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1,789 | Infection chain Figure 1. AvosLocker infection chain According to our analysis, the suspected entry point is via the Zoho ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus (ADSS) exploit: Figure 2. | [
{
"id": 5293,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 31,
"end_offset": 41
},
{
"id": 46920,
"label": "vulnerability",
"start_offset": 127,
"end_offset": 178
}
] | [
{
"id": 260,
"from_id": 5293,
"to_id": 46920,
"type": "exploits"
}
] | [] |
1,790 | The ADSS exploit abusing CVE-2021-40539 Due to the lack of network traffic details, we could not identify the exact CVE ID of the security gap the attacker used. | [
{
"id": 46921,
"label": "vulnerability",
"start_offset": 25,
"end_offset": 39
},
{
"id": 46922,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 4,
"end_offset": 8
}
] | [
{
"id": 261,
"from_id": 46922,
"to_id": 46921,
"type": "exploits"
}
] | [] |
1,810 | The PowerShell downloads, installs, and allows the remote desktop tool AnyDeskMSI through the firewall. | [
{
"id": 46930,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 4,
"end_offset": 14
},
{
"id": 46931,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 71,
"end_offset": 81
}
] | [
{
"id": 262,
"from_id": 46930,
"to_id": 46931,
"type": "downloads"
}
] | [] |
1,811 | Figure 9. The PowerShell downloading and installing AnyDeskMSI | [
{
"id": 5340,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 19,
"end_offset": 29
},
{
"id": 46932,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 57,
"end_offset": 67
}
] | [
{
"id": 263,
"from_id": 5340,
"to_id": 46932,
"type": "downloads"
}
] | [] |
1,819 | Additional tools and components were copied to the compromised machine using AnyDeskMSI to scan the local network and disable security products. | [
{
"id": 46934,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 77,
"end_offset": 87
},
{
"id": 46936,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 91,
"end_offset": 113
},
{
"id": 46937,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 118,
"end_offset": 143
}
] | [
{
"id": 265,
"from_id": 46934,
"to_id": 46936,
"type": "uses"
},
{
"id": 266,
"from_id": 46934,
"to_id": 46937,
"type": "uses"
}
] | [] |
1,820 | The tools transferred using AnyDesk are: Netscan: To scan for other endpoints Nmap (log4shell.nse): To scan for Log4shell vulnerable endpoints Hacking tools Mimikatz and Impacket: For lateral movement PDQ deploy: For mass deployment of malicious script to multiple endpoints Aswarpot.sys: For disabling defense solutions. | [
{
"id": 46938,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 28,
"end_offset": 35
},
{
"id": 46944,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 158,
"end_offset": 166
},
{
"id": 46951,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 294,
"end_offset": 321
},
{
"id": 46940,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 79,
"end_offset": 83
},
{
"id": 46942,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 85,
"end_offset": 98
},
{
"id": 46947,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 171,
"end_offset": 179
},
{
"id": 46939,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 42,
"end_offset": 49
},
{
"id": 46943,
"label": "vulnerability",
"start_offset": 113,
"end_offset": 122
},
{
"id": 46950,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 276,
"end_offset": 288
},
{
"id": 46948,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 185,
"end_offset": 201
},
{
"id": 46949,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 218,
"end_offset": 253
},
{
"id": 46953,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 202,
"end_offset": 212
},
{
"id": 46956,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 276,
"end_offset": 284
},
{
"id": 46955,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 104,
"end_offset": 108
}
] | [
{
"id": 272,
"from_id": 46938,
"to_id": 46947,
"type": "downloads"
},
{
"id": 267,
"from_id": 46938,
"to_id": 46939,
"type": "downloads"
},
{
"id": 268,
"from_id": 46938,
"to_id": 46940,
"type": "downloads"
},
{
"id": 269,
"from_id": 46940,
"to_id": 46942,
"type": "uses"
},
{
"id": 271,
"from_id": 46938,
"to_id": 46944,
"type": "downloads"
},
{
"id": 273,
"from_id": 46938,
"to_id": 46953,
"type": "downloads"
},
{
"id": 276,
"from_id": 46938,
"to_id": 46956,
"type": "downloads"
}
] | [] |
1,823 | We found an Avast anti-rootkit driver installed as service 'asWarPot.sys' using the command sc.exe create aswSP_ArPot2 binPath= C:\windows\aswArPot.sys type= kernel. | [
{
"id": 46957,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 60,
"end_offset": 72
},
{
"id": 46958,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 92,
"end_offset": 98
},
{
"id": 46959,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 129,
"end_offset": 152
},
{
"id": 46960,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 12,
"end_offset": 37
}
] | [
{
"id": 279,
"from_id": 46960,
"to_id": 46957,
"type": "consists-of"
}
] | [] |
1,828 | Mimikatz components were also copied to the affected machine via AnyDeskMSI. | [
{
"id": 5378,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 0,
"end_offset": 8
},
{
"id": 46961,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 65,
"end_offset": 75
}
] | [
{
"id": 277,
"from_id": 46961,
"to_id": 5378,
"type": "drops"
}
] | [] |
1,831 | Detecting and deleting Mimikatz We observed the PowerShell script disabling the security products by leveraging aswarpot.sys (a legitimate Avast Anti-Rootkit Driver). | [
{
"id": 5382,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 23,
"end_offset": 31
},
{
"id": 5383,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 53,
"end_offset": 63
},
{
"id": 46962,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 144,
"end_offset": 169
},
{
"id": 46963,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 117,
"end_offset": 129
},
{
"id": 46964,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 71,
"end_offset": 102
}
] | [
{
"id": 278,
"from_id": 46962,
"to_id": 46963,
"type": "consists-of"
}
] | [] |
1,850 | After disabling the security products, the actors behind AvosLocker again tried to transfer other tools, namely Mimikatz and Impacket. | [
{
"id": 46979,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 112,
"end_offset": 120
},
{
"id": 46978,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 57,
"end_offset": 67
},
{
"id": 46980,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 125,
"end_offset": 133
}
] | [
{
"id": 280,
"from_id": 46978,
"to_id": 46979,
"type": "downloads"
},
{
"id": 281,
"from_id": 46978,
"to_id": 46980,
"type": "downloads"
}
] | [] |
1,852 | We also observed the execution of a password recovery tool XenArmor with C:\temp\pass\start.exe. | [
{
"id": 46982,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 63,
"end_offset": 71
},
{
"id": 46981,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 77,
"end_offset": 99
}
] | [
{
"id": 282,
"from_id": 46982,
"to_id": 46981,
"type": "consists-of"
}
] | [] |
1,858 | Deploying across the network We saw software deployment tool PDQ being used to deploy malicious batch scripts to multiple endpoints in the network. | [
{
"id": 46986,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 83,
"end_offset": 113
},
{
"id": 46985,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 65,
"end_offset": 68
}
] | [
{
"id": 283,
"from_id": 46986,
"to_id": 46985,
"type": "uses"
}
] | [] |
1,860 | While AvosLocker has been documented for its abuse of AnyDesk for lateral movement as its preferred application, we note that other remote access applications can also be abused to replace it. | [
{
"id": 45154,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 6,
"end_offset": 16
},
{
"id": 45155,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 54,
"end_offset": 61
},
{
"id": 45156,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 66,
"end_offset": 82
}
] | [
{
"id": 77,
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},
{
"id": 284,
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"to_id": 45155,
"type": "uses"
},
{
"id": 285,
"from_id": 45154,
"to_id": 45156,
"type": "uses"
}
] | [] |
1,872 | Avast responded to our notification with this statement: "We can confirm the vulnerability in an old version of our driver aswArPot.sys, which we fixed in our Avast 21.5 released in June 2021. | [
{
"id": 45157,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 123,
"end_offset": 135
},
{
"id": 45158,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 159,
"end_offset": 169
},
{
"id": 45159,
"label": "TIME",
"start_offset": 182,
"end_offset": 191
},
{
"id": 45160,
"label": "identity",
"start_offset": 0,
"end_offset": 5
}
] | [
{
"id": 286,
"from_id": 45158,
"to_id": 45157,
"type": "consists-of"
}
] | [] |
1,882 | AvosLocker executable 05ba2df0033e3cd5b987d66b6de545df439d338a20165c0ba96cde8a74e463e5 Ransom.Win32.AVOSLOCKER.SMYXBLNT Mimikatz executable (x32 and x64) 912018ab3c6b16b39ee84f17745ff0c80a33cee241013ec35d0281e40c0658d9 HackTool.Win64.MIMIKATZ.ZTJA e81a8f8ad804c4d83869d7806a303ff04f31cce376c5df8aada2e9db2c1eeb98 HackTool.Win32.Mimikatz.CNFW Log4shell Nmap NSE script ddcb0e99f27e79d3536a15e0d51f7f33c38b2ae48677570f36f5e92863db5a96 Backdoor.Win32.CVE202144228.YACAH Impacket tool 14f0c4ce32821a7d25ea5e016ea26067d6615e3336c3baa854ea37a290a462a8 HackTool.Win32.Impacket.AA | [
{
"id": 5525,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 120,
"end_offset": 128
},
{
"id": 5529,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 352,
"end_offset": 356
},
{
"id": 5523,
"label": "SHA2",
"start_offset": 22,
"end_offset": 86
},
{
"id": 5530,
"label": "SHA2",
"start_offset": 368,
"end_offset": 432
},
{
"id": 5522,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 0,
"end_offset": 10
},
{
"id": 5527,
"label": "SHA2",
"start_offset": 154,
"end_offset": 218
},
{
"id": 5528,
"label": "SHA2",
"start_offset": 248,
"end_offset": 312
},
{
"id": 5533,
"label": "SHA2",
"start_offset": 481,
"end_offset": 545
},
{
"id": 5531,
"label": "tools",
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"end_offset": 475
},
{
"id": 47007,
"label": "tools",
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"end_offset": 572
},
{
"id": 47009,
"label": "tools",
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"end_offset": 247
},
{
"id": 47011,
"label": "vulnerability",
"start_offset": 342,
"end_offset": 351
},
{
"id": 47012,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 87,
"end_offset": 119
},
{
"id": 47008,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 313,
"end_offset": 341
},
{
"id": 47010,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 433,
"end_offset": 466
}
] | [
{
"id": 288,
"from_id": 47012,
"to_id": 5522,
"type": "duplicate-of"
},
{
"id": 287,
"from_id": 5522,
"to_id": 5523,
"type": "consists-of"
}
] | [] |
1,887 | What sets Urpage attacks apart is its targeting of InPage, a word processor for Urdu and Arabic languages. | [
{
"id": 45163,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 51,
"end_offset": 57
},
{
"id": 45162,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 10,
"end_offset": 16
}
] | [
{
"id": 78,
"from_id": 45162,
"to_id": 45163,
"type": "targets"
}
] | [] |
1,893 | The link between Bahamut and Urpage can be best discussed by way of the multiple malicious Android samples that matched Bahamut's code and had C&C belonging to the Urpage infrastructure. | [
{
"id": 45170,
"label": "Infrastucture",
"start_offset": 143,
"end_offset": 146
},
{
"id": 45167,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 120,
"end_offset": 128
},
{
"id": 5570,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 17,
"end_offset": 24
},
{
"id": 5572,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 29,
"end_offset": 35
},
{
"id": 5578,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 164,
"end_offset": 170
},
{
"id": 47025,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 91,
"end_offset": 106
}
] | [
{
"id": 289,
"from_id": 5570,
"to_id": 5572,
"type": "related-to"
}
] | [] |
1,903 | As with Bahamut applications, once downloaded and executed, it showed multiple malicious features that deal with stealing information. | [
{
"id": 47030,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 113,
"end_offset": 133
},
{
"id": 47029,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 8,
"end_offset": 15
}
] | [
{
"id": 290,
"from_id": 47029,
"to_id": 47030,
"type": "uses"
}
] | [] |
1,921 | A malicious RTF file that exploits the CVE-2017-8750 and drops a malicious VB backdoor with C&C appswonder[.]info A malicious InPage file that exploits CVE-2017-12824 and drops two files, one non-malicious, and one malicious VB backdoor with C&C referfile[.]com Talos recently reported both C&C domain names with one type of campaign that targets iOS and involves MDM, and another type using VB and Delphi backdoors. | [
{
"id": 47039,
"label": "vulnerability",
"start_offset": 40,
"end_offset": 53
},
{
"id": 47042,
"label": "DOMAIN",
"start_offset": 247,
"end_offset": 262
},
{
"id": 47043,
"label": "identity",
"start_offset": 264,
"end_offset": 269
},
{
"id": 47044,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 349,
"end_offset": 352
},
{
"id": 47045,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 3,
"end_offset": 16
},
{
"id": 47040,
"label": "vulnerability",
"start_offset": 153,
"end_offset": 167
},
{
"id": 47041,
"label": "DOMAIN",
"start_offset": 97,
"end_offset": 114
}
] | [
{
"id": 291,
"from_id": 47045,
"to_id": 47039,
"type": "exploits"
},
{
"id": 292,
"from_id": 47045,
"to_id": 47041,
"type": "communicates-with"
}
] | [] |
1,927 | One of the RTF files was found in a server related to Confucius (f1a54dca2fdfe59ec3f537148460364fb5d046c9b4e7db5fc819a9732ae0e063, detected as TROJ_CVE201711882.AG), while the other one (434d34c0502910c562f5c6840694737a2c82a8c44004fa58c7c457b08aac17bd,detected as Mal_CVE20170199-2) downloaded a VB Backdoor that pings back to twitck[.]com, a domain name belonging to Urpage. | [
{
"id": 5662,
"label": "SHA2",
"start_offset": 187,
"end_offset": 251
},
{
"id": 5659,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 54,
"end_offset": 63
},
{
"id": 5660,
"label": "SHA2",
"start_offset": 65,
"end_offset": 129
},
{
"id": 47051,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 143,
"end_offset": 163
},
{
"id": 47052,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 264,
"end_offset": 281
},
{
"id": 47053,
"label": "DOMAIN",
"start_offset": 327,
"end_offset": 339
},
{
"id": 47054,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 368,
"end_offset": 374
}
] | [
{
"id": 293,
"from_id": 5660,
"to_id": 5659,
"type": "authored-by"
},
{
"id": 294,
"from_id": 47051,
"to_id": 5660,
"type": "related-to"
},
{
"id": 295,
"from_id": 47051,
"to_id": 5659,
"type": "authored-by"
},
{
"id": 296,
"from_id": 5662,
"to_id": 5659,
"type": "authored-by"
},
{
"id": 297,
"from_id": 47052,
"to_id": 5659,
"type": "authored-by"
},
{
"id": 298,
"from_id": 47052,
"to_id": 47053,
"type": "beacons-to"
},
{
"id": 299,
"from_id": 47054,
"to_id": 47053,
"type": "controls"
}
] | [] |
1,929 | But this link is further fortified by the Android applications we found whose code is like that of Bahamut, with the C&C matching the usual name registration pattern of Patchwork’s group, as well as an infrastructure close to an old Patchwork domain. | [
{
"id": 45181,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 42,
"end_offset": 49
},
{
"id": 45183,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 169,
"end_offset": 178
},
{
"id": 45184,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 233,
"end_offset": 242
},
{
"id": 45182,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 99,
"end_offset": 106
}
] | [
{
"id": 80,
"from_id": 45182,
"to_id": 45183,
"type": "attributed-to"
}
] | [] |
1,942 | The decoy documents tell more about Urpage's possible targets, as it contains text from articles about the region of Kashmir. | [
{
"id": 47066,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 36,
"end_offset": 42
},
{
"id": 47067,
"label": "location",
"start_offset": 117,
"end_offset": 124
}
] | [
{
"id": 300,
"from_id": 47066,
"to_id": 47067,
"type": "targets"
}
] | [] |
1,986 | This post is also available in: 日本語 (Japanese) HelloXD is a ransomware family performing double extortion attacks that surfaced in November 2021. | [
{
"id": 45202,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 53,
"end_offset": 60
},
{
"id": 45203,
"label": "TIME",
"start_offset": 137,
"end_offset": 150
},
{
"id": 45205,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 95,
"end_offset": 111
}
] | [
{
"id": 81,
"from_id": 45202,
"to_id": 45205,
"type": "uses"
}
] | [] |
1,992 | During the analysis of the MicroBackdoor sample, Unit 42 observed the configuration and found an embedded IP address, belonging to a threat actor we believe is potentially the developer: x4k, also known as L4ckyguy, unKn0wn, unk0w, _unkn0wn and x4kme. | [
{
"id": 45216,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 246,
"end_offset": 251
},
{
"id": 45209,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 28,
"end_offset": 41
},
{
"id": 45212,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 207,
"end_offset": 215
},
{
"id": 45210,
"label": "identity",
"start_offset": 50,
"end_offset": 57
},
{
"id": 45213,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 217,
"end_offset": 224
},
{
"id": 45211,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 188,
"end_offset": 191
},
{
"id": 45214,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 226,
"end_offset": 231
},
{
"id": 45215,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 233,
"end_offset": 241
}
] | [
{
"id": 87,
"from_id": 45216,
"to_id": 45211,
"type": "duplicate-of"
},
{
"id": 83,
"from_id": 45212,
"to_id": 45211,
"type": "duplicate-of"
},
{
"id": 84,
"from_id": 45213,
"to_id": 45211,
"type": "duplicate-of"
},
{
"id": 85,
"from_id": 45214,
"to_id": 45211,
"type": "duplicate-of"
},
{
"id": 86,
"from_id": 45215,
"to_id": 45211,
"type": "duplicate-of"
},
{
"id": 88,
"from_id": 45209,
"to_id": 45211,
"type": "authored-by"
}
] | [] |
2,002 | The file description included the entry VlahmAV, a play on words on ClamAV, and the developer named the ransomware HelloXD and used another potential alias, uKnow, as the developer of HelloXD in the copyright section. | [
{
"id": 47109,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 69,
"end_offset": 75
},
{
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] | [
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},
{
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"to_id": 47112,
"type": "duplicate-of"
}
] | [] |
2,013 | For example, LockBit 2.0 leverages Tox Chat for threat actor communications. | [
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{
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] | [
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] | [] |
2,027 | While the obfuscation and execution may differ between the two, both samples contain very similar core functionality, due to the author copying the leaked Babuk/Babyk source code in order to develop the HelloXD ransomware (Figure 7). | [
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},
{
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}
] | [] |
2,030 | While there is a lot of overlap between HelloXD and Babuk, there are some small but crucial differences to take note of between Babuk and the two different variants. HelloXD version 1 is the least modified, utilizing Curve25519-Donna and a modified HC-128 algorithm to encrypt file data, while also containing the same CRC hashing routine incorporating the string dong, possibly referencing Chuong Dong, who had previously analyzed and reported on the first version of Babuk (Figure 8). | [
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] | [
{
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}
] | [] |
2,058 | From the GitHub page, we also observed a URL to a site – xn--90a5ai[.]com(фсб[.]com) – resolving to the previously mentioned IP 164[.]68[.]114[.]29, which at this point in time only shows an animation of interconnecting points. | [
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},
{
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{
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}
] | [] |
2,059 | That being said, when looking at the HTML source code of the site, we discovered a couple of references to the user observed before – x4kme – and other aliases such as uKn0wn, which was observed in the HelloXD ransomware samples. | [
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] | [
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] | [] |
2,061 | , we were able to observe another GitHub account with the name l4ckyguy, sharing the profile picture, location and URL in the description, with a link to the previously observed account (x4kme), and a name, Ivan Topor, which we believe may be another alias for this threat actor. | [
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{
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] | [
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},
{
"id": 92,
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"type": "related-to"
}
] | [] |
2,064 | This particular IP was linked to a Contabo server that x4k had also included within their VirusTotal graph discussed above. | [
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] | [
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}
] | [] |
2,081 | Most of his videos, comments, configurations and tutorials are written in Russian – and when combined with knowledge gained from a few OPSEC mistakes – Russia is also where we believe x4k originates from. | [
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] | [
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] | [] |
2,103 | This post is also available in: 日本語 (Japanese) A recent vulnerability in the Kerberos authentication protocol, CVE-2020-17049 (dubbed Bronze Bit), has been disclosed by Microsoft. | [
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] | [
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}
] | [] |
2,114 | On August 22, 2018, the Apache Foundation released a critical security update for CVE-2018-1176, a remote code execution vulnerability affecting Apache Struts versions 2.3 to 2.3.34 and 2.5 to 2.5.16. | [
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}
] | [] |
2,185 | This new campaign used updated instances of the Tdrop malware family discovered in the Operation Troy campaign. | [
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{
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] | [
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2,285 | Parallel to the analysis, tracking, and technical disruption of this botnet, Google has filed a lawsuit against two individuals believed to be located in Russia for operating the Glupteba Botnet and its various criminal schemes. | [
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] | [
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}
] | [] |
2,298 | In late August 2021, TAG discovered watering hole attacks targeting visitors to Hong Kong websites for a media outlet and a prominent pro-democracy labor and political group. | [
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}
] | [] |
2,299 | The watering hole served an XNU privilege escalation vulnerability (CVE-2021-30869) unpatched in macOS Catalina, which led to the installation of a previously unreported backdoor. | [
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] | [] |
2,313 | The exploit chain combined an RCE in WebKit exploiting CVE-2021-1789 which was patched on Jan 5, 2021 before discovery of this campaign and a 0-day local privilege escalation in XNU (CVE-2021-30869) patched on Sept 23, 2021. | [
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] | [] |
2,354 | Beer was able to quickly recognize this exploit as a variant of an earlier port type confusion vulnerability he analyzed in the XNU kernel (CVE-2020-27932). | [
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] | [
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] | [] |
2,365 | For those interested in following our in-the-wild work, we will soon publish details surrounding another, unrelated campaign we discovered using two Chrome 0-days (CVE-2021-37973 and CVE-2021-37976). | [
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}
] | [] |
2,368 | We have uncovered a cyberespionage campaign being perpetrated by Earth Baku, an advanced persistent threat (APT) group with a known history of carrying out cyberattacks under the alias APT41. | [
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] | [
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}
] | [] |
2,370 | Earth Baku deploys its ongoing campaign, which can be traced to as far back as July 2020, through multiple attack vectors that are designed based on different exploits or the infrastructure of its targeted victim's environment: • SQL injection to upload a malicious file • Installment through InstallUtil.exe in a scheduled task • Possibly a malicious link (LNK) file sent as an email attachment • Exploitation of the ProxyLogon vulnerability CVE-2021-26855 to upload a China Chopper web shell This campaign uses previously unidentified shellcode loaders, which we have named StealthVector and StealthMutant, and a backdoor, which we have dubbed ScrambleCross. | [
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}
] | [] |
2,381 | After its payload is decrypted, StealthMutant performs process hollowing to execute its payload in a remote process. | [
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] | [
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] | [] |
2,383 | Both StealthMutant and StealthVector contain a payload of either the Cobalt Strike beacon or ScrambleCross, a newly discovered backdoor. | [
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] | [] |
2,386 | It has many of the same capabilities as another backdoor, Crosswalk, which has also been used by Earth Baku. | [
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2,391 | But because Earth Baku has updated its toolset with StealthVector, StealthMutant, and ScrambleCross for this new campaign, we have identified it as its own separate operation. | [
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] | [] |
2,393 | A timeline of Earth Baku’s previous campaign as APT41 and its new campaign How Earth Baku creates its malware tools Earth Baku is known for its use of self-developed tools. | [
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] | [] |
2,398 | On March 29, 2022, the Spring Cloud Expression Resource Access Vulnerability tracked in CVE-2022-22963 was patched with the release of Spring Cloud Function 3.1.7 and 3.2.3. | [
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] | [] |
2,399 | Two days later on March 31, 2022, Spring released version 5.3.18 and 5.2.20 of Spring Framework to patch another more severe vulnerability tracked in CVE-2022-22965. | [
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] | [] |
2,400 | The CVE-2022-22965 vulnerability allows an attacker unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE), which Unit 42 has observed being exploited in the wild. | [
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] | [
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] | [] |
2,404 | On April 8, we updated this blog to include statistics on SpringShell exploitation attempts that we identified by analyzing hits on the Spring Core Remote Code Execution Vulnerability threat prevention signature for the Palo Alto Networks Next-Generation Firewall, as well as alerts triggered in Cortex XDR. | [
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}
] | [] |
2,407 | Affected Software and Versions Background on the Spring Framework Root Cause Analysis for CVE-2022-22965 | [
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"end_offset": 104
},
{
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}
] | [
{
"id": 335,
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}
] | [] |
2,427 | Early in 2010, CVE-2010-1622 was assigned to a remote code execution vulnerability in the Spring Framework. | [
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{
"id": 107,
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"type": "uses"
}
] | [] |
2,476 | This particular webshell is based on AntSword’s shell.jsp, which was modified to use a parameter of k3rwin instead of ant to load the class. | [
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"end_offset": 106
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{
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}
] | [
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}
] | [] |
2,488 | The signature triggered on the creation of the webshell files, of which we observed the following file written: /usr/local/tomcat/work/Catalina/localhost/ROOT/org/apache/jsp/shell_jsp.java /usr/local/tomcat/webapps/ROOT/shell_.jsp SpringShell is officially assigned CVE-2022-22965, and the patch was released on March 31, 2022. | [
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{
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}
] | [
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},
{
"id": 340,
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"to_id": 47566,
"type": "consists-of"
}
] | [] |
2,491 | While CVE-2022-22963 is a different vulnerability in Spring Cloud Function (not technically part of SpringShell), a Threat Prevention signature is also available to ensure coverage at the perimeter. | [
{
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"end_offset": 112
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{
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{
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}
] | [
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}
] | [] |
2,496 | Palo Alto Networks Cortex XDR Prevent and Pro customers running agent version 7.4 and above with content version 450-87751 on Linux devices are protected from CVE-2022-22963 using the Java Deserialization module; customers running agent version 7.7 and content 480 and above are protected from CVE-2022-22963 and CVE-2022-22965 for both Windows and Linux using the Java Deserialization module; other OSes and exploits receive protections from post-exploitation activities using Behavioral Threat Protection, Password Theft Prevention, Anti Ransomware and other Anti Exploitation modules. | [
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}
] | [
{
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}
] | [] |
2,516 | The FBI has connected Conti to more than 400 cyberattacks against organizations worldwide, three-quarters of which are based in the U.S., with demands as high as $25 million. | [
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] | [
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] | [] |
2,555 | Credential theft has been known to be a key part of the Shamoon 2 attacks. | [
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{
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] | [
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] | [] |
2,557 | And from this we can see how credential theft is the keystone of Shamoon 2 attacks; if an organization can prevent credential theft, the Shamoon 2 attacks can’t succeed. | [
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}
] | [] |
2,558 | In our research, we’re able to outline that Shamoon 2 enters and spreads through an organization in three stages: These stages are outlined in the image below. And that credential theft is a key element in each stage: It’s also worth noting that credentials are a keystone issue in Shamoon 2 wave 2 too: we saw evidence of targeting an organization’s virtual desktop infrastructure (VDI) solutions with default credentials. | [
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{
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}
] | [
{
"id": 349,
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}
] | [] |
2,561 | We do believe there is evidence suggestive of a connection between Shamoon 2 and the Magic Hound campaign, which could indicate these two attack campaigns could have worked in conjunction with each other to execute the Shamoon 2 attacks. | [
{
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{
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}
] | [
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}
] | [] |
2,594 | In December 2021, the Ministry of Health of Brazil fell victim to an attack claimed by Lapsus$ (Figure 2). | [
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] | [
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}
] | [] |
2,596 | This was followed in short order by attacks on South American telecoms providers Claro and Embratel, Brazilian state-owned postal service “Correios,” and Portuguese media giant Impresa. | [
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},
{
"id": 355,
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"type": "located-at"
}
] | [] |
2,597 | This initial focus has led to speculation that Lapsus$ Group may be Brazilian, although we understand the choice of targets to have been influenced by extended team members rather than the team leadership. | [
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},
{
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}
] | [
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}
] | [] |
2,598 | Apart from Argentinian eCommerce provider Mercado Libre / Mercado Pago, subsequent victimology has departed South America and pivoted to focus on the high-tech sector. Recent public victims have included: It should be understood that in addition there are likely any number of other victims, targeted by attacks not known in the public sphere. | [
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{
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}
] | [
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},
{
"id": 359,
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}
] | [] |
2,601 | For example, in the “proof” of the Okta breach posted on the Lapsus$ Group’s Telegram channel, the actor states: “… our focus was ONLY on okta customers” (Figure 3) | [
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] | [
{
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}
] | [] |
2,613 | Although the commodity malware RedLine Stealer has been implicated for credential harvesting in some attacks, it’s unclear if this is first- or third-party, and it cannot be used as a definitive indicator of Lapsus$-specific activity. | [
{
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{
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{
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}
] | [
{
"id": 109,
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"type": "delivers"
}
] | [] |
2,630 | This post is also available in: 日本語 (Japanese) LockBit 2.0 is ransomware as a service (RaaS) that first emerged in June 2021 as an upgrade to its predecessor LockBit (aka ABCD Ransomware), which was first observed in September 2019. | [
{
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"id": 47806,
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] | [
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},
{
"id": 363,
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"to_id": 47806,
"type": "duplicate-of"
}
] | [] |
2,633 | While several top-tier RaaS affiliate programs, such as Babuk, DarkSide and REvil (aka Sodinokibi) disappeared from the underground in 2021, LockBit 2.0 continued to operate and gradually became one of the most active ransomware operations. | [
{
"id": 47813,
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},
{
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}
] | [
{
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}
] | [] |
2,677 | Technically speaking, we have observed LockBit 2.0 affiliates leveraging the following tactics, techniques and procedures: Windows SysInternals PsExec has been utilized for both persistence and execution purposes. | [
{
"id": 47880,
"label": "threat-actor",
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},
{
"id": 47879,
"label": "tools",
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"end_offset": 152
}
] | [
{
"id": 365,
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}
] | [] |
2,681 | The LockBit group claimed that LockBit 2.0 is “the fastest encryption software all over the world” and provided a comparative table showing the encryption speed of various ransomware samples. LockBit 2.0 also contains a self-spreading feature, clears logs and can print the ransom note on network printers until the paper runs out. A management panel that affiliates can use to manage victims and affiliate accounts, generate new ransomware builds and generate the decryptor if the demanded ransom is paid also exists. | [
{
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},
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},
{
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}
] | [
{
"id": 367,
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"type": "authored-by"
}
] | [] |
2,682 | LockBit 2.0 operators also released an information-stealer dubbed StealBit, which was developed to support affiliates of the LockBit 2.0 RaaS when exfiltrating data from breached companies. | [
{
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},
{
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] | [
{
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}
] | [] |
2,704 | On Saturday, Microsoft disclosed a critical vulnerability in Internet Explorer, CVE-2014-1776, affecting Internet Explorer versions 6 through 11. | [
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"label": "TIME",
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},
{
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{
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] | [
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}
] | [] |
2,749 | Vulnerability Details CVE-2014-6271 exists in all versions of Bash and is related to how environment variables are processed when the shell starts up. | [
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},
{
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}
] | [
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] | [] |
2,801 | While the initial attack vector for these attacks is unknown, it is certain that the spread of the ransomware occurs through active exploitation of the ETERNALBLUE vulnerability (CVE-2017-0144) in Microsoft Windows. | [
{
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{
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}
] | [] |
2,816 | Reports quickly emerged that this attack was effective due to the presence of code exploiting a vulnerability (CVE-2017-0144) in Microsoft Windows (code named: ETERNALBLUE) that was released as part of the Equation Group dump by the Shadow Brokers in their fifth leak on April 14, 2017. | [
{
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},
{
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{
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] | [
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},
{
"id": 379,
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"type": "related-to"
}
] | [] |
2,845 | The WanaCrypt0r ransomware spreads itself by heavily scanning over TCP port 445 (associated with SMB) and attempting to exploit the ETERNALBLUE vulnerability on systems. | [
{
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},
{
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}
] | [
{
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}
] | [] |
2,849 | It has been reported that the DOUBLEPULSAR backdoor (also from the Equation Group leak by Shadow Brokers) is installed and used to execute the malware after successful exploitation of a host via ETERNALBLUE, but this warrants further analysis. | [
{
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},
{
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] | [
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},
{
"id": 382,
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"type": "exploits"
}
] | [] |
2,866 | Late last month reports surfaced that a new Internet Explorer vulnerability (CVE-2014-1776) was being exploited in targeted attacks. | [
{
"id": 48064,
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},
{
"id": 48065,
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}
] | [
{
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}
] | [] |
2,879 | Last year, exploitation of CVE-2013-3163 targeted Internet Explorer 8 and earlier this year, we found exploitation of CVE-2014-0322 in Internet Explorer 10. | [
{
"id": 48076,
"label": "vulnerability",
"start_offset": 27,
"end_offset": 40
},
{
"id": 48077,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 50,
"end_offset": 69
},
{
"id": 48079,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 135,
"end_offset": 155
},
{
"id": 48078,
"label": "vulnerability",
"start_offset": 118,
"end_offset": 131
}
] | [
{
"id": 385,
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"type": "has"
},
{
"id": 386,
"from_id": 48079,
"to_id": 48078,
"type": "has"
}
] | [] |
3,088 | They grouped these vulnerabilities under the names “Spectre” (CVE-2017-5753 and CVE-2017-5715) and “Meltdown” (CVE-2017-5754). | [
{
"id": 48151,
"label": "vulnerability",
"start_offset": 63,
"end_offset": 76
},
{
"id": 48152,
"label": "vulnerability",
"start_offset": 81,
"end_offset": 94
},
{
"id": 48153,
"label": "vulnerability",
"start_offset": 112,
"end_offset": 125
},
{
"id": 48154,
"label": "vulnerability",
"start_offset": 53,
"end_offset": 60
},
{
"id": 48155,
"label": "vulnerability",
"start_offset": 101,
"end_offset": 109
}
] | [
{
"id": 388,
"from_id": 48154,
"to_id": 48151,
"type": "related-to"
}
] | [] |
3,169 | We discovered a new malware that targets online gambling companies in China via a watering hole attack, in which visitors are tricked into downloading a malware loader disguised as a legitimate installer for well-known apps such as Adobe Flash Player or Microsoft Silverlight. | [
{
"id": 48286,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 82,
"end_offset": 102
},
{
"id": 48287,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 126,
"end_offset": 150
},
{
"id": 48291,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 16,
"end_offset": 27
},
{
"id": 48285,
"label": "location",
"start_offset": 70,
"end_offset": 75
},
{
"id": 48289,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 254,
"end_offset": 275
},
{
"id": 48290,
"label": "identity",
"start_offset": 41,
"end_offset": 66
},
{
"id": 48288,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 232,
"end_offset": 250
}
] | [
{
"id": 396,
"from_id": 48291,
"to_id": 48290,
"type": "targets"
},
{
"id": 397,
"from_id": 48290,
"to_id": 48285,
"type": "located-at"
},
{
"id": 398,
"from_id": 48291,
"to_id": 48286,
"type": "uses"
},
{
"id": 399,
"from_id": 48291,
"to_id": 48287,
"type": "uses"
}
] | [] |
3,173 | What makes BIOPASS RAT particularly interesting is that it can sniff its victim’s screen by abusing the framework of Open Broadcaster Software (OBS) Studio, a popular live streaming and video recording app, to establish live streaming to a cloud service via Real-Time Messaging Protocol (RTMP). | [
{
"id": 48296,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 11,
"end_offset": 22
},
{
"id": 48298,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 258,
"end_offset": 293
},
{
"id": 48297,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 117,
"end_offset": 148
}
] | [
{
"id": 400,
"from_id": 48296,
"to_id": 48297,
"type": "targets"
}
] | [] |
3,174 | In addition, the attack misuses the object storage service (OSS) of Alibaba Cloud (Aliyun) to host the BIOPASS RAT Python scripts as well as to store the exfiltrated data from victims. | [
{
"id": 48300,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 103,
"end_offset": 114
},
{
"id": 48299,
"label": "Infrastucture",
"start_offset": 68,
"end_offset": 90
}
] | [
{
"id": 401,
"from_id": 48299,
"to_id": 48300,
"type": "hosts"
}
] | [] |
3,178 | Furthermore, BIOPASS RAT also creates scheduled tasks to load the Cobalt Strike shellcode during the initialization, indicating that the malicious actor behind the attack still heavily relies on Cobalt Strike. | [
{
"id": 48304,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 13,
"end_offset": 24
},
{
"id": 48305,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 66,
"end_offset": 79
},
{
"id": 48306,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 195,
"end_offset": 208
}
] | [
{
"id": 402,
"from_id": 48304,
"to_id": 48305,
"type": "uses"
}
] | [] |
3,179 | We also found several clues that show how the malware might be connected with the Winnti Group(also known as APT41). | [
{
"id": 48308,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 110,
"end_offset": 115
},
{
"id": 48307,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 83,
"end_offset": 95
}
] | [
{
"id": 403,
"from_id": 48307,
"to_id": 48308,
"type": "duplicate-of"
}
] | [] |
3,180 | In this blog entry, we will dive deeper into BIOPASS RAT with a detailed technical analysis of the infection chain, the different components of the malware, and any possible associations with Winnti. | [
{
"id": 48309,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 192,
"end_offset": 198
},
{
"id": 48310,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 45,
"end_offset": 56
}
] | [
{
"id": 404,
"from_id": 48310,
"to_id": 48309,
"type": "related-to"
}
] | [] |
3,182 | The initial delivery mechanism of BIOPASS RAT uses of a watering hole, a compromised website in which the malicious actors inject their custom JavaScript code to deliver malware. | [
{
"id": 48312,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 56,
"end_offset": 69
},
{
"id": 48311,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 34,
"end_offset": 45
}
] | [
{
"id": 405,
"from_id": 48311,
"to_id": 48312,
"type": "uses"
}
] | [] |
3,199 | Authenticode-signed files are either downloaded from the official websites (as seen in sample c47fabc47806961f908bed37d6b1bbbfd183d564a2d01b7cae87bd95c20ff8a5) or are hosted on Alibaba Cloud OSS on the attackers’ account. | [
{
"id": 48324,
"label": "Infrastucture",
"start_offset": 177,
"end_offset": 194
},
{
"id": 9783,
"label": "SHA1",
"start_offset": 94,
"end_offset": 158
}
] | [
{
"id": 406,
"from_id": 48324,
"to_id": 9783,
"type": "hosts"
}
] | [] |
3,215 | An old sample of the module (30ccfbf24b7c8cc15f85541d5ec18feb0e19e75e1e4d2bca9941e6585dad7bc7) is likely a watchdog to check the status of another module that is known as “c1222”. The malicious actors can change this behavior by replacing the content of the cdaemon.txt service in the cloud so that when combined with the regular execution of the scheduled task, the cdaemon task can behave like a backdoor. | [
{
"id": 48338,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 172,
"end_offset": 177
},
{
"id": 48339,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 259,
"end_offset": 270
},
{
"id": 9814,
"label": "SHA2",
"start_offset": 29,
"end_offset": 93
},
{
"id": 9821,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 348,
"end_offset": 362
}
] | [
{
"id": 407,
"from_id": 9814,
"to_id": 48338,
"type": "related-to"
}
] | [] |
3,281 | The malware downloads OBS Studio files if the OBS folder and config file are not found in the root directory. | [
{
"id": 48378,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 5,
"end_offset": 12
},
{
"id": 48377,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 23,
"end_offset": 33
}
] | [
{
"id": 408,
"from_id": 48378,
"to_id": 48377,
"type": "downloads"
}
] | [] |
3,315 | Although these are not implemented inside the BIOPASS RAT malware, we have observed two additional plug-ins that are written in Python (“getwechatdb” and “xss_spoof”) and were deployed by the threat actor to a victim who had been infected with Cobalt Strike. | [
{
"id": 48398,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 46,
"end_offset": 57
},
{
"id": 48399,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 128,
"end_offset": 134
},
{
"id": 48400,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 244,
"end_offset": 257
}
] | [
{
"id": 409,
"from_id": 48398,
"to_id": 48400,
"type": "uses"
}
] | [] |
3,336 | The main script used to manipulate traffic with WinDivert Potential links with the Winnti group | [
{
"id": 48944,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 87,
"end_offset": 99
},
{
"id": 48943,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 48,
"end_offset": 57
}
] | [
{
"id": 505,
"from_id": 48944,
"to_id": 48943,
"type": "uses"
}
] | [] |
3,337 | We have found several connections between BIOPASS RAT and the Winnti Group: | [
{
"id": 10096,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 42,
"end_offset": 53
},
{
"id": 48945,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 62,
"end_offset": 74
}
] | [
{
"id": 506,
"from_id": 48945,
"to_id": 10096,
"type": "uses"
}
] | [] |
3,340 | It is well known that the Winnti Group has previously used stolen certificates from game studios to sign its malware. | [
{
"id": 48950,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 59,
"end_offset": 78
},
{
"id": 48949,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 26,
"end_offset": 38
}
] | [
{
"id": 507,
"from_id": 48949,
"to_id": 48950,
"type": "uses"
}
] | [] |
3,342 | Information from the stolen certificates 2. While checking the stolen certificates, we found a server-side variant of the Derusbi malware sample (e5fdb754c1a7c36c288c46765c9258bb2c7f38fa2a99188a623182f877da3783) that was signed with the same stolen certificate. | [
{
"id": 10119,
"label": "SHA2",
"start_offset": 153,
"end_offset": 217
},
{
"id": 48955,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 129,
"end_offset": 144
}
] | [
{
"id": 508,
"from_id": 10119,
"to_id": 48955,
"type": "indicates"
}
] | [] |
3,345 | 3. We found an interesting Cobalt Strike loader (a7e9e2bec3ad283a9a0b130034e822c8b6dfd26dda855f883a3a4ff785514f97) that embeds a URL that leads to the BIOPASS RAT loader. | [
{
"id": 10125,
"label": "SHA2",
"start_offset": 54,
"end_offset": 118
},
{
"id": 10126,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 156,
"end_offset": 167
},
{
"id": 48957,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 32,
"end_offset": 45
}
] | [
{
"id": 509,
"from_id": 10125,
"to_id": 48957,
"type": "indicates"
},
{
"id": 510,
"from_id": 10125,
"to_id": 10126,
"type": "drops"
}
] | [] |