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statute of limitations for actions against the United States set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a). Based on our review of Punchard’s complaint, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to dismiss any other claims that may be set forth in the complaint for failure to comply with Rule 8’s short and plain statement requirements. Punchard’s argument that the district court judge had no power to grant the motion to dismiss because Punehard asked for a jury trial has no merit. Actions against the United States generally are tried to the court, not a jury. See 28 U.S.C. § 2402. In any event, a district court has the authority to hear and decide defenses raised under Rule 12(b) prior to trial, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d); Christensen v. Ward, 916 F.2d 1462, 1466 (10th Cir. 1990) (<HOLDING>); Rosemound Sand & Gravel Co. v. Lambert Sand &
[ "holding that dismissal pursuant to federal rule of civil procedure 56 did not violate the seventh amendment", "holding that seventh amendment right to jury trial not violated by courts dismissal for lack of jurisdiction", "holding defendant to a preference action has a right to a jury trial pursuant to the seventh amendment of the united states constitution but that right can be waived by filing a claim in the bankruptcy proceedings", "holding that seventh amendment right to jury trial not violated by courts dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to rule 12b6 because as a matter of law complaint faded to present an issue for trial", "holding that a court should not dismiss a complaint pursuant to rule 12b6 for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief " ]
33
F.3d 1423, 1427-28 (7th Cir.1996) (noting several circuits have adopted sure course requirement), cert. denied, -U.S.-, 117 S.Ct. 1434, 137 L.Ed.2d 542 (1997); United States v. Garcia, 882 F.2d 699, 702-03 (2d Cir.1989) (noting wide variety of courts have upheld anticipatory warrants when sure course requirement was met). As one court has explained: The sure course standard functions as a proxy for the actual presence of the contraband at the locus to be searched. It offers the magistrate a trustworthy assurance that the contraband, though not yet on the site, will almost certainly be located there at the time of the search, thus fulfilling the requirement of future probable cause. Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d at 13; see also United States v. Hendriclcs, 743 F.2d 653, 654-55 (9th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). The "sure course” requirement is typically
[ "holding anticipatory warrant for search of defendants home was invalid when defendant was required to pick up suitcase containing contraband at airport and there was no assurance at time warrant was issued that defendant would take suitcase to his home", "holding anticipatory warrant was invalid for lack of probable cause because at time warrant was issued the contraband was not on a sure course to the place to be searched and there was no assurance defendant would take contraband to that place", "holding anticipatory warrant for search of defendants home was invalid because facts made known to magistrate did not establish at time warrant was issued the required nexus between the contraband to be seized which was mailed to defendants post office box and defendants home", "holding anticipatory warrant for search of defendants home was invalid because affidavit provided no assurance that defendant would take package to his home after collecting it at the airport despite fact that warrant contained condition that it was not to be executed until package arrived at defendants house", "holding anticipatory warrant for search of defendants home was invalid because contraband was picked up by defendant rather than being delivered to his home and affidavit failed to provide facts establishing a nexus between contraband and defendants home" ]
11
at least one district court to conclude that the Eleventh Circuit no longer strictly requires proof of bad faith as an essential element of spoliation. See Brown v. Chertoff, 563 F.Supp.2d 1372, 1381 (S.D.Ga.2008). Other district courts have rejected this interpretation of Flury. See Managed Care Solutions, Inc. v. Essent Healthcare, Inc., 736 F.Supp.2d 1317, 1328 n. 16 (S.D.Fla.2010); Woodard v. Wal-Mart Stores East LP, 801 F.Supp.2d 1363, 1372 (M.D.Ga.2011). While the degree of bad faith necessary to impose sanctions may not be entirely clear, it is clear that simple negligence is not enough but actual malice is not required. See, e.g., Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1310 (11th Cir.2009) (noting that malice is not required for finding of bad faith); Bashir, 119 F.3d at 931 (<HOLDING>); Preferred Care Partners Holding Corp. v.
[ "holding that something more than a mere error of law is required to constitute misconduct", "holding that probable cause is something more than mere suspicion", "holding that more than notice to a defendant is required", "recognizing that if there is evidence upon which one may reasonably infer an element of the crime the evidence is sufficient to sustain that element and where reasonable minds could differ the evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction", "holding that more than mere negligence in losing or destroying evidence is required to sustain an inference of consciousness of a weak case" ]
44
jurisdiction over Daniele. Plaintiffs assert three distinct bases of jurisdiction: that SBR paid Daniele to publish infringing material on SBR’s message board, that Daniele’s publications relate to the “sports wagering” industry in Nevada, and that Daniele’s publications were accessible in Nevada through the internet. Even accepting these assertions as true, these are not the type of contacts that give rise o Daniele must therefore fail. Third, the fact that Daniele’s publications related to sports wagering does not establish jurisdictional contacts with Nevada. Plaintiffs urge that the publications were directed at Nevada since the publications discussed sports wagering and since sports wagering is only legal in Nevada (within the United States). Bu F.3d 1124, 1129 (9th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256,
[ "holding that the basis of in rem jurisdiction is the presence of the subject property within the territorial jurisdiction of the forum state", "holding that fraudulent joinder required a finding that either there was no possibility that the plaintiff could prove a cause of action against the resident defendant or that the plaintiff fraudulently pled jurisdictional facts in order to subject that resident defendant to the jurisdiction of the state court", "holding that posting of infringing copyrighted material may give rise to jurisdiction where the victiimplaintiff was a resident of the forum state", "recognizing that where plaintiff is from the forum state and defendant is from an alternate forum each forum can claim a connection to one of the parties", "holding that alleged violations of a state statute did not give rise to federal constitutional claims" ]
22
his counsel did introduce evidence in support of Mr. Escareno’s theory that the hospital records did not corroborate all of the victim’s alleged injuries, and admission of the hospital records would not have altered the result of the proceeding because there was substantial, compelling witness testimony corroborating the extent of the victim’s injuries when she was in the hospital and the day after her release, see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and (b) his counsel’s performance did not so deny Mr. Escareno representation that prejudice should be presumed; and (4) the prosecutor’s closing argument comments, taken in context, were within the bounds of reasonable argumentation, see Pickens v. Gibson, 206 F.3d 988, 999 (10th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Issuance of a COA is jurisdictional.
[ "holding that disagreements over whether to call certain witnesses did not constitute a conflict of interest", "holding that prosecutor free to comment on defendants failure to call certain witnesses or present certain testimony", "holding that the failure to call certain witnesses was not ineffective assistance because witnesses already presented similar evidence and counsel is not required to present cumulative evidence", "holding the prosecutors statements were not an inappropriate comment on the defendants failure to testify but rather a comment on the defendants failure to present convincing evidence to support his defense", "holding a prosecutor may not comment on a defendants silence" ]
11
(Vernon 1993)). The judge heard the case in the 122nd Judicial District Court, which is composed solely of Galveston County, see TexGov’t Code Ann. § 24.224(a) (Vernon 1988), and the case was pending in the 333rd Judicial District Court, which is composed of Harris County only, see TexGov't Code Ann. § 24.479(a) (Vernon 1988), so the phrase does not apply to this case. 4 . The opinion is unclear on whether the trial court actually ruled on the motions in Bowie County, or whether it ruled on them in Dallas County. See Mauzy, 899 S.W.2d at 699 (stating that the trial court "subsequently ordered the Dallas suit abated and transferred to Travis County”). 5 . The trial court in this case did more than hear oral argument at the summaiy judg .2d 229, 232 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1992, writ denied) (<HOLDING>). In Tigner v. State, 928 S.W.2d 540, 543
[ "holding that filing of charges by employer constituted retaliatory act", "holding that portion of civil judg ment awarded under the idaho workmans compensation act was nondischargeable", "holding that liquidated damages under fair labor standards act constitutes compensation for the retention of a workmans pay which might result in damages too obscure and difficult of proof for estimate other than by liquidated damages", "holding that texas cause of action for retaliation does arise under its workers compensation laws", "holding that filing of request for lump sum settlement constituted institution of a proceeding under the texas workmans compensation act" ]
44
While we agree with the statement-in Brown that “[s]ometimes it is necessary for ... the summary statement to provide a context reference” for the initiative petition, we do not find that failure to do so, where the consequences are potentially ever changing due to the political landscape, will always render the summary insufficient. See Brown, 370 S.W.3d at 654. We find that the effect that the Initiative Petitions may eventually have on the provisions of SB19 does not require the court to step in and redraft the summaries in order for them to be fair and sufficient. It is commonly understood that constitutional amendments will supersede statutes that are in contravention with the amended constitutional provision. Labrayere v. Bohr Farms, LLC, 458 S.W.3d 319, 327 (Mo. banc 2015) (<HOLDING>); State v. Kinder, 89 S.W.3d 454, 459 (Mo. banc
[ "holding equivalent automatic license revocation provision of colorado real estate statute unconstitutional", "holding that a provision of the constitution is to be construed in the sense in which it was understood by the framers and the people at the time of its adoption but that if new products or circumstances that did not exist at the time the constitutional provision was enacted fall within the meaning of the provision the constitutional provision applies to them", "holding that it is not", "holding pennsylvania replevin statute unconstitutional", "holding that a statute is unconstitutional if it clearly contravenes a constitutional provision" ]
44
Except as outlined below, “[a] municipality may be held liable for torts arising out of the performance of proprietary functions but no recovery is allowed for injuries which result from the performance of governmental functions.” Lamar v. City of St. Louis, 746 S.W.2d 160, 161 (Mo.App.1988). “A governmental duty is one which is performed for the common good of all. A duty will be deemed proprietary if it is performed for the special benefit or profit of the municipality as a corporate entity.” Oberkramer v. City of Ellisville, 650 S.W.2d 286, 295 (Mo.App.1983). In Jones v. State Highway Comm’n, 557 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. banc 1977), the Missouri Supreme Court abrogated the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity. The legislature reinstated the doctrine in a modifie 6, 774 (Mo.App.1987) (<HOLDING>). In Alexander at 542, the Missouri Supreme
[ "holding construction company had actual notice of dangerous condition that its employees created", "holding that when a possessor knows that a dangerous condition frequently reoccurs plaintiffs had a right to go to the jury on the issue of defendants negligence even where plaintiffs could not show how long the condition remained on the stairs", "holding that the negligent placement of a folding room partition at the foot of a ladder on which plaintiff was working created a physical deficiency which constituted a dangerous condition", "holding that immunity is not waived for injury or death caused by negligent supervision", "holding that the negligent failure to remove debris on grounds contributed to creating a dangerous condition which resulted in death when debris was flung by lawn mower" ]
44
1381 (R.I.1994). It is well settled that a plaintiff aggrieved by a state agency’s action first must exhaust administrative remedies before bringing a claim in court. Burns v. Sundlun, 617 A.2d 114, 116 (R.I.1992). The exhaustion of remedies requirement serves two purposes: “(1) it aids judicial review by allowing the parties and the agency to develop the facts of the case, and (2) ‘it promotes judicial economy by avoiding needless repetition of administrative and judicial factfinding, perhaps avoiding the necessity of any judicial involvement.’ ” Id. at 117 (quoting Schwartz, Administrative Law § 8.33 at 542 (1991)). This Court has made exceptions when the exhaustion of administrative remedies would be futile. See M.B.T. Construction Corp. v. Edwards, 528 A.2d 336, 338 (R.I.1987) (<HOLDING>). In this case, plaintiffs contended that they,
[ "holding that the district court was authorized to remand the proceedings to the board where the board failed to make required findings", "holding that an appeal to an agency review board would be futile because the board lacked authority to invalidate ordinance as requested", "holding that the board did not abuse its discretion by dismissing an untimely appeal where the appellant failed to respond to a board order to show cause", "holding that where approval of the board of directors was not formally requested a demand would have been futile for it could hardly be expected that if approval of the board of directors were sought defendant who controlled 50 of the board would have authorized the action against himself", "holding that taxpayer could not have presented substantive due process claim to the board of assessment review because of the limited jurisdiction of that board" ]
11
Buckley v. Exodus Transit & Storage Corp., 744 A.2d 298, 304-305 (Pa.Super.1999) (internal citations omitted). We also note the following principles pertaining to our review of a verdict in an insurance bad faith claim. Our Supreme Court has long recognized that “the utmost fair dealing should characterize the transactions between an insurance company and the insured.” Dercoli v. Pennsylvania Nat. Mut. Ins. Co., 520 Pa. 471, 477, 554 A.2d 906, ,909 (1989) (quoting Fedas v. Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania, 300 Pa. 555, 559, 151 A. 285, 286 (1930)). Moreover, the insurance company has a duty to deal with its insured “on a fair and frank basis, and at all times, to act in good faith.” Id.; Hol-lock v. Erie Ins. Exchange, 842 A.2d 409, 416 (Pa.Super.2004) [ (en banc) ] (<HOLDING>).... In 1990, our legislature created a
[ "holding that a partner owes a duty to all other partners to exercise the utmost good faith fairness and loyalty", "holding when an insurers alleged breach of its duty of good faith and fair dealing toward its insured involves facts and circumstances within the common knowledge or ordinary experience of an average juror an insured need not introduce expert testimony to establish a bad faith claim", "holding that an insurer has a duty to act with the utmost good faith towards its insured", "holding that insured may recover attorneys fees from insurer where insurer acts in bad faith", "holding despite a reservation of rights that when the insurer provides a defense to its insured the insured has no right to interfere with the insurers control of the defense and a stipulated judgment between the insured and the injured claimant without the consent of the insurer is ineffective to impose liability upon the insurer" ]
22
or damage the property of another.” In order to convict Mr. Ellis of home invasion, the State was required to prove: • that Mr. Ellis entered the Residence; • that the Residence was an inhabited dwelling or a structure used in whole or in part as a home or place of abode; • that Mr. Ellis was not authorized to enter the Residence; • that the Residence did not belong to Mr. Ellis; and • that Mr. Ellis acted with specific intent to use force or violence upon the person of another or to vandalize, deface, or damage the property of another. See Cheney C. Joseph, and P. Raymond Lamonica, 17 LA. CIV. L. TREATISE, CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 10.62.8 (2d ed.2011)(defining elements of home invasion offense); see also State v. Hart, 10-1614, p. 6 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/2/11), 80 So.3d 25, 30 (<HOLDING>) The first two elements of the offense are
[ "holding that an illegal arrest occurred when the defendant was transported without probable cause from his home to the police station for fingerprinting and that the line is crossed when the police without probable cause or a warrant forcibly remove a person from his home or other place in which he is entitled to be and transport him to the police station where he is detained although briefly for investigative purposes", "holding that the defendant failed to demonstrate legitimate expectation of privacy where he could not show that he had the owners permission to use the car or demonstrate prior use or control of the car", "holding that to convict a defendant of home invasion pursuant to la rs 14628 the state is required to prove that he entered a dwelling owned by another without permission that the dwelling was used in whole or in part as a home that a person was present when he made the unauthorized entry and that he had the intent to use force or violence upon the person or to vandalize deface or damage the property", "holding tila applies only to credit transactions secured by real or personal property used or expected to be used as the principal dwelling of the debtor", "holding there was enough evidence to find the defendant abandoned his child when he claimed to have knowledge of cpss involvement he admitted that for periods of two years and six months he did not attempt any contact with his child and from the date he canceled a home study until the petition was filed he did not attempt to contact the child or cps or provide support even when he was out of jail" ]
22
Id. The government, in turn, has submitted a declaration from petitioner’s counsel providing, inter alia, that “I very likely advised Ms. Mendoza that pleading guilty to a violation of § 1028 could result in her deportation, and I am sure that I advised her to seek the expert legal advice of an immigration attorney.” Counsel’s Decl. at ¶ 6. 8 . See, e.g., Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (providing that declarations made "in open court carry a strong presumption of verity” and that "the representations of the defendant ... [at a plea] hearing, as well as any findings made by the judge accepting the plea, constitute a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings”); Beck v. Angelone, 261 F.3d 377, 396 (4th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted). 9 .See, e.g.,
[ "holding that representations made by the defendant during a plea hearing carry a strong presumption of verity", "holding that a defendant is bound by representations made during a guilty plea absent a valid reason for controverting those statements", "holding that despite the lack of a statutory requirement that severe child abuse be shown by clear and convincing evidence due to the consequences of such a finding the clear and convincing standard must be applied", "holding that absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary a defendant is bound by his representations made during a plea colloquy", "holding that whether adverse possession was proven by clear and convincing evidence is a factual determination made by the chancellor" ]
33
for administrative and judicial relief from a wrongful zoning decision are unconstitutional. The gravamen of this claim is Greenspring’s allegation that because it might take “in excess of two years” to pursue administrative and judicial appeals, these procedures are unconstitutionally burdensome. However, Greenspring does not explain how it arrived at this two year projection, and in any event, delays of this magnitude are not unconstitutional burdens. Even when a significant delay is incurred in reversing a wrongful zoning board decision, and even when that delay causes the plaintiffs to default on their construction loans and lose everything to foreclosure, the Fourth Circuit has held that plaintiffs have not been deprived of procedural due process. Sylvia Dev., 48 F.3d at 817, 827(<HOLDING>). • Greenspring speculates that it could take
[ "holding that a five month delay is unreasonable", "holding that 11 month delay in reversing wrongful zoning board decision did not deprive plaintiff of due process", "holding that a 13 month delay was unreasonable", "holding that discretion of zoning board was not sufficiently circumscribed to support substantive due process claim", "holding that a five month delay was unreasonable" ]
11
Id. at 115, 113 S.Ct. 566. We make these determinations in light of the statutory purpose of ADA as a remedial statute, which should be broadly construed to effectuate its purpose of eliminating discrimination against the disabled in our society. Kinney v. Yerusalim, 812 F.Supp. 547, 551 (E.D.Pa.), aff'd 9 F.3d 1067 (3d Cir.1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1033, 114 S.Ct. 1545, 128 L.Ed.2d 196 (1994). The Third Circuit has not had occasion to identify the standard for determining who is a prevailing party under the ADA. It is clear, however, that the test is to be derived from jurisprudence under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. See Disabled In Action of Pa. v. Pierce, 789 F.2d 1016, 1018-19 (3d Cir.1986) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 n. 7, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983)) (<HOLDING>). The legislative history of the ADA reflects
[ "holding the ada and the rehabilitation act applicable", "holding rehabilitation act applicable", "holding that plaintiffs were prevailing parties under 42 usc section 1988 despite dismissal of the appeal as moot and vacation of the district court judgment", "holding that standards used in section 1988 cases are applicable to determine prevailing party under section 505b of the rehabilitation act of 1973", "holding that the same standards apply to claims under the ada and under the rehabilitation act" ]
33
light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and must uphold that ruling absent an abuse of discretion.” Kniatt, 206 S.W.3d at 664. In reviewing the trial court’s order denying habeas corpus relief, the appellate court affords “almost total deference to the judge’s determination of the historical facts that are supported by the record, especially when the fact findings are based on an evaluation of credibility and demean- or.” Ex parte Wilson, 171 S.W.3d 925, 928 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.); see also Ex parte Mello, 355 S.W.3d 827, 832 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2011, pet. ref'd) (“This deferential review applies even when the findings are based on affidavits rather than live testimony.”); Phuong Anh Thi Le v. State, 300 S.W.3d 324, 327 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). The appellate court “will sustain the lower
[ "holding that where both the appellate and trial courts are reviewing the paper record there is no reason for the appellate courts to defer to the trial courts finding", "holding that in reviewing trial courts ruling on habeas corpus petition reviewing court must defer to all of trial courts implied factual findings supported by record", "holding that appellate court must defer to all implied factual findings supported by record", "holding that reviewing court may consider trial evidence in reviewing denial of motion to suppress", "holding that appellate court reviewing trial courts habeas corpus ruling must review record evidence in light most favorable to ruling and uphold ruling absent abuse of discretion" ]
11
part: “For purposes of removal ..., the citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious names shall be disregarded.” After removal, however, Casas replaced the fictitious defendants with Caguas and Oficentro, which were clearly identified as Puerto Rico corporations, like Casas itself. The issue is whether this substitution, which unquestionably destroyed complete diversity, also defeated federal subject matter jurisdiction. We hold that it did. Casas argues that as diversity jurisdiction was established at the commencement of the proceeding, it was not later defeated by the mere naming of the fictitious parties, who were dispensable, not indispensable. E.g., Freeport-McMoRan Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc., 498 U.S. 426, 428, 111 S.Ct. 858, 859-60, 112 L.Ed.2d 951 (1991) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Wichita R.R. & Light Co. v. Public Util.
[ "holding that diversity jurisdiction was not established by a statecourt order that provided only that the plaintiffs claims against a nondiverse defendant be and hereby are severed from this action", "holding that in order for a defendant to remove a case to federal court based upon diversity jurisdiction there must be complete diversity of citizenship both at the time that the case is commenced and at the time that the notice of removal is filed", "holding that because there was complete diversity when the action commenced diversity jurisdiction was not defeated by the addition of a nondiverse plaintiff which was not indispensable", "holding diversity jurisdiction was collusively obtained because the transferor retained a onehalf interest in the outcome of the litigation and was an indispensable party but for the assignment", "holding that although the question of diversity jurisdiction is distinct from that of immunity the analysis of citizenship determinations for eleventh amendment immunity and diversity jurisdiction are the same" ]
22
context, courts examine whether the relevant files were password-protected or whether the defendant otherwise manifested an intention to restrict third-party access.” United States v. Aaron, 33 Fed.Appx. 180, 184 (6th Cir.2002) (per curiam) (unpublished opinion); see also United States v. Buckner, 473 F.3d 551, 554 (4th Cir.2007) (using a password showed that defendant affirmatively intended to exclude others from his password-protected files); Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 403 (4th Cir.2001) (distinguishing joint access to the computer and its hard drive, for which co-user had authority to consent to search, from password-protected files; with respect to those files, co-user had no common authority where there was no access to the passwords); see also Conklin, 63 M.J. at 337 (<HOLDING>). But in this case, neither the computer nor
[ "holding that defendants had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of an apartment building", "holding that a roommate with shared access to anothers computer has common authority over the computer and can grant consent to search", "holding that an agents use of filesharing program to access child pornography files on the defendants computer did not constitute an illegal warrantless search because the defendant had made those files accessible to others and thus lacked any reasonable expectation of privacy in files", "holding appellant failed to show any expectation of privacy in files stored on the computer system in his office was one that society accepts as objectively reasonable", "holding that where there is no evidence of shared use or common authority an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the files kept on a personally owned computer" ]
44
or services. U.S. Search, LLC v. U.S. Search.com Inc., 300 F.3d 517, 523 (4th Cir.2002). For instance, “[ijmagine being forbidden to describe a Chevrolet as a ‘car’ or an ‘automobile’ because Ford or Chrysler or Volvo had trademarked these generic words.’ ” Retail Services, 364 F.3d at 538 (quoting Blau Plumbing, Inc. v. S.O.S. Fix-It, Inc., 781 F.2d 604, 609 (7th Cir.1986)). No trademark protection can be afforded to such marks because, “if a business were permitted to appropriate a generic word as its trademark, it would be ‘difficult for competitors to market their own brands of the same product.’ ” Retail Services, 364 F.3d at 538 (quoting Blau Plumbing, Inc., 781 F.2d at 609).; see also A. & H. Transp., Inc. v. Save Way Stations, Inc., 214 Md. 325, 333, 135 A.2d 289, 293 (Md.1957) (<HOLDING>). On the opposite end of the spectrum are
[ "holding that irreparable injury exists in a trademark case when the party seeking the injunction shows that it will lose control over the reputation of its trademark pending trial", "holding that the continued use of licensed trademark after termination of franchise agreement constituted trademark infringement and breach of contract", "holding that the defendants reference to the plaintiffs trademark in the metatags of the defendants web page was a violation of trademark law", "holding that lprs are entitled to the protection of the equal protection clause", "recognizing that generic marks are not subject to trademark protection" ]
44
scenario.'is, the subject of Meister v. Jamison (In re Jamison), 21 B.R. 380, 381 (Bankr.D.Conn.1982). The Court in Jamison held, as the Court holds" here, that the son was not liable for the- car payments made by, the debtor, his father, to the credit union. 5 . The same holds true for. instances in which a debtor, prepetition, depletes his assets under circumstances in which a trustee believes the' decision was unwise, such as when a debtor buys dinner for his friends or purchases an expensive prom dress for his daughter. In these scenarios, a trustee likely has no authority to judge all of the debtor’s prepetition decisions and thus likely has no remedy. However, such a scenario is not now before the Court. See, e.g. Montoya v. Campos (In re Tarin), 454 B.R. 179 (Bankr.D.N.M.2011)
[ "holding that debtors daughter was not liable under fraudulent transfer law for the amount her parents paid for her wedding prepetition", "holding that trial court properly terminated fathers obligation to support his seventeenyearold daughter who refused to live with father but instead chose to reside in her own apartment after her mother moved out of state where daughter offered no justifiable reason for not living with her father daughter only contended that her stepmother was too neat for her and that she wanted to live closer to her friends", "holding that the applicant was entitled to asylum based on her fear that her daughter will be forced to undergo female genital mutilation because her fear of being forced to witness the pain and suffering of her daughter is wellfounded", "holding that a wife is not liable simply by virtue of the marital relationship for her husbands fraudulent acts", "holding that debtors cannot claim an exemption in a homestead after trustee avoided the transfer of the property as a fraudulent conveyance because the transfer by the debtors was voluntary" ]
00
both Mr. Schneider and Mr. Zakaras agree that the possibility existed, at the October 25th meeting, that Mr. Zakaras would obtain another supervisory position. In fact, Mr. Zakaras knew of another United employee, who after calling someone a “stupid nigger,” was transferred from his supervisory position in Ramp Services to another supervisory position as a Zone Controller with no loss in pay. (Pl.’s SMF ¶ 98.) Consequently, at the October 25th meeting, there remained a possibility that Mr. Zakaras was going to be transferred to another department as a supervisor. The Seventh Circuit has held that transfers, with no loss in pay, are, in some instances, not considered adverse employment actions. See, e.g., Williams v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 85 F.3d 270, 274 (7th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Crady v. Liberty National Bank and Trust Co.
[ "holding that reduction in workload is an adverse employment action", "holding that suspension with pay was not adverse employment action", "holding that transfer involving no reduction in pay and only a minor change in working conditions does not rise to the level of a material adverse employment action", "holding that a change in work schedule and request that an employee perform two additional tasks did not rise to the level of an adverse employment action", "holding a transfer or reassignment may rise to the level of an adverse employment condition if it is a significant change in working conditions" ]
22
the “entire Caribbean” over CCC’s station — which in fact reached only a fraction of that area — and therefore that they did not need to advertise with CBS as well. (¶¶ 30-34) The complaint also alleges that CCC and C&W made sham technical objections to CBS’s application for a broadcast license for the purpose of defeating that application and thereby ensuring that CCC would continue to enjoy a monopoly. (¶¶ 35-40) Contrary to the arguments of C&W, such allegations do support the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction. A would-be monopolist or member of a conspiracy to monopolize comes within the condemnation of the Sherman Act when it engages in “anti-competitive conduct.” See, e.g., Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456, 113 S.Ct. 884, 122 L.Ed.2d 247 (1993) (<HOLDING>). “Anticompetitive conduct” can come in too
[ "holding that proof of relevant market is essential under 2", "recognizing the sherman acts central interest in protecting the economic freedom of participants in the relevant market", "holding elements of attempted monopolization claim under 2 of sherman act are intent anticompetitive conduct and dangerous probability of success in a relevant market", "holding district court erred by incorporating issue of anticompetitive market effect into its standing analysis confusing antitrust injury with an element of a claim under section 1 of the sherman act and stating district courts approach may have been result of the similar antitrust injury label applied to injury component of antitrust standing analysis and to marketplace harm element under section 1", "holding that a plaintiff claiming monopolization is obligated to establish the relevant market because the power to control prices or exclude competition only makes sense with reference to a particular market" ]
22
counsel informed him that counsel had been relieved of his responsibility. Defendants further contend that even if the AG had known that former counsel was no longer Plaintiffs’ present counsel, it could not have served the motion for modification on anyone else since the addresses of the class representatives, Taylor and Yanich, cannot be found by the Arizona Department of Corrections. 2. DUE PROCESS A fundamental and elementary requirement of due process in any proceeding is notice and opportunity to be heard. In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950), the Supreme Court established the standard for determining whether a party’s notice would meet due process scrutiny: An elementary and fundament d 1440, 1448-49 (9th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). A judgment entered in a manner inconsistent
[ "holding that entry of settlement decree without notice to putative class members violated the due process rights of the class members", "recognizing that when a creditor does not receive adequate notice the creditor is not bound by the confirmation order", "holding that due process rights were not violated when alien claimed a lack of actual notice but his attorney received notice", "holding that the debtor in possession was liable for civil contempt when he disobeyed the courts order to turn over the cash collateral and violated 11 usc 363", "holding that oneday notice provided to creditor before entry of cash collateral order violated due process" ]
44
is constitutional under the circumstances presented here. That policy ensures institutional safety and keeps the traffic of prisoners between cells and other locations within the prison at a minimum. Prompt examinations of inmates in their cells is often the most practical way to provide necessary treatment and to determine if in fact more extensive examinations are needed in the infirmary or outside the institution. A policy that requires all medical examinations, of every kind, to be done at the infirmary would pose an undue burden on the already strained medical resources available. DOCS’s sick call prison policies recognize that inmates have certain rights to privacy and that these rights need to be balanced against safety and security measures. See Patient Bill of Rights #7 (<HOLDING>), and DOCS Health Care Services Policy 1.34.
[ "holding whistleblower protections available under the washington health care act rcw 4370075 adequately promoted workplace safety ensured compliance with the accepted standard of care and prevented fraudulent billing in the health care industry", "recognizing that a patients choice of a health care facility does not render the facility a beneficiary under 502a1b", "recognizing an individuals right of privacy in the content of health records and noting that health records are the property of the health care entity maintaining them", "recognizing right to privacy in receipt of health care services to the extent consistent with providing adequate medical care and the safety and good order of the facility", "holding claim that negligent supervision caused assault was health care liability claim because it was inseparable from the health care and nursing services provided" ]
33
501 U.S. 808 (1991). 76 See U.S. Const. amends. VIII, XIV; Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962). 77 Booth, 482 U.S. at 502-09. 78 Id. 79 490 U.S. 805 (1989), overruled in part by Payne, 501 U.S. 808. 80 501 U.S. at 827-30. 81 Id. at 822-27. 82 Id. at 830 n.2. 83 108 Nev. 127, 136-37, 825 P.2d 600, 606 (1992). 84 See, e.g., Rippo v. State, 113 Nev. 1239, 1261, 946 P.2d 1017, 1031 (1997); Atkins v. State, 112 Nev. 1122, 1136, 923 P.2d 1119, 1128 (1996); McNelton v. State, 111 Nev. 900, 906 & n.4, 900 P.2d 934, 937 & n.4 (1995). 85 Floyd v. State, 118 Nev. 156, 174, 42 P.3d 249, 261 (2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1196 (2003); see also McNelton, 111 Nev. at 905-06, 900 P.2d at 937-38. 86 Gallego v. State, 117 Nev. 348, 370, 23 P.3d 227, 242 (2001); Rippo, 113 Ne 473, 484 (1997) (<HOLDING>). 94 See Sherman v. State, 114 Nev. 998, 1014,
[ "holding that the law presumes that the jury will follow the courts instructions", "holding that in light of the affirmative constitutional mandate to provide impartial juries in criminal cases the state has an important interest in obtaining juries that do not contain members who because of their religious beliefs are unable to follow the law or the trial courts instructions", "recognizing that jurors are presumed to follow instructions", "holding that a jury is presumed to follow the trial courts instructions", "recognizing that this court presumes that juries follow district courts instructions" ]
44
is to be construed as altering the common law, farther than its words import. It is not to be construed as making any innovation upon the common law which it does not fairly express.” [Ibid, (quoting 3 Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 61.01, at 77 (4th ed.1986) (footnote omitted) (quoting Shaw v. Railroad Co., 101 U.S. 557, 565, 25 L.Ed 892, 894 (1880))).] Coincident with that interpretive canon is our tradition of giving “narrow range” to statutes granting immunity from tort liability because they leave “unredressed injury and loss resulting from wrongful conduct.” Harrison v. Middlesex Water Co., 80 N.J. 391, 401, 403 A.2d 910 (1979) (construing strictly landowner’s immunity statute). See also Renz v. Penn Cent. Corp., 87 N.J. 437, 457-58, 435 A.2d 540 (1981) (<HOLDING>); Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 487-88, 267 A.2d
[ "holding dormancy statutes should be strictly construed", "holding that a governments consent to be sued must be construed strictly in favor of the sovereign", "holding that railroad immunity act should be strictly construed", "holding 2513 to be jurisdictional and therefore must be strictly construed", "holding that in presence of any doubt a penal statute is to be strictly construed" ]
22
that speech about the use of public funds touches upon a matter of public concern.” Kincade v. City of Blue Springs, 64 F.3d 389, 396 (8th Cir.1995). Allegations of the misuse of public funds relate directly to citizens’ interests as taxpayers, and are generally considered to address matters of public concern despite their personal pecuniary ramifications. See Kincade, 64 F.3d at 396; Casey v. City of Cabool, 12 F.3d 799, 803 (8th Cir.1993). Speech that criticizes a public employer in his capacity as a public official also addresses matters of public concern. “Criticism, no matter how obnoxious or offensive, of government officials and their policies clearly addresses matters of public concern.” Casey, 12 F.3d at 802.; see Barnard v. Jackson County, 43 F.3d 1218, 1225 (8th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Heightened public interest in a particular
[ "holding allegations of wrongdoing by public officials are on the highest order of first amendment concern", "holding that alleged misconduct by public officials particularly by law enforcement officials is matter of public concern", "holding that the plaintiffs speech was not a matter of public concern because it did not bring to light actual or potential wrongdoing or breach of public trust on the part of the defendant and others", "holding that a complaint that included only allegations of intentional wrongdoing also set forth grounds for liability based on unintentional wrongdoing", "recognizing a public employees first amendment right to address matters of legitimate public concern" ]
00
doctor make multiple submissions to confirm compliance with the medical practice requirement before the doctor can obtain LPR status. See 8 C.F.R. § 245.18(g), (h). III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY The Immigrant Doctors are all medical doctors licensed to practice medicine in their respective jurisdictions in the United States. The doctors seek to adjust to LPR status based on second preference employment-based immigrant visa petitions filed by their employers in conjunction with national interest waiver requests. Though the Immigrant Doctors’ original complaint named eight doctor plaintiffs when it was filed in 2002, four doctors have since obtained LPR status, rendering their claims moot. See Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman, 736 F.2d 1305, 1307-08 (9th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). A. Plaintiffs 1. Dr. Stefan Schneider Dr.
[ "holding moot appeal from revocation of visa petition where immigrant subsequently obtained lpr status", "holding that the beneficiary of a form 1130 visa petition did not have standing to challenge a denied petition", "holding appeal moot on this basis", "holding the bia did not err in affirming the ijs denial of a continuance request where there was no prima facie approvable visa petition pending and alien had not applied for status adjustment", "holding that where an alien was ineligible for a visa as a matter of law his citizenship was illegally procured and subject to revocation" ]
00
U.S. 555, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). An individual must satisfy a three-prong test in order to establish standing. See id. First, the individual must have suffered some injury in fact — an invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent. See id. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130; MD Pharmaceutical Inc. v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 133 F.3d 8, 11 (D.C.Cir.1998) (concluding that current manufacturer had standing to seek review of actions taken by the DEA). In some cases, a plaintiff may be injured when the “discriminatory classification preventfs] the plaintiff from competing on an equal footing.” Northeastern Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of America v. Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 667, 113 S.Ct. 2297, 124 L.Ed.2d 586 (1993) (<HOLDING>). Second, the injury must be fairly traceable
[ "holding that the claims to a statutory benefit had not yet vested when the legislature eliminated the benefit", "holding that a debtor need not have received a benefit from the fraudulent activity in order for 523a2a to prevent a discharge", "holding that when the government erects a barrier in order to establish standing a group seeking to challenge the barrier need not allege they would have attained the benefit but for the barrier", "holding the government waived its argument on appeal that the defendant did not have standing to challenge a search when it failed to raise the argument to the district court", "holding that the burden is on the plaintiff to allege facts sufficient to establish jurisdiction" ]
22
of contract claim. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Defendant’s position is that there are no material issues of fact to try. Both sides have represented that there are no further relevant facts to present. Plaintiffs, however, did not move for summary judgment, and argued that there are triable issues, including whether the Indicative Term Sheet, rather than the two Total Return Swap Agreements, should be considered the agreement. A district judge, presented with a motion for summary judgment, is entitled to search the record and, if no genuine issues of material fact exist, to determine the motion in favor of the party entitled to summary judgment, regardless whether the party is the moving, or the responding, party. Coach Leatherware Co. v. Ann-Taylor, Inc., 933 F.2d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 1991) (<HOLDING>); Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 969
[ "holding that district courts sua sponte grant of summary judgment to nonmoving party is an accepted method of expediting litigation", "holding that grant of summary judgment is appropriate where the nonmoving party adduces nothing more than speculation to support its claims", "recognizing that nonmoving party must present affirmative evidence to defeat summary judgment", "holding that sua sponte grant of summary judgment without notice to the parties constitutes reversible error", "holding that a court can raise the issue of res judicata sua sponte in order to affirm a grant of summary judgment" ]
00
an essential element of r such claims. Accordingly, Sun Trading’s state law claims are hereby dismissed without prejudice to re-filing in state court. B. Plaintiff’s Cross Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint Sun Trading moves for leave to amend its complaint to include Kenwood Japan and Art Union Records as defendants, in place of Kenwood Electronics Corp. The Court finds that amendment of the complaint at this stage would be futile. Even if Sun Trading were able to determine the proper Kenwood entities and add them as defendants, its claims against these entities would fail as a matter of law for the reasons stated above. Accordingly, plaintiffs motion for leave to amend the complaint is hereby denied. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 230, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962) (<HOLDING>). CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons,
[ "holding that futility is among the reasons for denying leave to amend a complaint", "holding that denial of leave to amend is error in the absence of justifying reasons", "holding that leave to amend should be freely given unless there is a good reason such as futility to the contrary", "holding that futility prejudice or bad faith may justify refusing to grant leave to amend", "recognizing several reasons to deny leave to amend a complaint" ]
00
willfulness is the allegedly invalid NPL (invalid because it was allegedly issued in violation of the automatic stay). However, as already noted above, the NPL did not violate the automatic stay, and therefore is not void. The District Court has already found the NPL constitutes prima facie proof of the Debtor's willfulness. Furthermore, IDOR has submitted other evidence of the Debt- or’s willfulness. 34 . FAA creates, inter alia, a national recording scheme for air commerce. Most courts have held that although the FAA operates to determine whether a valid recording has occurred, in most other aspects of secured transactions it does not preempt state law. See, e.g., Bergquist v. Anderson-Greenwood Aviation Corp. (In re Bellanca Aircraft Corp.), 850 F.2d 1275, 1278 (8th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); Gary Aircraft Corp. v. General Dynamics Corp.
[ "holding that faa does not preempt state law when determining date of perfection", "holding flsa did not preempt state law fraud claim", "holding that fehba does not completely preempt state law", "holding section 10 of faa is procedural and does not preempt state common law", "holding security interest enforceable at time of creation when state statutory law silent on perfection" ]
00
rules), practices, routes, services, and facilities of such carriers; and “(2) the construction, acquisition, operation, abandonment, or discontinuance of spur, industrial, team, switching, or side tracks, or facilities even if the tracks are located or intended to be located, entirely in one State, “is exclusive. Except as otherwise provided in this part, the remedies provided under this part with respect to regulation of rail transportation are exclusive and preempt the remedies provided under federal or State law.” 49 U.S.C. § 10102(9)(A) and (B) define “transportation” as used in § 10501(b)(1) to include: “(A) a locomotive, car,' vehicle, vessel, warehouse, wharf, , pier, dock, yard, property, facility, instrumentality, or equipment of any kind related to' th 4 (5th Cir.2001)(<HOLDING>); Pejepscot Indus. Park, Inc. v. Maine Cent.
[ "holding that the iccta preempted claims of negligence and negligence per se with respect to railroads alleged road blockages", "holding that violation of city ordinance does not constitute negligence per se", "holding negligence per se not applicable to violation of railroad commission regulation", "holding that the iccta preempted statelaw negligence and nuisance claims intended to interfere with railroads operation of switchyard", "holding that the iccta preempted statelaw nuisance claim with respect to operation of side track" ]
00
or not”, when used in a superior heading, is considered to modify the article descriptions in the provisions under that heading even though the phrase was not repeated in the provisions thereunder. See General Electric Co. v. United States, 83 Cust.Ct. 56, 61, C.D. 4822, 476 F.Supp. 1082 (1979). In General Electric Co, decided by this Court under the Tariff Schedules of the United States (TSUS), the Court reasoned that “the invasive character of the ‘whether or not’ language in the superior heading would make recitation of such language in each of the indented subheadings redundant.” General Electric Co. v. United States, 83 Cust.Ct. 56, 61, C.D. 4822, 476 F.Supp. 1082 (1979). See also Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. United States, 74 Cust.Ct. 125, 130, C.D. 4596, 1975 WL 26986 (1975) (<HOLDING>). Further, Plaintiffs proposed subheading
[ "holding that whether or not phrase in the superior heading qualifies all of the provisions subordinate to the superior heading", "holding that the hearing provisions of the ina supersede the provisions of the apa", "holding that the phrase or ganic diseases of the nervous system contained in 38 usc 11013 was ambiguous because the statute did not define the phrase", "recognizing that where the marks share a word or phrase but are otherwise different the plaintiff is not pmmitted to claim a right to all variant of the phrase in a specific market", "holding that the possibility of a mistaken understanding of the phrase preponderance of the evidence on the part of the jury is too remote to constitute plain error when counsel gave the jury an accurate explanation of the legal meaning of the phrase in his closing argument and that meaning is consistent with the common understanding of the words in the phrase" ]
00
to find a mother in contempt for failing to produce the child for summer visitation). II. Attorney’s Fees and Costs Because we affirm the family court’s overall contempt findings, we also affirm the award of attorney’s fees and costs. Regardless of whether the family court applied the E.D.M. factors or compensatory contempt doctrine, the family court correctly determined Father was entitled to attorney’s fees. Mother has a gross monthly income of $23,451, including her salary, alimony, and child support. She has over $5 million in savings. Mother’s payment of the attorney’s fees and costs would not affect her standard of living in any meaningful way. Accordingly, we affirm the award of attorney’s fees. See Whetstone v. Whetstone, 309 S.C. 227, 235, 420 S.E.2d 877, 881 (Ct. App. 1992) (<HOLDING>). CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, we affirm
[ "holding that by choosing the words any actual expenses including attorneys fees incurred congress did not intend to remove the discretion of the district court to award fees in cases such as contingent fee or pro bono cases where the client has not actually incurred the obligation to pay her attorneys fees", "holding that it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to deny an award of attorneys fees to the wife", "holding that attorneys fees incurred in a nonenforcement modification suit can be awarded as additional child support under the family code", "holding that because the wife failed to present any evidence as to the legal services performed in the trial court the wife was not entitled to a second hearing to establish attorneys fees", "holding the family court properly awarded a wife attorneys fees incurred as the result of her husbands contempt" ]
44
precise method of sale is prescribed by contract or decree, some discretion is necessarily granted to the trustee ... making the sale, as to the manner in which the property will be offered. That discretion will naturally be affected by the character and location of the property and other circumstances peculiar to the case, so that it is impossible to lay down a hard and fast rule[.] Jackson, 249 Md. at 16-17, 238 A.2d at 87 (quoting Webster, 176 Md. at 254-55, 4 A.2d at 438); see Waters, 165 Md. at 75, 166 A. at 432-33. For example, a trustee has the discretion to determine whether the property should be sold as a whole, or divided into separate parcels. Webster, 176 Md. at 254, 4 A.2d at 438; Gittings, 156 Md. at 577-78, 144 A. at 841; see also Fagnani, 418 Md. at 388, 15 A.3d at 292 (<HOLDING>). Similarly, a trustee has discretion to
[ "holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property", "holding that treating trust rather than trustee as attorneys client is inconsistent with the law of trusts", "holding that the trustee of a nominee trust functions more as an agent than as a true trustee", "holding that standard of review is a matter of procedural rather than substantive law", "holding that as a matter of law a trustee may foreclose on an undivided one half interest rather than the entire property citation omitted" ]
44
coworkers, and usual work situations; and to deal with changes in a routine work setting. A substantial loss of ability to meet any of these basic work-related activities would severely limit the potential occupational base. This, in turn, would justify a finding of disability....” SSR 85-15, 1985 WL 56857 (S.S.A.), at *4. Before making a final determination according to the five step process outlined above, the ALJ is under an affirmative duty to adequately develop the medical record. See Tejada, 167 F.3d at 774; 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(d). The ALJ is thus “obligated to explore the facts by obtaining relevant medical records and asking questions ... to assist the claimant in developing her case.” Jones v. Apfel, 66 F.Supp.2d 518, 538 (S.D.N.Y.1999); see also Perez, 77 F.3d at 47 (<HOLDING>). The ALJ’s duty to assist a claimant in
[ "holding that a failure to advise even when the defendant has an affirmative obligation to do so is not the same as engaging in affirmative misconduct ", "holding it is error for an alj to fail to consider factors relevant to the pain analysis which are supported by the record", "holding that the alj is not obliged to accept an iq if there is a substantial basis in the record for believing that the claimant was feigning the results", "holding that there may be an obligation to defend under an insurance policy even though there is no obligation to indemnify", "holding that where there are deficiencies in the record the alj is under an affirmative obligation to develop the relevant medical history even when the claimant is represented by counsel" ]
44
we need not reach the issue whether the challenged statement constitutes an allegation or á factual statement. As the Eskildsens point out, and as our review of the record demonstrates, Inline did not move to strike the affidavit at issue. In Ex parte Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 92 So.3d 771 (Ala.2012), our supreme court reiterated the requirements for successfully challenging the admissibility of an affidavit submitted in support of or in opposition to a motion for a summary judgment, writing: “Cases decided after Perry [v. Mobile County, 533 So.2d 602 (Ala.1988),] have not always been clear in holding that a party challenging the admissibility of an affidavit must object to the affidavit and move to strike it. See Ex parte Diversey Corp., 742 So.2d 1250, 1253-54 (Ala.1999) (<HOLDING>); Elizabeth Homes, L.L.C. v. Cato, 968 So.2d 1,
[ "holding that the court can consider inadmissible evidence if the party against whom it is offered does not object to the evidence by moving to strike it", "holding it is well settled that an error in admission of evidence is cured where the same evidence comes in elsewhere without objection defense counsel must object every time allegedly inadmissible evidence is offered", "holding that the trial courts damages award was against the manifest weight of the evidence because it was based upon inadmissible evidence", "holding that court can consider inadmissible evidence in the context of a motion for preliminary injunction", "holding that an arbitration agreement enforceable against party who signed the agreement even where the other party did not sign it because generally it is enough that the party against whom the contract is sought to be enforced signs it" ]
00
459 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). Because the order on appeal simply remands the petition back to the administrative law judge for further proceedings (i.e., a formal hearing), it is not a final order. Furthermore, O’Donnell’s has not established the alternative ground for review under section 120.68. Review of the final agency action would provide an adequate remedy. Consequently, we do not have jurisdiction to review it under section 120.68 and Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.110. APPEAL DISMISSED. SAWAYA, C.J., concurs, and concurs specially with opinion. ORFINGER, J., dissents with opinion. 1 . We considered the possibility of treating this appeal as a petition for writ of prohibition. See, e.g., Dept. of Health and Rehab. Servs. v. Career Serv. Com’n, 448 So.2d 18 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (<HOLDING>). However, prior opinions uniformly hold that
[ "holding that the superior court may not issue writs of prohibition to review an order denying recusal before final judgment", "holding that district courts have power to issue writs of prohibition to administrative agencies to prevent them from exceeding their jurisdiction", "holding that district court had jurisdiction to consider claims under the all writs act", "recognizing the supreme courts longstanding jurisdiction over writs of prohibition and mandamus to courts of inferior jurisdiction", "holding prohibition lies to prevent a lower tribunal from acting in excess of its jurisdiction but not to prevent an erroneous exercise of jurisdiction" ]
11
for Plaintiffs will redress their alleged injuries, thereby satisfying the third requirement for individual standing. Plaintiffs here seek injunctive relief to mandate that Defendants implement TCM 2. As discussed above, Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries are fairly traceable to Defendants’ alleged failure to implement TCM 2. Thus, it goes without question that the injunctive relief sought by Plaintiffs would alleviate the alleged injuries. Even though Plaintiffs’ injuries might not be completely eliminated by the implementation of TCM 2, any increase in air quality that would result from a favorable decision, is sufficient to satisfy the “minimal requirements of Article III.” Pub. Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 73 (3d Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). In short, individual members of Plaintiffs’
[ "holding that a contractor lacked standing because it failed to show a substantial chance it would have received the contract award but for agency error", "holding that an osha inspection violating the fourth amendment would constitute irreparable injury for which injunctive relief would be appropriate", "holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to seek injunctive relief because they failed to demonstrate any likelihood that they would end up back in jail where alleged constitutional violations occurred", "holding that a protester must show only that there was a substantial chance it would have received the contract award but for that error", "holding that to have standing plaintiffs must only show that the injunctive relief requested would decrease pollution not that it would return a polluted waterway to pristine condition" ]
44
of any diminution of value to the Wages Tract. Additionally, in Case No. A16A0258, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Old Republic as to RM Kids’s bad-faith claim and its grant of a directed verdict in favor of Old Republic as to RM Kids’s prejudgment interest claim. Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part, and case remanded in Case No. A16A0257. Judgment affirmed in Case No. A16A02S8. Phipps, P. J., and Peterson, J., concur. Schiff Hardin, LLP, Leah Ward Sears, John C. Amabile, Nicholas F. McDaniel; Knight Johnson, LLC, Bryan M. Knight, Sherri G. Buda, for appellee. Gilroy Bailey Trumble, LLC, MonicaK Gilroy, Tania T. Trumble, amici curiae. 1 See Horton v. Hendrix, 291 Ga. App. 416, 416 ( ., 881 FSupp.2d 1058, 1066 (III) (C) (D. Minn. 2012) (<HOLDING>); Marble Bank v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins.
[ "holding that because a mortgage provides the security for the repayment of the note the person having standing to foreclose a note secured by a mortgage may be either the holder of the note or a nonholder in possession of the note who has the rights of a holder", "holding that an insured mortgagees loss under a title insurance policy cannot be measured until the note has not been repaid and the security for the mortgage is shown to be inadequate", "holding that a mortgagees loss cannot he measured unless the underlying debt is not repaid and the security for the mortgage proves inadequate", "holding that a mortgageeinsureds loss cannot be determined unless the note is not repaid and the security for the mortgage proves inadequate", "holding that the loss of trade secrets cannot be measured in money damages" ]
11
applies to illegal contraband, the court found it “almost impossible to conceive of an object which may be lawfully possessed, but has no legitimate use.” Id. at 424. Therefore, the court determined that under the amended statute, “criminal instrument” is not limited to objects that can be used only for criminal purposes. Id. Having concluded that it was not bound by Universal or Fronatt, the court proceeded to reject Eodice’s interpretation of section 16.01 as well. The court believed that Eodice presented the exact type of scenario envisioned by the Legislature when it adopted section 16.01. Id. at 424-25. And, in stark contrast to Andrews, the court held that “the gravamen of the crime remains the actor’s intended use of the instrument.” Id. at 425. Contra Andrews, 814 S.W.2d at 841 (<HOLDING>). The court concluded that “the ontological
[ "holding that the gravamen of the offense is the physical adaptation of the instrument", "holding that the florida offense of attempted lewd assault on a child under the age of sixteen is a crime of violence even though the offense might be accomplished without use of physical force", "holding that an offense is factually lesser included if the charging instrument alleges that the means used to commit the crime charged include all of the elements of the alleged lesser included offense", "holding that the deferential standard of review of a plan interpretation is appropriate only when the trust instrument allows the trustee to interpret the instrument and when the trust ee has in fact interpreted the instrument", "holding an indictment legally insufficient when it failed to inform the defendant of the gravamen of the alleged offense" ]
00
attacks. See Williams, 480 Fed.Appx. at 256 (“A prison guard is deliberately indifferent if he intentionally denies or delays access to medical care.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Walker v. Butler, 967 F.2d 176, 178 (5th Cir.1992))). Moreover, the parties agree that Stewart’s medical condition was known by the prison guards. Our review of the summary judgment evidence indicates that Appellees also intentionally disregarded the established treatment plan for Stewart. See Chapman v. Johnson, 339 Fed.Appx. 446, 448 (5th Cir.2009) (per curiam) (unpublished) (stating that a defendant is not entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity when the defendant knew of prisoner’s injury and treatment protocol but failed to follow it); see also Easter, 467 F.3d at 465 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the district court erred when it
[ "holding that summary judgment was improper on qualified immunity grounds when defendant was aware of prisoners need for medical treatment but failed to provide it", "holding that summary judgment in favor of the defendant was appropriate because the plaintiff failed to designate evidence that demonstrates that the defendant abused the qualified privilege", "holding that it was error for the district court to overrule appellants motion for summary judgment without reference to the qualified immunity defense", "holding that summary judgment for defendant officials on the basis of qualified immunity was improper given officials indefinite refusal to treat plaintiffs cavity", "holding that an interlocutory appeal lies from a denial of summary judgment on a qualified immunity claim" ]
00
a DD Form 214 is a "source document” that “retires ... or transitions a person from the military.” Aplt.App. at 141. He also clarified that a DD Form 214 separates a person from the Army "[rjegardless of whether the Army did all the follow-up paperwork and computer entries and so forth properly[J” Id. 3 . There is no uniformly accepted definition of the phrase "acting as such,” and courts disagree with respect to the amount of independence required to separate an overt act from the original act of impersonation. Compare United States v. Rosser, 528 F.2d 652, 657 (D.C.Cir.1976) ("the act that completes a violation of Section 912(1) must be something more than merely an act in keeping with the falsely assumed character”) with United States v. Gayle, 967 F.2d 483, 488 (11th Cir. 1992) (<HOLDING>). This case does not require us to weigh in on
[ "holding that an indictment under 912 need not allege additional acts beyond the general act of impersonation", "holding when a statute defines manner or means of committing an offense indictment need not allege matters beyond the language of the statute", "holding that an indictment under 922g1 was not required to allege a substantial effect on interstate commerce an indictment which tracked the statutory language was sufficient", "holding that an indictment charging one offense during the commission of another crime need not allege the elements of the latter offense", "holding that a found in indictment need not allege all of the elements of entry" ]
00
91 (D.N.J.1990). The statute of limitations will be tolled, however, where the defendant affirmatively conceals the facts that would allow plaintiff to realize that a cause of action exists. See Plain v. Flicker, 645 F.Supp. 898, 902-03 (D.N.J.1986). Active concealment tolls the statute of limitations until the plaintiff exercising reasonable diligence knows or should know of the fraud. See id. To determine whether an employer’s affirmative misrepresentations on monthly ERISA reports tolls the statute of limitations for a fund or trustee’s suit against the employer for deficient ERISA contributions, the Court must assess whether the deficiencies were apparent from the face of the reports. See, e.g., Sheet Metal Workers, Local 19 v. 2300 Group, Inc., 949 F.2d 1274, 1282-83 (3d Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); Connors v. Beth Energy Mines, Inc., 920 F.2d
[ "holding that there is no first amendment right of access to presentence reports", "holding tolling appropriate where no aspect of reports should have alerted plaintiffs to irregularities", "holding annexation ordinance only voidable due to procedural irregularities", "holding that whether the judgment creditor had reason to know or might have been alerted to circumstances that should reasonably have impelled him to check beyond the filed record is irrelevant ", "holding that 2244d is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases" ]
11
(applying literal test); Oregon Bureau of Labor & Indus, ex rel. Richardson v. U.S. West Commc’ns, Inc., 288 F.3d 414, 417-18 (9th Cir.2002) (same); see also Sun Buick, supra, 26 F.3d at 1261-64 (criticizing functional test, but stopping short of rejecting it because administrative agency at issue “would not qualify [as a state court] under any circumstances”); Tool & Die Makers Lodge No. 78 Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Gen’l Elec. Co. X-Ray Dept., 170 F.Supp. 945, 949-50 (E.D.Wis.1959) (district court decision that has been characterized as the “genesis” of the functional test). The Fourth Circuit appeared to endorse the functional test in the context of the federal officer removal statute in Kolibash v. Committee on Legal Ethics of West Virginia Bar, 872 F.2d 571, 576 (4th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, subsequent decisions in this
[ "holding that the west virginia state bar committee on legal ethics was a state court for purposes of removal and citing favorably to volkswagen de puerto rico supra 454 f2d 38", "holding that a minimum fee schedule enforced by the virginia state bar did not fall within the parker exception because the fee schedule was not mandated by the virginia supreme court and thus it could not fairly be said that the state of virginia through its supreme court rules required the anticompetitive activities", "holding that the proceedings of the west virginia state bar committee on the unlawful practice were judicial in nature based on hallmarks similar to those discussed herein", "holding that a state procedural default will not bar consideration of a federal claim on habeas review unless the last state court rendering a judgment clearly and expressly stated that its judgment rested on a state procedural bar", "holding that the united states was a statutory employer under puerto rico law" ]
00
implicated system-wide discrimination they would have unquestionably involvedia matter of “public concern.” See Marshall v. Allen, 984 F.2d 787 (7th Cir.1993) (allowing Section 1983 claim where plaintiff was discharged following his support of other employees who had filed suit for gender discrimination); Wilson v. UT Health Ctr., 973 F.2d 1263, 1266 ( .2d 749 (1991). In the instant case there is no indication that the plaintiff “wanted to debate issues of sex discrimination,” that her suit sought “relief against pervasive or systemic misconduct by a public agency or public officials,” or that her suit was “part of an overall effort ... to correct allegedly unlawful practices or bring them to public attention.” Yatvin v. Madison Metro. School Dist., 840 F.2d 412, 420 (7th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Although evidence was subsequently uncovered
[ "holding that plaintiff had failed to state a claim for relief under section 1983", "holding that plaintiffs complaint failed to state a claim under section 1 of the sherman act", "recognizing such a claim under 1983", "holding that claim brought under section 1983 of the civil rights act constituted a personal injury tort claim because section 1983 confers a general remedy for injuries to personal rights", "holding state is not a proper defendant under 1983" ]
00
of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, decree, order, or proceeding or to set aside a judgment or decree for fraud upon the court.... 3 . The record discloses that Martinez served Mills with a proposal to settle several months before Mills’s proposal was served. Ironically, Martinez also filed his offer with the court in violation of the rule and statute. 4 . Other federal courts have reached similar results when considering time periods established in other statutes. See, e.g., Shenango Inc. v. Apfel, 307 F.3d 174, 193 (3d Cir.2002) (statutory deadline does not, by itself, establish that Congress intended to strip an agency's authority to act after the deadline has passed); Friends of Aquifer, Inc. v. Mineta, 150 F.Supp.2d 1297 (N.D.Fla.2001) (<HOLDING>); Bhd. of Ry. Carmen Div. v. Pena, 64 F.3d 702,
[ "holding that the secretary is not entitled to deference when construing the acts implementing regulations", "holding that even though the reasonable doubt instruction given in the case was not the preferred instruction it was not a misstatement of the law and therefore was legally appropriate", "holding that to grant a writ of mandamus a court in the exercise of its discretion must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate under the circumstances", "holding that group was not entitled to writ of mandamus given that it was not clear that congress intended deadlines for meeting the standards to be mandatory even though the statute provided that the secretary shall prescribe certain regulations not later than given deadlines", "holding that the statute is mandatory" ]
33
in bankruptcy. As of November 23, 2005, the Debtor owed the Creditor approximately $114,040. A debtor cannot claim an exemption against amounts owed on a secured debt that represents a voluntary encumbrance of property; consequently, the Debtor is not entitled to any exemption in the $114,040 owed to the Creditor. Because the Debtor’s principal residence was sold for $130,000, the Debtor’s entitlement to an exemption based on the transfer sought to be avoided was only $15,960. Assuming that all four of the requirements are met, a debtor has the right to avoid the transfer of his property to the extent that he could have exempted such property. See Compton v. Compton (In re Compton), No. 97-31367DWS, 1998 WL 372659, **4-5, 1998 Bankr.LEXIS 744, *13-14 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. June 22, 1998) (<HOLDING>); Davis v. Victor Warren Properties, Inc. (In
[ "holding that a state tax lien was not judicial lien arising from judgment such that it could be avoided in bankruptcy by a chapter 13 debtor", "holding that chapter 20 debtor could not avoid lien because of ineligibility for discharge", "holding state courts authority under iowa code section 59821 not the lien created there under prevented debtor from claiming the iowa homestead exemption and therefore the debtor could not avoid the lien because the lien did not impair an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled but for the lien", "holding that a chapter 13 debtor had standing to avoid a judgment lien to the extent of her exemption amount but not the entire judgment lien", "holding that the debtor had standing to avoid a foreclosure sale under 522 but only to the extent of her 5000 exemption" ]
33
on December 7, 1990. Since Hodari D. was not decided by the Supreme Court until April 23, 1991, the district court did not have the benefit of its guidance in ruling on these motions. Hodari D.’s predecessors include Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 328-32, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2415-17, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990) (defining and distinguishing the government’s burdens regarding reasonable suspicion and probable cause); Brower v. Inyo County, 489 U.S. 593, 596, 109 S.Ct. 1378, 1381-83, 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989) (where a suspect was caught when stolen car he was driving at high speeds to elude pursuing police, crashed into police roadblock, holding there was not a "stop” until the suspect crashed into a blockade); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1586, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (<HOLDING>). 9 . See Brower, 489 U.S. at 596, 109 S.Ct. at
[ "holding that factors that ordinarily constitute innocent behavior may provide a composite picture sufficient to raise reasonable suspicion", "holding innocent facts when considered together can give rise to reasonable suspicion", "holding that such factors may constitute a substantial burden", "holding that while each separate item standing alone did not provide reasonable suspicion a combination of factors clearly satisfied the reasonable suspicion requirement", "holding that factors which by themselves were quite consistent with innocent travel collectively amounted to reasonable suspicion" ]
00
of an action is the most critical aspect of the court’s authority to act. Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the power of the court to deal with the kind of action in question[, and] ... is conferred upon the courts by either the North Carolina Constitution or by statute.” In re McKinney, 158 N.C. App. 441, 443, 581 S.E.2d 793, 795 (2003) (citations omitted). N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-200(a) confers on the trial court exclusive, original jurisdiction “over any case involving a juvenile who is alleged to be abused, neglected, or dependent.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-200(a) (2003). “ ‘[0]nce jurisdiction of a court attaches it exists for all time until the cause is fully and completely determined.’ ” In the Matter of Arends, 88 N.C. App. 550, 554, 364 S.E.2d 169, 171 (1988) (citation omitted) (<HOLDING>); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-201 (2003). “[A] court’s
[ "holding that the superior court had no jurisdiction over the division of marital property when the district court had properly invoked jurisdiction over the property", "holding that the district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related statelaw claims once it has dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction", "holding that personal jurisdiction is not required to make an outofstate parent a party to custody action where the state court has subject matter jurisdiction under the uniform child custody jurisdiction act", "holding that the trial court had continuing jurisdiction over all subsequent custody orders once the trial court acquired jurisdiction", "holding that a subsequent action was not barred because the initial court did not have jurisdiction over the claim" ]
33
video surveillance, respectively), not the location of a search, which is addressed by the wording of Rule 41. This court in any case declines to legislate by reading into the statute language that Congress did not place there. a. Nature of the Rule 41 Violation A Rule 41 violation is either “technical” or “procedural,” as courts have phrased it, or constitutional. See, e.g., Adams, 2016 WL 4212079, at *6 (“The Court views a Rule 41(b) violation to be a technical or procedural violation.... ”). “[Ujnless a clear constitutional violation occurs, noncompliance with Rule 41 requires suppression of evidence only where (1) there was prejudice in the sense that the search might not have occurred or would not have been so abrasive if the rule had been followed, or (2) ther 515 (D.D.C. 2013) (<HOLDING>); U.S. v. Master, 614 F.3d 236, 241 (6th Cir.
[ "holding that the district court which erred in its conclusion that there was jurisdictional defect abused its discretion in denying a plaintiffsmotion for leave to amend his complaint because the proposed amendment would not cure the jurisdictional defect", "holding that a violation of the forum defendant rule is a jurisdictional defect", "holding jurisdictional defect voids judgment when defect exposes such personal jurisdictional deficiencies as to violate due process", "holding error to be fundamental when record shows jurisdictional defect", "holding that a rule 41b violation constituted a jurisdictional flaw inexcusable as a technical defect" ]
44
has not run as to the minor’s claim, a fortiori, it has not run against his present guardian.” Id. The import of both of these cases is that the cause of action remains personal to the plaintiff insofar as the running of the statute of limitations is concerned. That is, the statute of limitations either runs or is tolled depending upon the status of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether a legal guardian exists. If the plaintiff is under some form of legally recognized disability which tolls the statute of limitations, the statute of limitations remains tolled despite the possibility that some representative could bring the action on the plaintiff’s behalf. The majority of other state courts construing similar statutes have also concluded that the a 136, 927 P.2d 796, 801 (Ct.App.1996) (<HOLDING>); Mason v. Sorrell, 260 Ark. 27, 551 S.W.2d
[ "holding that appointment of a conservator does not remove a mentally disabled persons legal disability so as to start the statute of limitations running", "holding that tolling of the statute of limitations was not tolled during the pendency of a claim dismissed without prejudice for want of prosecution", "holding that tolling accorded to persons of unsound mind continued during disability regardless that next friend might have sued", "holding that the express provisions of article 4590i exclude the unsound mind tolling provision of texcivprac remcode ann 16001a2 and b", "holding that the appointment of a conservator will not cease the tolling of the statute of limitations for those of unsound mind" ]
44
purpose served by obliterating a serial number on a firearm. Because a firearm with a serial number is equally effective as a firearm without one, there would appear to be no compelling reason why a law-abiding citizen would prefer an unmarked firearm. These weapons would then have value primarily for persons seeking to use them for illicit purposes. See United States v. Carter, 421 F.3d 909, 910 (9th Cir.2005) (noting that unmarked firearms have a “greater flexibility to be utilized in illicit activities” (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. United States v. Tagg, 572 F.3d 1320, 1326 (11th Cir.2009) (finding no Second Amendment protection for pipe bombs because they could not be used for legitimate lawful purposes); State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489, 489-90 (1850) (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, a handgun with an obliterated
[ "holding that evidence of violent crimes and other illegal activities of defendants gang was not unduly prejudicial because defendant was not directly implicated and the evidence was probative of elements of the crimes that the defendant was charged with", "holding south carolina conviction for failure to stop for a blue light to be violent felony under acca because prohibited conduct creates potential for confrontation and violence", "holding that eighth amendment prohibited consideration at sentencing of personal characteristics of the victim and the emotional im pact of the crimes on the victims family", "holding concealed weapons could be prohibited because of their tendency to be used in violent crimes on unsuspecting victims", "holding intoxication is only a defense to specific intent crimes and not general intent crimes" ]
33
prison officials based on Ware’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). We affirm, adding only the following comments. First, Ware has not shown that the district court erred in failing to find that defendants waived the exhaustion requirement. Defendants raised a failure-to-exhaust defense in their answer and in a renewed motion for summary judgment. Ware did not assert any prejudice, nor do we perceive any, as he was on notice of the exhaustion requirement and had ample time to oppose the renewed summary judgment motion. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in considering the defendants’ failure-to-exhaust defense. See Guzman-Rivera v. Rivera-Cruz, 98 F.3d 664, 668 (1st Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Also, Ware has not shown that the district
[ "holding that such a decision was within the trial courts discretion", "holding that laches is an affirmative defense", "holding that decision on waiver of affirmative defense normally is within district courts discretion", "holding burden of proof is on one asserting an affirmative defense", "holding that fair use is an affirmative defense" ]
22
Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 39, 122 N.M. 777, 932 P.2d 1 (requiring particularized showing of exigent circumstances for warrantless search of vehicle under N.M. Const, art. II, § 10); Campos v. State, 117 N.M. 155, 158-59, 870 P.2d 117, 120-21 (1994) (declining to adopt federal rule allowing warrantless arrest without exigent circumstances); State v. Gutierrez, 116 N.M. 431, 445-47, 863 P.2d 1052, 1066-68 (1993) (rejecting good faith rationale under Fourth Amendment and the federal rationale for the exclusionary rule based on deterring police misconduct); State v. Cordova, 109 N.M. 211, 217, 784 P.2d 30, 36 (1989) (rejecting Fourth Amendment rationale for the "totality of circumstances” test to establish probable cause); State v. Snyder, 1998-NMCA-166, VH 18-24, 126 N.M. 168, 967 P.2d 843 (<HOLDING>). 3 . We do not address the breadth of the
[ "holding that exclusionary rule does not extend to forbid the use in federal civil tax proceeding of evidence illegally seized by state criminal law enforcement agent", "holding that exclusionary rule to be applied as a matter of state law is no broader than the federal rule", "holding that due process requires exclusionary rule to be applied in state trials", "holding that me const art 1 5 does not require the state to prove probable cause for a search beyond a reasonable doubt", "holding that nm const art ii 10 exclusionary rule applied to use of evidence in state court criminal proceeding when that evidence resulted from warrantless search by federal border patrol agents at checkpoint in new mexico" ]
44
is made, the court, after notice and a hearing, shall determine the amount of such claim ... and shall allow such claim in suc scretion in this case. While Porges obtained a dismissal of his bankruptcy ease and chose not to convert his petition to a proceeding under another chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, he previously had sought bankruptcy protection and initiated the adversary proceeding. Porges thus subjected himself “ ‘to all the consequences that attach to an appearance,’ ” including the determination of liability on Gruntal’s claims. In re McLaren, 3 F.3d at 966 (quoting Hillman, 296 U.S. at 242, 56 S.Ct. at 211). A party seeking relief in bankruptcy court cannot avoid an adverse judgment by subsequently abjuring bankruptcy protection. See Pepper, 308 U.S. at 305, 60 S.Ct. at 244 (<HOLDING>). Finally, the exercise of a court’s equitable
[ "holding that where a court possesses jurisdiction over a disputed matter it may exercise its equitable powers to ensure that substance will not give way to form and that technical considerations will not prevent substantial justice from being done", "holding that it may not", "holding that congress may impose its will on the states as long as it is acting within the powers granted by the constitution", "holding that any attempt by way of contract to deprive a city of control over exercise of it police powers is void", "holding a court of criminal appeals may not exercise its sentence approval powers to criticize a state court conviction" ]
00
See Thornton, 511 F.3d at 1228; Holt, 510 F.3d at 1012. Some of our sister circuits have encountered a different type of “double counting” problem in cases that involve calculations of loss under § 2Bl.l(b)(l). This version of “double counting” occurs where the same fraudulent check or stolen credit card is erroneously counted twice in estimating the total loss attributable to a defendant. Reviewing courts have found such errors to be material only where they bring the amount of loss into a different category for Guidelines purposes, such as from $900,000, which would carry a fourteen-level enhancement under § 2Bl.l(b)(l)(H), to $1.1 million, which would carry a sixteen-level enhancement under § 2Bl.l(b)(l)(I). See, e.g., United States v. Mickens, 453 F.3d 668, 671-72 (6th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Lee, 427 F.3d 881, 896 (11th
[ "holding that where defendant objected in the district court only to the loss calculation and not specifically to the calculation of restitution the issue of restitution was not properly presented to the district court", "holding that a calculation of the amount of loss is a factual finding", "holding that the district court failed to comply with rule 32c1 because its oral finding regarding the value of loss resulting from monuss offense was stated in general terms and did not explain how it calculated the amount of loss or respond to the defendants specific factual objections to the methods of calculation included in the psr", "holding that even if one of the governments calculation methods impermissibly counted funds obtained from the same stolen credit card towards both actual and intended loss any error was harmless because an alternate calculation method which was free of any double counting also resulted in a loss amount of between 120000 and 400000 and thus application of the same enhancement", "holding the same" ]
33
CD because it incorporated the holder’s possession and endorsement of the CD as a precondition to payment. Aside from bearing the “nontransferable” legend, the CD also stated on its face that “It Will Pay To the Order of Michael Brier * * * On Return Of This Certificate Properly Endorsed.” (Emphasis added.) By incorporating possession and endorsement of the CD as a precondition to payment, the bank implicitly acknowledged that the CD was indeed transferable. See First National Bank in Grand Prairie v. Lone Star Life Insurance Co., 524 S.W.2d 525, 530 (Tex.Civ.App.1975). Otherwise, why would the bank have required Brier to return and endorse the CD upon seeking payment? “Such presentation is necessary for the bank’s protection because lack of possession wou 374 So.2d 6, 10 (Fla.1979) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, because the CD was an instrument
[ "holding that it may be decided as a matter of law", "holding as matter of law that nontransferable cds were article 9 instruments", "holding that the defendant did not establish good faith as a matter of law", "holding as matter of law that cds containing restrictions on transfers were nonetheless article 9 instruments", "holding blank transfers of real property are impermissible under massachusetts law" ]
33
for theft by receiving.” Korelis, 273 Or at 429; Thomas, 13 Or App at 170-73. We explained, in the context of a jury trial, that giving a jury instruction that includes the phrase “having good reason to know” is erroneous because it suggests that a jury may consider whether a reasonable person would have believed that the property was stolen. Id. at 171-72. The same is true where the trier of fact is the court. See, e.g., Babler Bros. v. Pac. Intermountain, 244 Or 459, 467, 415 P2d 735 (1966) (“When the record discloses that the jury applied the wrong law to the problem, the verdict cannot stand. * * * Where an error of law is shown to have influenced the court trying a case without a jury, reversal is equally necessary.”); State v. Clum, 216 Or App 1, 7-9, 8 n 5, 171 P3d 980 (2007) (<HOLDING>). In this case, we are bound by Korelis. To be
[ "holding that the trial court is required to provide reasons for its decision prior to appeal", "holding the trial court is required to make a determination on impairment of access prior to trial", "holding that complaint on appeal must be the same as that presented in the trial court", "holding that a party may not raise a claim on appeal that was not presented to the trial court", "holding that whether the trial court in a bench trial applied a correct understanding of the elements legally required to convict was reviewable on appeal" ]
44
by, a protected ground.”); see also § 1252(b)(4)(B). The crux of Thuri’s position is that she was persecuted because her father opposed institutional government corruption — which (in her view) constitutes the expression of a political opinion. By contrast, the IJ concluded, and the government contends, that the officers’ retaliatory conduct was driven by a criminal, nonpolitical motive to punish Thuri’s father for reporting the hijacking. Thuri has not identified any decisions in this circuit that support her argument for refugee status. In addition, even if the two Ninth Circuit cases on which Thuri relies were binding precedent, it is not clear that the legal standards those decisions announce would apply to Thuri’s case. See Grava v. INS, 205 F.3d 1177, 1181 & n. 3 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Desir v. Ilchert, 840 F.2d 723, 727-29 (9th
[ "recognizing that purely personal retribution is of course not persecution on account of political opinion but holding that when the alleged government corruption is inextricably intertwined with governmental operation the exposure and prosecution of such an abuse of public trust is necessarily political", "holding that opposition to government corruption may constitute political opinion", "holding that retaliation for opposition to government corruption can constitute persecution on account of a political opinion", "holding that persecution was on account of political opinion because petitioners prosecutorial investigation into acts of political corruption was by its very nature political", "holding that a fear of retribution from a husband a high political official was a strictly personal matter" ]
00
who has pled guilty in an open plea to challenge the sentence imposed is to file a direct appeal or, if the time for filing a direct appeal has run, to file an appeal under [Indiana Post-Convietion Rule] 2," rather than filing a post-conviction relief petition. The trial court subsequently granted Sullivan permission to pursue this belated appeal challenging his sentence. The State does not argue that Sullivan cannot invoke Blakely with respect to a sentencing hearing that was conducted in 1999. It was correct not to make such an argument. The Indiana Supreme Court's rule that precludes retroactive application of new criminal rules to collateral proceedings does not apply to direct appeals brought pursuant to Post-Conviction Rule 2. Fosha v. State, 747 N.E.2d 549, 552 (Ind.2001) (<HOLDING>). "New rules for the conduct of criminal
[ "holding that the granting of an application to file an appeal out of time is considered part of the direct appeal process under oklahoma law", "holding on appeal from a habeas corpus denial that counsel was not ineffective for failure to file a notice of appeal because of defendants escape", "holding that defendants claim based on richardson v state 717 ne2d 32 ind1999 would be considered on the merits where defendant was convicted in 1993 and did not originally timely file a direct appeal but in 1999 was granted permission to file a belated appeal", "holding that counsels failure to file appeal was not deficient performance under strickland where the petitioner in 2255 action did not direct counsel to file an appeal and acquiesced in counsels decision to pursue as an alternative a reduction in sentence", "holding that where the fourth amendment question was raised at trial but not preserved on direct appeal in the state court the defendants failure to raise the issue on appeal in the state courts did not suffice to avoid stone" ]
22
would not have recovered anything even in the absence of a grant of derivative standing to Hyundai. Or, if the estate has additional assets and the JT & T parties have a small, secured claim that is superior to all other claims, then they will likely recover on their claim regardless of whether the adversary action brought by Hyundai is successful. In either of these scenarios, permitting Hyundai to pursue the avoidance and recovery action could hardly be said to have a negative impact on the JT & T parties’ interests as creditors. See In re The Watch Ltd., 257 Fed.Appx. at 750 (stating, in dictum, that the creditor’s injury was too speculative where he could not show a likelihood of recovering on his unsecured claim); In re Richardson Indus. Contractors, Inc., 189 Fed.Appx. at 93 (<HOLDING>); see also Fishell v. Soltow (In re Fishell),
[ "holding an unsecured creditors postconfirmation suit against a secured creditor for fraudulent misrepresentation at a creditors meeting constituted a collateral attack on the confirmation order", "holding that unsecured creditor could not appeal decision determining priority among secured creditors because it would not affect the payment of his claims", "holding that plan proposing and payment of nondischargeable student loan in full outside plan according to its terms for 54 months and 79 payment to unsecured creditors over 36 months did not discriminate unfairly among unsecured class", "holding that because creditors claim was unsecured after application of section 506a and because section 1325a5 does not apply to unsecured claims creditors lien could properly be avoided", "holding that postconfirmation attempt to equitably subordinate claim of one general unsecured creditor in a class of general unsecured creditors was a violation of 1123a4" ]
11
it concluded that “neither the statutory text nor the legislative history discloses any congressional intent to categorically exclude attempt offenses from the scope of § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)’s residual provision.” Id. We need go no further. IV. Criminal Possession of a Weapon Is a Violent Felony Lynch also argues that his 1989 conviction for criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree is not a violent felony under the ACCA. Lynch asserts that since he never admitted to having “intent to use the weapon unlawfully against another,” his conviction was based on “mere possession” and cannot constitute a violent felony. Lynch, however, pled guilty to the charge at issue in state court. Under New York law, “[a] person is guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the se Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). This Court, in United States v. Danielson,
[ "holding that possession of a sawedoff shotgun under 26 usc 5861d is a crime of violence and noting that congress found certain firearms sawedoff shot guns and grenades to be inherently dangerous and lacking in usefulness other than for violent and criminal purposes", "holding that shortbarreled shotguns are unprotected", "holding that burglary is violent felony", "holding that possession of a shortbarreled shotgun is a violent felony under the accas residual clause because sawedoff shotguns are inherently dangerous and lack usefulness except for violent and criminal purposes internal quotation marks omitted", "holding that possession of sawedoff shotgun is violent felony as defined by armed career criminal act" ]
33
Procedure Act unquestionably provides authority to agencies to adopt mandatory internal administrative appeals. See 5 U.S.C. § 704. Courts have routinely applied the exhaustion doctrine to bar judicial review of underlying merits determinations where a party fails to timely appeal under an agency’s internal regulations. See, e.g., Spitzer Great Lakes Ltd. v. United States EPA, 173 F.3d 412, 414 (6th Cir.1999) (“Because the Board’s order dismissing Spitzer’s administrative appeal was based solely on Spitzer’s failure to comply with the agency’s procedural deadlines, we limit our review to the question of whether the Board abused its discretion in requiring strict compliance with its regulatory deadlines.”); Glisson v. United States Forest Serv., 55 F.3d 1325, 1328 (7th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Blevins v. United States DOL, 683 F.2d 139,
[ "holding that bivens plaintiff was not required to exhaust administrative remedies where administrative remedy program provided only for injunctive relief", "holding that claims not presented to the ij and bia should be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies", "holding that partys failure to file a timely internal administrative appeal as required by regulations of the department of agriculture constituted failure to exhaust administrative remedies and precluded judicial action", "holding that constitutional claims against defendants in their individual capacities were precluded by plaintiffs failure to exhaust administrative remedies under pertinent statutory scheme", "holding that failure to take available appeal to board of immigration appeals constitutes failure to exhaust administrative remedies and deprives the court of appeals of jurisdiction to review" ]
22
CURIAM: Fahed T. Tawalbeh appeals the district court’s order denying his motion for reduction of sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2000). In criminal cases, the defendant must file his notice of appeal within ten days of the entry of judgment. Fed. R.App. P. 4(b)(1)(A); United States v. Alvarez, 210 F.3d 309, 310 (5th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). With or without a motion, the district court
[ "holding that 3582 proceeding is criminal in nature and tenday appeal period applies citing united states v petty 82 f3d 809 810 8th cir1996 and united states v ono 72 f3d 101 10203 9th cir1995", "holding 3582 proceeding is criminal in nature and tenday appeal period applies and collecting cases", "holding that 3582 proceeding is criminal in nature and tenday appeal period applies", "holding that the commandant of the united states disciplinary barracks and the united states are identical parties", "holding that sovereign immunity does not bar extinguishment of united states junior lien in proceeding in which united states was not a party" ]
00
Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58, 103 S.Ct. 400, 402, 74 L.Ed.2d 225, 228 (1982). Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ Cal. Civ.Code § 52.1 claims are involved in the appeal because they, like the § 1983 claims, require finding a violation of constitutional rights. Defendants conclude that the Court lacked jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ Cal. Civ.Code § 52.1 claims against Appellant Defendants. California Civil Code § 52.1 claims are not subject to qualified immunity. See e.g., Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1072 (9th Cir.2009) (“California law is ... clear that qualified immunity of the kind applied to actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not apply to actions brought under [Cal. Civil Code § 52.1].”); Venegas, 153 Cal.App.4th at 1248, 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 741 (<HOLDING>). Defendants appeal the Court’s denial of
[ "holding that preclusion rules apply in 1983 actions", "holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity", "holding that qualified immunity under 1983 does not apply to actions brought under 521", "holding that preclusion rules apply in section 1983 actions", "holding that in actions brought under 42 usc 1983 federal courts apply the states statute of limitation for personal injury" ]
22
Petitions for Judgments of Separate Courts. A petitioner who seeks relief from judgments of more than one state court must file a separate petition covering the judgment or judgments of each court. The amendment to the rule is purely semantic, as the change was “intended to be stylistic and no substantive change [was] intended, except [changes not affecting this provision].” Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, Rule 2, Rule 2 advisory committee’s notes on 2004 Amendments. 6 . Our holding is consistent with the principle, well-recognized as a matter of both federal and state jurisprudence, that resentencing does not affect the finality of the original judgment of conviction. See, e.g., United States v. Sanders, 247 F.3d 139, 144 (4th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). The same rule obtains as a matter of Florida
[ "holding resentencing does not affect the date on which the judgment of conviction became final", "holding that a conviction is deemed final on the date of sentencing when there is no evidence that notice of appeal was filed", "holding that the date on which the plaintiff learned of the defendants denial of tenure not the date on which the plaintiff became unemployed was when the statute of limitations began to run", "holding that interest does not begin to accrue until the date of judgment not the date of verdict", "holding that resentencing is required" ]
00
to modification may have pre-clusive effect for res judicata purposes. See, e.g., Spiker v. Spiker, 708 N.W.2d 347, 355 (Iowa 2006) (noting order granting continuing relief is “final” for res judicata purposes as long as there has been no substantial change in circumstance). And judgments are given res judicata effect during appeals. Peterson v. Eitzen, 173 N.W.2d 848, 850 (Iowa 1970) (“The judgment of the trial court is res judicata until set aside, modified or reversed.”); see also N. Star Steel Co. v. MidAmerican Energy Holdings Co., 184 F.3d 732, 737 (8th Cir. 1999) (“Under Iowa law, issue preclusion may be applied to a trial court’s ruling on the merits of an issue despite the pen-dency of an appeal from that ruling.”); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 13 cmts. c, f at 133, 135 (<HOLDING>). The Restatement defines “final judgment” to
[ "recognizing bankruptcy courts jurisdiction over such a collateral attack", "recognizing collateral attack on void order", "holding that federal rules of res judicata and collateral estoppel determine preclusive effect of prior federal ftca judgments even though liability is based on state law", "recognizing preclusive effect of judgments notwithstanding pending appeal or collateral attack", "holding that settlement agreements like consent judgments are not given preclusive effect unless the parties manifest their intent to give them such effect" ]
33
which objection is made. [The district court] may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). However, to obtain this de novo review of a magistrate judge’s R & R, an objecting party “must point out the specific portions of the report and recommendation to which [he] object[s].” U.S. Flour Corp. v. Certified Bakery, Inc., No. 10-CV-2522 (JS), 2012 WL 728227, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2012). If a party “makes only conclusory or general objections, or simply reiterates his original arguments, the Court reviews the Report and Recommendation only for clear error.” Pall Corp. v. Entegris, Inc., 249 F.R.D. 48, 51 (E.D.N.Y.2008); see also Mario v. P & C Food Markets, Inc., 313 F.3d 758, 766 (2d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Portions of the R & R to which a party makes
[ "holding that error was preserved by running objection because of defendants immediate objection to states specific question in combination with trial courts comments showing that it understood nature of defendants objection", "holding that plaintiffs objection to an r r was not specific enough to constitute an adequate objection under fedrcivp 72b", "holding that parties waived any choice of law objection by not raising an objection", "holding that an objection was adequate when the judge cut short the objection and the defendant was not afforded the opportunity to explain his objection fully", "holding that a party fails to preserve an evidentiary issue for appeal not only by failing to make a specific objection but also by making the wrong specific objection" ]
11
had an adequate remedy at law. The gist of appellants’ counterclaims is that American is a competitor and is unlawfully attempting to restrict them ability to maintain a competing business. Appellants’ complaint fails initially because they failed to support them written motion for continuance with an affidavit as required by rule 251. Tex.R. Civ. P. 251. Generally, when a movant fails to comply with rule 251, we presume the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying a motion for continuance. Villegas v. Carter, 711 S.W.2d 624, 626 (Tex.1986); Sw. Country Enters., Inc. v. Lucky Lady Oil Co., 991 S.W.2d 490, 493 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. denied); see also TriSteel Structures, Inc. v. Baptist Found. of Tex., 166 S.W.3d 443, 448-49 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2005, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). Appellants did not comply with rule 251;
[ "holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a continuance to allow defendant to present mitigating evidence in the form of letters and affidavits from family members when they were not requested until the day before the hearing", "holding that the district court did not err by concluding that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for continuance motion to withdraw and motion for reconsideration and rehearing", "holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants motion for a continuance when record showed that contrary to defendants contention state did not fail to comply with discovery duties and that defendant failed to show that denial resulted in harm to his case", "holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to strike when movant failed to show prejudice", "holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying motion for continuance when not in proper affidavit form" ]
44
and he accompanied the officers in their search of the garage, during which the officers discovered sixty-five bundles of marihuana. • The time between the officers’ arrival at appellant’s residence and appellant’s written consent was about ten to fifteen minutes. We conclude that the totality of the circumstances, as outlined above, show appellant’s consent was not freely and voluntarily given. Rather, appellant’s consent was the result of coercive police tactics aimed at forcing appellant to consent to a search of his residence. First, the officers knew they could not obtain a warrant to search appellant’s residence solely based upon the anonymous tip because the tip, standing alone, did not establish probable cause. See State v. Steelman, 93 S.W.3d 102, 108 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (<HOLDING>); see also Elardo v. State, 163 S.W.3d 760, 768
[ "holding anonymous tip that someone at the residence was dealing drugs did not amount to anything the tip was never substantiated and none of the occupants were ever charged with drug dealing", "holding that there was sufficient probable cause to search a defendants residence after evidence of drug dealing was found in his car during a traffic stop that was conducted when the defendant was coming from his residence and noting that under such circumstances a practical commonsense conclusion could be made that the drugs and money had been at the defendants residence a short time before the stop", "holding that the officers had sufficient evidence to believe that the defendant was inside the residence to execute the arrest warrant because the officers relied on the anonymous tip given to the defendants parole officer the drivers identification of the defendant as meaty in a photograph and his assertion that meaty was in the residence at that time selling drugs", "holding that the fact that the defendant did not handle the drugs is not dispositive of his involvement in drug dealing", "holding an informants tip can establish reasonable suspicion without investigative confirmation if the tip is credible" ]
00
first argues that the district court exceeded its constitutional authority under the Sixth Amendment when it imposed “an enhancement based on facts not admitted by him and not found by a jury.” He acknowledges, however, that the line of cases beginning with Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998), permits factfinding by the court regarding the nature of a prior conviction. But he wishes to preserve the issue in the event that the Supreme Court reconsiders Almendarez-Torres. By Ossa-Gallegos’s own admission, the district court’s classification of his prior sexual-assault conviction as violent does not violate his Sixth-Amendment rights under the current state of the law. See United States v. Richardson, 437 F.3d 550, 555 (6th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). The 16-level enhancement under the
[ "holding that the armed career criminal designation based on prior convictions does not violate the sixth amendment under booker", "holding that a sentencing court may determine the nature of a prior conviction without violating the sixth amendment", "holding that defendants sixth amendment right to trial by a jury was not violated by district courts reliance on his prior convictions for purposes of sentencing under the acca even though convictions were neither charged in indictment nor admitted", "holding that controlling law both before and after booker counsels that a judge can make factual findings about a defendants prior convictions without implicating the sixth amendment", "holding that defendants sixth amendment right to trial by a jury was not violated by district courts reliance on his prior convictions for purposes of sentencing as career offender" ]
33
Fed.R.Evid. 501 applies. This rule provides, in essence, that when the claims before the court are based in state law, the state privileges apply; but when the claims are based in federal law, the common law privileges apply. In spite of the distinction made by the Fed.R.Evid. 501, it has been held that when the information made privileged by state law “is relevant for both the federal and the state claims, the movant must rely upon a privilege developed by the federal courts and not state law privileges.” Sirmans v. City of South Miami, 86 F.R.D. 492, 495 (S.D.Fl.1980); see also, Vanderbilt v. Town of Chilmark, 174 F.R.D. 225, 226 (D.Ma.1997); Hancock v. Hobbs, 967 F.2d 462, 467 (11th Cir.1992); Wm. T. Thompson Co. v. General Nutrition Corp., 671 F.2d 100, 104 (3d Cir.1982)(<HOLDING>). Such is the case here. Notwithstanding the
[ "holding that when there are federal law claims in a case also presenting state law claims the federal rule favoring admissibility is the controlling rule the court found this approach consistent with the rule in federal practice disfavoring privileges not constitutionally based", "holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law", "holding that the federal rule favoring admissibility of relevant evidence applies to state law claims in federal cases to which state law privileges might oth erwise apply", "holding that exclusionary rule to be applied as a matter of state law is no broader than the federal rule", "holding that a federal court may resort to state law analogies for the development of a federal common law of privileges in instances where the federal rule is unsettled" ]
00
ND 161, ¶ 5, 652 N.W.2d 354, and states that “[a]ny party to any proceeding heard by an administrative agency, except when the order of the administrative agency is declared final by any other statute, may appeal from the order within 30 days after notice of the order has been given as required by section 28-32-39.” An “order” is defined in N.D.C.C. § 28-32-01(7) as “any agency action of particular applicability which determines the legal rights, duties, privileges, immunities, or other legal interests of one or more specific persons.” Section 28-32-42(3)(a), N.D.C.C., emphasizes that “[o]nly final orders are appealable. A procedural order made by an administrative agency while a proceeding is pending before it is not a final order.” [¶ 7] The requirement o N.W.2d 249, 251 (N.D.1992) (<HOLDING>); Ceartin v. Ochs, 479 N.W.2d 863, 865
[ "holding that a disqualification order in a criminal case is not appealable", "holding order granting a new trial is not a final appealable order because it does not terminate the action or any of the claims or parties in the action", "holding that this court lacked preliminary authority to review the district courts jurisdiction because there was no immediately appealable order before the court", "holding order partially vacating a judgment was not appealable because it does not provide the ultimate decision in the case and questions remained before the district court", "holding appealable a case dismissed in effect by the district courts order" ]
33
of law better left for the court to decide.”). We reverse the district court’s order insofar as it grants the defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law on the plaintiffs claim for arrest without probable cause under § 1983. In this case, the district court erred by considering the jury verdict' from the common law false arrest claims in its qualified immunity analysis. As explained above, whether a right is “clearly established” — ’that is, whether an objectively reasonable officer would have believed his conduct to be law ful, in light of clearly established law — is a question of law that must be resolved by the court, not the jury. We reverse the district court on this issue and remand for a determination of whether the defendants are entitled to 178, 183-84 (4th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939, 953-54
[ "holding that a 1983 due process claim that essentially contests the fairness of the plaintiffs prosecution is similar to his malicious prosecution claim and claims resembling malicious prosecution do not accrue until the prosecution has terminated in the plaintiffs favor ", "holding that the fourth amendment right implicated in a malicious prosecution action is the right to be free of unreasonable seizure of the person", "holding that a plaintiffs allegations that the defendant seized him pursuant to legal process that was not supported by probable cause and that the criminal proceedings terminated in his favor are sufficient to state a 1983 malicious prosecution claim alleging a seizure that was violative of the fourth amendment", "holding that section 1983 claims alleging due process violations stemming from malicious prosecution are unavailable when a state malicious prosecution action exists", "holding that under fourth amendment standards for determining probable cause for arrest and probable cause for search and seizure are same" ]
22
petition, in contrast, seeks the very different relief of rescinding the plea agreement, and it attacks the validity of his conviction and sentence. It is settled that “[mjotions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 are the presumptive means by which federal prisoners can challenge their convictions or sentences that are allegedly in violation of the Constitution,” Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir.2002), and a federal prisoner can seek relief under § 2241 only if the remedy provided by § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). Ryan’s attempt to void his plea agreement as a result of the government’s alleged breach must be brought in proceeding under § 2255. See Nichols v. Symmes, 553 F.3d 647, 649-50 (8th Cir. 2009) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Eakman, 378 F.3d
[ "holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to withdraw guilty plea filed three weeks after entering the plea", "holding that the court had no jurisdiction over an alleged breach of a plea agreement", "holding that prisoner who sought to withdraw guilty plea based on alleged breach of plea agreement due to his placement in a federal rather than a state prison facility had to bring claim under 2255 not 2241", "holding that a defendant who is allowed to withdraw his plea must either withdraw his plea to all charges or to none when his plea to all charges was part of an agreement with the state", "holding that a defendant may withdraw a guilty plea as a matter of right before it is accepted by the court based on ndr crim p 32d3 which states that a defendant may not withdraw his plea of guilty as a matter of right once the plea has been accepted by the court alteration in original" ]
22
The record shows that the district court considered the § 3553(a) sentencing factors in denying Perez’s motion for reduction. The district court was not required to expressly refer to the specific § 3553(a) factors or provide more specific reasons in support of its determination that a reduction was not warranted. See Whitebird, 55 F.3d at 1010; Henderson, 636 F.3d at 718. As for Perez’s argument that the district court should have applied the analysis in Pepper, the holding in Pepper applied to the consideration of post-sentencing reha bilitation when resentencing after a defendant’s sentence had been vacated on appeal, not on a motion to reduce a sentence under § 3582(c)(2). See 562 U.S. at 490, 131 S.Ct. 1229; United States v. Harris, 643 Fed.Appx. 340, 341-42 (5th Cir. 2016) (<HOLDING>). AFFIRMED. * Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the
[ "recognizing this distinction in case with eeoc intervention", "recognizing this distinction", "recognizing the boggs distinction", "recognizing this distinction between 2l12 and 4b12", "recognizing distinction made by majority" ]
11
bank is probably prohibited from dishonoring the check that is otherwise valid. Finally, case law dealing with similar facts has addressed whether the creditor must turn over the funds, not its receipt of the property after lawful presentment of a negotiable instrument. See, e.g., In re Thomas, 311 B.R. 75, 79-80 (Bankr. W.D.Mo.2004). The Seventh Circuit’s decision in In re Roete, 936 F.2d 963 (7th Cir.1991), is not instructive as the check in that case was dishonored. The Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens Bank of Maryland v. Strumpf 516 U.S. 16, 116 S.Ct. 286, 133 L.Ed.2d 258 (1995), also is not helpful because the bank froze the debtor’s account without violating the automatic stay to preserve its setoff rights, and setoff rights are not present 290 B.R. 487 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2003) (<HOLDING>); In re Boscia, 237 B.R. 184
[ "holding creditor willfully violated the automatic stay in refusing after notified of debtors bankruptcy filing to turn over debtors funds in his possession", "holding refusal to turn over property seized prepetition constituted violation of stay once notice of the stay had been given", "holding that the automatic stay terminates as to the debtor personally and as to his nonestate property but that the stay persists as to property of the bankruptcy estate", "holding that creditors failure to voluntarily turn over property lawfully seized prepetition constituted violation of automatic stay", "holding secured creditors refusal to turn over property of debtors estate to debtor upon demand constituted an exercise of control over such property in violation of automatic stay" ]
44
authori 782 N.E.2d 275, 280-81 (2002) (detention for fifteen minutes to write out ticket while awaiting arrival of drug-sniffing dog called at outset of stop held unreasonable absent reasonable suspicion); Haas v. State, 172 S.W.3d 42, 50 (Tex.App.-Waco 2005, pet. ref’d) (citing United States v. Kelley, 981 F.2d 1464, 1470 (5th Cir.1993)) (noting, under appropriate circumstances, extensive questioning about matters wholly unrelated to routine traffic stop may violate Fourth Amendment). 29 . Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407, 125 S.Ct. at 837. 30 . Kothe, 152 S.W.3d at 64; Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 245 (purpose of stop for suspicion o 392 U.S. at 32-33, 88 S.Ct. at 1885-86 (Harlan, J., concurring)); see also United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201, 122 S.Ct. 2105, 2110, 153 L.Ed.2d 242 (2002) (<HOLDING>). 46 . Bostick, 501 U.S. at 436, 111 S.Ct. at
[ "holding that one does not arouse reasonable suspicion merely by attempting to walk away from the police", "holding only reasonable suspicion is required to conduct a field sobriety test", "holding that while each separate item standing alone did not provide reasonable suspicion a combination of factors clearly satisfied the reasonable suspicion requirement", "holding that the excluded evidence required a finding of reasonable suspicion", "holding reasonable suspicion not required provided police do not induce cooperation by coercive means" ]
44
and the items that could be seized. The government agents responsible did not minimize intrusions on privacy, however, but instead seized papers and records beyond those the warrant authorized. See United States v. Rettig, 589 F.2d 418, 423 (9th Cir.1978) (concluding that although the warrant was sufficiently particular, the executing “agents did not confine their search in good faith to the objects of the warrant, and that while purporting to execute it, they substantially exceeded any reasonable interpretation of its provisions”). Unlike cases where the magistrate judge erred in filling out the warrant but the government reasonably relied on the judge’s approval, here the magistrate judge properly authorized the warrant but the agents did not follow it. See Hurd, 499 F.3d at 969 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Hitchcock, 286 F.3d 1064
[ "holding that officers reasonably relied on the warrant though judge inadvertently failed to initial the appropriate line", "holding that the warrant application at issue did not specifically mention the presence of criminal activity at defendants residence but that the executing officers reasonably relied on the warrant", "holding that if the application for a warrant contains probable cause apart from the improper information then the warrant is lawful and the independent source doctrine applies providing that the officers were not prompted to obtain the warrant by what they observed during the initial entry", "holding that the warrant application at issue did not specifically mention the presence of criminal activity at defendants residence but that the executing officers reasonably relied on warrant", "holding that executing officers reasonably relied on judges determination that there was probable cause to search motel room even though search warrant affidavit failed to mention a connection between motel room and criminal activity" ]
00
district court concluded, however, that McVeigh had not come close to establishing a reasonable basis to believe that he would be able to satisfy the exceedingly demanding standards applicable to a fraud on the court claim. Without the requisite fraud on the court foundation, the district court concluded that it would not have jurisdiction over McVeigh’s anticipated Rule 60(b) motion. Because § 1651 does not constitute a grant of jurisdiction, but instead merely empowers federal courts to issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of respective jurisdiction, and because it would not have jurisdiction over McVeigh’s anticipated Rule 60(b) motion, the district court concluded that it must deny McVeigh’s request for a stay. See Hatch v. Oklahoma, 92 F.3d 1012, 1017 (10th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>) (citing Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880,
[ "recognizing numerous different grounds which may be relied upon for granting a stay and that in general a stay will be allowed or refused on the particular grounds best fitting the exigencies of the individual case and with a view to doing justice between the parties", "holding where movant asserts several grounds in support of its summary judgment motion and the trial court does not specify the grounds on which judgment was granted the reviewing court can affirm the judgment if any of the grounds are meritorious", "holding that a court may issue injunctive relief only when the movant demonstrates four factors substantial likelihood of success on the merits irreparable harm no substantial injury to the other party and furtherance of the public interest", "holding that a stay of execution is only appropriate where the movant demonstrates substantial grounds upon which relief might be granted", "holding that amendment is futile if the proposed amended complaint does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted" ]
33
“fully and finally affirmed,” it remained possible that attorneys’ fees could be reduced or the order reversed altogether. R. 97-1, Pg. ID 1488-89, 1508 (providing that “the Settling Parties enter[ed] into this Agreement on a conditional basis,” and that if the order was reversed on appeal the agreement “shall be deemed null and void”). And while it would have been good business practice to set the money aside, the contempt power is not meant to force businesses into good business practices. Nor is it meant to force parties to comply with contracts, where a breach of contract action would be more appropriate. Rather, the contempt power is reserved for parties that knowingly violate clear and specific commands of the court. See, e.g., Downey v. Clauder, 30 F.3d 681, 686 (6th Cir. 1994) (<HOLDING>); NLRB v. Deena Artware, Inc., 261 F.2d 503,
[ "holding that an order that did not specify a date or command the contemnor to act immediately was not definite and specific", "holding that letter stating an annual salary did not embody the terms of any agreement between the parties as it did not specify a beginning date duration of time and did not require acceptance signatures", "holding that the date of the federal indictment not the date of the state arrest was the triggering date for the speedytrial act", "holding that an order of consolidation is interlocutory and not immediately appealable", "holding that the march of time began for the period in which to file a rule 59e motion on the date the court entered an order that was immediately appealable" ]
00
Cir.1993); United States v. Miller, 821 F.2d 546, 548-49 (11th Cir.1987). In determining whether such a non-owner may claim a privacy interest in a car that he is driving, courts consider two factors: whether the driver manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the area searched; and whether that expectation of privacy is one that society would find objectively reasonable. United States v. Amaral-Estrada, 509 F.3d 820, 826-27 (7th Cir.2007). Courts have repeatedly recognized the right of a driver to assert a Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches of a vehicle where the driver is operating that vehicle, with the permission of the owner. Garcia, 897 F.2d at 1418-19; Soto, 988 F.2d at 1553; Miller, 821 F.2d at 548-49; see also Thomas, 447 F.3d at 1197-98 (<HOLDING>). In lawfully possessing and controlling the
[ "holding that even a driver not listed as an authorized driver for a rental car could nevertheless have an expectation of privacy if given permission to use the car by an authorized driver", "holding that during a routine traffic stop it is reasonable for an officer to search the driver for weapons before placing the driver in a patrol car if placing the driver in the patrol car during the investigation prevents officers or the driver from being subjected to a dangerous condition and placing the driver in the patrol car is the least intrusive means to avoid the dangerous condition", "holding that the driver of a car who had permission to use the car had standing to challenge its search", "holding that the driver of a borrowed car had the requisite legitimate expectation of privacy to support standing for fourth amendment purposes", "holding that the driver of a ear owned by his wife who had given him permission to use it had a legitimate expectation of privacy under the fourth amendment" ]
00
prosecution, a reasonable juror could conclude that (1) Ms. Colwell sold Carter the green Chrysler that was recovered by Officer Oliver; (2) Carter was the man Ms. Ford saw enter the Hartsville Citgo station and change into coveralls shortly before the bank robbery; (3) Carter was the man whom Ms. Cornwell saw at the carwash before the bank robbery; (4) Carter’s green car was the same car that Mr. Holder saw the robber drive away in after the robbery; (5) it was Carter who fled from both Officer Oliver and Sergeant Lanier; and (6) Carter fled because he knew he committed the robbery at the Hartsville Bank. In sum, a rational fact finder could decide that Carter was the man who robbed Hartsville Bank on October 15, 1996. See, e.g., United States v. Bond, 22 F.3d 662, 667 (6th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). 11 . The district court included the
[ "holding that the defendants allegations that his codefendant admitted that the defendant had no role in the robbery and that the codefendant had not testified on the defendants behalf because he had been coerced by the state were sufficient to state a prima facie claim of newly discovered evidence", "holding that there was sufficient evidence for a robbery conviction where the getaway car a red firebird was identified by an individual who followed the vehicle and wrote down the license plate the firebird had been stolen from a gas station in a nearby city several weeks earlier the firebird had a defendants fingerprints both on its inside and outside on the drivers side a friend of one defendant testified that he had seen him driving a red firebird two or three weeks before the robbery a music tape reported missing by the owner of the firebird was found in one defendants house ammunition for handguns a spent shotgun shell and stacks of cash sorted by denomination were found in one defendants house a friend testified that the defendants confided in him about the robbery and an fbi agent testified that he overheard the defendants talking about killing a person who planned to testify against them", "holding that defendants false statement was material even though the grand jury was not certain that the defendant had lied until several weeks later when three witnesses testified contrary to the defendant", "holding that the defendants sentence for robbery was not inappropriate", "holding that there was sufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation when the defendant previously planned to commit the robbery armed himself with a shotgun and shot the victim during the robbery" ]
11
the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). Rule 23(b)(3) requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that “questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” In applying these standards, the Court focuses on “the substantive elements of plaintiffs’ cause of action and inquire into the proof necessary for the various elements.” Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 672 (7th Cir.1981). Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that “the predominance criterion is far more demanding” than “Rule 23(a)’s commonality requirement.” Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 62 F.R.D. 668, 674 (D.Wyo. 2011) (<HOLDING>); Kenro, Inc. v. Fax Daily, 962 F.Supp. 1162,
[ "holding class action to be superior adjudication method where individual class members had no interest in controlling prosecution of individual actions", "holding that class action was superior to individual suits where class members had relatively small interests and might not have the wherewithal to bring suit to protect their individual rights", "holding jurisdiction over an individual may not usually be predicated on jurisdiction over a corporation unless the corporation is the alter ego of the individual or when the individual perpetrates a fraud", "holding that because the tcpa claims will require extensive individual fact inquiries into whether each individual gave express consent by providing their wireless number to the creditor during the transaction that resulted in the debt owed individual inquiries predominate over the class action", "holding that because no class was certified at the time the individual claims were dismissed the class action was properly dismissed" ]
33
distinguishes work specific to Williams. (Jan. 31, 2006 Hackett Aff. 113-9.) Indeed, the affidavit explains that defense counsel excluded approximately $1 million in fees for work that could be used in this case and Kutten II. (Id. 13.) Third, Plaintiffs argue that Rule 41(d) provides only for an award of costs—not attorneys’ fees. Courts disagree on this issue. See Rogers, 230 F.3d at 874-75 (conceding that “the majority of courts find that attorney fees are available under Rule 41(d),” but nonetheless holding that the plain language of Rule 41(d) does not include attorneys’ fees). However, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has awarded attorneys’ fees under Rule 41(d). See Evans v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 623 F.2d 121, 122 (8th Cir.1980); see also Copeland, 462 F.Supp.2d at 1022-24 (<HOLDING>). In addition, the Eighth Circuit has
[ "holding trial court had no authority to award attorneys fees when arbitrator had stated he would not award attorneys fees", "holding that a court may award attorneys fees under rule 41d", "holding that a district court may award attorneys fees while the merits are on appeal", "holding that an award of attorneys fees under supreme court rule 38 precursor to rule 222 did not preempt an award of attorneys fees to which one is otherwise entitled and thus appellant could seek an award of attorneys fees pursuant to section 1577300 which permits an award of fees for a party prevailing in an action against a state agency", "holding that a court may award attorneys fees in a successful lmrda action" ]
11
Mr. Rosen “ethically would be compelled to inform other clients of [one witness's] testimony if detrimental to them.” Mr. Rosen, as noted earlier, has avoided that problem by keeping himself unacquainted with each witness’s version of the events at the Post. 12 . Counsel for appellant Rosen and Local 6 conceded at oral argument that there is no evidence in the record indicating what the witnesses think their relationship is with respect to Mr. Rosen, and furthermore that the witnesses were never asked whether they wanted this type of “representation.” 13 . The District Court has power to find criminal contempt on the part of a grand jury witness for refusing to obey a court order requiring him to testify. E. g., Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162, 86 S.Ct. 352, 15 L.Ed.2d 240 (1965) (<HOLDING>). Of course, “the trial judge [should] first
[ "holding that right was available in grand jury proceedings", "holding fedrcrimp 42b applicable to such criminal contempt proceedings for refusals to testify before the grand jury", "holding that where witness refused to take the oath and testify his grand jury testimony should not have been admitted because he was not subject to cross examination before the grand jury", "holding no right to crossexamine in grand jury proceedings", "holding one man grand jury that held witness in contempt and sentenced him to prison was contempt proceeding to which there was a right to public access" ]
11
the breadth of § 541 to hold that causes of action which accrued prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition are included in the bankruptcy estate). Upon the filing of a Chapter 7 petition, an interim Trustee is appointed to administer, inter alia, the property of the estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 701. The Trustee is the sole representative of the estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 323(a). As such, the Trustee has the exclusive right to prosecute causes of action that are property of the bankruptcy estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 323(b); see also Jones v. Harrell, 858 F.2d 667, 669 (11th Cir.1988) (concluding that a “trustee succeeds to all causes of action held by a debtor at the time the bankruptcy petition is filed”); In re Labrum & Doak, No. CIV.A. 99-753, 1999 WL 667284, at *1 (E.D.Pa. Aug. 26, 1999) (<HOLDING>) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 323(b)). Thus, after a
[ "holding that a state officer sued in his individual capacity may be held personally liable for damages under 42 usc 1983 based upon actions taken in his official capacity", "holding that the trustee alone has the capacity to sue and be sued ", "holding that bank could not bring counterclaim in its capacity as trustee", "holding that delaware law controlled delaware corporations capacity to sue or be sued", "holding that the words sue and be sued when used in a statute do not by themselves waive immunity" ]
11
with the department. Section 84-917 provides that one “aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case” before an administrative agency “shall be entitled to judicial review ... .” Assuming, but not deciding, that the department has jurisdiction to pass upon the rights, if any, which Inner Harbour may have against the department under the latter’s agreement with the adoptive parents, the fact is that the matter was not before the department, and it therefore made no decision, final or otherwise, with respect thereto. That being so, there was no decision for the district court to review in that regard; it was therefore without jurisdiction to issue any orders with respect to the adoption agreement. See Bohling v. State Bd. of Pub. Accountancy, 243 Neb. 666, 501 N.W.2d 714 (1993) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the portion of the district
[ "holding that district court lacked power to decide personal jurisdiction issue already decided by district of columbia superior court", "holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to review state disciplinary proceedings against attorney", "holding that this court lacked jurisdiction under 46110 for lack of finality and that the district court also lacked jurisdiction because the orders were not final and thus not ripe for review", "holding that in absence of valid final order district court lacked power to review boards action", "holding that this court lacked preliminary authority to review the district courts jurisdiction because there was no immediately appealable order before the court" ]
33
that the district court’s limitation of wrongful death damages and Kane’s subsequent choice to voluntarily abandon his attempt to seek damages for Cornish’s emotional distress left nothing further for the district court to do. We disagree. Rather, we find that Kane’s voluntary abandonment of the other “claims” in his complaint merely foreclosed the possibility of his recovering a certain type of damages. The question that will determine liability — whether the officers knocked and announced prior to entering Cornish’s apartment — is still live. Further, if this question is resolved in Kane’s favor, he will be able to recover nominal damages under § 1983 for the violation of Cornish’s constitutional rights. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978) (<HOLDING>). As such, a jury must resolve this factual
[ "holding that nominal damages are appropriate for deprivations of constitutional rights that do not result in actual injury", "holding that the right to nominal damages for eighth amendment violations can be waived if such damages are not timely requested", "recognizing availability of nominal damages for violations of constitutional rights notwithstanding statutory bar in prison litigation reform act 42 usc 1997ee", "holding that under 1983 violations of constitutional rights are actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury", "holding that the right to nominal damages was waived in a breach of duty action when plaintiff failed to raise the issue of nominal damages until after the verdict" ]
33
that the presumption of immunity creates an “unusual” standard for summary judgment. As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit observed, [T]he rebuttable presumption ... creates an unusual summary judgment standard that can best be expressed as follows: “Might a reasonable jury, viewing the facts in the best light for [the plaintiff], conclude that he has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendants’ actions are outside the scope of § 11112(a)?” If not, the court should grant the defendant’s motion. In a sense, the presumption language in HCQIA means that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the peer review process was not reasonable. (Citations omitted.) Bryan, 33 F.3d at 1333; see also Gordon v. Lewistown Hosp., 423 F.3d 184, 202 (3d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). We explained this standard in Goodwich: [T]he
[ "holding that the standard for a motion for judgment on the pleadings is the same as the standard for a motion to dismiss", "holding that plaintiff incorrectly concludes that an abuse of discretion is the standard of review for summary judgment", "holding that hcqias presumption of immunity creates an unusual standard for reviewing summary judgment orders as the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the professional review process was not reasonable and thus did not meet the standard for immunity", "holding that the standard of review for the sufficiency of the evidence is the same as the standard for denying a motion for a directed verdict", "holding that the defendant bears the burden of proving outside contact with the jury" ]
22
practices. We have previously rejected this precise argument in FTC v. Dixie Finance Co., 695 F.2d 926, 930 (5th Cir.1983), albeit under the second prong of McCarran Act preemption test set forth in Cochran, 606 F.2d at 464. The analysis set forth in Dixie Finance is equally applicable in this case, and for the sake of brevity, we will not repeat it. 7 . The First, Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits hold that if a practice is illegal under both state and federal law but federal law provides for a stronger remedy, the McCarran Act does not preempt the federal law. See Villafane-Neriz v. FDIC, 75 F.3d 727, 735-36 (1st Cir.1996) (Federal Deposit Insurance Act); Merchants Home Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Frank B. Hall & Co., 50 F.3d 1486, 1492 (9th Cir.1995) (RICO); NAACP, 978 F.2d at 295-97 (<HOLDING>); Mackey v. Nationwide Ins. Cos., 724 F.2d 419,
[ "holding that the federal cigarette labeling and advertising act did not preempt plaintiffs state law claims", "holding flsa did not preempt state law fraud claim", "recognizing provisions of the fair housing act that forbid false statements that housing is unavailable to a person because of his race", "holding that mccarran act did not preempt application of fair housing act against redlining by insurance companies where state law outlawed the practice but provided no private remedy", "holding that the brooke amendment to the housing act provided a cause of action under 1983" ]
33
explicitly state whether it provides the exclusive means for removing a tow company from the list, and it contains no “explicitly mandatory language” limiting the police departments’ discretion to “maintain” the tow-rotation lists. See Ridgely, 512 F.3d at 735-36. In sum, for our interlocutory review of the denial of a preliminary injunction, the ordinances do not limit discretion sufficiently to confer a property interest in remaining on the tow-rotation list; the ordinances do not contain the requisite mandatory language. This is especially true in the light of our policy of construing ambiguities in defendants’ favor where a purported property interest is not “unequivocally granted in clear and explicit terms”. Batterton v. Tex. Gen. Land Office, 783 F.2d 1220, 1223 (5th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>); see also Mills v. Brown, 159 Tex. 110, 316
[ "holding in deciding whether texas law confers a property interest that purported legislative grants of property rights or privileges must be construed in favor of the state and whatever is not unequivocally granted in clear and explicit terms is withheld quoting texas v standard 414 sw2d 148 153 tex1967", "holding that jurisdiction existed over nonresident printing customer despite the fact that texas printer solicited the business in alabama and nonresident sent no personnel to texas because nonresident placed additional orders from which it expected to profit sent payments to texas sent and received printing materials to and from texas paid for shipping of printed goods from texas and sent payments to texas the transactions were governed by texas law and substantial part of performance occurred in texas", "holding that where the entity was incorporated in texas and the shareholders reside in texas and the bankruptcy case is pending in texas texas law not arizona law should be applied", "recognizing strong interest in protecting texas citizens where tort was committed in whole or in part in texas", "holding misrepresentation made by outofstate defendant to texas plaintiff who relied on it in texas satisfied requirement for jurisdiction under longarm statute based on commission of a tort in part in texas" ]
00
district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law defamation claim. See Big Bear Lodging Ass’n v. Snow Summit, Inc., 182 F.3d 1096, 1106 n. 9 (9th Cir.1999). The district court erred as a matter of law in holding that Rivera’s defamation claim was preempted by FELA. See Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 556, 114 S.Ct. 2396. A claim for defamation does not result in a physical impact and is therefore not the type of claim that FELA was designed to encompass. See id. at 555-56, 114 S.Ct. 2396; see also Smith v. Union Pacific Railroad, 236 F.3d 1168, 1172 (10th Cir. 2000) (rejecting plaintiffs emotional distress claim under FELA because there was no physical impact causing the disorder); Grown v. Union Pacific Railroad, 162 F.3d 984, 985-86 (8th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Rivera should therefore be permitted to
[ "recognizing torts of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress", "holding that employee could not state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress under fela without a showing of physical impact", "holding that under south dakota law compensation for negligent infliction of emotional distress requires manifestation of physical symptoms and intentional infliction of emotional distress requires an extreme disabling emotional response", "holding that a tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is distinct from a claim for emotional distress damages under the employment discrimination statute", "holding that in being discharged employee did not sustain the direct physical impact required to maintain an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress" ]
11
and filed an opinion on January 20, 1994, in which he ruled that, in light of claimant’s inconsistent reports of his accident to doctors, he failed to prove an injury by accident. The commission reversed the deputy commissioner’s ruling and awarded claimant benefits beginning November 17,1992. The commission further stated that it could not rely on history relayed by a claimant to determine how an accident occurred. II. CONSIDERATION OF MEDICAL HISTORIES As the Supreme Court of Virginia has stated, “injuries resulting from repetitive trauma ... as well as injuries sustained at an unknown time, are not ‘injuries by accident’ within the meaning of Code § 65.1-7.” Morris v. Morris, 238 Va. 578, 589, 385 S.E.2d 858, 865 (1989) (emphasis added). In this 9, 434 S.E.2d 904, 907 (1993) (<HOLDING>); Baker v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 11 Va.App.
[ "recognizing that commissions rules permit hearsay evidence", "recognizing privilege under federal rules", "holding that because the rules of evidence including the rule against hearsay do not apply to sentencing hearings the district court did not err in relying on hearsay in ordering restitution", "holding that rules of evidence do not permit an expert to give opinion or state legal conclusions regarding a question of law", "holding that the district court did not err in relying on hearsay evidence where the government offered reasons why its hearsay evidence had indicia of reliability and the court considered the reliability of the evidence in deciding the weight to give the hearsay evidence" ]
00
that we should reverse our prior precedents and hold that, under Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979), the Fourth Amendment permits visual strip searches of all jail detainees upon being booked into a detention facility, regardless of reasonable suspicion. Second, the County argues in the alternative that the district court erred in classifying hindering apprehension as a “minor offense,” and that the nature of Ms. Jimenez’s offense therefore justified the search regardless of the lack of individualized reasonable suspicion. For the following reasons, we disagree. A t a policy of strip searching every arrestee booked into a jail or detention facility does not violate the Fourth Amendment); Roberts v. Rhode Island, 239 F.3d 107, 112-13 (1st Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Weber v. Dell, 804 F.2d 796, 802 (2d
[ "holding that mandatory visual strip search policy in county jail was unconstitutional", "holding a visual strip and visual cavity search unreasonable when done beside a police car", "holding that mandatory visual strip search policy at correctional institution intake center was unconstitutional", "holding unconstitutional blanket jail policy of subjecting all arrestees to strip and visual body cavity searches", "holding that mandatory routine visual strip search policy for all arrestees who were to be introduced into general jail population was constitutional" ]
22
research and development tasks was erroneous, because it was inaccurate and contrary to OHA precedent determining “research and development support” to be an acceptable justification for the NAICS Code 541712 designation. Pl. Mot. JAR at 22-23 (citing NAICS Appeal of DCS Corp., SBA No. NAICS-4874 (2007); see also NAICS Appeal of Davis-Paige Mgmt. Sys., LLC, SBA No. NAICS-5055 (2009)). Although some of the May 15, 2012 Solicitation’s research and development activities “envision direct performance on the part of the contractor,” the designation of NAICS Code 541712 also would be proper when “the work is an integral part of the research and development that will be conducted.” Pl. Mot.. JAR at 23 (citing NAICS Appeal of Information Ventures, Inc., SBA No. NAICS-4945, at 6-7 (2008) (<HOLDING>)). In sum, OHA’s decision was contrary to
[ "holding that congress intended the phrase physical force incorporated into 922g9 to encompass crimes characterized by the application of any physical force", "recognizing that an arrest requires either physical force or where physical force is absent submission to the assertion of authority", "holding that work by the contractor that did not itself entail physical research nonetheless was an integral part of physical research to be performed by the agency and thus supported the designation of naics code 541712", "holding that your work exclusion is triggered only where the damage at issue is to work performed by you and is caused by work performed by you and does not apply to damage caused to original construction of a house during later repair work", "holding iowa common law touching assault met use of physical force required for enhancement under 18 usc 922g9 be cause any physical contact by necessity requires physical force to complete" ]
22
to review by the courts.” Goonsuwan v. Ashcroft, 252 F.3d 383, 390 (5th Cir.2001); see also Bonhometre v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 442, 447 (3d Cir.2005) (“[A] claim is ‘available as of right’ if, at the very least, (1) the alien’s claim was within the jurisdiction of the BIA to consider and implicated agency expertise, and (2) the agency was capable of granting the remedy sought by the alien.”). “The principle underlying this policy is that courts should not address an immigration issue until the appropriate administrative authority has had the opportunity to apply its specialized knowledge and experience to the matter.” Padilla v. Gonzales, 470 F.3d 1209, 1214 (7th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted); See also I.N.S. v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16, 123 S.Ct. 353, 154 L.Ed.2d 272 (2002) (<HOLDING>). The Government contends that this Court does
[ "holding that the supreme court has final appellate review of agency decisions", "holding that an appellate court cannot consider an issue that was not preserved for appellate review", "holding that except in rare circumstances an appellate court should not intrude upon the domain which congress has exclusively entrusted to an administrative agency", "holding that an appellate court has discretion to consider an issue not argued by the parties", "recognizing the principle that an administrative agency error should not work to a claimants detriment" ]
22
claim time-barred, and in finding that he failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact entitling him to surcharge and contract reformation on either his § 102(a) or § 404(a) claims. Because Osberg seeks the same relief under § 404(a) as under § 102(a), and because the timeliness of the § 404(a) claim is undisputed, we need not conclusively decide whether Osberg’s § 102(a) claim is subject to a three- or six-year statute of limitations to resolve the instant appeal. To survive summary judgment on his disclosure claims, Osberg was required to raise a genuine issue of material fact with respect to his demand for “appropriate equitable relief’ — specifically, surcharge or reformation — under ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3). See CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S.Ct. at 1879-80 (<HOLDING>). We recently articulated the appropriate
[ "recognizing those actions for monetary relief that we have characterized as equitable such as actions for disgorgement of improper profits", "holding that monetary damages may be awarded in a 1132a3 claim because when sought as a remedy for breach of fiduciary duty restitution is properly regarded as an equitable remedy because the fiduciary concept is equitable", "recognizing surcharge and reformation as traditional equitable remedies that may allow for awarding monetary compensation based on misleading disclosures", "holding that state prisoner seeking only monetary damages in 1983 suit need not exhaust administrative remedies pursuant to 1997e if such remedies do not provide for the award of monetary relief", "holding that equitable relief is only appropriate where legal remedies are inadequate" ]
22
on the same or similar elements. Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 90, 106 S.Ct. 433, 438, 88 L.Ed.2d 387, 395 (1985); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 317, 98 S.Ct. 1079,1082, 55 L.Ed.2d 303, 309 (1978); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 136-38, 79 S.Ct. 676, 686, 3 L.Ed.2d 684, 694-95 (1959). This concept of “dual sovereignty” is premised on the principle that the states and federal government are each sovereign entities with the power to independently prosecute criminal offenses created under the laws of that sovereign by employing their own prosecutorial and adjudicative institutions for that purpose. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 320, 98 S.Ct. at 1084, 55 L.Ed.2d at 310-11. This court has recognized this principle for many years. See State v. Moore, 143 Iowa 240, 121 N.W. 1052 (1909) (<HOLDING>). While conceding the force of the dual
[ "recognizing legislature knows difference between prosecution and conviction by noting former jeopardy provisions of code 192294 provide that if the same act be a violation of two or more statutes conviction under one of such statutes shall be a bar to a prosecution or proceeding under the other or others and holding that if the legislature had intended that the statutory bar apply to felony cases tried in the circuit court after the resolution in district court of misdemeanor charges arising out of the same act it would have provided that a conviction for a criminal offense arising out of one act would bar a later conviction for another offense arising out of the same act", "holding that foreign states prosecution did not bar subsequent florida prosecution for same conduct", "holding that a judgment in a criminal prosecution for dwi did not bar a subsequent civil proceeding founded on the same facts", "holding federal conviction for forcibly breaking and entering post office does not bar state prosecution for burglary based on same facts", "holding the same for malicious prosecution" ]
33