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 5a:8:1 | Sanhedrin 5a:8 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | לא מינייכו נקיטנא רשותא - ואיני כפוף לכם: | The Gemara asks: And is this permission not effective? But when Rabba bar Rav Huna was involved in a dispute with the members of the house of the Exilarch he said: It is not from you that I received permission to judge cases. I received permission from my father, my master, i.e., Rav Huna, and my father, my master, received permission from Rav, and Rav from Rabbi Hiyya, and Rabbi Hiyya from Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi in Eretz Yisrael. Therefore, it seems that permission received in Eretz Yisrael is in fact effective in Babylonia. The Gemara rejects this proof: He was merely standing up to them with words alone, but there was no halakhic validity to his statement. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 5a:9:1 | Sanhedrin 5a:9 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | על הגבולין - הנמשכות אחר ארץ ישראל: | The Gemara asks: But since permission to judge received in Eretz Yisrael is not effective in Babylonia, why did Rabba bar Hana need to receive permission when he left for Babylonia? What was the value of that permission? The Gemara answers: The permission is effective for the cities that stand on the borders of Babylonia, which are not entirely in the jurisdiction of Babylonia, so permission from Eretz Yisrael is effective there. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 5b:10:1 | Sanhedrin 5b:10 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | רבי חייא חזייה כו' - לא איתפרש לן מאי בעיא הכא ונראה בעיני דהא אתא לאשמעינן אף על גב דרבי חייא תלמידו דרבי הוה ובמקומו דר' הוה לא חלק לו כבוד לרבי מלהפריש זה מן האיסור דלענין אפרושי מאיסורא אין כאן מורה הלכה לפני רבו כדאמרינן פרק הדר עם הנכרי (עירובין סג.) ובמס' שביעית ירושלמי בפרק שלש ארצות מצאתי בההוא עובדא דההוא דקאי בבית הקברות דלא גרסינן ביה רבי חייא אלא רבי הוה ושני דברים הללו ראה רבי בעכו דמי ביצים אין מכשירין והאי ולא גרסינן דהוה קאי בבית הקברות אלא בעכו שבה ארץ ישראל ויש בה ארץ העמים וראה אותן העומדים בגבול ארץ ישראל שהיו מגבלין עיסותיהן בטומאה ותמה עד שאמרו לו תלמיד אחד בא לכאן כו' וחזר וראה אותו כהן עומד בקצת העיר שחוץ לגבול ארץ ישראל אמר לו והרי הוא זה ארץ העמים שגזרו עליה טומאה כבית הקברות ואמר ליה לאו בן איש כהן פלוני אתה כו' ולכך נשנו מעשים הללו זה אצל זה: | The Gemara relates: Rabbi Hiyya saw a certain man standing in a cemetery. He said to him: Are you not the son of so-and-so the priest? As it is prohibited for priests to come into contact with the dead (see Leviticus 21:1–4), Rabbi Hiyya was surprised to see a priest standing in a cemetery. The man said to him: Yes, but that man's, meaning his own, father was a man with raised eyes who would desire things that he saw, even if they were forbidden. He set his eyes upon a divorcée and married her despite the Torah prohibition against such a union (see Leviticus 21:7), and thereby disqualified the offspring of that union from the sanctity of priesthood. As the son of a priest and a divorcée, the man had the status of a halal and was therefore not obligated to abide by the restrictions specific to priests. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 5b:10:2 | Sanhedrin 5b:10 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | גבה עינים - הלך אחר עיניו: | The Gemara relates: Rabbi Hiyya saw a certain man standing in a cemetery. He said to him: Are you not the son of so-and-so the priest? As it is prohibited for priests to come into contact with the dead (see Leviticus 21:1–4), Rabbi Hiyya was surprised to see a priest standing in a cemetery. The man said to him: Yes, but that man's, meaning his own, father was a man with raised eyes who would desire things that he saw, even if they were forbidden. He set his eyes upon a divorcée and married her despite the Torah prohibition against such a union (see Leviticus 21:7), and thereby disqualified the offspring of that union from the sanctity of priesthood. As the son of a priest and a divorcée, the man had the status of a halal and was therefore not obligated to abide by the restrictions specific to priests. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 5b:10:3 | Sanhedrin 5b:10 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | נתן עיניו בגרושה - ונשאה וממנה נולדתי והריני חלל: | The Gemara relates: Rabbi Hiyya saw a certain man standing in a cemetery. He said to him: Are you not the son of so-and-so the priest? As it is prohibited for priests to come into contact with the dead (see Leviticus 21:1–4), Rabbi Hiyya was surprised to see a priest standing in a cemetery. The man said to him: Yes, but that man's, meaning his own, father was a man with raised eyes who would desire things that he saw, even if they were forbidden. He set his eyes upon a divorcée and married her despite the Torah prohibition against such a union (see Leviticus 21:7), and thereby disqualified the offspring of that union from the sanctity of priesthood. As the son of a priest and a divorcée, the man had the status of a halal and was therefore not obligated to abide by the restrictions specific to priests. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 5b:11:1 | Sanhedrin 5b:11 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | לפלגא - כגון רב דיהיבי להו רשותא למידן ולא להתיר בכורות: | Continuing the discussion about receiving permission to teach halakha , the Gemara discusses the extent of this authority. It is obvious that one's teacher can grant partial permission, meaning permission to rule on certain types of cases but not others, as it has been said above that doing so is effective. But what is the halakha with regard to granting such permission conditionally? Is it possible to grant permission limited to a certain period of time, or limited to a certain location? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear the solution to this matter from what Rabbi Yohanan said to Rav Shemen: You have our permission to instruct and to adjudicate until you return to us. This statement proves that it is possible to grant permission limited to a specific period of time. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 5b:11:2 | Sanhedrin 5b:11 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | על תנאי - כגון עד שנה או עד שנתים ולא יותר: | Continuing the discussion about receiving permission to teach halakha , the Gemara discusses the extent of this authority. It is obvious that one's teacher can grant partial permission, meaning permission to rule on certain types of cases but not others, as it has been said above that doing so is effective. But what is the halakha with regard to granting such permission conditionally? Is it possible to grant permission limited to a certain period of time, or limited to a certain location? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear the solution to this matter from what Rabbi Yohanan said to Rav Shemen: You have our permission to instruct and to adjudicate until you return to us. This statement proves that it is possible to grant permission limited to a specific period of time. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 5b:11:3 | Sanhedrin 5b:11 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | מאי - מהני בתוך הזמן או לא: | Continuing the discussion about receiving permission to teach halakha , the Gemara discusses the extent of this authority. It is obvious that one's teacher can grant partial permission, meaning permission to rule on certain types of cases but not others, as it has been said above that doing so is effective. But what is the halakha with regard to granting such permission conditionally? Is it possible to grant permission limited to a certain period of time, or limited to a certain location? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear the solution to this matter from what Rabbi Yohanan said to Rav Shemen: You have our permission to instruct and to adjudicate until you return to us. This statement proves that it is possible to grant permission limited to a specific period of time. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 5b:11:4 | Sanhedrin 5b:11 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | לרב שמן - כשהיה פורש ממנו וירד לבבל: | Continuing the discussion about receiving permission to teach halakha , the Gemara discusses the extent of this authority. It is obvious that one's teacher can grant partial permission, meaning permission to rule on certain types of cases but not others, as it has been said above that doing so is effective. But what is the halakha with regard to granting such permission conditionally? Is it possible to grant permission limited to a certain period of time, or limited to a certain location? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear the solution to this matter from what Rabbi Yohanan said to Rav Shemen: You have our permission to instruct and to adjudicate until you return to us. This statement proves that it is possible to grant permission limited to a specific period of time. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 5b:11:5 | Sanhedrin 5b:11 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | ברשותינו - רשות נתונה לך לדון: | Continuing the discussion about receiving permission to teach halakha , the Gemara discusses the extent of this authority. It is obvious that one's teacher can grant partial permission, meaning permission to rule on certain types of cases but not others, as it has been said above that doing so is effective. But what is the halakha with regard to granting such permission conditionally? Is it possible to grant permission limited to a certain period of time, or limited to a certain location? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear the solution to this matter from what Rabbi Yohanan said to Rav Shemen: You have our permission to instruct and to adjudicate until you return to us. This statement proves that it is possible to grant permission limited to a specific period of time. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 5b:12:1 | Sanhedrin 5b:12 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | אפילו שנים מזכין כו' - משנה היא [בזה בורר] (לקמן סנהדרין דף כט.): | § Earlier, the Gemara discussed the possibility of a court consisting of only two judges adjudicating a case. Concerning the matter itself, Shmuel says: With regard to two judges who adjudicated a case, their judgment is a valid judgment, but they are called an impudent court. Rav Nahman sat and said this halakha . Rava raised an objection to Rav Nahman from a mishna (29a): In a case where three judges are adjudicating a case, even if two judges deem the defendant exempt from payment or two judges deem him liable to pay, and one says: I do not know, the judges must add another judge, since the one who abstained has removed himself from the court, and there are not enough judges. And if it is so as Shmuel says, they should be viewed as two judges who adjudicated the case, and there would be no need to add another judge, as a judgment passed by two judges is valid. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 5b:12:1 | Sanhedrin 29a:16 | null | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | אפילו שנים מזכין כו' - משנה היא [בזה בורר] (לקמן סנהדרין דף כט.): | If the opinions of the judges are divided, as two judges say that the defendant is exempt from payment and one says he is liable to pay, he is exempt. If two say he is liable and one says he is exempt, he is liable. If one says he is liable and one says he is exempt, or even if two of the judges deem him exempt or two of them deem him liable, and the other one says: I do not know, the court must add more judges and then rule in accordance with the majority opinion. This is because the one who abstains is considered as though he is not a member of the court. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 5b:12:2 | Sanhedrin 5b:12 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | יוסיפו הדיינין - דהוה ליה כמאן דלא הוה התם ואישתכח דתרי הוא דהוי ואנן בעינן מעיקרא תלתא דאי נמי גמר דינא בתרי דהוי רובא שפיר דמי: | § Earlier, the Gemara discussed the possibility of a court consisting of only two judges adjudicating a case. Concerning the matter itself, Shmuel says: With regard to two judges who adjudicated a case, their judgment is a valid judgment, but they are called an impudent court. Rav Nahman sat and said this halakha . Rava raised an objection to Rav Nahman from a mishna (29a): In a case where three judges are adjudicating a case, even if two judges deem the defendant exempt from payment or two judges deem him liable to pay, and one says: I do not know, the judges must add another judge, since the one who abstained has removed himself from the court, and there are not enough judges. And if it is so as Shmuel says, they should be viewed as two judges who adjudicated the case, and there would be no need to add another judge, as a judgment passed by two judges is valid. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 5b:14:1 | Sanhedrin 5b:14 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | שנים שעשו פשרה אין בעלי דינין יכולין לחזור בהן - שהרי נתרצו ועל פיהן עשו: | Rava raised an objection to Rav Nahman from a baraita : Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Cases of monetary law are adjudicated by three judges, and mediation leading to compromise can be performed by two mediators. And the power of compromise is greater than the power of adjudication, as if two judges adjudicated a case, the litigants are able to withdraw from the case and demand a court with a complete quorum. But if two mediated a compromise, the litigants may not withdraw. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 5b:1:1 | Sanhedrin 5b:1 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | על שם חכמתו - שהיה רב חכם ביותר קרי ליה בן אחותו: | It was due to his extraordinary wisdom, as it is written: "Say to wisdom: You are my sister" (Proverbs 7:4). Therefore, calling him: My sister's son, was an indication of his great wisdom. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 5b:2:1 | Sanhedrin 5b:2 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | הא קאמר דחכים טובא - דהא תרצת דעל שם חכמתו קריה בן אחותו: | The Gemara had related that Rabbi Hiyya asked Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: May Rav declare a firstborn animal permitted, and that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi had responded: He may not declare such an animal permitted. The Gemara asks: What is the reason that he denied him this permission? If we say that it was because Rav was not sufficiently wise and learned, but that is difficult, as we already said that he was exceedingly wise. Rather, it must be that it was because, although he was quite knowledgeable about the halakha , he was not an expert with regard to blemishes, meaning that he lacked the practical expertise to apply the halakha to actual cases. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 5b:3:1 | Sanhedrin 5b:3 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | לחלק כבוד לרבה - כדי שינהגו בו בני בבל כבוד שבק ליה האי חשיבותא דאילו לרב הוו נהגי ביה יקר בלאו הכי: | The Gemara rejects this answer. But didn't Rav say: I apprenticed with a shepherd for eighteen months in order to be able to know which blemish is a permanent blemish, and which is a temporary blemish? Evidently, he had a high level of practical expertise in this matter. The Gemara explains: Rather, it was in order to bestow honor upon Rabba bar Hana. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi wanted to ensure that Rabba bar Hana would be treated with respect, so he made sure that there was an area of halakha with regard to which the people would not be able to consult with Rav and would need to consult with Rabba bar Hana instead. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 5b:4:1 | Sanhedrin 5b:4 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | אי בעית אימא - הא דקאמר אל יתיר: | And if you wish, say instead: It is due to this fact itself: Since Rav was a great expert with regard to blemishes, he would permit blemishes that average people do not know about. And as a result, they would erroneously say with regard to a different blemish: In a case like this Rav declared the animal permitted, and in this way they would come to erroneously permit an animal with a temporary blemish, believing it to be identical to the blemish that Rav had declared permitted. Due to this concern, Rav was denied the authority to declare firstborn animals permitted on the basis of a blemish. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 5b:4:2 | Sanhedrin 5b:4 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | משום היא גופא - משום הא מילתא דקאמר שמונה עשר חדשים גדלתי וכו': | And if you wish, say instead: It is due to this fact itself: Since Rav was a great expert with regard to blemishes, he would permit blemishes that average people do not know about. And as a result, they would erroneously say with regard to a different blemish: In a case like this Rav declared the animal permitted, and in this way they would come to erroneously permit an animal with a temporary blemish, believing it to be identical to the blemish that Rav had declared permitted. Due to this concern, Rav was denied the authority to declare firstborn animals permitted on the basis of a blemish. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 5b:4:3 | Sanhedrin 5b:4 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | דלא ידעי אינשי - אינו ניכר לרבים שהוא מום: | And if you wish, say instead: It is due to this fact itself: Since Rav was a great expert with regard to blemishes, he would permit blemishes that average people do not know about. And as a result, they would erroneously say with regard to a different blemish: In a case like this Rav declared the animal permitted, and in this way they would come to erroneously permit an animal with a temporary blemish, believing it to be identical to the blemish that Rav had declared permitted. Due to this concern, Rav was denied the authority to declare firstborn animals permitted on the basis of a blemish. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 5b:6:1 | Sanhedrin 5b:6 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | בטומאה - לא הוו מקפידין לטהר כליהם: | As it is taught in a baraita : Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi once went to a certain place, and he saw people there kneading dough while they were in a state of ritual impurity, and they believed that nevertheless, the dough remained ritually pure. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to them: For what reason are you kneading your dough in a state of ritual impurity? They said to him: A certain Torah scholar came here and taught us that water from swamps [ mei betza'im ] does not render food susceptible to contract ritual impurity. Therefore, they would take water from swamps and knead dough with it, in the mistaken belief that such dough would not be susceptible to ritual impurity. But in reality, what he taught them was that water of eggs [ mei beitzim ], i.e., the albumin of eggs, does not render food susceptible to impurity, as it is not considered water. But they thought he said: Water from swamps. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 5b:6:2 | Sanhedrin 5b:6 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | מי בצעים - אגם מריש"ק בלע"ז: | As it is taught in a baraita : Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi once went to a certain place, and he saw people there kneading dough while they were in a state of ritual impurity, and they believed that nevertheless, the dough remained ritually pure. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to them: For what reason are you kneading your dough in a state of ritual impurity? They said to him: A certain Torah scholar came here and taught us that water from swamps [ mei betza'im ] does not render food susceptible to contract ritual impurity. Therefore, they would take water from swamps and knead dough with it, in the mistaken belief that such dough would not be susceptible to ritual impurity. But in reality, what he taught them was that water of eggs [ mei beitzim ], i.e., the albumin of eggs, does not render food susceptible to impurity, as it is not considered water. But they thought he said: Water from swamps. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 5b:6:3 | Sanhedrin 5b:6 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | אין מכשירין - וממימי בצעים אנו לשין הלכך לא מקבלה עיסה טומאה: | As it is taught in a baraita : Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi once went to a certain place, and he saw people there kneading dough while they were in a state of ritual impurity, and they believed that nevertheless, the dough remained ritually pure. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to them: For what reason are you kneading your dough in a state of ritual impurity? They said to him: A certain Torah scholar came here and taught us that water from swamps [ mei betza'im ] does not render food susceptible to contract ritual impurity. Therefore, they would take water from swamps and knead dough with it, in the mistaken belief that such dough would not be susceptible to ritual impurity. But in reality, what he taught them was that water of eggs [ mei beitzim ], i.e., the albumin of eggs, does not render food susceptible to impurity, as it is not considered water. But they thought he said: Water from swamps. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 5b:6:4 | Sanhedrin 5b:6 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | מי ביצים - הלש עיסה בביצים של תרנגולת ואווז: | As it is taught in a baraita : Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi once went to a certain place, and he saw people there kneading dough while they were in a state of ritual impurity, and they believed that nevertheless, the dough remained ritually pure. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to them: For what reason are you kneading your dough in a state of ritual impurity? They said to him: A certain Torah scholar came here and taught us that water from swamps [ mei betza'im ] does not render food susceptible to contract ritual impurity. Therefore, they would take water from swamps and knead dough with it, in the mistaken belief that such dough would not be susceptible to ritual impurity. But in reality, what he taught them was that water of eggs [ mei beitzim ], i.e., the albumin of eggs, does not render food susceptible to impurity, as it is not considered water. But they thought he said: Water from swamps. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 5b:7:1 | Sanhedrin 5b:7 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | קרמיון ופיגה - נהרות של אגמים: | And the residents of that same place erred also with regard to this: It was taught in a mishna ( Para 8:10): The waters of the Keramiyyon River and the waters of the Piga River are not fit for mixing with ashes of the red heifer to use as water of purification, since they are water from swamps. And they erroneously thought: Since this water is not fit for use as water of purification, this means it is not considered water, and therefore it also does not render food susceptible to contracting impurity. But it is not so, as there, with regard to water of purification, we need: "Running water" (see Numbers 19:17), and water from swamps is not running water. But here, with regard to rendering food susceptible to impurity, any water renders food susceptible. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 5b:7:2 | Sanhedrin 5b:7 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | פסולין - למי חטאת מפני שהן מי בצעים ואנו מים חיים אל כלי בעינן: | And the residents of that same place erred also with regard to this: It was taught in a mishna ( Para 8:10): The waters of the Keramiyyon River and the waters of the Piga River are not fit for mixing with ashes of the red heifer to use as water of purification, since they are water from swamps. And they erroneously thought: Since this water is not fit for use as water of purification, this means it is not considered water, and therefore it also does not render food susceptible to contracting impurity. But it is not so, as there, with regard to water of purification, we need: "Running water" (see Numbers 19:17), and water from swamps is not running water. But here, with regard to rendering food susceptible to impurity, any water renders food susceptible. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 5b:8:1 | Sanhedrin 5b:8 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | נוטל רשות מרבו - וכי יהיב ליה רבו רשותא מידק דייק ביה שיהא לשונו פתוח ולא יטעו השומעין את דבריו: | It was taught: At that time, when Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi discovered the consequences resulting from a Torah scholar who was not precise with his terminology, the Sages decreed: A Torah scholar may not teach halakha unless he receives permission from his teacher to do so. The teacher should not grant him this permission if he does not know how to express himself in a clear manner. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 5b:9:1 | Sanhedrin 5b:9 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | לחתר - מקום: | Concerning a similar matter, the Gemara relates: Tanhum, son of Rabbi Ami, arrived at a place called Hatar, and he taught them: It is permitted to wash wheat in a small amount of water in order to make it easier to peel during the grinding process on Passover, and there is no concern that perhaps it will become leavened. They said to him: Isn't Rabbi Mani from Tyre here i.e., near our location? And it is taught in a baraita : A Torah scholar may not teach halakha in the vicinity of his teacher, unless he is distant from the teacher by at least three parasangs [ parsaot ], corresponding to the size of the camp of Israel. In the encampment in the wilderness no one else judged cases, as all the Jewish people brought their cases to Moses (see Exodus 33:7). Tanhum, son of Rabbi Ami, said to them: It did not enter my mind that Rabbi Mani was in the vicinity. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 5b:9:2 | Sanhedrin 5b:9 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | מותר ללתות - לשרות מעט במים ולכותשן במכתשת ולא חיישינן לחימוץ הואיל וכותשן מיד: | Concerning a similar matter, the Gemara relates: Tanhum, son of Rabbi Ami, arrived at a place called Hatar, and he taught them: It is permitted to wash wheat in a small amount of water in order to make it easier to peel during the grinding process on Passover, and there is no concern that perhaps it will become leavened. They said to him: Isn't Rabbi Mani from Tyre here i.e., near our location? And it is taught in a baraita : A Torah scholar may not teach halakha in the vicinity of his teacher, unless he is distant from the teacher by at least three parasangs [ parsaot ], corresponding to the size of the camp of Israel. In the encampment in the wilderness no one else judged cases, as all the Jewish people brought their cases to Moses (see Exodus 33:7). Tanhum, son of Rabbi Ami, said to them: It did not enter my mind that Rabbi Mani was in the vicinity. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 5b:9:3 | Sanhedrin 5b:9 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | כנגד מחנה ישראל - דכל מאן דבעי מילתא אזיל לגבי משה דכתיב (שמות לג) והיה כל מבקש ה' וגו' אע"ג שהמחנה ג' פרסאות ואתו לגבי משה רבותא דמשה שאני מחנה ישראל ג' פרסאות דכתיב (במדבר לג) ויחנו על הירדן מבית הישימות עד אבל השטים ואמר רבה בר בר חנה לדידי חזי לי ההוא אתרא והוה תלתא פרסי בעירובין (דף נה:) וביומא (דף עה:): | Concerning a similar matter, the Gemara relates: Tanhum, son of Rabbi Ami, arrived at a place called Hatar, and he taught them: It is permitted to wash wheat in a small amount of water in order to make it easier to peel during the grinding process on Passover, and there is no concern that perhaps it will become leavened. They said to him: Isn't Rabbi Mani from Tyre here i.e., near our location? And it is taught in a baraita : A Torah scholar may not teach halakha in the vicinity of his teacher, unless he is distant from the teacher by at least three parasangs [ parsaot ], corresponding to the size of the camp of Israel. In the encampment in the wilderness no one else judged cases, as all the Jewish people brought their cases to Moses (see Exodus 33:7). Tanhum, son of Rabbi Ami, said to them: It did not enter my mind that Rabbi Mani was in the vicinity. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 60a:12:1 | Sanhedrin 60a:12 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | ושם המפורש - כלומר שם המיוחד: | The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that the judges must stand? Rabbi Yitzhak bar Ami says: It is derived from that which the verse states about Eglon: "And Ehud came to him, and he was sitting by himself alone in his cool upper chamber. And Ehud said: I have a message from God [ Elohim ] to you. And he arose out of his seat" (Judges 3:20). And are these matters not inferred a fortiori ? And if Eglon, king of Moab, who was a gentile and knew the name of God only by an appellation, stood in honor, all the more so must a Jew stand if he hears the ineffable name. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 60a:13:1 | Sanhedrin 60a:13 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | קרועי בגדים - על גדופין ששמעו מפי רבשקה כדכתיב (מלכים ב י"ט:ד') אשר שלחו מלך אשור [אדניו] לחרף אלהים חי: | The mishna teaches that upon hearing the curse the judges each make a tear in their garments. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this? The Gemara answers that it is derived from that which is written: "Then came Eliakim, son of Hilkiah, who was over the household, and Shebna the scribe, and Joah, son of Asaph, the recorder, to Hezekiah with torn garments, and they told him Rabshakeh's statement" (II Kings 18:37). Apparently, since they heard the blasphemous statement of Rabshakeh they were obligated to make a tear in their garments. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 60a:16:1 | Sanhedrin 60a:16 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | והעדים - בשעה שמעידין בפירוש מה ששמעו אינן חייבין לקרוע: | The Sages taught: Both one who hears the curse himself and one who hears it from the one who heard it are obligated to make a tear in their garments. But the witnesses are not obligated to make a tear when they testify, as they already made a tear when they heard it from the blasphemer himself. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 60a:17:1 | Sanhedrin 60a:17 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | הא שמעו השתא - מפי עצמן: | The Gemara asks: And if they made a tear when they heard the curse, what of it? Aren't they also hearing the curse now? The Gemara answers: It should not enter your mind that they are obligated to make a tear a second time, as it is written: "And it came to pass, when King Hezekiah heard the statement of Rabshakeh, that he tore his clothes" (II Kings 19:1). It can be inferred that King Hezekiah tore his clothes, but those who reported the blasphemy did not tear their clothes a second time. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 60a:18:1 | Sanhedrin 60a:18 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | השומע אזכרה - ברכת השם מפי העובד כוכבים אינו חייב לקרוע: | § Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: One who hears a mention of God's name in a blasphemous manner from a gentile is not obligated to make a tear in his garments. And if you object and say that those who heard the blasphemy of Rabshakeh made a tear even though he was a gentile, that is not correct, as Rabshakeh was an apostate Jew. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 60a:18:2 | Sanhedrin 60a:18 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | וא"ת - הרי קרעו על רבשקה ישראל מומר היה: | § Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: One who hears a mention of God's name in a blasphemous manner from a gentile is not obligated to make a tear in his garments. And if you object and say that those who heard the blasphemy of Rabshakeh made a tear even though he was a gentile, that is not correct, as Rabshakeh was an apostate Jew. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 60a:1:1 | Sanhedrin 60a:1 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | מכשפה לא תחיה וכל שוכב עם בהמה - סמוכין הן בפרשת ואלה המשפטים: | "You shall not allow a witch to live" (Exodus 22:17), and it is written in the following verse: "Whoever lies with an animal shall be put to death" (Exodus 22:18). It is derived from here that anyone who is included in the prohibition of: "Whoever lies with an animal," including gentiles, is included in the command: "You shall not allow a witch to live." |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 60a:20:1 | Sanhedrin 60a:20 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | בזמן הזה - שאנו בגלות ואין אימת ב"ד מוטלת עליהם לדון חייבי מיתות: | The Gemara notes: And Shmuel disagrees with Rav Hiyya with regard to two matters. As Rabbi Hiyya says: One who hears a mention of God's name in a blasphemous context nowadays is not obligated to make a tear, as if you do not say so, the entire garment will be full of tears. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 60a:20:2 | Sanhedrin 60a:20 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | נתמלא כל הבגד קרעים - לפי שהדבר תדיר לפי שאין מתיראין מב"ד: | The Gemara notes: And Shmuel disagrees with Rav Hiyya with regard to two matters. As Rabbi Hiyya says: One who hears a mention of God's name in a blasphemous context nowadays is not obligated to make a tear, as if you do not say so, the entire garment will be full of tears. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 60a:21:1 | Sanhedrin 60a:21 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | מי גמירי - עובד כוכבים שם המיוחד כל כך שמקללין בו תמיד דקאמר נתמלא כל הבגד כולו קרעים: | The Gemara clarifies: From whom does one hear these mentions of God's name about which Rabbi Hiyya says that one's entire garment would be full of tears? If we say that he hears from it a Jew, are Jews irreverent to such an extent that they demean the name of God? Rather, it is obvious that Rabbi Hiyya is referring to hearing it from a gentile. And if you say that the reference is to cursing the ineffable name, have the gentiles learned it? They have no knowledge of his name. Rather, is it not referring to cursing by an appellation of God's name? |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 60a:21:2 | Sanhedrin 60a:21 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | אלא לאו בכנוי - תדיר ובזמן הזה הוא דלא קרעינן משום דנתמלא כל הבגד וכו' אבל בזמן ב"ד קורעין על עובד כוכבים ואכנוי: | The Gemara clarifies: From whom does one hear these mentions of God's name about which Rabbi Hiyya says that one's entire garment would be full of tears? If we say that he hears from it a Jew, are Jews irreverent to such an extent that they demean the name of God? Rather, it is obvious that Rabbi Hiyya is referring to hearing it from a gentile. And if you say that the reference is to cursing the ineffable name, have the gentiles learned it? They have no knowledge of his name. Rather, is it not referring to cursing by an appellation of God's name? |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 60a:23:1 | Sanhedrin 60a:23 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | ומעלה הוא דעבוד רבנן - בדיני ממונות ודיני נפשות שהצריכו כל העדים לפרש עדותן: | § The mishna teaches that after the eldest witness states the exact wording of the curse, the second witness does not repeat it, but he says: I too heard as he did. Reish Lakish says: Conclude from it that saying: I too heard as he did, is valid testimony by Torah law, both in cases of monetary law and in cases of capital law. And the requirement that every witness must relate his testimony separately is a higher standard that the Sages instituted, and here, since it is not possible to fulfill this requirement, as it is not appropriate for a blasphemous statement to be repeated several times, the Sages established the matter according to Torah law and did not require that every witness repeat the curse. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 60a:23:2 | Sanhedrin 60a:23 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | הכא - בברכת השם דלא אפשר לפרש מפני כבוד השם: | § The mishna teaches that after the eldest witness states the exact wording of the curse, the second witness does not repeat it, but he says: I too heard as he did. Reish Lakish says: Conclude from it that saying: I too heard as he did, is valid testimony by Torah law, both in cases of monetary law and in cases of capital law. And the requirement that every witness must relate his testimony separately is a higher standard that the Sages instituted, and here, since it is not possible to fulfill this requirement, as it is not appropriate for a blasphemous statement to be repeated several times, the Sages established the matter according to Torah law and did not require that every witness repeat the curse. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 60a:23:3 | Sanhedrin 60a:23 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | אוקמוה אדאורייתא - וקטלינן ליה בהאי עדות: | § The mishna teaches that after the eldest witness states the exact wording of the curse, the second witness does not repeat it, but he says: I too heard as he did. Reish Lakish says: Conclude from it that saying: I too heard as he did, is valid testimony by Torah law, both in cases of monetary law and in cases of capital law. And the requirement that every witness must relate his testimony separately is a higher standard that the Sages instituted, and here, since it is not possible to fulfill this requirement, as it is not appropriate for a blasphemous statement to be repeated several times, the Sages established the matter according to Torah law and did not require that every witness repeat the curse. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 60a:24:1 | Sanhedrin 60a:24 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | דאי סלקא דעתך - בעלמא פסול עד שיפרשו כולם: | As if it enters your mind that saying: I too heard as he did, is not valid testimony by Torah law, here, in the case of blasphemy, would we execute the man without full testimony because it is not possible to allow the repetition of blasphemy? Clearly, such testimony is valid by Torah law. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 60a:24:2 | Sanhedrin 60a:24 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | אטו הכא משום דלא אפשר קטלינן ליה לגברא - בלא העדאת עדים: | As if it enters your mind that saying: I too heard as he did, is not valid testimony by Torah law, here, in the case of blasphemy, would we execute the man without full testimony because it is not possible to allow the repetition of blasphemy? Clearly, such testimony is valid by Torah law. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 60a:25:1 | Sanhedrin 60a:25 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | כר' עקיבא - במסכת מכות (ד' ה.) דמקיש שלשה לשנים דאם נמצא שלישי קרוב או פסול עדות של כולן בטלין הלכך בדקינן ליה בהדייהו דאי מתזם או מתכחש מבטלין לסהדותייהו: | The mishna teaches: And the third witness says: I too heard as he did. The Gemara comments: The unattributed tanna of the mishna holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who compares three witnesses to two. Rabbi Akiva maintains that just as in a case where there are two witnesses, the disqualification of one disqualifies all of the testimony, so too, even if there are three witnesses, and one of the three is disqualified, all of the testimony is disqualified. Similarly, here too he holds that if there are three witnesses, each of them must testify concerning the curse. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 60a:2:1 | Sanhedrin 60a:2 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | את חקתי תשמרו - כשהזהיר ישראל בסיני בהמתך לא תרביע וגו' פתח בהו קרא את חקותי תשמרו מה שלא פתח כן בשאר מקומות שמע מינה הכי קאמר להו את חקותי שחקקתי כבר לבני נח תשמרו ואלו הן בהמתך לא תרביע כלאים אבל על חרישת שור וחמור לא הזהרתים: | The baraita teaches that Rabbi Elazar says that descendants of Noah were also commanded about the prohibition of diverse kinds. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Shmuel says: They are derived from that which the verse states: "My statutes you shall keep. You shall not breed your animal with a diverse kind; you shall not sow your field with two kinds of seed" (Leviticus 19:19). God is saying: Keep the statutes that I have already instituted for you, i.e., mitzvot that were already given to the descendants of Noah, namely, "you shall not breed your animal with a diverse kind; you shall not sow your field with two kinds of seed." |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 60a:2:2 | Sanhedrin 60a:2 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | שדך לא תזרע כלאים - וזריעה זו אינה זריעה ממש דלא נצטוו בני נח על כלאי הכרם אלא שלא להרכיב האילן על שאינו מינו דלא תזרע דומיא דלא תרביע מה בהמה בהרבעה דבר המסויים על דבר המסויים: | The baraita teaches that Rabbi Elazar says that descendants of Noah were also commanded about the prohibition of diverse kinds. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Shmuel says: They are derived from that which the verse states: "My statutes you shall keep. You shall not breed your animal with a diverse kind; you shall not sow your field with two kinds of seed" (Leviticus 19:19). God is saying: Keep the statutes that I have already instituted for you, i.e., mitzvot that were already given to the descendants of Noah, namely, "you shall not breed your animal with a diverse kind; you shall not sow your field with two kinds of seed." |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 60a:3:1 | Sanhedrin 60a:3 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | מה בהמה בין בארץ בין בחו"ל - דחובת הגוף שאינה תלויה בחובת הארץ נפקא לן בקדושין (ד' לז.) דנוהגת אפילו בחו"ל: | The Gemara derives the details of this prohibition from the verse: Just as the Noahide prohibition concerning your animal applies with regard to breeding animals of different species, and not with regard to plowing with animals of two different species working together, which is prohibited only for Jews, so too, the Noahide prohibition in your field applies with regard to grafting one species onto another, which is equivalent to breeding, but it is not prohibited for gentiles to sow different seeds together. Furthermore, just as the Noahide prohibition against breeding your animal applies both in Eretz Yisrael and outside Eretz Yisrael, so too, the Noahide prohibition against grafting diverse kinds in your field applies both in Eretz Yisrael and outside Eretz Yisrael. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 60a:4:1 | Sanhedrin 60a:4 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | אלא מעתה ושמרתם את חקותי - דכתיב בכל התורה כולה הכי נמי דנצטוו בני נח עליהם: | The Gemara asks: If that is so, that the term "My statutes" is understood as referring to mitzvot that were already given to the descendants of Noah, then the verse: "You shall therefore keep My statutes and My ordinances" (Leviticus 18:5), referring to the entire Torah, should also obligate the descendants of Noah, as it would be referring to: Statutes that I have already instituted for you. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 60a:5:1 | Sanhedrin 60a:5 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | הכא כתיב את חקותי תשמרו - דהקדים חקים למצות שמירה דמשמע חקים דמעיקרא ואע"ג דגבי שביעית ויובל כתיב נמי את משפטי תעשו ואת חקתי תשמרו דהקדים נמי חקים למצות שמירה התם כיון דרישא דקרא כתיב את משפטי תעשו ארחיה למיכתב ואת חקותי תשמרו: | The Gemara answers: There the verse states: "You shall therefore keep My statutes," indicating only those statutes that I am giving you now, whereas here, in the verse concerning diverse kinds, the wording is "My statutes you shall keep," meaning statutes that obligate you from the outset you shall keep in the future. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 60a:7:1 | Sanhedrin 60a:7 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | שם בן ארבע אותיות - שם הוא ולא בעינן שם המפורש בן ארבעים ושתים אותיות: | Rav Aha bar Ya'akov says: The blasphemer is not liable unless he blesses, i.e., curses, the Tetragrammaton, the four-letter name of God, which is to the exclusion of one who curses the two-letter name of God, spelled yod heh , who is not liable. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 60b:10:1 | Sanhedrin 60b:10 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | לפי שיצאה זביחה - בפירוש מכלל שאר עבודות שנכללו בכלל וילך ויעבוד ומדה היא בתורה דדבר שהוא בכלל ויצא מן הכלל ללמד לא ללמד על עצמו יצא אלא ללמד על הכלל כולו יצא שאין הכלל הזה מחייב אלא עבודה הדומה לזבוח שהוא עבודת פנים ומהשתא לא נפקא לן דליחייב אהשתחואה שלא כדרכה דלאו עבודה היא בפנים מניין לרבות השתחואה: | The baraita asks: Since slaughter is singled out from all of the forms of worship to be mentioned in this verse in order to derive from it that with regard to all the sacrificial rites performed inside the Temple, one who performs them in idol worship is liable to receive capital punishment, from where is it derived that this halakha includes bowing down to an idol, which is not a sacrificial rite? |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 60b:11:1 | Sanhedrin 60b:11 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | ה"ג בסיפרי ת"ל וילך ויעבוד אלהים אחרים וישתחו להם - דעל כרחיך לשלא כדרכה קאמר דאי דרכה לעבדה בכך בכלל ויעבוד הוא: | The baraita answers that the verse states: "And has gone and served other gods and bowed to them" (Deuteronomy 17:3), and a verse near it states: "Then you shall bring forth that man or that woman who has done this evil thing to your gates, the man or the woman, and you shall stone them with stones and they shall die" (Deuteronomy 17:5). It is derived from the juxtaposition of these two verses that one who bows down to an idol is liable to be executed. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 60b:12:1 | Sanhedrin 60b:12 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | עונש שמענו - דכתיב ביה וסקלתם דלעיל: | The baraita asks: We have heard the punishment for bowing down to an idol, but from where is the prohibition against doing so derived? The baraita answers that the verse states: "For you shall bow to no other god" (Exodus 34:14). |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 60b:12:2 | Sanhedrin 60b:12 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | אזהרה מניין ת"ל כי לא תשתחוה לאל אחר - והאי נמי אם אינו ענין לכדרכה תנהו ענין לשלא כדרכה וספרים דכתוב בהו (כי) לא תשתחוה שיבוש הוא דהא מיתה הכא לא כתיבא: | The baraita asks: We have heard the punishment for bowing down to an idol, but from where is the prohibition against doing so derived? The baraita answers that the verse states: "For you shall bow to no other god" (Exodus 34:14). |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 60b:13:1 | Sanhedrin 60b:13 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | יכול שאני מרבה וכו' - דנימא השתחואה שיצא מן הכלל ללמד על הכלל כולו יצא דמה השתחואה מיוחד שהיא דרך כבוד וחייב עליה אף לשלא כדרכה אף כל שהוא דרך כבוד כגון אלו חייב: | One might have thought that I should include among those liable to receive capital punishment one who hugs an idol, or one who kisses it, or one who puts its shoes on it as well. Therefore, the verse states: "One who sacrifices shall be utterly destroyed," referring to the act of slaughtering an offering in idol worship. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 60b:13:2 | Sanhedrin 60b:13 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | ת"ל זובח - ואם השתחואה ללמד על הכלל באתה למה פרט לך זביחה הלא דרך כבוד הוא ומהשתחואה נפקא ליה אלא היא באתה ללמד על הכלל לומר לך זביחה בכלל היתה ויצאה מן הכלל להקיש לה כל הנכללות עמה ולומר לך מה זביחה מיוחדת עבודת פנים אף כל שהיא עבודת פנים חייבין עליה בחוץ לעבודת כוכבים ומשום דהשתחואה לא נפקא לן מהכא לחיובא הוצרכה השתחואה לחזור ולצאת כדי לדון בעצמה לבדה שיתחייבו עליה ואע"פ שאין חייבין כיוצא בה ויצאה זביחה ללמד על הכלל כולו: | One might have thought that I should include among those liable to receive capital punishment one who hugs an idol, or one who kisses it, or one who puts its shoes on it as well. Therefore, the verse states: "One who sacrifices shall be utterly destroyed," referring to the act of slaughtering an offering in idol worship. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 60b:17:1 | Sanhedrin 60b:17 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | סד"א - האי יחרם אתא לאורויי לן דאי אתרו ביה לקטלא וכרת כי לא אתרו ביה הוא כדלגבי שבת ועבודת כוכבים ועריות: ה"ג ס"ד אמינא אתרו ביה קטלא ולא אתרו ביה כרת קמ"ל: | The Gemara answers: It might enter your mind to say that in a case when the witnesses warned the transgressor not to slaughter the offering outside the Temple he is liable to receive the death penalty, but in a case when they did not warn him he is liable to receive karet . Therefore, the baraita teaches us that one who slaughters an offering outside the Temple is not liable to receive the death penalty even if he was warned. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 60b:18:1 | Sanhedrin 60b:18 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | אימא יצאה לן השתחואה ללמד על הכלל - ומתרבי מגפף ומנשק וכל שהוא דרך כבוד כהשתחואה וקא קשיא לי' לתנא א"כ זובח למאי אתא תיפוק לי' מהשתחואה דהא עבודת כבוד הוא: | The baraita states that the principle concerning the forms of idol worship that are punishable by execution is derived from the verse that mentions slaughtering an animal as an idolatrous offering, whereas bowing to an idol is mentioned in the verse as an exception. Rava bar Rav Hanan said to Abaye: Say that bowing is singled out to be mentioned to teach, with regard to the entire category, that any honorable form of worship, when performed for the sake of idol worship, carries the death penalty, not only sacrificial rites performed the Temple. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 60b:19:1 | Sanhedrin 60b:19 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | לגופיה אתא - ולאורויי דאפי' לא שחט שחיטת עצמו לעבודת כוכבים אלא שוחט לעצמו וחשב בה ע"מ לזרוק דמה לעבודת כוכבים חייב ואפי' לא זרק: | And if you would say that if so, why do I need slaughter to be mentioned in the verse specifically, one can say that mentioning slaughter is necessary for the matter of slaughter itself, i.e., to teach that one can have intention from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite. In other words, slaughtering an animal with idolatrous intent is punishable by death even if the intention of the transgressor pertains not to the slaughter itself but to another part of the sacrificial process. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 60b:19:2 | Sanhedrin 60b:19 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | דמחשבין מעבודה לעבודה - כלומר דמחשבה שהוא מחשב בשעת עבודה זו על עבודה אחרת מחשבה היא להתחייב עליה: | And if you would say that if so, why do I need slaughter to be mentioned in the verse specifically, one can say that mentioning slaughter is necessary for the matter of slaughter itself, i.e., to teach that one can have intention from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite. In other words, slaughtering an animal with idolatrous intent is punishable by death even if the intention of the transgressor pertains not to the slaughter itself but to another part of the sacrificial process. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 60b:1:1 | Sanhedrin 60b:1 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | מתני' אחד העובד - מפרש בגמרא: | MISHNA: One who worships idols is executed by stoning. This includes one who worships an idol, and one who slaughters an animal as an idolatrous offering, and one who burns incense as an idolatrous offering, and one who pours a libation in idol worship, and one who bows to an idol, and one who declares that he accepts an idol upon himself as a god, and one who says to an idol: You are my god. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 60b:1:2 | Sanhedrin 60b:1 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | אחד המזבח ואחד המקטר וכו' - ובגמרא מוקים לה לכולה מתניתין בשאין דרכה של אותה עבודת כוכבים לעבדה בכך ואפ"ה אהנך עבודות מיחייב כדיליף לה בברייתא: | MISHNA: One who worships idols is executed by stoning. This includes one who worships an idol, and one who slaughters an animal as an idolatrous offering, and one who burns incense as an idolatrous offering, and one who pours a libation in idol worship, and one who bows to an idol, and one who declares that he accepts an idol upon himself as a god, and one who says to an idol: You are my god. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 60b:1:3 | Sanhedrin 60b:1 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | והמקבלו עליו באלוה - ואפי' אמירה בעלמא כגון האומר לו אלי אתה דאיתקש לזביחה דכתיב (שמות לב) וישתחוו לו ויזבחו לו ויאמרו אלה אלהיך ישראל ל"א והמקבלו לאלוה שלא בפניו והאומר לו אלי אתה בפניו ותנא סיפא לגלויי רישא דאי תנא רישא הוה אמינא הני מילי בפניו אבל שלא בפניו לא תנא סיפא בפניו מכלל דרישא שלא בפניו ואפ"ה חייב: | MISHNA: One who worships idols is executed by stoning. This includes one who worships an idol, and one who slaughters an animal as an idolatrous offering, and one who burns incense as an idolatrous offering, and one who pours a libation in idol worship, and one who bows to an idol, and one who declares that he accepts an idol upon himself as a god, and one who says to an idol: You are my god. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 60b:2:1 | Sanhedrin 60b:2 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | אבל המגפף והמנשק - שלא כדרכה: | But with regard to one who hugs an idol, or one who kisses it, or one who cleans it, or one who sprays water before it, or one who washes it, or one who rubs it with oil, or one who dresses it, or one who puts its shoes on it, he transgresses a prohibition but is not liable to receive capital punishment. With regard to one who vows in an idol's name and one who affirms his statement by an oath in its name, he transgresses a prohibition. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 60b:2:2 | Sanhedrin 60b:2 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | עובר בלא תעשה - דלא תעבדם יתירא כתיבי חד בדברות ראשונות ואחרונות וחד לא תשתחוה לאלהיהם ולא תעבדם ולא תעשה כמעשיהם (שמות כ"ג:כ"ד) אם אינו ענין לכדרכה תנהו ענין לשלא כדרכה אבל מיתה לא מיחייב בשלא כדרכה אלא הני דפרט בהו קרא: | But with regard to one who hugs an idol, or one who kisses it, or one who cleans it, or one who sprays water before it, or one who washes it, or one who rubs it with oil, or one who dresses it, or one who puts its shoes on it, he transgresses a prohibition but is not liable to receive capital punishment. With regard to one who vows in an idol's name and one who affirms his statement by an oath in its name, he transgresses a prohibition. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 60b:2:3 | Sanhedrin 60b:2 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | הנודר בשמו - בלשון נדר קונם עלי כל פירות שבעולם בשם עבודת כוכבים פלונית אם ארחץ: | But with regard to one who hugs an idol, or one who kisses it, or one who cleans it, or one who sprays water before it, or one who washes it, or one who rubs it with oil, or one who dresses it, or one who puts its shoes on it, he transgresses a prohibition but is not liable to receive capital punishment. With regard to one who vows in an idol's name and one who affirms his statement by an oath in its name, he transgresses a prohibition. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 60b:2:4 | Sanhedrin 60b:2 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | והמקיים בשמו - שבועה נשבע מתרגם מקיים: | But with regard to one who hugs an idol, or one who kisses it, or one who cleans it, or one who sprays water before it, or one who washes it, or one who rubs it with oil, or one who dresses it, or one who puts its shoes on it, he transgresses a prohibition but is not liable to receive capital punishment. With regard to one who vows in an idol's name and one who affirms his statement by an oath in its name, he transgresses a prohibition. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 60b:2:5 | Sanhedrin 60b:2 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | עובר בלא תעשה - ושם אלהים אחרים לא תזכירו (שם): | But with regard to one who hugs an idol, or one who kisses it, or one who cleans it, or one who sprays water before it, or one who washes it, or one who rubs it with oil, or one who dresses it, or one who puts its shoes on it, he transgresses a prohibition but is not liable to receive capital punishment. With regard to one who vows in an idol's name and one who affirms his statement by an oath in its name, he transgresses a prohibition. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 60b:3:1 | Sanhedrin 60b:3 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | הפוער עצמו - מתריז רעי בפניו וזהו עבודתו וחייב עליו מיתה: | One who defecates before the idol known as Ba'al-Peor is liable to receive capital punishment, even though defecating is a degrading act, as that is its form of worship. Likewise, one who throws a stone at Mercury is liable to receive capital punishment, as that is its form of worship. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 60b:3:2 | Sanhedrin 60b:3 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | מרקוליס - מצדדין שלש אבנים אחת מכאן ואחת מכאן ואחת מלמעלה על גביהן וקורין אותם מרקוליס ועובדין אותה בזריקת האבנים: | One who defecates before the idol known as Ba'al-Peor is liable to receive capital punishment, even though defecating is a degrading act, as that is its form of worship. Likewise, one who throws a stone at Mercury is liable to receive capital punishment, as that is its form of worship. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 60b:4:1 | Sanhedrin 60b:4 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | גמ' מאי אחד העובד - אטו כל הני לאו עובד נינהו: | GEMARA: What is added in the mishna by stating the phrase: One who worships? Since worship is the general description of all the actions detailed in the mishna, why is this phrase necessary? |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 60b:5:1 | Sanhedrin 60b:5 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | אחד העובד - כל עבודה אף גפוף ונשוק אף דרך בזיון בכדרכה וחייב מיתה דכתיב וילך ויעבוד אלהים אחרים וכתיב בתריה וסקלתם באבנים ואזהרתיה מהכא ופן תדרוש לאלהיהם לאמר איכה יעבדו הגוים האלה את אלהיהם וגו' (דברים יב) דהיינו בכדרכה: | Rabbi Yirmeya says that this is what the mishna is saying: One who worships an idol in its typical manner of worship is liable to be executed; and furthermore, one who slaughters an animal as an idolatrous offering, and one who burns incense, and one who pours a libation, and the one who bows to an idol are all liable to be executed, and this applies even if this manner of worship is not the idol's typical manner of worship. Even if the idol in question is not typically worshipped in these ways, these specific acts are still considered idol worship because these are the ways in which God is worshipped in the Temple. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 60b:5:2 | Sanhedrin 60b:5 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | ואחד המזבח - אפי' שלא כדרכה בעבודות הללו כדיליף לקמן דכל עבודות הנעשות בפנים לגבוה חייבין עליה מיתה בעבודת כוכבים אפילו שלא כדרכה: | Rabbi Yirmeya says that this is what the mishna is saying: One who worships an idol in its typical manner of worship is liable to be executed; and furthermore, one who slaughters an animal as an idolatrous offering, and one who burns incense, and one who pours a libation, and the one who bows to an idol are all liable to be executed, and this applies even if this manner of worship is not the idol's typical manner of worship. Even if the idol in question is not typically worshipped in these ways, these specific acts are still considered idol worship because these are the ways in which God is worshipped in the Temple. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 60b:6:1 | Sanhedrin 60b:6 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | ולחשוב נמי זורק - דבשלמא מקבל ומוליך לא קשיא לן אף על גב דעבודת פנים הם דלא אשכחן דלהוו עבודות הנעשות לשם עבודת כוכבים כדאשכחן הנך זביחה ויזבחו לו (שמות לב) קטור אשר חלב זבחימו יאכלו (דברים ל"ב:ל"ח) ניסוך ישתו יין נסיכם (שם) ומיהו דם אשכחן בעבודת כוכבים בל אסיך נסכיהם מדם וכיון דגמרינן דכל עבודות פנים חייבין בהם אף שלא כדרכה נתנייה נמי: | The Gemara suggests: And let the mishna also count sprinkling the blood of an offering, which is also one of the sacrificial rites in the Temple. Abaye says: Sprinkling the blood of an offering is the same as pouring a libation, since they are essentially one sacrificial rite, as it is written: "I will not pour their libations of blood" (Psalms 16:4), indicating that sprinkling the blood of an offering is also referred to as offering a libation. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 60b:6:2 | Sanhedrin 60b:6 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | אמר אביי זורק בכלל ניסוך - דמתני' דהא קרא נמי ניסוך קרייה: | The Gemara suggests: And let the mishna also count sprinkling the blood of an offering, which is also one of the sacrificial rites in the Temple. Abaye says: Sprinkling the blood of an offering is the same as pouring a libation, since they are essentially one sacrificial rite, as it is written: "I will not pour their libations of blood" (Psalms 16:4), indicating that sprinkling the blood of an offering is also referred to as offering a libation. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 60b:7:1 | Sanhedrin 60b:7 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | מנא הני מילי - דמחייב בהני עבודות אף בשלא כדרכה: | § The Gemara asks with regard to the halakha that one is liable for worshipping an idol in these manners even if they are not the way the idol is typically worshipped: From where are these matters derived? |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 60b:8:1 | Sanhedrin 60b:8 | commentary | Rashi on Sanhedrin | Sanhedrin | Talmud | Talmud | אילו נאמר זובח יחרם הייתי אומר - באיזו זביחה בא הכתוב לענוש מיתה ודאי בזובח קדשים בחוץ קאמר שמצינו שהזהיר עליהם במקום אחר ולקמן פריך הרי כבר פרשו להם עונש אחר ונכרתה דכתיב גבי שחוטי חוץ: | The Gemara answers: As the Sages taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: "One who sacrifices to the gods shall be utterly destroyed, except to the Lord alone" (Exodus 22:19): If it were stated: One who sacrifices shall be utterly destroyed, I would have said that the verse speaks of one who slaughters a sacrificial animal outside the Temple courtyard, referring to a severe transgression that is stated elsewhere in the Torah. Therefore, the verse states: "To the gods," indicating that the verse speaks of one who slaughters an offering to an idol. |