Datasets:

coastalcph

/

lex_glue

like 49

Follow

CoAStaL NLP Group 28

[ "holding that the economic loss rale did not bar banks claim against mortgagors attorney for negligent misrepresentation where there was no contract between the bank and the attorney", "holding negligent misrepresentation sufficient", "holding that economic loss rule barred claim for breach of fiduciary duty where plaintiffs claim arose solely as a result of the existence of a contract between the parties", "holding economic loss rule did not bar negligent misrepresentation claim where parties had no contract", "holding economic loss rule did not bar recovery of tort damages on statutory fraud claim based upon fraudulent inducement" ]

[ "holding that in a suit against state officials in their official capacities monetary relief unlike prospective injunctive relief is generally barred by the eleventh amendment", "holding that such claims however cannot be brought directly against the state or a state agency but only against state officials in their official capacities", "holding an exception to eleventh amendment immunity inapplicable in a suit against state officials on the basis of state law", "holding that barring waiver by the state the eleventh amendment precludes federal courts from hearing state claims brought against state officials in their official capacities", "holding that an action brought against the state officials in their official capacities was not properly removed to federal court because the district court lacked jurisdiction" ]

[ "holding the tenday requirement was ministerial and the defendant failed to show he was prejudiced by the delay", "holding that an appellants due process rights were not violated when he did not receive brady material before his transfer hearing because he will be able to make effective use of any brady material at trial", "holding that the defendant insufficiently pled the brady claim because he failed to assert how the evidence was material or how he was prejudiced by the states nondisclo sure", "holding that the brady claim was insufficiently pled in the rule 3851 motion because the defendant presented no factual basis that the disputed item ever existed or contained exculpatory information", "holding that the defendant did not require advance notice where he could not show how he was prejudiced by late notice or how he could have been helped by additional notice" ]

[ "holding that threatening employee to mind her own business investigating her videotaping her without her permission and forcing her to take polygraph could not be considered adverse employment actions because they had no effect on conditions of employment", "holding that the word interfere in the regulation could not p 7 fairly be interpreted to encompass the respondents failure to unlock her door and her remonstrances on constitutional grounds", "holding that relative to the threat that she posed physically separating tina cortez from her telephone taking her by the arm escorting her from her home taking the keys to her home and locking the door and placing her in the locked back seat of a patrol car was excessive force as well as an unlawful seizure under the fourth amendment", "holding that the former wife did not waive her attorneyclient privilege simply because the credibility of her claim that she relied on her husbands representations could be impeached by deposing her former attorney", "holding that the word interfere in a dc regulation criminalizing the interfering with or preventing of building inspections by health officers could not be interpreted to encompass respondents failure to unlock her door and her remonstrances on fourth amendment grounds" ]

[ "holding debtor satisfied first prong even though she had cable television", "holding that debtor failed the first brunner prong because she did not demonstrate that she had maximized earnings and minimized expenses", "holding plaintiff failed to demonstrate disparate treatment because she failed to show she was similarly situated to coworker to whom she compared herself", "holding that a plaintiff can show that she is qualified by presenting credible evidence that she continued to possess the objective qualifications she held when she was hired", "holding that debtor did not satisfy the third prong because she did not seek out loan consolidation options even though she made several payments on her student loan debt" ]

[ "recognizing that mcl 57011076 provides a real property owner with a defense to a claim of lien if the owner can show that the sum of payments made pursuant to the specific contract plus the claim of lien exceed the price of the contract", "holding that owner of townhouse was nominee of relative and therefore lien on property by irs was proper", "holding that property seized by a creditor prior to debtors bankruptcy was property of the estate even though creditor the irs held a secured interest a tax lien in the property", "holding that where property subject to the irss timely filed lien is sold during a nonjudicial sale and the irs is not given notice of the sale the sale of the property is made subject to and without disturbing the lien", "holding that the lien bond releases the property from the lien but the lien is then secured by the bond" ]

[ "holding rule 38 applies to frivolous criminal appeals as well as civil appeals", "holding that cr 60b applies to criminal as well as civil judgments", "holding that amended note 12 applies to choate as well as inchoate offenses", "holding that sentence factor manipulation applies to statutory minimums as well as to the guidelines", "holding that it is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy spacious as well as clean wellbalanced as well as carefully patrolled" ]

[ "recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel", "holding no ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim for failure to raise as basis for appeal of conviction ineffective assistance of trial counsel where basis for the latter claim was inadequate", "holding that plea did not waive claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to seek suppression", "holding that right to appeal claim of ineffective assistance of counsel alleging that counsel failed to convey plea negotiations timely and adequately inform of consequences of pleading guilty to jury for sentencing waived because plea of guilty to jury was independent of and not supported by alleged ineffective assistance of counsel claims", "holding that failure to object to admissible evidence was not ineffective assistance of counsel" ]

[ "holding testimony that inter alia paint at issue was defective and of no value whatsoever was sufficient evidence that the consideration had totally failed punctuation omitted", "holding that there was no evidence of market value where owners testimony affirmatively showed that it was based on personal value", "holding inter alia that common law claims were preempted", "holding that the trial court properly excluded evidence that other persons had a motive to kill the victims because inter alia such evidence was speculative", "holding inter alia that expert testimony was not required to prove damages for emotional distress in an abuse of process claim" ]

[ "holding that an insurer acted in bad faith by failing to keep the insured informed of settlement negotiations", "holding a settlement privilege exists as to thirdparty discovery of settlement negotiations", "holding that continuing settlement negotiations if infected with an element of deception may create an estoppel", "holding a court may eonsider settlement negotiations for the purpose of deciding a reasonable attorney fee award", "holding the connection is an element" ]

[ "holding that when both parties agree that the facts of the case entitled defendant to a selfdefense instruction failing to so instruct the jury was error", "holding that the failure to properly instruct the jury on the burden of proof required a new trial", "holding that a failure to instruct the jury on additional uncharged conspiracies is not reversible error so long as the jury is instructed that the government has the burden to prove the charged conspiracy", "holding eighth amendment does not require trial courts to instruct jury on consequences of failure to agree on sentence unless to fail to do so would affirmatively mislead the jury regarding its role in the sentencing process", "holding that the district courts failure to instruct the jury as to the proper standard of proof constituted plain error" ]

[ "holding that where the date of the offense is not an element of the charge a variance between the indictment date and the proof at trial is not fatal so long as the acts charged were committed within the statute of limitations period and prior to the return date of the indictment", "holdingin an adversary proceeding in which the issue was whether the certificate of acknowledgment must include the date of signingthat the date was not required and that the statutory short form of acknowledgment was not dispositive because while the date is indeed a part of the short form of acknowledgment authorized under ohio revcode 14755 that section does not preclude the use of other forms", "holding that the omission of the date of execution on the acknowledgment did not render it invalid when read in conjunction with the instrument", "holding that the date of the federal indictment not the date of the state arrest was the triggering date for the speedytrial act", "holding that the date of sale for an installment contract was the date of contract formation not the date of the last payment due" ]

[ "holding first lawsuit and allegations in second lawsuit part of same transaction for res judicata purposes even though different theory of recovery and harm alleged in second lawsuit", "holding that where the violation of the fdcpa was the filing of a lawsuit the statule of limitations begins to run on the date of filing", "holding that filing an answer does not invoke the status as a defendant in plaintiffs lawsuit", "holding that the district court used the wrong legal standard when calculating restitution and remanding for further proceedings without discussing sufficiency of the evidence under the wrong standard", "holding that filing a lawsuit in the wrong court is actionable under the tdca" ]

[ "holding officers engaged in search entitled to immunity", "holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity", "holding that defendant officers were entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law where they relied upon consent of property owner to perform search", "holding that officers were entitled to qualified immunity where defendant officers could have reasonably believed that they were given sufficient third party consent to search", "holding officers involved in investigatory raid entitled to immunity" ]

[ "holding that expert reports were not required to mention the defendant hospital because reports were based upon the actions of hospital physicians", "holding that expert report addressing hospitals conduct was not required when plaintiffs sole theory against hospital was vicarious liability based on ostensible agency and explaining that the conduct by the hospital on which the agency relationship depends is not measured by a medical standard of care these are principles of agency law on which no expert report is required", "holding that because the contract between the hospital and the health insurance company had a hold harmless provision which stated the hospital would not bill or hold insurance subscribers liable for any hospital expenses covered by the subscribers insurance contract and all expenses from the patients treatment for the automobile accident were covered in such contract there was no debt upon which the hospital could assert a lien pursuant to the states hospital lien statute", "holding that because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the expert report adequate as to the vicarious liability claim against the hospital based on the actions of the doctors plaintiffs suit against the hospital including her claim that the hospital was vicariously hable for the actions of its nurses could proceed", "holding that where hospital used balance billing that since the hospital had already received payments from the patient and his health insurer and had agreed to accept that amount as payment in full for its services there was no longer any amount owing to the hospital and thus it could not assert a statutory hospital lien for the difference between its charges and the amount received in light of the negotiated network agreements" ]

[ "recognizing that an easement may entitle the easement owner to do acts which were not for the easement would constitute a nuisance", "recognizing that one cannot have an easement in his own land", "holding that one who possesses deeded easement need not use the easement to maintain his title and easement cannot be extinguished from nonuser alone", "holding one cannot grant an easement to oneself one can only reserve such interest in land granted to another", "holding that an easement agreement and an unrecorded easement plan created an easement" ]

[ "recognizing tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy", "recognizing common law tort claim for wrongful discharge in violation of ohio public policy based upon statutory and judicial sources", "holding that an employees claim for relief for wrongful discharge based on state common law was preempted by 1132a", "holding that a wrongful discharge claim based on violation of a state public policy is not preempted because it is a nonnegotiable independent statelaw right", "holding statelaw claim based on alleged failure to give proper notice of right to convert is preempted by erisa" ]

[ "holding that an appellant bears the burden of demonstrating error on appeal", "holding that the government can usually satisfy its burden of demonstrating the propriety of an irs summons through an affidavit of one of its agents", "holding that the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that the action should be transferred", "holding that the government must satisfy its burden of proving contract damages", "holding actual possession of or access to information by the irs is not an absolute bar to enforcement of a summons for that information" ]

[ "holding that although the plaintiff was a problem employee and eventually may have been terminated for that reason the immediate cause of his termination was the osha report", "holding that although a reason was provided in the termination letter the without cause termination provision was applicable", "holding that although incorrect drug report was detrimental to employee employee had no claim against hospital because the report was not intended to primarily or directly benefit the employee", "holding attendance problem was a legitimate basis for an employers termination of an employee", "holding that without a provision stating that an employee can be terminated only for cause the atwill doctrine permitted termination in the absence of any reason at all summary judgment and directed verdict in companion cases affirmed" ]

[ "holding judgment in violation of automatic stay void", "holding that the denial of a motion to find a violation of the automatic stay was a final order", "holding that a debtor that is a corporation cannot sue under 362h for a violation of the automatic stay", "holding that although the automatic stay only applies to proceedings against the debtor counterclaims seeking affirmative relief against a debtor implicate the automatic stay", "holding that the protections of the automatic stay apply only to actions against the debtor" ]

[ "recognizing exception", "holding that the trial court lacked authority to renew spousal support payments pursuant to a motion that was filed after the expiration of time during which spousal support was required to be paid under the original judgment", "holding that there is no spousal exception to the statute", "holding that there is no exception to rule 322c and that the limitations period is jurisdictional", "holding that the trial court was without authority to modify a spousal support obligation when the modification proceeding was initiated ten years after the obligation to pay spousal support under the dissolution judgment had been terminated by order" ]

[ "holding that the petitioners initial 2255 motion offered him an adequate and effective means for testing his statutory interpretation argument", "holding that an expert is not competent to testify as to statutory interpretation", "holding statutory interpretation is subject to de novo review", "holding that a trial courts statutory interpretation is given no deference on review", "holding that the defendant is precluded from bringing his ncmiosbased statutory interpretation argument under prost" ]

[ "holding that a certificate of deposit labeled nontransferable is not an instrument without making any inquiry into actual business practice", "holding out admission to practice law when not admitted to practice", "holding that a loan transaction is a business practice under the ucl", "holding certification is not an occasion for inquiry into the merits", "holding that the term manufacture applied not only to things made but to the practice of making to principles carried into practice in a new manner to new results of principles carried into practice" ]

[ "holding that ijnadmissible evidence may be material if the evidence would have led to admissible evidence", "holding on the authority of celotex v catrett 477 us 317 106 sct 2548 91 led2d 265 1986 that hearsay evidence produced in an affidavit opposing summary judgment may be considered if the outofcourt declarant could later present that evidence through direct testimony ie in a form that would be admissible at trial ", "holding that hearsay evidence may be considered on summary judgment if the same evidence would be admissible in another form at trial", "holding that hearsay in affidavit which would be inadmissible in evidence at trial could not be considered on motion for summary judgment", "holding that evidence in an inadmissible form may be considered at the summary judgment stage as long as the evidence is submitted in an admissible form at trial" ]

[ "holding that a jurys finding that a city had delegated its final policymaking authority in the area of law enforcement to a city police chief was supported by the evidence and warranted imposing liability upon the city", "holding that city policymakers who owed an independent duty to pretrial detainees were individually liable under 1983 for prisoner suicide even though factfinder determined that the turnkey had not violated prisoners constitutional rights", "holding city policymakers rather than turnkey were the city actors whose primary liability must be shown to establish 1983 claim arising from prisoner suicide", "holding that a city manager was the final policymaker for purposes of section 1983 liability because of provisions in the norfolk city code requiring that all orders rules and regulations applicable to the entire police department must be approved by the city manager other than some police standard operating procedures", "holding that city attorneys promise in an oral settlement agreement for city to annex and rezone land was within the legal authority of the city of joliet to accomplish and were not absolutely void acts per se therefore city could be estopped from avoiding enforcement of contract" ]

[ "holding as meritless a claim that the standard jury instructions which refer to the jury as advisory and refer to jurys verdict as a recommendation violate caldwell", "recognizing that references to and descriptions of the jurys verdict as advisory as a recommendation and of the judge as the final sentencing authority are permissible under romano v oklahoma 512 us 1 114 sct 2004 129 led2d 1 1994", "holding that district court could not decide after jury returned verdict to treat jury verdict as advisory on issue not triable of right by jury but which was tried by consent of parties to nonadvisory jury", "holding that if jury instructions viewed as a whole fairly state the applicable law to the jury the failure to give particular instructions will not be error", "holding that although the instruction at issue could have been worded more specifically the jury instructions as a whole did not mislead the jury as to the law" ]

[ "holding to the effect that section 24 fifth has been impliedly amended by title vii", "holding to the effect that section 1432a as impliedly amended by title vii preempts state law without limitation as to only conflicting state law", "holding outside of the context of title vii or the adea that section 24 fifth preempts state law to the extent but only to the extent that it conflicts", "holding to the effect that section 341 fifth as impliedly amended by title vii preempts state law to the extent but only to the extent that it conflicts", "holding outside of the context of title vii or the adea to the effect that section 341 fifth preempts conflicting state law" ]

[ "holding that bare conclusions even if unobjected to cannot constitute probative evidence", "holding it is proper to defer to the family court even if conflicting evidence is presented on appeal as long as ample evidence in the record supports the family courts findings and conclusions", "recognizing the probative value of objective and reliable hearsay evidence", "holding that a court is not required to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged", "holding that inextricably intertwined evidence is intrinsic evidence that is admissible if its probative value outweighs the danger of prejudice" ]

[ "holding that especially in civil rights claims a court has a duty to ensure that pro se litigants do not lose their right to a hearing on the merits due to ignorance of technical procedural requirements", "holding that pro se litigants must follow the kentucky rules of civil procedure", "holding that although pro se litigants are entitled to liberal construction of their pleadings pro se litigants must follow procedural rules", "recognizing that although pro se litigants are not entitled to greater rights than represented litigants due process principles permit the imposition of a procedural bar only after consideration of the pro se litigants reasonable expectations about what had occurred", "recognizing that courts generally afford pro se litigants leniency in technical matters" ]

[ "holding a subjective inquiry into a prison officials state of mind is mandated when it is claimed that the official has inflicted cruel and unusual punishment", "holding prison officials ultimately violated the plaintiffs right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment", "holding cruel and unusual punishment complaint not preserved", "holding life in prison without the possibility of parole was not cruel and unusual punishment for juvenile convicted of murder", "holding that what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment is a question of law" ]

[ "holding that although the automatic stay only applies to proceedings against the debtor counterclaims seeking affirmative relief against a debtor implicate the automatic stay", "holding that annulment of the automatic stay can be retroactively applied to validate proceedings that otherwise would be void", "holding judgment in violation of automatic stay void", "holding that the automatic stay did not bar the filing of a proof of claim where the debtor actively litigated a separate action during the pending bankruptcy proceeding because to permit the automatic stay provision to be used as a trump card played after an unfavorable result was reached would be inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the automatic stay", "recognizing that any action taken in violation of the automatic bankruptcy stay is void and without effect" ]

[ "recognizing that restatement second of torts 323 and 324a correctly state pennsylvania law", "recognizing tentative draft of restatement second of torts 652e", "recognizing kansas courts adoption of restatement second of torts 909 1977", "recognizing that restatement second of torts 416 to 429 are often overlapping", "holding that auto thefts on parking lot should alert owner to danger of assaults citing restatement second of torts 281 comment j 1965" ]

[ "holding that the proof at sentencing1 provision contained in 42 pacs 97121 is unconstitutional in light of alleyne and is not severable from the remainder of the statute", "holding that because pennsylvania law limited a state courts review of a zoning boards decision to the issue whether the boards determinations were supported by substantial evidence the rookerfeldman doctrine did not prevent the plaintiffs from filing a federal action claiming that the zoning board had engaged in disability discrimination following a state courts review of the boards determinations", "holding that an arbitration provision that waived class actions and thus required the consumer to pay a 125 fee to vindicate a 150 claim was substantively unconscionable but also holding that the waiver provision was severable from the remainder of the arbitration provision which would be enforced", "holding export provision severable from other hmt provisions", "holding boards unconstitutional regulations severable from remainder" ]

[ "holding petitioners pro se status did not constitute adequate cause for failure to raise claims earlier", "holding that this court was unable to reach alleged errors where pro se appellant did not provide an adequate record", "holding that pro se status does not in itself constitute an extraordinary circumstance meriting tolling", "holding that pro se petitioners need not raise issues in ins terms but may raise them as they may have understood them", "holding a court can restrict future pro se pleadings if it first provides a pro se litigant notice and an opportunity to respond" ]

[ "holding that owner of land sought to be taken for public use has a vested right to compensation pursuant to law in effect at time of filing of petition because filing of petition creates an immediate fixed and determinate right to any compensation", "holding that because maryland law expressly creates right to file workers compensation claim action exists for wrongful discharge for termination based solely on the filing of a workers compensation claim", "holding that time limit for filing petition for review is mandatory and jurisdictional", "holding that if defendant could establish ineffective assistance of counsel in failure to file petition for review in his direct appeal then appropriate remedy would be to allow filing of petition for review out of time", "holding that utility customers mailing of a petition did not constitute the filing of the petition as filing was not effectuated until the petition was received by the clerk" ]

[ "holding that a nonstatutory postponement does not constitute an irregularity in the foreclosure proceeding itself that could justify setting aside a foreclosure sale", "holding that a failure to comply with the foreclosure statutes invalidates a foreclosure sale", "holding that only the most compelling reasons can justify the total foreclosure of public and professional scrutiny to a courts basis for the adjudication", "holding that after a judgment entry grants a decree of foreclosure and order of sale the foreclosure action cannot be dismissed as the judgment is final", "holding that foreclosure on mortgage not state action and thus could not trigger due process clause scrutiny" ]

[ "holding that a statute of general applicability was not enacted for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance", "holding that the filing of a complaint in a class action suit suspends the statute of limitations but a denial of class certification reactivates the statute of limitations for potential plaintiffs", "holding that when a statute is patterned after a similar provision in another states statute it is proper to resort to judicial constructions placed on the statute by the courts of the state whose statute provided the model in determining the proper construction ", "holding that liability arises out of a statute only in limited instances where disregard of the command of the statute results in damage to one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted", "holding that the title of the statute did not limit the reach of the statute" ]

[ "holding that the employee was acting within the course of her employment when she died while returning from the workrelated session because her death occurred on a public highway which was brought within the scope of her employment by her employers requirement that she attend training at the state police academy", "holding that lifeguard on call was in course of employment because she was in a position to return quickly to work and employer benefitted from her availability", "holding the employee was clearly within the zone of her employment even though not at her work station because she was on the universitys premises the campus", "holding that a doctor who was traveling to the hospital simply to be on call and not in response to a page was in the course of business even though she was not required to be in any particular location while on call", "holding that a plaintiff could not show that she engaged in protected activity because she did not present evidence that she informed her employer that her complaints were based on race or age discrimination" ]

[ "holding that the doctrine of promissory estoppel did not apply where promise was supported by bargained for consideration", "holding that the absence of a binding agreement does not defeat a promissory estoppel claim", "holding that promissory estoppel is applicable only in the absence of an enforceable contract", "holding that unenforceable promises cannot form the basis for a claim of promissory estoppel", "holding that a promissory estoppel claim failed where the plaintiff provided no evidence that the employer defendant did not follow the employment manuals requirements" ]

[ "holding that even though an inventory search was invalid the vehicle was properly impounded", "holding that a qualitative statement that inventory was in good shape while defendants knew the contrary was actionable", "holding that police do not need probable cause or a warrant to search items that have already been searched for inventory purposes", "holding that inventory search could not be condemned insofar as department policy permitted opening box for the standard purposes of inventory searches", "holding the opening and inventory of a shoulder bag was reasonable despite the possible alternative of securing the bag as a whole" ]

[ "recognizing that union members interests are adequately represented by the union", "holding that a rico action by union members was properly dismissed where any financial improprieties occurred with union funds and directly injured solely the union", "holding union members state law claims for defamation against union preempted", "holding that a union officials comments may be used to infer the object of union activity", "holding that an employer could only distribute its proposal to union employees when the proposal was properly before the union" ]

[ "holding that the statute is mandatory", "holding that a sentencing court is required by 18 usc 3583g to revoke the defendants term of supervised release unless defendant could come under the exception in 18 usc 3583d", "holding that when revocation is mandatory under 18 usc 3583g the statute does not require consideration of 3553a factors", "holding that a district courts failure to consider the 18 usc 3553a factors was plain error relying on gall", "holding that the district courts sentencing decision was not constrained by the factors specifically enunciated in 18 usc 3583e where revocation was mandated by 3583g" ]

[ "holding that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering temporary alimony that exceeded the husbands ability to pay", "holding that the trial court exceeded its discretion because its judgment created financial obligations for the husband that after deducting the wifes periodicalimony award from the husbands net income exceeded his remaining income", "holding that although trial judges have broad discretion in setting temporary alimony awards any such award must be supported by competent substantial evidence that demonstrates the need for support and the paying spouses ability to pay", "holding in part that the trial court abused its discretion in granting a temporary injunction in the absence of a showing that the plaintiff did not have an adequate remedy at law", "holding that final judgment ordering 4000 in monthly alimony created presumption in subsequent proceedings that husband had ability to pay that amount" ]

[ "holding that agreement had been reached where the plaintiff had proposed terms for providing his services to the defendant and the parties then entered into a business relationship despite defendants claim it never agreed to the plaintiffs proposed salary terms for that relationship", "holding that a settlement agreement in which the parties failed to agree upon the terms of a release was unenforceable", "holding that reopening a closed case to file a reaffirmation agreement is not permitted by the bankruptcy code", "holding that a reaffirmation agreement is enforceable as having been made predischarge where the parties agree to the terms of the proposed reaffirmation predischarge but the debtors do not sign a writing embodying the terms of their agreement until after entry of the discharge order", "recognizing an agreement to agree is enforceable if its terms are reasonably definite and certain" ]

[ "holding police incident to arrest of occupant of automobile may search entire passenger compartment of vehicle", "holding that after making an arrest of the driver of a vehicle the police may search the passenger compartment of the vehicle", "holding when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile he may as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest search the passenger compartment of that automobile", "recognizing that permissive search of car compartment incident to arrest is based on the fact that compartment is within reach of the arrestee", "holding that after policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile he may as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest examine the contents of any containers including glove compartments found within the passenger compartment" ]

[ "holding a fetus is not a child person or individual for purposes of criminal prosecution under the reckless injury to a child statute", "holding for purposes of establishing the offense of reckless manslaughter against a pregnant woman a fetus is not a person", "holding that the definition of person in the hawaii manslaughter statute did not include a fetus and thus did not apply when a woman caused the death of her fetus by smoking crystal methamphetamine", "holding an unborn viable fetus is not a human being under the new mexico child abuse statute and the mothers use of cocaine during pregnancy was not child abuse", "holding that a woman possessed immunity from criminal prosecution for causing injury or death to her fetus" ]

[ "holding that a drivers knowledge that there are concealable weapons in the car available for the drivers use is evidence of possession", "holding that variance between indictment alleging that defendant held knife to victims neck and proof that defendant only pointed knife at victim was not fatal to conviction for aggravated assault", "holding a knife to the drivers neck", "holding that the officer acted reasonably in shooting the decedent where the plaintiff did not directly counter the defendants evidence showing that the decedent matched the description of a suspect who threatened a victim with a knife was armed with a knife and ignored the officers instructions to drop it and jabbed it at the officer while taking steps toward him", "holding that variance between indictment alleging that defendant threw a knife at the victim and proof that the knife fell out of the defendants hand as he was stabbing the victim was not fatal to conviction for aggravated assault" ]

[ "holding that effect of discharge of debt under bankruptcy code is the same as it was under the 1898 bankruptcy act it is not an extinguishment of the debt but only a bar to enforcement of the debt as a personal obligation of the debt or", "holding that reporting of historically accurate debt may violate the fcra when the reporting did not include that the debt was discharged in bankruptcy or that the debt was in dispute", "holding that satisfaction of preexisting debt of corporate affiliate was sufficient to support jury finding of fair consideration for the transfer of valid security interest", "recognizing satisfaction of a valid debt as adequate consideration in a transfer of real property", "holding that the plaintiff was not a bioc because the plaintiffs purchase was in partial satisfaction of a prior personal debt" ]

[ "recognizing that a limit on the governments ability to enter a consent decree would make it substantially more difficult to settle title vii litigation", "holding that arbitration agreement that did not provide for award of attorney fees to successful title vii claimant was unenforceable because the right to attorneys fees is central to the ability of persons to seek redress from violations of title vii", "holding that nonparties to a consent decree resolving a title vii case may fully challenge beyond the narrow grounds normally available for such a collateral attack employment decisions taken pursuant to it", "holding claims based on title vii subject to arbitration", "holding that absent a factual basis rendering it invalid an oral agreement to settle a title vii claim is enforceable against a plaintiff" ]

[ "holding that unsubstantiated oral reprimands do not constitute an adverse em ployment action absent evidence that they had some impact on the employees employment status", "holding that written reprimands with only speculative consequences do not constitute adverse actions", "holding not only that court had no obligation to predict consequences but also that court could not have predicted consequences", "holding that poor evaluations alone do not constitute an adverse employment action", "recognizing that a set of actions may constitute an adverse employment action when considered collectively even though some actions do not rise to the level of an adverse employment action individually" ]

[ "holding that in light of an applicants omission of various relevant facts from his asylum application substantial evidence supported the ijs adverse credibility determination", "recognizing that using false documents that go to the heart of an asylum claim can indicate lack of credibility", "holding that pursuant to the best evidence rule trial testimony relying on documents was inadmissible without submission of such documents or an explanation as to why the documents were unavailable", "holding that an asylum applicants submission of false documents without an adequate explanation supported adverse credibility findings", "holding that an adverse credibility determination is sufficient to deny asylum" ]

[ "holding that it is wellsettled that although a plaintiff is entitled to full recovery for its damages it is not entitled to a double recovery for the same loss or injury", "holding that it is clear that ebys misrepresentation claim as it is presented here is a contractual one", "holding that it is wellsettled in our jurisprudence that unjust enrichment is a quasicontract claim", "holding that it is not", "holding that under michigan law it is wellsettled that an individual with a mental disability is the beneficiary of the tolling statute even where his rights have been capably handled by a guardian or an attorney" ]

[ "holding that the courts statute of limitations is jurisdictional in nature and is thus not subject to waiver or estoppel", "holding that employer was estopped to assert a statute of limitations defense where the insurer had arranged to have the claimant examined by one of its physicians after the statute of limitations had run", "holding that defendants may be estopped from raising defense of statute of limitations even though equitable estoppel is not listed in fla stat 95051", "holding nursing home estopped from raising statute of limitations defense when it stipulated to sixtyday extension of presuit screening period", "holding that equitable estoppel may bar a partys assertion of a statute of limitations" ]

[ "holding that an employeess selfserving statements about his ability are insufficient to contradict an employers negative assessment of that ability such statements may create a material dispute about the employees ability but do nothing to create a dispute about the employers honesty do nothing in other words to establish that the proffered reason is a pretext for discrimination", "holding that there is nothing arbitrary or capricious about the requirement", "holding that summary judgment is not appropriate if there is a genuine dispute about a material fact", "holding that the sentence alone tells us nothing about whether the district court would have imposed a lesser sentence", "holding that there is nothing intrinsically unclear about the terms sudden and accidental" ]

[ "holding that even if employee established prima facie case of retaliation he produced no evidence challenging employers reason for firing him", "holding that federal government employee successfully established prima facie case of retaliation under mcdonnell douglas but failed to prove employers proffered reason was pretextual", "holding that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation because there was no evidence that the decisionmaker knew of the plaintiffs protected conduct", "holding that a prima facie case of retaliation requires a causal link between the employees protected activity and the employers adverse employment action", "holding that close temporal proximity is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation" ]

[ "holding that an encounter was consensual where the defendant was comfortable during the encounter chose not to leave and acquiesced to the officers request to answer questions", "holding officers request for passengers identification during stop constituted lawful consensual encounter", "holding that once the officer asked the defendant to exit his vehicle the encounter became a stop because the defendant was no longer free to leave", "holding that the officers mere use of her spotlight and flashlight did not transform the consensual encounter into an investigatory stop", "holding that request of passenger in vehicle lawfully stopped for traffic infraction for her identification was consensual encounter where there was no evidence that defendant was intimidated or forced to comply with request" ]

[ "holding that a court can correct a patent claim for a grammatical error where the prosecution history does not suggest a different interpretation of the claims", "holding that claim 22 which depends from nonexistent claim 38 could be corrected because the error in the dependency was evident based on the face of the patent and that the correct antecedent claim was apparent from the prosecution history", "holding a technical term used in a patent document is interpreted as having the meaning that it would be given by persons experienced in the field of the invention unless it is apparent from the patent and the prosecution history that the inventor used the term with a different meaning", "holding that prosecution history will limit the interpretation of claim terms so as toexclude any interpretation that was disclaimed during prosecution", "holding that in order to understand patent claims a court can take instruction from the other claims the specification and the prosecution history" ]

[ "holding that employers report to state employment agency providing a reason for termination that was different than employers proffered reason did not create a genuine and material issue of fact as to pretext particularly when evidence showed the inaccurate reporting benefitted employee", "holding that a jury could find employers proffered reason for termination pretext when plaintiff presented evidence that she had not violated company policy or was authorized to deviate from stated policy and employer never discussed alleged violations with her", "holding that questions about employees impending retirement failed to rebut the employers nondiscriminatory reason for termination particularly considering employee admitted that he did not know whether questions were for a legitimate purpose in concluding overall that the plaintiff had not established a genuine issue of material fact regarding pretext", "holding that plaintiff can show pretext by demonstrating that an employers proffered reason for an adverse employment action has no basis in fact", "holding that a reason cannot be proved to be a pretext for discrimination unless it is shown both that the reason was false and that discrimination was the real reason" ]

[ "holding that the possibility of a mistaken understanding of the phrase preponderance of the evidence on the part of the jury is too remote to constitute plain error when counsel gave the jury an accurate explanation of the legal meaning of the phrase in his closing argument and that meaning is consistent with the common understanding of the words in the phrase", "holding that the phrase party aggrieved should be given a practical rather than hypertechnical meaning", "recognizing that each word and phrase of a statute must be given meaning so that no part of it will be void inert redundant or trivial", "holding that an undefined statutory term should be given its natural ordinary meaning", "holding that party is aggrieved from the date of issuance but construing a statute rather than rule 15a" ]

[ "holding that counsels ambiguous statement during argument on summary judgment motion did not constitute waiver", "holding exclusion was not ambiguous", "holding that another courts decision is a proper subject of judicial notice", "holding proper basis for award of fees", "holding ambiguous finding that one or another defendant was liable did not provide a proper basis for judgment" ]

[ "holding that before terminating benefits the plan should have obtained a vocational experts opinion to determine if claimant is presently capable in light of his physical impairment to perform any occupation and observing that claimant met his burden when he proved his disability initially", "holding that the consideration of the fact that claimant collected unemployment benefits while he was allegedly disabled was not a ground for reversal where there was other medical and vocational evidence supporting denial of benefits and claimants receipt of unemployment benefits was not decisive factor in denial of benefits", "holding that a claimants benefits were rightly suspended under what is now section 8434048 when the claimant refused to cooperate with a vocational rehabilitation plan", "holding that vocational experts testimony that there were jobs claimant could perform constituted substantial evidence", "holding that a claimants benefits were rightly suspended under what is now section 8434043 when the claimant did not return to the authorized physician for treatment" ]

[ "holding that comment by prosecutor in closing argument that defense counsel did not produce evidence of the defendants innocence was not a comment on the defendants failure to testify", "holding that the failure of defense counsel to call a corroborating witness resulted in prejudice to the defendant", "recognizing the right of a defendant to comment upon the failure of the state to produce evidence", "holding that it was permissible for prosecutor to comment on the general failure of the defense to produce any evidence", "holding that defense counsel may call attention to the states failure to produce evidence" ]

[ "holding that warrantless searches of cell phones incident to arrest should not be allowed because such searches cannot be justified by officer safety or the preservation of evidence given the privacy implications inherent in cell phone data searches", "holding a person may consent to warrantless searches as a condition of a suspended sentence", "holding a warrantless search of cell phone contents did not exceed permissible scope of search incident to arrest", "holding that while law enforcement officers properly separated and assumed possession of a cell phone from arrestees person during the search incident to arrest a warrant was required before the information data and content of the cell phone could be accessed and searched by law enforcement", "holding that consensual suspicionless searches of government employees personal belongings in the workplace were searches even though refusal to consent carried no criminal penalty and the searches were not for law enforcement purposes" ]

[ "holding that the bia abused its discretion when it denied petitioners motion to reopen by failing to consider evidence of country conditions", "holding that change in country conditions is measured from time of proceedings before ij", "holding that bia did not abuse its discretion by declining to consider an unauthenticated document submitted with a motion to reopen to show changed country conditions", "holding that in determining whether evidence accompanying a motion to reopen demonstrates a material change in country conditions that would justify reopening we compare the evidence of country conditions submitted with the motion to those that existed at the time of the merits hearing below", "holding that in evaluating evidence of changed country conditions the bia compares the evidence of country conditions submitted with the motion to those that existed at the time of the merits hearing below" ]

[ "holding that parent has custodial right to prevent visitation with nonparent", "holding interference with visitation of the noncustodial parent that negatively impacts the welfare of the child can constitute a substantial change of circumstances sufficient to warrant a change of custody", "holding that the domicile of the child follows that of the parent with lawful custody", "holding that psychological parent was not entitled to custody or visitation", "holding that where interference with visitation becomes so pervasive as to harm the childs close relationship with the noncustodial parent there can be a conclusion drawn that the actions of the custodial parent show a disregard for the best interests of the child warranting a change of custody" ]

[ "holding that judgment as a matter of law was proper when the plaintiff did not present any evidence that the defendant was motivated by the eeoc complaint knowledge is necessary to establish causation but it is not sufficient", "holding that a claim not pleaded in the petition ie the complaint was not properly before the court on a motion for summary judgment", "holding despite authority for the general proposition that the duty to defend is determined based on the allegations of the complaint that an insurer had no duty to defend where the underlying claim was covered by the policy based on the facts pleaded in complaint but other facts not appearing in the complaint excluded coverage", "holding the presence or absence of federalquestion jurisdiction is governed by the veil pleaded complaint rule which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only where a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiffs properly pleaded complaint", "holding loss causation not adequately pleaded when the complaint did not claim that the share price fell significantly after the truth became known" ]

[ "holding that erisa creates no private right of action", "recognizing cause of action", "holding that mississippis wrongful death statute creates an independent cause of action", "holding that section 3763133 creates a cause of action", "recognizing the cause of action" ]

[ "holding that mother could not be prosecuted under child abuse statute for prenatal use of heroin", "holding that mother may not be prosecuted criminally for child endangerment for prenatal substance abuse", "holding a woman may be prosecuted for child neglect and endangering a child for prenatal substance abuse", "holding that evidence was sufficient to support trial courts best interest finding where mother allowed child to be in contact with individual who had physically abused her mother was not capable of caring for child on her own mother admitted at trial she had not found stable employment and child was doing well in her current placement", "holding that mother could not be charged with criminal endangering the welfare of her child based upon prenatal acts of smoking cocaine" ]

[ "holding that an unconstitutional act of congress has no legal effect", "holding that where congress has directed the agency to issue a rule without regard to any other provision of statute or regulation that applies to issuance of such rule congress has amended the law and does not offend the constitution", "holding that a customer list may be protectable as a trade secret if it is secret and the court examines and determines if it is protectable based on three factors 1 what steps if any an employer has taken to maintain the confidentiality of a customer list 2 whether a departing employee acknowledges that the customer list is confidential and 3 whether the content of the list is readily ascertainable", "holding that cfr 130812d is a list of drugs that congress has determined to have a stimulant effect on the central nervous system", "holding to the same effect" ]

[ "holding that because article iii standing is jurisdictional it must be decided before other legal issues", "holding that article iii standing is not a prerequisite to intervention", "holding that federal courts may not consider other issues before resolving standing an article iii jurisdictional matter", "holding that a court can dismiss a case under forum non conveniens before resolving any other jurisdictional issues", "holding that article iii standing is necessary for intervention" ]

[ "recognizing that the critical question is whether any present violation exists", "holding that the question whether a cause of action exists is not a question of jurisdiction and therefore may be assumed without being decided", "holding that such a duty exists", "holding that the question of whether an existing constitutional right is infringed is strictly a question of law", "recognizing that whether a duty exists is a question of law for the courts" ]

[ "holding that the clock was tolled from the day the lastarraigned defendant appeared before a judicial officer because at that time several defendants already had filed pretrial motions and pretrial motions of some type remained pending for over two years", "holding in part that the presumption of public access attaches to pretrialnondiscovery motions whether preliminary or dispositive and the materials briefs and documents filed with the court in support of or in opposition to such motions but not to pretrial discovery motions", "holding that there is a presumptive common law right to public access to all material filed in connection with nondiscovery pretrial motions but no such right as to discovery motions and their supporting documents", "holding that although the defendant filed a number of motions because the original trial date never changed as a result of those motions no delay could be attributed to the motions", "holding delays caused by numerous defense pretrial motions and defendants motion to continue do not weigh against the government" ]

[ "holding that opposition to a gangs criminal activity is not a protected political opinion", "holding that leaning towards the death penalty is not the same as an automatic vote for the death penalty", "recognizing a distinction between pure opinion which does not imply that it is based upon undisclosed facts and mixed opinion which implies that it is based upon facts which justify the opinion but are unknown to those reading or hearing it", "holding that it is proper to exclude potential venire persons for criminal activity and based upon opinion of the death penalty", "holding that the death penalty is unconstitutional as applied to juvenile defendants" ]

[ "holding that an order imposing sanctions against an attorney for one of the parties in a pending case is final and therefore immediately appealable by the attorney", "holding that an attorney approval clause in a contract for the sale of real estate was a part of that contract and would have to be satisfied for the underlying contract to be enforceable", "holding contract for sale of law practice which included duty on part of selling attorney to refer clients as consideration for the sale violated rpc", "holding that an agreement in which one party promised to make monthly payments to the other partys attorney as part of an asset sale contract was for the direct benefit of the attorney", "holding attorney general could not contract on behalf of the state to employ an assistant attorney beyond the attorney generals own term" ]

[ "holding that acts of promissory fraud which require proof that the defendants intended not to perform promised acts were not protected by stateagent immunity", "holding admission of prior bad acts of child abuse was reversible error when the defendant did not have exclusive control over the children during the period when the prior bad acts occurred", "holding that the acts of a corporate officer done in his or her official capacity are acts of the corporation", "holding that party did not waive right to trial by jury by requesting directed verdict", "holding ultra vires acts by chairperson did not vest right" ]

[ "holding that trial counsel made a reasonable tactical decision not to object to damaging testimony as it would merely serve to highlight the testimony", "holding that even if the alleged failure to present mitigating evidence was an oversight and not a tactical choice by counsel it was harmless", "holding that counsel may well have made a reasonable tactical choice to not object to arguably inadmissible testimony", "holding that pretrial motions in limine were not feasible because counsel could not have anticipated inadmissible testimony", "recognizing the wide latitude counsel must have in making tactical decisions and that strategic choices made after less than complete investigation may be reasonable if reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation" ]

[ "holding that the statute of limitations for a claim of tortious interference with contractual relations begins to run when the contract in question has been breached", "recognizing the tort of wrongful interference with anothers business relations", "holding that there must be a tort distinguishable from or independent of the breach of contract in order for a party to bring a valid claim in tort based on a breach in a contractual relationship", "holding that to sustain a claim under the tort of interference with contractual relations the plaintiff must inter alia show that the defendant intentionally induced the third party to breach or render performance impossible", "recognizing the tort of interference with prospective contractual relations as a subspecies of the broader tort of interference with prospective economic advantage" ]

[ "recognizing that wiggins established de novo standard of review for any claim that was not addressed by the state courts", "holding that de novo standard of review applies on federal claims never addressed by state courts", "holding that appellant was entitled to a de novo review however he was not entitled to a de novo review of an argument never raised", "recognizing de novo standard of review", "holding that we review legal conclusions of the court of federal claims de novo" ]

[ "holding that the district court committed plain error by admitting evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment where the error did affect a substantial right of the defendants and the admission of evidence which should have been excluded did have a prejudicial impact on the jury", "holding that suppression issue was waived under rule 12 but then noting that the court did not find plain error in the district courts admission of the evidence", "holding that suppression issue not raised to the district court was waived under rule 12", "holding that the district court did not commit plain error in admitting physical evidence of the defendants prior drug arrest in addition to the fact of the arrest itself when the evidence was relevant under rule 404b and the district court gave a limiting instruction", "holding that assuming suppression argument not waived there was no plain error" ]

[ "holding that a mere passing reference or even references however to a document outside the complaint does not on its own incorporate the document into the complaint itself citation omitted", "holding that a court may consider a document submitted by a defendant in determining whether to dismiss the complaint because it was integral to and explicitly relied on in the complaint and because the plaintiffs do not challenge its authenticity", "holding that a court ruling on a motion to dismiss may consider a document that is referenced in the complaint and is central to the plaintiffs claims", "holding that in connection with a motion to dismiss the court may consider a document not attached to the pleadings where the plaintiffs claim depends on the contents of a document the defendant attaches the document to its motion to dismiss and the parties do not dispute the authenticity of the document even though the plaintiff does not explicitly allege the contents of that document in the complaint", "holding that when a complaints factual allegations are expressly linked and admittedly dependent upon a document the authenticity of which is not challenged that document effectively merges into the pleadings and the trial court can review it in deciding a motion to dismiss under rule 12b 6" ]

[ "holding that plain error review applies where the defendant fails to object to the lack of an opportunity to allocute", "holding that a defendant who fails to object to an error at a plea colloquy hearing must satisfy the plain error rule", "holding that when a district court fails to provide reasons for imposing special conditions and the defendant fails to object we review for plain error", "holding that where a defendant fails to challenge his plea in district court he must establish plain error", "holding that we review for plain error whether the government breached its plea obligations when the defendant fails to object at sentencing" ]

[ "holding that to find the measure of damages as the difference in market value immediately before and after the collision would be arbitrarily reading out of the policy the right of defendant to make repairs or replace the damaged part with materials of like kind and quality", "holding that if the insurer cannot return the vehicle to substantially the same condition then the actual cash value is the appropriate measure where insured sued for damages caused by insurers inappropriate election to repair and the value after repairs was almost sixty percent less than its preloss value", "holding that if repairs to a firedamaged vehicle with parts of like kind and quality would not restore the vehicle to its former market value the proper measure of damages was the difference in market value before and after the loss where the policy limited liability to the cost to repair or replace the property with other of like kind and quality less depreciation", "holding that when the insurer elects to repair or replace the damaged part with other of like kind and quality less depreciation the insurer is obligated to put the automobile in substantially the same condition it was prior to the collision so as to render it as valuable and serviceable as before with the insured being compensated for any deficiency in loss of actual value", "holding that unless the collision resulted in a total loss the measure of recovery is the difference between the fair market value of the vehicle in the condition in which it was immediately prior to the collision and its value thereafter" ]

[ "recognizing the natural consequences flowing from a compensable injury absent an independent intervening cause are compensable as well as the aggravation of a preexisting condition infirmity or disease by a workrelated injury", "holding that when a preexisting infirmity is aggravated by repetitive minute trauma as a result of the ordinary and necessary duties of employment the disability resulting from such aggravation is compensable as a personal injury under the workers compensation statute", "holding that psychological conditions resulting from workrelated trauma are compensable", "recognizing that a preexisting disease or infirmity of the employee does not disqualify a claim arising out of employment if the employment aggravated accelerated or combined with the disease or infirmity to produce disability for which compensation is sought", "holding that although cause of dystonia unknown experts opinion regarding causation based on temporal relationship between plaintiffs workrelated injury and onset of condition was sufficient to support commission s finding that dystonia was caused by compensable injury" ]

[ "holding a trial courts decision involving withdrawal or discharge of counsel is subject to review for abuse of discretion", "holding that the determination of whether statements are excited utterances is within the trial courts discretion and its ruling will be reversed only for an abuse of that discretion", "holding that whether particular violations of its orders are so serious as to warrant a denial of discharge is a matter that is within the trial courts discretion", "holding that such a decision was within the trial courts discretion", "holding that denial of amendment is within discretion of trial court" ]

[ "holding that the definition of procurement under the tucker act is broader than the definition of procurement contract in the fgcaa such that an agency can engage in a procurement process for the purposes of the tucker act even though it is using a cooperative agreement instead of a procurement contract to memorialize the parties agreement", "holding that if the procuring agencys decision lacked a rational basis or was made in violation of the applicable statutes regulations or procedures the court must then determine as a factual matter if the bid protester was prejudiced by that conduct", "holding that without a valid reason for cancelling the procurement the government violated its duty to conduct a fair procurement", "holding a bid award may be set aside if either 1 the procurement officials decision lacked a rational basis or 2 if the procurement procedure involved a violation of regulation or procedure", "holding that as a matter of law where the procurement decision was rational a reviewing court may not award injunctive relief despite the presence of procedural irregularities in the procurement process" ]

[ "holding that to be an exclusive licensee a party may rely on either an express or implied promise of exclusivity", "holding that a contract for an exclusive agency to market a product contains an implied promise to use all reasonable efforts to market the product", "holding that the other source of law might be a moneymandating constitutional provision statute or regulation that has been violated or an express or implied contract with the united states", "holding that an implied contract may not be found if there is an express contract between the same parties on the same subject matter quoting 42 cjs implied and constructive contracts 34 p 33", "holding that a promise to make a loan is not covered by 1823e because a promise is not an asset" ]

[ "holding that district court did not err in determining that cocaine base was crack cocaine based on chemical analysis identifying cocaine base together with competent lay testimony bridging the evidentiary gap between cocaine base and crack cocaine and refusing to require showing of smokeability ie water solubility or melting point for purposes of establishing crack cocaine under the guidelines since smokeability distinguishes cocaine base from powder cocaine not from crack", "recognizing district courts ability to vary from guidelines based on policy disagreement with sentencing range in cases involving child pornography", "holding district courts are entitled to vary from the guidelines based on a policy disagreement with those guidelines", "holding a district court has authority to vary from the crack cocaine guidelines based on a policy disagreement with them italics omitted", "holding that our prior rule that a district court lacked authority to premise a variance on disagreement with the policy of a guideline does not survive the supreme courts decision in kimbrough v united states 552 us 85 128 sct 558 169 led2d 481 2007 which was a recognition of district courts authority to vary from the guidelines based on policy disagreement with them" ]

[ "holding that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing expert testimony that directly linked the characteristics of sexually abused children to the complainants in this case", "holding that the court abused its discretion where the delay cannot not reasonably be attributed to the plaintiff alone", "holding that the district court abused its discretion in denying leave to amend after a delay of eight months", "holding district court abused its discretion in admitting state court findings of fact", "holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint" ]

[ "holding that the labeling act did not preempt design defect claim against cigarette manufacturer", "holding that a violation of the forum defendant rule is a jurisdictional defect", "holding that plaintiffs allegation that defendant had exclusive knowledge as the manufacturer did not support claim that defendant was aware of a defect", "holding that an unspecified number of complaints posted on the defendants website was insufficient to show that the defendant had knowledge of an alleged defect", "holding that notice of a defect could not be imputed to a defendant inasmuch as it created the defect" ]

[ "holding individual defendants subject to suit", "holding that where both liability and damages depend on individual factual determinations claims may only be determined on individual basis", "holding that courts should consider the merits of the litigants claims the nature of the factual issues the litigants ability to present his claims and the complexity of the legal issues", "holding that individual factual differences among the individual litigants or groups of litigants will not preclude a finding of commonality", "holding jurisdiction over an individual may not usually be predicated on jurisdiction over a corporation unless the corporation is the alter ego of the individual or when the individual perpetrates a fraud" ]

[ "holding that district courts do not have appellate jurisdiction over state courts", "holding appellate courts have jurisdiction over the district courts orders rejecting as a matter of law qualified immunity raised in a motion to dismiss", "holding that the court lacked appellate jurisdiction over a partial summary judgment on liability in a qualified immunity case", "holding that a district courts order is final and immediately reviewable under mitchell if the appellants properly raised a claim of qualified immunity in the district court", "holding that the circuit courts have no appellate jurisdiction over a general district courts review of an administrative license suspension in the absence of any statutory authority vesting them with such jurisdiction" ]

[ "holding violation of right to testify could not be harmless", "holding right to testify was federal constitutional right", "recognizing the right to trial by jury is a constitutional right to be given the same protections as other constitutional rights", "recognizing defendants state and federal constitutional rights to testify", "holding that a defendant has a constitutional right to counsel as a matter of right on direct appeal" ]

[ "holding that the giving of an erroneous reasonable doubt instruction can never be harmless error", "holding that a substantial right is affected when the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jurys verdict", "holding that nonconstitutional error is harmless if it did not have substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jurys verdict", "holding that an erroneous decision to exclude evidence is considered harmless unless the error had a substantial influence on the outcome or leaves this court in grave doubt as to whether it had such an effect", "holding that erroneous admission of evidence was harmless where it had no substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury verdict judged in relation to the total evidence on the issue in question internal quotation marks omitted" ]

[ "holding cercla does not preempt californias corporate capacity statute", "holding that californias liquor pricefixing statute violated federal antitrust law", "holding that the district of columbias antislapp law could not be applied in federal court in a diversity case because it conflicted with federal rules of civil procedure 12 and 56", "holding that californias antislapp statute is applicable in federal court", "holding that maines antislapp statute could be applied in the district court because federal rules of civil procedure 12 and 56 are not so broad as to attempt to answer the same question as the statute" ]

[ "holding that equitable estoppel requires proof of fraud misrepresentation or affirmative deception", "holding that aedpas time limitation may be equitably tolled where extraordinary circumstances prevent petitioner from filing a timely petition and where petitioner acts with reasonable diligence", "holding that the equitable tolling doctrine applies to the 90day period provided in 8 cfr 323bl2000 for filing motions to reopen based on new facts", "holding that this court recognizes equitable tolling on motions to reopen during periods when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception fraud or error as long as the petitioner acts with due diligence", "holding that a petitioner must act with due diligence when pursuing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim to benefit from equitable tolling of deadlines" ]

[ "holding that the initial stop by officer was based on reasonable suspicion that defendant was impersonating a police officer although another officer arrested defendant for privacy act violation", "holding officer who received a radio dispatch about a loud party disturbance at an apartment created by a person who left in brown jeep did not give officer reasonable suspicion to stop defendant in brown jeep because officer had no reason to suspect that a misdemeanor involving personal or property damage had been committed as required by ark rcrim p 31 to justify temporary detention", "holding that an officer had reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory stop of an automobile where the officer received a dispatch that a black male in a black bmw with a temporary license tag was selling controlled substances and the officer observed a person in an automobile fitting that description less than one minute later", "holding officer had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity necessary to support traffic stop where officer received dispatch that defendant committed disorderly conduct and record check showed parked truck was registered to defendant", "holding that notwithstanding the officers testimony that he had no suspicion of criminality the officer was aware of facts that would give rise to reasonable suspicion in the mind of a reasonable officer" ]

[ "holding that service is not avoided by service on a partys attorney as service on an attorney is ineffective unless he has been authorized to accept such service", "holding that ricos nationwide service of process provision did not authorize service outside the united states", "recognizing that although provision of municipal service is not fundamental right inequitable provision of that service is subject to equal protection analysis", "holding that 1132e2 allows for nationwide service of process and thus jurisdiction and that the nationwide service of process provision comports with the constitution", "holding the rule 4 requirement of delivery to the appropriate united states attorney required personal service not service by certified mail" ]

[ "holding retroactive application", "holding that the retroactive application of a nevada exemption did not violate the contracts clause", "holding that the act is not retroactive", "recognizing that the application of a retroactive amendment is discretionary", "holding no retroactive application" ]

[ "holding that defendants bank account and open line of credit in florida utilized to transfer money in international commerce was insufficient to confer jurisdiction under section 481932 florida statutes where defendant operated its business in honduras had no employees or agents in florida and did not advertise or solicit business in florida", "holding that 155 trips to texas by foreign corporation personnel over a tenyear period did not support general jurisdiction because evidence did not establish a general business presence", "holding assignee could collect debt on stated account", "holding that the maintenance of a florida bank account even if used to collect premiums is too tenuous a contact to support an assertion of general jurisdiction over a foreign insurer", "holding that an interactive website allowing clients to bank online was insufficient to confer general jurisdiction over a foreign bank" ]

[ "holding that a person employed by the defendant as a bodyguard during the defendants drugrelated activities was supervised by the defendant", "holding that the injury was inflicted by the defendant when it occurred while the defendant applied force directly to the victims person", "holding that invitederror doctrine precludes defendant from challenging sentence of supervised release where defendant requested sentence of supervised release", "holding that courts failure to tell defendant in rule 11 plea hearing that he faced a mandatory period of supervised release was harmless error because the defendant was on notice of the supervised release requirement set out in the plea agreement and the defendant did not claim he was unaware of the requirement only that court technically had failed to comply with requirements of rule", "holding that the failure to notify the defendant of the term of supervised release and its possible effect on his sentence was not harmless error where nothing in the record suggests that the defendant understood that his sentence would include supervised release and there was no written plea agreement by which he might have been warned" ]