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crs_RL33819 | crs_RL33819_0 | 5581 (Dodd) to S. 3001 , H.R. 6913 (Flake), and H.R. On May 21, 2008, the Senate passed S.Res. 573 (Martinez) by unanimous consent, which recognized Cuba Solidarity Day and the struggle of the Cuban people. Unless the regime changes, our policy will not. 2764 , the Senate approved S.Amdt. 707 (Rangel) to H.R. 2419 , the 2007 farm bill. It would fully fund the Administration's request for $45.7 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) for Cuba democracy programs. Political Conditions
On February 24, 2008, Cuba's legislature selected Raúl Castro as President of the 31-member Council of State, a position that officially made him Cuba's head of government and state. For background, also see CRS Report RS22742, Cuba ' s Political Succession: From Fidel to Raul Castro , and CRS Report RL33622, Cuba ' s Future Political Scenarios and U.S. Policy Approaches , written in the aftermath of Fidel Castro's stepping down because of poor health in 2006. Since the early 1960s, U.S. policy toward Cuba has consisted largely of isolating the island nation through comprehensive economic sanctions, including an embargo on trade and financial transactions. This includes U.S. private humanitarian donations, medical exports to Cuba under the terms of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, U.S. government support for democracy-building efforts, and U.S.-sponsored radio and television broadcasting to Cuba. Under the current Bush Administration, enforcement of U.S. restrictions on Cuba travel has increased, and restrictions on travel and on private remittances to Cuba have been tightened. In the first session of the 110 th Congress, two Senate Appropriations Committee reported-versions of appropriations bills had provisions that would have eased restrictions on travel to Cuba for the marketing and sale of agricultural and medical goods, but ultimately these provisions were not included in the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act ( P.L. H.R. Two bills that would have lifted overall economic sanctions— H.R. 217 (Serrano) and H.R. In addition, as noted above, several initiative introduced in the aftermath of Hurricanes Gustav and Ike would temporarily ease U.S. embargo restrictions in several areas, including travel and remittances, but no action was taken on these measures. In other first session action, on July 27, 2007, the House rejected (by a vote of 182-245) H.Amdt. Several other legislative initiatives introduced in the 110 th Congress would have eased restrictions on the sale of U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba, but none of these were considered:
H.R. Two broader bills that would have lifted economic sanctions on Cuba— H.R. 217 (Serrano) and H.R. In the 110 th Congress, five initiatives— H.R. 2819 (Rangel), S. 1673 (Baucus), and S. 1806 (Leahy)—had provisions that would have repealed the Section 211 trademark sanction from law, while two other initiatives— H.R. 1679 (Ros-Lehtinen), S. 876 (Martinez), and S. 2503 (Nelson, Bill)—would have imposed sanctions related to Cuba's offshore oil development on its northern coast, but no action was taken on the measures. In contrast, several legislative initiatives – S. 1268 (Dorgan), S. 2953 (Craig), H.R. Over the years, there have been varying levels of cooperation with Cuba on anti-drug efforts. Ultimately, none of these provisions were included in enacted measures. 110 - 161 ( H.R. H.R. Would facilitate the sale of U.S. agricultural products to Cuba by providing for general license authority for travel-related expenditures for persons engaging in sales and marketing activities for agricultural products or in the transportation by sea or air of such products; authorizing a consular officer to issue a temporary visa for a Cuban national conducting activities related to the purchase of U.S. agricultural goods, including phytosanitary inspections; clarifying the "payment of cash in advance" term used in the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA) to mean that the payment by the purchaser and the receipt of such payment to the seller occurs prior to the transfer of title of the commodity or product to the purchaser and the release of control of such commodity or product to the purchaser; and prohibiting the President from restricting direct transfers from a Cuban financial institution to a U.S. financial institution for U.S. agricultural sales under TSRA. H.R. 1306 (Wexler)/ S. 749 (Nelson). H.R. 2819 (Rangel)/ S. 1673 (Baucus). H.R. H.R. H.R. 3161 (DeLauro)/ S. 1859 (Kohl). H.R. 5627 (Diaz - Balart, Lincoln)/ S. 2777 (Martinez). Similar bills to award the congressional gold medal to Dr. Oscar Elias Biscet, in recognition of his courageous and unwavering commitment to democracy and human rights in Cuba. H.R. S. 554 (Dorgan). Title I, Section 101 would terminate U.S. government-sponsored television broadcasting to Cuba and prohibit funding. S. 721 (Enzi). S. 3260 (Durbin). S. 3288 (Leahy). H.R. The House would have funded Cuba broadcasting in H.R. H.Res. | Since the early 1960s, U.S. policy toward Cuba has consisted largely of isolating the communist nation through economic sanctions, which the Bush Administration has tightened significantly. A second policy component has consisted of support measures for the Cuban people, including private humanitarian donations and U.S.-sponsored radio and television broadcasting to Cuba. As in past years, the main issue for U.S. policy toward Cuba in the 110th Congress was how to best support political and economic change in one of the world's remaining communist nations. Unlike past years, however, Congress examined policy toward Cuba in the context of Fidel Castro's departure from heading the government because of poor health. Raúl Castro, who had served as provision head of government since July 2006, was selected on February 24, 2008 by Cuba's legislature to continue in that role officially.
In the first session of the 110th Congress, Congress fully funded the Administration's FY2008 request for $45.7 million for Cuba democracy programs in the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2008 (P.L. 110-161). In other first session action, on July 27, 2007, the House rejected H.Amdt. 707 to H.R. 2419, the 2007 farm bill, that would have facilitated the export of U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba. In the second session, the Senate approved S.Res. 573 on May 21, 2008, which recognized the struggle of the Cuban people. In both sessions, there were Cuba provisions in several House and Senate appropriations measures (H.R. 2829, H.R. 3161, S. 1859, H.R. 7323, and S. 3260) that would have eased restrictions on travel and on U.S. agricultural sales to Cuba, but none of these provisions were included in enacted measures.
Numerous other legislative initiatives on Cuba were introduced in the 110th Congress, but were not considered. Several of these initiatives would have eased sanctions: H.R. 177 (educational travel); H.R. 216 (Cuban baseball players); H.R. 217 and H.R. 624 (overall sanctions); H.R. 654, S. 554, and S. 721 (travel); H.R. 757 (family travel and remittances); H.R. 1026 (sale of U.S. agricultural products); H.R. 2819/S. 1673 (sale of U.S. agricultural and medical products and travel); and S. 1268, S. 2953, H.R. 3182, and H.R. 3435 (development of Cuba's offshore oil). S. 554 would have terminated U.S.-government sponsored television broadcasting to Cuba. Several initiatives would have tightened sanctions: H.R. 525 (related to U.S. fugitives in Cuba), and H.R. 1679/S. 876 and S. 2503 (related to Cuba's offshore oil development). Two initiatives, H.R. 1306 and S. 749, would have amended a provision of law restricting the registration or enforcement of certain Cuban trademarks; five initiatives—H.R. 217, H.R. 624, H.R. 2819, S. 1673, and S. 1806—would have repealed the trademark sanction. H.R. 5627 and S. 2777 would have awarded the congressional gold medal to Cuban political prisoner Dr. Oscar Elias Biscet. H.Res. 995 would have commemorated the 1996 shootdown of two U.S. civilian planes by Cuba. S. 3288 had a provision that would have funded U.S. work to establish anti-drug cooperation with Cuba. In the aftermath of Hurricanes Gustav and Ike, several initiatives would have temporarily eased some U.S. economic sanctions on Cuba: H.R. 6913, H.R. 6962, and S.Amdt. 5581 to S. 3001.
This report reflects legislative developments through the 110th Congress, and will not be updated. For additional information on Cuba, see CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances, and CRS Report RS22742, Cuba's Political Succession: From Fidel to Raul Castro |
crs_R40833 | crs_R40833_0 | Renewable Energy, Energy Efficiency, and Green Jobs
In the United States, growing awareness of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and the possible implications for global climate change have combined with recent high energy prices and economic uncertainty to rekindle interest in renewable energy. Renewable energy technologies generate electricity from resources such as the sun, wind, or biomass, with essentially no net GHG emissions. President Obama has declared a goal for the United States to become the world's leading exporter of renewable energy technologies, setting out policy objectives for the development of related "green jobs" and the investment of $150 billion over 10 years in energy research and development (R&D) for the next generation of energy technologies. Although there is no consensus on the term's meaning, it often has been defined to include at a minimum jobs that result directly from increasing reliance on renewables for generating electricity and powering vehicles as well as jobs that result directly from achieving greater energy efficiency. Complicating the estimation of the number of green jobs is the absence of an authoritative data source. In the case of the utility industry, for example, NAICS disaggregates firms into the categories of hydro, fossil fuel, nuclear and "other" sources. For its part, the government agency responsible for labor force statistics, BLS, has requested funding for FY2010 to develop data on the number of green jobs and their characteristics (e.g., wages, training requirements) by industry and occupation. As a result of differences in definitions, assumptions, and methodologies, the analyses produce wide-ranging estimates of the number of green jobs. Most of the future growth in green jobs is generally envisioned as coming from the growth in deployment of renewable energy technologies. The timeframe under consideration is important in any discussion of the potential for renewable energy technologies to create jobs, for the technologies are at different stages in their development cycles and have attributes suited to different applications. As such, renewable energy deployment programs from state governments have had a great influence on the current deployment levels of renewable energy technologies and resultant jobs. Historically, the federal investment in renewable energy technologies in the United States has not been about creating jobs, but instead simply focused on developing the technologies to a point where they are considered ready for commercialization. It is important to recognize that as a specific renewable energy technology becomes more efficient, the number of jobs per Megawatt (MW) of output is likely to decrease. Companies must be capable of competing in the domestic market for renewable energy first and foremost, as the potential growth of U.S. renewable markets already has significant international participation. Incentivizing Domestic Production
A key to maximizing U.S. green jobs growth from renewable energy is the domestic design and manufacturing of equipment and components. A renewable energy industry capable of serving the export market may create many more jobs than an industry which only serves domestic needs since production would necessarily be at internationally competitive prices. Given the growing international competition for renewable energy markets and green jobs, policy mechanisms and incentives may be necessary to encourage manufacturers to locate production of renewable energy products and components in the United States. Few doubt the potential of renewable energy to help address climate change concerns; the question is whether the desired benefits merit the investment. But developing the next generation of renewable energy technologies and building an internationally competitive industry may require a significant and sustained national investment. Without it, the majority of the solar panels, wind turbines, and components providing the clean energy of tomorrow may continue to be designed and built by workers overseas. | In the United States, growing awareness of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and the possible implications for global climate change have combined with recent high energy prices and economic uncertainty to rekindle interest in renewable energy. Renewable energy technologies generate electricity from resources such as the sun, wind, or biomass, with essentially no net GHG emissions. President Obama has declared a goal for the United States to become the world's leading exporter of renewable energy technologies, setting out policy objectives for the development of related "green jobs".
Green jobs have often been defined to include (at a minimum) jobs that result directly from renewables for generating electricity and powering vehicles as well as jobs that result directly from achieving greater energy efficiency. Studies of green job creation in the renewable energy industry vary greatly as a result of differences in definitions, assumptions, and methodologies, with the resulting analyses producing wide-ranging estimates of the number of green jobs. Complicating the estimation of the number of green jobs is the absence of an authoritative data source. The North American Industry Classification System disaggregates firms into the categories of hydro, fossil fuel, nuclear and "other" sources. Renewables are part of the "other" category. The Bureau of Labor Statistics has requested funding for FY2010 to develop data on the number of green jobs and their characteristics (e.g., wages, training requirements) by industry and occupation.
Most of the future growth in green jobs is generally envisioned as coming from the growth in deployment of renewable energy technologies. Renewable energy deployment programs from state governments have had a great influence on the existing deployment levels of renewable energy technologies and resultant jobs. Historically, the federal investment in renewable energy technologies in the United States has not been about creating jobs, but was focused on developing the technologies to a point where they are ready for commercialization. The timeframe under consideration is thus important in any discussion of the potential for renewable energy technologies to create jobs, for the technologies are at different stages in their development cycles. It is also important to recognize that as a specific renewable energy technology becomes more efficient, the number of jobs per Megawatt of output is likely to decrease.
A key to maximizing green jobs growth in the United States from renewable energy is the domestic design and manufacture of equipment and components. Given the growing international competition for renewable energy markets and green jobs, policy mechanisms and incentives may be necessary to encourage manufacturers to locate production in the United States. Companies must be capable of competing in the domestic market for renewable energy first and foremost, as the potential growth of U.S. renewable markets already has attracted significant international participation. A renewable energy industry capable of serving the export market may create many more jobs than an industry which only serves domestic needs.
Few doubt the potential of renewable energy to help address climate change concerns; the question is whether the desired benefits merit the investment. But developing the next generation of renewable energy technologies and building an internationally competitive industry may require a significant and sustained national investment. Without it, the majority of the solar panels, wind turbines, and components providing the clean energy of tomorrow may continue to be designed and built by workers overseas. |
crs_RS20958 | crs_RS20958_0 | As U.S. Steps Taken By the United States to Advance Its Policy Goals
The United States has been active in international efforts to address the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. The United States continues to participate in international fora aimed at addressing various issues associated with the international small arms and light weapons trade. | This report provides general background on U.S. policy regarding the international trade in small arms and light weapons (SA/LW). It outlines major questions associated with the international trade in these items, and reviews United States efforts to assist in controlling the illicit transfers of these items. This report will be revised as developments warrant. |
crs_R44161 | crs_R44161_0 | 113-146 , enacted on August 7, 2014, creates new authority for removing an individual in a senior executive position in the Department of Veterans Affairs. Section 713(a)(1) authorizes the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to remove an individual employed in a Senior Executive Service (SES) position if the Secretary determines that the individual's performance or misconduct merits removal. The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution provides, in relevant part, that, "No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law;.... " Some Supreme Court cases have interpreted this language to determine (1) whether a nonprobationary government employee who is removable for cause, as distinguished from at-will, has a constitutionally protected property interest in continued government employment; (2) whether due process applies to deprivation of such an interest; and (3) if due process applies, what kind of process is constitutionally sufficient? Because OEO's regulations and practice provided that a removed employee was entitled to a trial-type hearing a fter removal either at OEO or the Civil Service Commission, the predecessor to the Merit Systems Protection Board, the Court focused on whether a hearing before or after removal provided adequate due process under the Clause. Application to Section 713
Section 713 of Title 38, as added by Section 707 of the Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability Act of 2014, does not expressly provide for notice and an opportunity to respond. Nevertheless, the Department of Veterans Affairs has issued guidelines which mandate that an individual in a senior executive position whom it seeks to remove from federal service or from such a position pursuant to 38 U.S.C. §713 will receive prior notice of five days and an opportunity to respond to charges in writing in advance of removal. The implication is that the Fifth Amendment requires that this right cannot be deprived without due process. Section 713(d)(2)(A) of Title 38 provides that an individual whom the Secretary seeks to remove from federal service or transfer to a non-senior executive position may file an appeal with the Merit Systems Protection Board within seven days after removal or transfer. The Board must assign this appeal to an administrative judge for a hearing. An administrative judge must decide the appeal within 21 days, that decision is final and not subject to further appeal. Section 713(e)(2)(3) states that if an administrative judge cannot issue an opinion in that period, the Secretary's decision becomes final. In the Manzo case cited in Loudermill , the Court said that a post-termination hearing must be provided not only at a meaningful time, but also in a meaningful manner. It allows an MSPB administrative judge, an employee who is not appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, to render a final decision of the United States without any review by the presidentially appointed, Senate- confirmed members of the Board or any other executive officer. In her principal brief filed on October 9, 2015, Helman argued that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction to review the decision of the MSPB administrative judge. She maintained that the MSPB administrative judge who approved the Secretary's removal decision lacked constitutional authority to preside at her removal hearing because he was not appointed in the manner prescribed in the Appointments Clause of the Constitution, relating to the appointment of principal and inferior officers who exercise significant authority of the United States. On January 22, 2015, after the administrative judge upheld the department's decision to remove Helman from federal service, she submitted a request for an extension of time to file an appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board. It provides that a decision of an administrative judge "shall be final and shall not be subject to any further appeal." Without judicial review, a senior executive who is removed pursuant to Section 713 would have no opportunity to challenge removal as a deprivation of a property right to continued employment without meaningful due process of law. | This report discusses selected legal issues relating to the authority for summary removal of individuals in senior executive positions at the Department of Veterans Affairs. Section 707 of the Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability Act, P.L. 113-146, enacted on August 7, 2014, created this authority by adding Section 713 to Title 38 of the United States Code. It authorizes the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to remove an individual in a senior executive position from federal service or transfer him or her to a position in the General Schedule if the Secretary determines that the individual's performance or misconduct warrants removal.
This report addresses whether this authority raises a constitutional question under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment as a deprivation of a property right to continued federal employment and whether a court would have jurisdiction to hear a case brought by a senior executive who had been removed pursuant to it.
The Supreme Court has held that a nonprobationary government employee who is removable for cause, as distinguished from at-will, has a property right in continued employment. The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution states that property may not be deprived without due process of law. According to the Court, an agency may not remove such an employee from government employment without due process rights of notice and an opportunity to respond to charges. The employee also is entitled to a hearing either before or after removal. A hearing must be provided at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.
Section 713 of Title 38 does not expressly provide for notice and an opportunity to respond, but the Department of Veterans Affairs has issued guidelines that grant advance notice of five days and an opportunity to respond to charges in writing. Section 713 provides for a hearing after removal by an administrative judge of the Merit Systems Protection Board if a decision can be issued in 21 days and that this decision is not subject to further appeal. If an administrative judge does not issue a decision in that period, the Secretary's removal or transfer is final.
A senior executive whose removal from federal service pursuant to this authority was upheld by an administrative judge has filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. This appeal alleges that these limited time periods for notice and an opportunity to respond to charges, as well as for an appeal to an administrative judge, do not provide meaningful due process. The court is considering whether to accept jurisdiction of this case because the Department of Veterans Affairs, citing the finality clause in Section 713, asserts that an administrative judge's decision is not subject to judicial review.
In challenging the constitutionality of Section 713, the removed senior executive also maintains that granting an administrative judge of the Merit Systems Protection Board authority conclusively to determine whether or not to uphold a removal contravenes the Appointments Clause of the Constitution. She asserts that to comply with the Clause, an administrative judge's decision should be supervised or be subject to review by members of the Merit Systems Protection Board or another officer or officers who are principal officers of the United States whom the President appoints and the Senate confirms. An administrative judge is an employee who is not appointed in the manner that the Appointments Clause prescribes, she contends. This report will be updated to reflect later developments. |
crs_RL34586 | crs_RL34586_0 | Introduction
Although a number of U.S. agencies and departments implement global health programs that might improve child survival and maternal health (CS/MH), this report focuses only on CS/MH programs conducted by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) from FY2001 to FY2008. In 2006, an estimated 9.7 million children in that age range died, representing a 60% drop in under-five mortality since 1960. The majority of child deaths occur in developing countries, and almost half of them in Africa. On average, nearly 90% of all child deaths are caused by neonatal infections and five infectious diseases: acute respiratory infections (mostly pneumonia), diarrhea, malaria, measles and HIV/AIDS ( Table 1 ). According to UNICEF, undernutrition is the underlying cause of up to half of these deaths. More than 500,000 women die each year due to pregnancy-related causes, and an additional 15-20 million more suffer debilitating long-term effects, such as obstetric fistula (discussed below). UNICEF estimates that 20% of all maternal deaths are linked to undernutrition and that about 75% of maternal deaths are caused by obstetric complications including hemorrhage, sepsis, hypertensive disorders (mostly eclampsia), prolonged or obstructed labor, and unsafe abortions. Low-cost interventions can prevent and treat the condition. From FY2004 through FY2008, Congress provided $19.7 billion for global HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria programs. Issues for Congress
Congress has consistently boosted appropriations to USAID's global health programs throughout the Administration of President George W. Bush, though mostly for specific diseases. While most health experts applaud the recent increase in U.S. commitment to countering the global spread of diseases like HIV/AIDS, many remained concerned that other health programs that offer life-saving interventions for women and children are overlooked and underfunded, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. In addition to proposing an increase in funding for CS/MH programs, some observers urge Congress to boost support for other health issues that affect child survival and maternal health. | Appropriations for child survival and maternal health programs (CS/MH) have grown by about 22% during the tenure of President George W. Bush. Most of that growth occurred in FY2008, when Congress provided $521.9 million for CS/MH programs, up from $361.1 million in FY2001. Although Congress provided support during this time for other global health initiatives that affect CS/MH, such as some $19.7 billion for international programs that prevent and treat human immunodeficiency virus/ acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS), tuberculosis (TB), and malaria, other global health interventions are discussed only as they relate to USAID's CS/MH programs.
According to latest estimates, 9.7 million children under the age of five died in 2006; some 26,000 each day. The majority of those deaths occurred in developing countries, and almost half of them in Africa. On average, nearly 90% of all child deaths are caused by neonatal infections and five other diseases: acute respiratory infections (primarily pneumonia), diarrhea, malaria, measles, and HIV/AIDS. Undernutrition contributes to more than half of these deaths.
More than 500,000 women die each year due to pregnancy-related causes, and many more suffer debilitating long-term effects, such as obstetric fistula. Most of these deaths occur in developing countries. About 20% of global maternal deaths are linked to undernutrition, and about 75% result from obstetric complications, most often hemorrhage, sepsis, eclampsia, and prolonged or obstructed labor.
While most health experts applaud the recent increase in U.S. commitment to global health, many remain concerned that funding is largely aimed at specific diseases, such as HIV/AIDS and malaria. Other health programs that offer life-saving interventions for women and children are overlooked and underfunded, they contend, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. In addition to proposing an increase in funding for CS/MH programs, some observers urge Congress to boost support for health systems so that countries can better address a wide range of health issues that affect child survival and maternal health. This report will be updated at the end of the 110th Congress. |
crs_RL34131 | crs_RL34131_0 | When the Mississippi River rose to near record levels in 2011, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) intentionally broke several levees along the river, thereby flooding normally protected areas in order to prevent greater damage elsewhere. The 2011 Mississippi River floods brought renewed attention to federal liability for floods, which has been the subject of ongoing litigation since Hurricane Katrina. Some of these structures were part of the federally authorized Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Project (LPV), constructed by the Corps and maintained by local levee districts. By August 31, 2005, 80% of New Orleans was under water. In other instances, like that of the 2011 Mississippi River flooding, the Corps may flood certain lands in order to reduce damage to other areas. This report examines the legal issues resulting from flood damage in both instances. It analyzes the general framework of liability claims for flood damage and federal government immunity under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and the Flood Control Act of 1928 (FCA). The report specifically analyzes claims for federal liability for damage caused by Katrina. Sovereign immunity means that the government cannot be sued. Flood Control Act of 1928
Even if litigants are able to refute the discretionary function exception and sue the government under the FTCA, the FCA offers additional immunity to the federal government. Levee Failure and Hurricane Katrina Flooding
In the aftermath of Katrina, numerous legal claims were filed against the government for flood damage. The legal defenses available to the federal government depend on the facts underlying the specific flooding incident. Failure of the Hurricane Protection System
With respect to the failure of the Hurricane Protection System in New Orleans, a central question has been whether the design of the levees and floodwalls was exceeded or whether they were poorly designed, constructed, or maintained. However, any documented choice involving prioritization would likely be considered a discretionary action, exempting the government from liability. Floodway Operation and Immunity Under the FTCA and FCA
The focus of legal challenges related to the 2011 Mississippi floods has focused on the Corps' authority with respect to the MRTP and the sufficiency of floodway easements. In the case of the 2011 floods, the waters causing damage are clearly floodwaters that were diverted through the floodway as a primary facet of the MRTP, one of the nation's largest flood control projects. | Over the past century, the federal government has undertaken a number of civil works projects to prevent widespread damage from flooding of various waterways. These flood control projects generally have been designed and constructed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps). Despite the existence of these flood control structures, floods have caused major damage to various regions of the country. Hurricane Katrina was the most costly natural disaster ever to hit the United States. Striking land in August 2005 as a Category 3 hurricane, Hurricane Katrina left 80% of New Orleans under water. Since Katrina, a number of major floods in the midwestern states have caused significant damage. In particular, heightened flows of the Mississippi River in 2011 have resulted in historic flooding and controversy over the use of floodways to redirect floodwaters. In the wake of these floods, the issue of federal liability for flood damage is receiving attention in the media and in Congress.
The costly and unprecedented nature of recent flood damage has led to an upsurge in litigation over flood damage liability. Some lawsuits filed against the federal government, particularly after Katrina, assert government liability for damages resulting from the failure of levees and floodwalls designed and constructed by the Corps. Other lawsuits claim federal liability for damages resulting from the Corps' decision to activate floodways during the 2011 Mississippi River flooding.
The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and the Flood Control Act of 1928 (FCA) may protect the government from liability for some flood-related claims. Under the FTCA, the federal government is exempt from liability for discretionary actions. Under the FCA, the government cannot be sued for damages resulting from federally supported damage reduction projects or floodwaters.
This report examines federal liability for flood damage and analyzes legal defenses available to the federal government. Specifically, it provides an overview of the discretionary function exemption under the FTCA and immunity under the FCA as applied to Corps projects. The report also considers the Corps' potential liability for damages caused by levee failure during Hurricane Katrina and the activation of floodways during the 2011 Mississippi flooding. |
crs_R43538 | crs_R43538_0 | The professional experiences of judicial nominees are also of interest to interest groups, particularly professional organizations such as the American Bar Association (ABA). In light of ongoing interest in the professional qualifications of those nominated to circuit court judgeships, this report seeks to inform Congress by providing statistics related to the professional qualifications or experiences of those currently serving on the bench as U.S. circuit court judges. Specifically, this report provides statistics and analysis related to (1) the percentage of active circuit court judges with judicial experience, as well as the type of judicial experience; (2) the percentage of active circuit court judges with private practice experience, as well as the length of time of such experience; and (3) the percentage of active circuit court judges by professional experience immediately prior to their appointment to a circuit court judgeship. Consequently, the statistics do not include circuit court judges who, prior to February 1, 2014, had assumed senior status, retired, or resigned. Altogether, 54.6% of U.S. circuit court judges who are currently serving had prior experience as another type of judge before their appointment to a circuit court (and 45.4% had no such experience). Of the judges with prior judicial experience, 22.7% served solely as another type of federal judge (e.g., a U.S. district court judge), while 20.9% served solely as a state judge and another 11.0% had both prior federal and state judicial experience. Although over half of active circuit court judges have prior judicial experience (54.6%), a greater percentage have at least some prior experience as attorneys in private practice (84.7%). Similarly, while 45.6% of active circuit judges do not have prior judicial experience, a much smaller percentage, 15.3%, have no prior experience in private practice. Figure 1 also shows that of active circuit court judges with private practice experience, a plurality (26.4%) had 15 or more years of experience as attorneys in private practice. Altogether, half (50.3%) of all active circuit court judges were serving as another type of judge (either a U.S. district court judge, another type of federal judge, or a state judge). Of circuit court judges currently serving on the bench, approximately one-quarter (25.8%) were working as attorneys in private practice prior to being appointed as a circuit court judge, with 22.1% having worked in private practice for 10 years or more. Additionally, of those working in private practice for 10 years or more, 80.6% had been working as an attorney in private practice for at least 15 years. Conclusion
This report provides a statistical overview of the professional qualifications and experiences of active U.S. circuit court judges. Ongoing congressional interest in the professional background of those nominated to the federal bench reflects, in part, the role of Congress in evaluating the qualifications of those who are nominated by the President to life-tenure positions. There are, however, judges without either type of experience who have other types of professional experiences such as working as an attorney for the federal government or as a law professor. | This report provides an analysis of the professional qualifications and experiences of U.S. circuit court judges who are currently serving on the federal bench. Interest in the professional qualifications of those nominated to the federal judiciary has been demonstrated by Congress and others. Congressional interest in the professional experiences of those nominated by a President to the federal courts reflects, in part, the evaluative role of Congress in examining the qualifications of those who are nominated to life-tenure positions. Other organizations, such as the American Bar Association (ABA), also have an ongoing interest in the professional qualifications of those appointed to the federal judiciary. Additionally, scholars have demonstrated an interest in this topic by examining whether a relationship exists between the professional or career experiences of judges and judicial decision making.
The analysis in this report focuses on the professional experiences of 163 active U.S. circuit court judges who were serving as of February 1, 2014. Active judges are those who have not taken senior status, retired, or resigned. Consequently, the statistics provided do not necessarily reflect all circuit court judges who are sitting on the bench (which include judges who have assumed senior status).
Some of this report's findings include the following:
A majority, 54.6%, of active circuit court judges had prior judicial experience at some point before being appointed as circuit court judges (and 45.4% had no such experience). Of the judges with prior judicial experience, 22.7% served solely as another type of federal judge (e.g., a U.S. district court judge), while 20.9% served solely as a state judge and another 11.0% had both prior federal and state judicial experience. A majority, 84.7%, of active circuit court judges had at least some prior experience as an attorney in private practice at some point prior to their appointment as a circuit judge. Of active circuit court judges with private practice experience, a plurality (26.4%) had 15 or more years of experience as an attorney in private practice. While 45.4% of active circuit judges do not have prior judicial experience, a much smaller percentage, 15.3%, have no prior experience in private practice. Circuit court judges without either prior judicial experience or experience as an attorney in private practice had other professional experiences such as working as an attorney for the federal government or as a law professor. Immediately prior to their appointment to the appellate bench, most circuit court judges were either serving as another type of judge or had been engaged in private practice for at least 10 years. Approximately half, 50.3%, of all active circuit judges were serving as another type of judge immediately prior to their appointment (i.e., serving as a district court judge, another type of federal judge such as a bankruptcy judge, or a state judge). Approximately one quarter, 25.8%, of active circuit court judges were working as attorneys in private practice immediately prior to being appointed as a circuit judge (with 22.1% having worked in private practice for 10 years or more). |
crs_RL33586 | crs_RL33586_0 | 102-194 ), the Networking and Information Technology Research and Development (NITRD) Program is the primary mechanism by which the federal government coordinates its unclassified networking and information technology (NIT) R&D investments. The director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) appoints a director for the NCO. Budget, Funding, and Spending
The President's FY2017 budget request for the NITRD Program is $4.54 billion, an increase of $0.05 billion, or approximately 1.11%, compared to the $4.49 billion FY2016 estimate. The NITRD budget is an aggregation of the IT R&D components of the individual budgets of NITRD participating agencies and is reported in the annual release of the Networking and Information Technology Research and Development Program Supplement to the President's Budget . The NITRD budget is not a single, centralized source of funds that is allocated to individual agencies. The NITRD budget is then calculated by aggregating the IT R&D components of the appropriations provided by Congress to each federal agency. Federal Technology Funding: Background and Context
In the early 1990s, Congress recognized that several federal agencies had ongoing high-performance computing programs, but no central coordinating body existed to ensure long-term coordination and planning. To provide such a framework, Congress passed the High-Performance Computing Program Act of 1991 to improve the interagency coordination, cooperation, and planning of agencies with high-performance computing programs. In conjunction with the passage of the act, OSTP released Grand Challenges: High-Performance Computing and Communications . That document outlined an R&D strategy for high-performance computing and communications and a framework for a multi-agency program, the HPCC Program. In general, supporters of federal funding of IT R&D contend that it has produced positive results. The CSTB's observation was that the unanticipated results of research are often as important as the anticipated results. Additionally, the report noted that federally funded programs have played a crucial role in supporting long-term research into fundamental aspects of computing. Such "fundamentals" provide broad practical benefits but generally take years to realize. Another aspect of government-funded IT R&D is that it often leads to open standards, something that many perceive as beneficial, encouraging deployment and further investment. Industry, on the other hand, is more likely to invest in proprietary products and will typically diverge from a common standard if it sees a potential competitive or financial advantage; this happened, for example, with standards for instant messaging. Finally, proponents of government R&D support believe that the outcomes achieved through the various funding programs create a synergistic environment in which both fundamental and application-driven research are conducted, benefitting government, industry, academia, and the public. Supporters also believe that such outcomes justify government's role in funding IT R&D as well as the growing budget for the NITRD Program. Critics have asserted that the government, through its funding mechanisms, may set itself up to pick "winners and losers" in technological development, a role more properly residing with the private sector. For example, the size of the NITRD Program could encourage industry to follow the government's lead on research directions rather than selecting those directions itself. Legislative Activity in the 115th Congress
There has been no legislative activity related to the NITRD Program in the 115 th Congress. | In the early 1990s, Congress recognized that several federal agencies had ongoing high-performance computing programs, but no central coordinating body existed to ensure long-term coordination and planning. To provide such a framework, Congress passed the High-Performance Computing and Communications Program Act of 1991 (P.L. 102-194) to enhance the effectiveness of the various programs. In conjunction with the passage of the act, the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) released Grand Challenges: High-Performance Computing and Communications. That document outlined a research and development (R&D) strategy for high-performance computing and a framework for a multi-agency program, the High-Performance Computing and Communications (HPCC) Program. The HPCC Program has evolved over time and is now called the Networking and Information Technology Research and Development (NITRD) Program to better reflect its expanded mission.
Current concerns are the role of the federal government in supporting information technology (IT) R&D and the level of funding to allot to it. Proponents of federal support of IT R&D assert that it has produced positive outcomes for the country and played a crucial role in supporting long-term research into fundamental aspects of computing. Such fundamentals provide broad practical benefits but generally take years to realize. Additionally, the unanticipated results of research are often as important as the anticipated results. Another aspect of government-funded IT research is that it often leads to open standards, something that many perceive as beneficial, encouraging deployment and further investment. Industry, on the other hand, is more inclined to invest in proprietary products and will diverge from a common standard when there is a potential competitive or financial advantage to do so. Proponents of government support believe that the outcomes achieved through the various funding programs create a synergistic environment in which both fundamental and application-driven research are conducted, benefitting government, industry, academia, and the public. Supporters also believe that such outcomes justify government's role in funding IT R&D as well as the growing budget for the NITRD Program. Critics assert that the government, through its funding mechanisms, may be picking "winners and losers" in technological development, a role more properly residing with the private sector. For example, the size of the NITRD Program may encourage industry to follow the government's lead on research directions rather than selecting those directions itself.
The President's FY2017 budget request for the NITRD Program was $4.54 billion and the FY2016 NITRD budget estimates totaled $4.49 billion. The FY2018 budget is not yet available. The NITRD budget is an aggregation of the IT R&D components of the individual budgets of NITRD participating agencies and is reported in the annual release of the Networking and Information Technology Research and Development Program Supplement to the President's Budget. The NITRD budget is not a single, centralized source of funds that is allocated to individual agencies. Rather, it is calculated by aggregating the IT R&D components of the appropriations provided by Congress to each federal agency.
There has been no legislative activity related to the NITRD Program in the 115th Congress. |
crs_RL32551 | crs_RL32551_0 | The National Commission on TerroristAttacks Upon the United States, also known as the 9/11 Commission, was to
make a full and complete accounting of thecircumstances surrounding the attacks, and the extent of the United States' preparedness for, andimmediate response to, the attacks; andâ¦investigate and report to the President and Congress on itsfindings, conclusions, and recommendations for corrective measures that can be taken to prevent actsof terrorism. (3)
The panel's July 22 report was the culmination of a series of hearings and investigations by the paneland its staff into the terrorist attacks. The proposal is relativelysparse on details, and implementing it would require the Senate to flesh out the plan substantially;however, it is clear that the recommended changes in the Senate's confirmation process wouldprovide a certain up-or-down vote by the full chamber on all National Security Team nomineeswithin a definitive time frame (30 days) after a nomination is made at the start of an administration. Congressional Response
On October 6, the Senate passed, by a vote of 96-2, legislation ( S. 2845 ),introduced by Senate Governmental Affairs Committee Chair Susan Collins and Ranking MemberJoseph I. Lieberman, that would implement many of the 9/11 Commission's recommendations. It states that the "Senate committees to which thesenominations are referred should, to the fullest extent possible, complete their consideration of thesenominations, and, if such nominations are reported by the committees, the full Senate should voteto confirm or reject these nominations within 30 days of their submission." This is, essentially, anaffirmation of the current confirmation process. President George W. Bush signed the bill into law on December17, 2004 ( P.L. 108-458 ). A review of the data on the speed with which newadministrations have been able to get their National Security Team members in place suggests thisis an issue in a minority of cases. Historically, much of the regular order of business on the nomination and confirmationof presidential appointments has been regulated not by strict, formal rules, but rather by informalcustoms that can change (and have changed) over the years, as the relative balance of power betweenthe President and the Senate ebbs and flows. (20)
Implementation of the 9/11 Commission's Recommendation
Committee Proceedings
The 9/11 Commission's proposal, and most likely the House-passed provision to S. 2845 , would presumably require that Senate committee chairs schedule confirmationhearings on the proposed members of the National Security Team. The power of committee chairs to control the agenda of their panels is longstanding. Means of Implementation
The Senate could institute procedures to implement the 9/11 Commission's proposal or theHouse provision in several ways: by enacting an expedited procedures law, by amending the Senate'sstanding rules or its standing orders, through adoption of a unanimous consent agreement, or bypassage of a constitutional amendment. Expedited Procedures Statute. Constitutional Amendment. Standing Order. "The relationship between the executive and legislative branches has been and remainsessentially political. Conflict occurs in the appointment process for a verysimple reason. What would a new process mean for other presidential nominations,particularly those to the judiciary? | On July 22, 2004, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,known as the 9/11 Commission, issued its final report, detailing the events up to and including theSeptember 11, 2001 terrorist attacks upon the United States. The report contained 41recommendations on ways to prevent future catastrophic assaults, including a series of proposalsdesigned to improve the presidential appointments process as it relates to the top national securityofficials at the beginning of a new administration. On October 6, the Senate passed legislation( S. 2845 ) to implement many of the changes recommended by the 9/11 Commission. The House on October 8 passed its version of the legislation ( H.R. 10 ). The Presidentsigned the final version of the bill on December 17, 2004 ( P.L. 108-458 ). Two other measuresdealing with the 9/11 Commission's recommendations ( S. 2774 and H.R. 5040 ) were introduced in early September.
The 9/11 Commission recommended that the Senate adopt rules requiring hearings and votesto confirm or reject national security nominees within 30 days of their submission at the start of eachnew presidential administration. Implicit in the proposal is the assumption that there is a problemwith the process for nominating and confirming presidential appointees. Analysis of Senateconsideration of the initial nominations by Presidents William J. Clinton and George W. Bush to theposts covered by the recommendation shows that the commission's proposed timetable was not metin 14 of the 49 cases, suggesting this is an issue in a minority of cases.
The Constitution gives the Senate a role in the presidential appointments process, but theparameters of that role have never been clearly defined. The current process is regulated by amixture of formal rules and informal customs, as well as by political interactions between thePresident and Senators. Implementing the commission's proposal would presumably requireinstituting procedures that guarantee committee consideration of each nomination, at least at ahearing, and a final vote on each by the full Senate. Changes of this kind would involve newrestrictions on both the power of committee chairs to control the agenda of their committees and therights of Senators to delay or block nominations through holds and extended debate. These changeswould likely also alter the relationship between the legislative and executive branches, weakeningthe negotiating posture of the Senate in relation to the President, particularly if they were to beextended to additional nominations.
Procedures adequate to implement the commission's recommendation would resemble anexpedited procedure, such as those used in resolutions of approval and disapproval of executiveactions. Procedural changes of this kind could be achieved by amending the Standing Rules of theSenate, changing the Standing Orders of the Senate, passing a Constitutional Amendment enactingan expedited procedures statute, or reaching a unanimous consent agreement.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R44939 | crs_R44939_0 | Consequently, the secure operation of both the power grid and pipelines are national priorities. While physical threats to the U.S. power grid and pipelines have long worried policymakers, cyber threats to the computer systems that operate this critical infrastructure are an increasing concern. Furthermore, with ever greater physical interdependency between electricity generators and the natural gas pipelines which supply their fuel, many in Congress recognize that grid and pipeline cybersecurity are intertwined. The Department of Energy (DOE) is the lead agency for the protection of electric power, oil, and natural gas infrastructure—cooperating with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the lead agency for pipelines. DOE's energy sector cybersecurity activities are led primarily by its Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (OE). In 2015, the Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act (the FAST Act) provided the Secretary of Energy with additional authority to order measures to protect or restore the reliability of the power grid during a grid security emergency, including "a malicious act using electronic communication." The 115 th Congress is considering additional legislation to fund and expand DOE's cybersecurity programs, including appropriations in the Defense, Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, Legislative Branch, and Energy and Water Development National Security Appropriations Act, 2018 ( H.R. 3219 ) and the Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2018 ( S. 1609 ). The Energy and Natural Resources Act of 2017 (S. 1460) and the Enhancing State Energy Security Planning and Emergency Preparedness Act of 2017 ( H.R. 3050 ) would authorize additional DOE funding for cybersecurity research and assistance to states, respectively. OE Cybersecurity Program Structure
The OE's cybersecurity program for energy delivery systems is structured around three areas: (1) cybersecurity preparedness; (2) cyber incident response and recovery; and (3) research, development, and demonstration. It would establish a program for energy sector cybersecurity RD&D to be carried out by DOE, in consultation with other agencies, states, and the energy sector, for advanced applications to identify and mitigate cyber vulnerabilities. Given the ever-changing cybersecurity environment in the energy sector, Congress may continue to examine OE's cybersecurity resources to ensure that they are adequate and being deployed appropriately to address the most important energy delivery risks. With DOE-provided or independently provided information, Congress may have a more-informed basis for considering whether to adjust the provisions of the FAST Act or clarify, expand, or contract the authorizations it contains. Among its recommendations, the QER calls for assessment of natural gas and electricity infrastructure interdependencies to cybersecurity protection. How OE's cybersecurity programs and expertise in energy delivery systems could best be used to inform such analysis may be of interest to Congress. Congress may examine how OE's cybersecurity activities fit in, and coordinate with, the other various roles in energy cybersecurity for electricity, oil and natural gas pipelines, and other related energy infrastructure. In particular, Congress may examine how OE's RD&D programs and other work with the National Labs in electric power sector cybersecurity supports federal and private sector efforts in pipeline cybersecurity. | While physical threats to the U.S. power grid and pipelines have long worried policymakers, cyber threats to the computer systems that operate this critical infrastructure are an increasing concern. Cybersecurity risks against the power and pipeline sectors are similar, as both use similar control systems, and there appears to be a broad consensus that cyber threats to this infrastructure are on the rise. Furthermore, with ever-greater physical interdependency between electricity generators and the natural gas pipelines that supply their fuel, many in Congress recognize that grid and pipeline cybersecurity are intertwined. In 2015, the Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act (the FAST Act) provided the Secretary of Energy with new authority to protect or restore the power grid during a grid security emergency, including a cyber incident. Congress is considering additional legislation to fund and expand the Department of Energy's cybersecurity programs.
The Department of Energy (DOE) is the lead agency for the protection of electric power, oil, and natural gas infrastructure—cooperating with the Department of Homeland Security, the lead agency for pipelines. DOE's cybersecurity activities are led by its Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (OE) and structured around three areas: (1) cybersecurity preparedness, (2) cyber incident response and recovery, and (3) research, development, and demonstration. Although nominally applicable to energy delivery systems across the electric power, oil and natural gas, and pipeline sectors, OE's cybersecurity activities to date appear to have been focused primarily on the grid. Publicly available examples of DOE-supported activities specifically focused on pipeline cybersecurity are limited. Rather, pipeline cybersecurity efforts appear to be included as part of broader national cybersecurity efforts.
Several bills potentially affecting DOE's cybersecurity activities for power grid and pipeline infrastructure have been introduced in the 115th Congress. These include the Defense, Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, Legislative Branch, and Energy and Water Development National Security Appropriations Act, 2018 (H.R. 3219) and the Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2018 (S. 1609), both of which would modestly increase funding for OE in FY2018. The Energy and Natural Resources Act of 2017 (S. 1460) would establish and fund a DOE program for energy sector cybersecurity research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) to be carried out for advanced applications to identify and mitigate cyber vulnerabilities. The Enhancing State Energy Security Planning and Emergency Preparedness Act of 2017 (H.R. 3050) would authorize DOE to provide financial and technical assistance to states for assessing cybersecurity threats to energy infrastructure.
As federal cybersecurity oversight and legislative debate continue, Congress may focus on several key issues. Given the ever-changing cybersecurity environment in the energy sector, Congress may continue to examine OE's cybersecurity resources to ensure that they are adequate and being deployed appropriately to address the most important energy delivery risks. Congress may also seek a more-informed basis for considering whether to adjust the provisions of the FAST Act or clarify the authorizations it contains. How OE's programs and expertise could best be used to inform analysis of electric power and natural gas infrastructure interdependency from a cybersecurity perspective may also be of interest to Congress. Finally, Congress may examine how OE's cybersecurity activities fit in, and coordinate with, the other various roles in energy cybersecurity for electricity, oil and natural gas pipelines. In particular, Congress may examine how OE's RD&D programs and work with the National Labs in electric power sector cybersecurity supports federal and private sector efforts in pipeline cybersecurity. |
crs_RL34269 | crs_RL34269_0 | Congress and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) have a history of supporting programs that foster diversity of broadcast station ownership, in general, and minority and female ownership, in particular, as a means to achieve that goal. Structuring the programs narrowly may be necessary in order to survive a judicial challenge. To qualify for a tax certificate, the purchasing business had to be controlled by a minority. If the certificate was granted the selling corporation was allowed to defer paying taxes on any capital gain from the sale. However, to the extent that those programs are designed to benefit individuals based on their race, they will likely be subject to the standard of review described below. Judicial Review of Racial Classifications in Broadcast Ownership Policies
In 1995, the Supreme Court decided Adarand Construction v. Peña , which held that all race-based classifications by the federal government must withstand strict scrutiny, as discussed in the following section. In the context of tax provisions and FCC programs that encourage SDBs to own broadcast properties, the government interest that has been articulated is to promote broadcast viewpoint diversity. Though Metro Broadcasting can provide some guidance as to the arguments that would be advanced in favor of finding that broadcast viewpoint diversity is a compelling government interest, because the Court applied a lower standard of scrutiny to what it termed a "benign racial classification," deeper analysis is required to determine if the interest is sufficiently compelling to withstand strict scrutiny. | Amidst growing media ownership consolidation and a significant decline in minority ownership of telecommunications businesses, there has been renewed interest in programs that foster diversity among telecommunications business owners. One potential avenue under consideration is to revive, in revised fashion, a tax program that would allow current owners who sell their broadcast properties to eligible purchasers to defer taxes on gains from the sale. That program had been available for sales to minority-owned firms, defined as socially and economically disadvantaged businesses (SDBs). It was abolished by Congress in 1995 amidst allegations of abuse. In that same year, the Supreme Court held that all government race-based classifications must meet the most exacting standard of review applied by the Court, meaning that all racial classifications must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest. To the extent that legislation or FCC programs seek to increase racial and ethnic minority ownership of broadcast stations, they are likely to be subjected to intense scrutiny if challenged in court. The analysis that may be conducted is discussed in detail in this report. |
crs_R40498 | crs_R40498_0 | The second are those MBSs that are packaged and issued by private market participants (i.e., mortgage companies, savings and loans, and commercial banks), known as private label MBSs. This report will provide an overview of the registration requirements for private label MBSs under the Securities Act. It outlines potential liability for fraud and/or material misstatements in the required disclosures and the consequences for failure to register when required by federal securities laws. Securities Act Registration for Private Label Mortgage-Backed Securities
The Securities Act requires issuers of all types of securities to register the offering with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or to qualify for an exemption from the registration requirements. Exemptions
Certain offerings of private label MBSs may be exempt from registration under the Securities Act. The issuer has absolute liability under Section 11. | Mortgage-backed securities that are packaged and issued by private industry participants are required to comply with the Securities Act of 1933. Issuers of so-called private label mortgage-backed securities must either register these securities pursuant to the rules the Securities and Exchange Commission has set forth, or obtain an exemption from registration. Failure to register or fall under an exemption could result in liability for the issuer and other parties involved in the offering. Furthermore, material misstatements or omissions in the offering materials may also result in liability under the Securities Act. This report will provide an overview of the Securities Act of 1933 as it may be applied to mortgage-backed securities issued by private industry participants. |
crs_R44903 | crs_R44903_0 | The reconciliation instructions included in S.Con.Res. 1628 , the American Health Care Act (AHCA) of 2017. The House subsequently passed the AHCA with amendments on May 4, 2017, by a vote of 217 to 213. The House bill was received in the Senate on June 7, 2017, and the next day the Senate majority leader had it placed on the calendar, making it available for floor consideration. The Senate Budget Committee published on its website a "discussion draft" titled, "The Better Care Reconciliation Act of 2017" (BCRA) on June 22, 2017, and updated the discussion draft on June 26 and July 13. On July 19, 2017, the Senate Budget Committee posted the "Obamacare Repeal Reconciliation Act of 2017" (ORRA) on its website as another draft reconciliation bill. Each of these draft bills is written in the form of an amendment in the nature of a substitute, meaning that it is intended to be considered by the Senate as an amendment to H.R. 1628 , as passed by the House, and that all of the House-passed language would be stricken and the language of the draft would be inserted in its place. ORRA is largely based off the Restoring Americans' Healthcare Freedom Reconciliation Act of 2015 ( H.R. 3762 ), which was vetoed by President Obama on January 8, 2016, and returned to the House. ORRA would repeal several provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148 , as amended), and it could restrict federal funding for the Planned Parenthood Federation of America (PPFA) and its affiliates and clinics for a period of one year. The bill also would appropriate (1) an additional $422 million for FY2017 to the Community Health Center Fund and (2) $750 million for each of FY2018 and FY2019 to award grants to states to address the substance abuse public health crisis or respond to urgent mental health needs. A number of the provisions in ORRA are also in the AHCA and/or BCRA. However, ORRA does not include the AHCA or BCRA provisions that would substitute the ACA's premium tax credit for premium tax credits with different eligibility rules and calculation requirements. ORRA also does not include the AHCA or BCRA provisions that would establish new programs and requirements that are not related to the ACA, for example, a new fund to provide funding to states for specified activities intended to improve access to health insurance and health care or provisions to convert Medicaid financing to a per capita cap model (i.e., per enrollee limits on federal payments to states) with a block grant option (i.e., a predetermined fixed amount of federal funding) for certain populations. This report provides summaries of each ORRA provision. In CY2018, CBO and JCT estimate that 17 million more people would be uninsured under ORRA than under current law, and CBO and JCT estimate that that figure would grow to 32 million in CY2026. | Per the reconciliation instructions in the budget resolution for FY2017 (S.Con.Res. 3), the House passed its reconciliation bill, H.R. 1628—the American Health Care Act (AHCA)—with amendments on May 4, 2017. The House bill was received in the Senate on June 7, 2017, and the next day the Senate majority leader had it placed on the calendar, making it available for floor consideration. The Senate Budget Committee published on its website a "discussion draft" titled, "The Better Care Reconciliation Act of 2017" (BCRA) on June 22, 2017, and subsequently updated the discussion draft on June 26, July 13, and July 20. The Senate's draft legislation is written in the form of an amendment in the nature of a substitute, meaning that it is intended to be considered by the Senate as an amendment to H.R. 1628, as passed by the House, and that all of the House-passed language would be stricken and the language of the BCRA would be inserted in its place.
On July 19, 2017, the Senate Budget Committee posted the "Obamacare Repeal Reconciliation Act of 2017" (ORRA) on its website as another draft reconciliation bill. ORRA is largely based off the Restoring Americans' Healthcare Freedom Reconciliation Act of 2015 (H.R. 3762), which was vetoed by President Obama on January 8, 2016, and returned to the House.
ORRA would repeal several provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148, as amended), and it could restrict federal funding for the Planned Parenthood Federation of America (PPFA) and its affiliates and clinics for a period of one year. The bill also would appropriate (1) an additional $422 million for FY2017 to the Community Health Center Fund and (2) $750 million for each of FY2018 and FY2019 to award grants to states to address the substance abuse public health crisis or respond to urgent mental health needs. The Congressional Budget Office and the Joint Committee on Taxation estimate that ORRA would reduce federal deficits by $473 billion from FY2017 through FY2026, and they estimate that 17 million more people would be uninsured under ORRA than under current law in FY2018, with that figure growing to 32 million in CY2026.
A number of the provisions in ORRA are also in the AHCA and/or BCRA. However, ORRA does not include the AHCA or BCRA provisions that would substitute the ACA's premium tax credit for premium tax credits with different eligibility rules and calculation requirements. ORRA also does not include the AHCA or BCRA provisions that would establish new programs and requirements that are not related to the ACA, for example, a new fund to provide funding to states for specified activities intended to improve access to health insurance and health care or provisions to convert Medicaid financing to a per capita cap model (i.e., per enrollee limits on federal payments to states) with a block grant option (i.e., a predetermined fixed amount of federal funding) for certain populations. This report provides summaries of each ORRA provision. |
crs_R44787 | crs_R44787_0 | On June 24, 2016, Republicans released a tax reform blueprint, "A Better Way for Tax Reform." This blueprint proposes to consolidate the seven individual income tax brackets under current law into three, and to eliminate the alternative minimum tax (AMT). Statutory rates also provide limited information on the economic incentives created by the tax code. The analysis in this report relies on the 2010 Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Statistics of Income (SOI) individual public use file. The focus of this report is on the federal individual income tax. Statistics are provided to show how these rates vary for taxpayers at different income levels. Average Tax Rates
A taxpayer's average tax rate is the percentage of total income that is paid in taxes. The average of average tax rates (or mean average tax rate) for taxpayers in the second income decile is less than the mean average tax rate for taxpayers in the lowest 10% of the income distribution, reflecting the phase-in of certain refundable credits (e.g., the EITC). For taxpayers in the top income decile, or those with incomes above $123,230 in 2010, the mean average tax rate was 13.6%. Effective Marginal Tax Rates
Effective marginal tax rates are the amount paid in tax on the next dollar of income. In an uncomplicated tax system, the effective marginal rate would equal the statutory rate. While effective marginal tax rates tend to rise with income, there is substantial variation in the effective marginal tax rates faced by taxpayers within income groups. For low- and middle-income taxpayers, family composition explains much of the variation in average tax rates within income groups. Statutory Tax Rates Do Not Necessarily Reflect Tax Burden
While statutory tax rates are often highlighted in tax reform debates, statutory tax rates are often not a good measure of either taxes paid on additional earnings or overall tax burden. Table 4 provides more information on the magnitude of differences between effective marginal and statutory rates, as well as average and statutory rates. Approximately 36% of taxpayers in the 10% bracket in 2010 faced effective marginal tax rates that were at least 5 percentage points higher than 10% (faced an effective marginal tax rate of at least 15%), while 20% of taxpayers in the 10% bracket faced effective marginal tax rates that were at least 10 percentage points higher than 10% (faced an effective marginal tax rate of at least 20%). Of the less than 1% of taxpayers in 2010 that filed returns that placed them in the top statutory bracket (the 35% bracket), nearly half of those taxpayers face an effective marginal tax rate that is less than the statutory rate, and for most of those taxpayers, the effective marginal tax rate was 30% or less. As a result, some higher-income taxpayers have average tax rates that are less than the average tax rate faced by lower-income taxpayers. Looking at Figure 8 , the distribution of average tax rates for single filers in the top income decile appears roughly similar to the distribution of average tax rates for married filers without children that are in the top 10% of that family type group. Since statutory tax rates provide limited information about tax burdens, questions of equity are often better addressed by using average rates. Since effective marginal tax rates do not equal statutory tax rates for a large proportion of taxpayers, statutory rates provide limited information on the incentives created by the tax code. In a progressive tax system, average tax rates rise with income. Exemptions, deductions, exclusions, credits, and other features of the tax code mean that, even for taxpayers with similar incomes, average tax rates can vary substantially. Further, controlling for family composition tends to expose differences in average tax burdens and effective marginal tax rates between taxpayers with and without children in the lower and middle parts of the income distribution. However, as illustrated in this report, under the current individual income tax system, there is substantial variation in tax burdens within income groups. Under the current system, however, a taxpayer's effective marginal tax rate often differs from the statutory rate. The most recent public use file available at the time this report was written was for tax year 2010. | Tax reform is a stated priority of the 115th Congress. In June 2016, Ways and Means Committee Republicans released the "Better Way" tax reform blueprint. The proposal seeks to make the individual income tax system "simpler, flatter, and fairer" by consolidating the number of individual income tax brackets. Looking at statutory tax rates alone, however, provides limited information regarding the simplicity or fairness of the tax system. Average tax rates and effective marginal tax rates are frequently used by economists and policy analysts to evaluate the fairness of the tax system, as well as various economic incentives created by the system.
This report provides background information on alternative tax rate metrics, and discusses how these measures of the tax burden inform the tax reform debate.
Under current law, there are seven statutory tax rate brackets in the federal individual income tax system. Very few taxpayers, less than 1% in 2014, face the top statutory rate. A taxpayer's average tax rate is the percentage of total income that is paid in taxes. This metric is useful when comparing tax burdens across taxpayers, as well as certain economic incentives created by the tax system. For nearly every taxpayer, average tax rates are less than the statutory rate. A taxpayer's effective marginal tax rate is the amount of income tax paid on the next dollar of earnings. Effective marginal tax rates are determined by statutory rates, as well as various other provisions. Effective marginal tax rates also provide information on the economic incentives created by the tax code for different taxpayers.
As illustrated in this report, under the current system, statutory, average, and effective marginal tax rates can differ substantially for any given taxpayer. Since statutory tax rates provide limited information about tax burdens, questions of equity are often better addressed by using average rates. Since effective marginal tax rates do not equal statutory tax rates for a large proportion of taxpayers, statutory rates provide limited information on the incentives created by the tax code.
One way to evaluate average tax rates is to examine them across the income distribution. This report uses the 2010 Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Statistics of Income (SOI) public use file, the most recent publicly available sample of individual taxpayer returns available when this report was written, to complete this analysis. When taxpayers are divided into income deciles (grouped such that there are 10 equal-sized groups of taxpayers, ranked by income), average tax rates are negative for the first four income deciles. Negative average tax rates are the result of refundable tax credits, generally provided to working families with children. For the top income decile, taxpayers with income above $123,210 in 2010, the average of the average tax rates was 13.6%.
In an uncomplicated tax system, marginal tax rates would generally equal the statutory tax rate. For 46% of taxpayers in 2010, effective marginal tax rates differed from the statutory rate. Twenty-nine percent of taxpayers had an effective marginal tax rate that exceeded their statutory rate, while 16% had an effective marginal tax rate that was less than the statutory rate.
Both average and effective marginal tax rates vary both across and within income groups. Average tax rates tend to rise with income, reflecting the overall progressivity of the tax system. However, the substantial variation of average tax rates within income groups illustrates that higher-income taxpayers do not necessarily face higher average tax rates. For lower- and middle-income taxpayers, family composition explains much of the difference in average tax rates for taxpayers with similar incomes.
Unlike average tax rates, effective marginal tax rates do not always rise with income. The phase-ins and phaseouts associated with tax benefits for families with children mean that for these family types, effective marginal tax rates in the lower and middle parts of the income distribution are similar to those faced by taxpayers near the top of the income distribution. |
crs_RL33578 | crs_RL33578_0 | Energy Tax Policy from 1918 to 1970: Promoting Oil and Gas
Historically, federal energy tax policy was focused on increasing domestic oil and gas reserves and production; there were no tax incentives for energy conservation or for alternative fuels. Relatively low oil prices encouraged petroleum consumption (as opposed to conservation) and inhibited the development of alternatives to fossil fuels, such as unconventional fuels and renewable forms of energy. Chief among the taxes on oil was the windfall profit tax (WPT) enacted in 1980 ( P.L. The third broad action taken during the 1970s to implement the new and refocused energy tax policy was the introduction of numerous tax incentives or subsidies (e.g., special tax credits, deductions, exclusions) for energy conservation, the development of alternative fuels (renewable and nonconventional fuels), and the commercialization of energy efficiency and alternative fuels technologies. Although the Reagan Administration's objective was to create a free-market energy policy, significant liberalization of the depreciation system and reduction in marginal tax rates—both the result of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA, P.L. President George H.W. 4 . The House bill proposed larger energy tax cuts, with some energy tax increases. It included about $5 billion in energy tax incentives. Energy Action in the 109th Congress
The 109 th Congress enacted the Energy Policy Act of 2005 ( P.L. 109-58 ), which included the most extensive amendments to U.S. energy tax laws since 1992, and the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, which extended the energy tax subsidies enacted under the 2005 Energy Policy Act (EPACT05). This bill was weighted almost entirely toward fossil fuels and electricity supply. The Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 provided for one-year extensions of these provisions. Energy Tax Policy in the 110th Congress
Continued high crude oil and petroleum product prices and oil and gas industry profits, and the political realignment of the Congress resulting from the 2006 Congressional elections continued the energy policy shift toward increased taxes on the oil and gas industry, and the emphasis on energy conservation and alternative and renewable fuels rather than conventional hydrocarbons. On October 3, President Bush signed this legislation, the Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 ( P.L. 110-343 ), which includes $17 billion in energy tax incentives, primarily extensions of pre-existing provisions, but also including several new energy tax incentives: $10.9 billion in renewable energy tax incentives aimed at clean energy production, $2.6 billion in incentives targeted toward cleaner vehicles and fuels, and $3.5 billion in tax breaks to promote energy conservation and energy efficiency. The cost of the energy tax extenders legislation is fully financed, or paid for, by raising taxes on the oil and gas industry (mostly by reducing oil and gas tax breaks) and by other tax increases. The oil and gas tax increases comprise cutbacks in the IRC §199 manufacturing deduction for income attributable to oil and gas production, which will be frozen at 6% (rather than increasing to 9% as scheduled), reforming the foreign tax credit provisions, and by increasing the per-barrel tax rate on refinery crude oil under the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund provisions. | Historically, U.S. federal energy tax policy promoted the supply of oil and gas. However, the 1970s witnessed (1) a significant cutback in the oil and gas industry's tax preferences, (2) the imposition of new excise taxes on oil, and (3) the introduction of numerous tax preferences for energy conservation, the development of alternative fuels, and the commercialization of the technologies for producing these fuels (renewables such as solar, wind, and biomass, and nonconventional fossil fuels such as shale oil and coalbed methane). The Reagan Administration, using a free-market approach, advocated repeal of the windfall profit tax on oil and the repeal or phase-out of most energy tax preferences—for oil and gas, as well as alternative fuels. Due to the combined effects of the Economic Recovery Tax Act and the energy tax subsidies that had not been repealed, which together created negative effective tax rates in some cases, the actual energy tax policy differed from the stated policy. The George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton years witnessed a return to a much more activist energy tax policy, with an emphasis on energy conservation and alternative fuels. While the original aim was to reduce demand for imported oil, energy tax policy was also increasingly viewed as a tool for achieving environmental and fiscal objectives. The Clinton Administration's energy tax policy emphasized the environmental benefits of reducing greenhouse gases and global climate change, but it will also be remembered for its failed proposal to enact a broadly based energy tax on Btus (British thermal units) and its 1993 across-the-board increase in motor fuels taxes of 4.3¢/gallon.
The 109th Congress enacted the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58), signed by President Bush on August 8, 2005, provided a net energy tax cut of $11.5 billion ($14.5 billion gross energy tax cuts, less $3 billion of energy tax increases) for fossil fuels and electricity, as well as for energy efficiency, and for several types of alternative and renewable resources, such as solar and geothermal. The Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-432), enacted in December 2006, provided for one-year extensions of these provisions. The current energy tax structure favors tax incentives for alternative and renewable fuels supply relative to energy from conventional fossil fuels, and this posture was accentuated under the Energy Policy Act of 2005.
On October 3, President Bush signed the Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-343), which includes $17 billion in energy tax incentives, primarily extensions of pre-existing provisions, but also including several new energy tax incentives: $10.9 billion in renewable energy tax incentives aimed at clean energy production, $2.6 billion in incentives targeted toward cleaner vehicles and fuels, and $3.5 billion in tax breaks to promote energy conservation and energy efficiency. The cost of the energy tax extenders legislation is fully financed, or paid for, by raising taxes on the oil and gas industry (mostly by reducing oil and gas tax breaks) and by other tax increases. The oil and gas tax increases comprise cutbacks in the IRC §199 manufacturing deduction for income attributable to oil and gas production, which will be frozen at 6% (rather than increasing to 9% as scheduled), reforming the foreign tax credit provisions, and by increasing the per-barrel tax rate on refinery crude oil under the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund provisions. |
crs_R41750 | crs_R41750_0 | Introduction
In June 2008, the Supreme Court issued its decision in District of Columbia v. Heller , holding by a 5-4 vote that the Second Amendment to the Constitution of the United States protects an individual right to possess a firearm, unconnected with service in a militia, and to use that firearm for traditionally lawful purposes such as self-defense within the home. The decision in Heller marked the first time in almost 70 years that the Supreme Court addressed the nature of the right conferred by the Second Amendment. Although the Court conducted an extensive analysis of the Second Amendment to interpret its meaning, the decision left unanswered other significant constitutional questions, including the standard of scrutiny that should be applied to laws regulating the possession and use of firearms, and whether the Second Amendment applies to the states. Accordingly, this report first provides a historical overview of judicial treatment of the Second Amendment and a discussion of the Court's decision in Heller . It then examines the issue of incorporation, which was the focus of the McDonald decision. Lastly, this report concludes with an analysis that focuses on the potential impact of the Court's decisions in Heller and McDonald on such legislation pertaining to the use and possession of firearms at the federal, state, and local levels. Parker v. District of Columbia
In Parker , six residents of the District of Columbia challenged three provisions of the District's 1975 Firearms Control Regulation Act: DC Code § [phone number scrubbed].02(a)(4), which generally barred the registration of handguns, thus effectively prohibiting of possession of handguns in the District; § 22-4504(a), which prohibited carrying a pistol without a license (to the extent the provision would prevent a registrant from moving a gun from one room to another within his or her home); and § [phone number scrubbed].02, which required all lawfully owned firearms be kept unloaded and disassembled or bound by a trigger lock or similar device. The Court then declared that the inherent right of self-defense is central to the Second Amendment right, and that the District's handgun ban amounted to a prohibition of an entire class of arms that has been overwhelmingly utilized by American society for that purpose. Has the Supreme Court Addressed Incorporation of the Second Amendment via the Due Process Clause? Post-Heller Appellate Decisions and Incorporation of the Second Amendment
After the Heller decision, three courts of appeals addressed whether the Second Amendment applies to the states, that is, via direct application or via incorporation through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second Circuit and Seventh Circuit both held that the Second Amendment does not apply to the states, whereas the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Nordyke v. King held that the Second Amendment is applicable to the states, though it later vacated its decision in light of McDonald . Similarly, in National Rifle Association v. City of Chicago , the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (Seventh Circuit) held that the Second Amendment does not apply to the states. | In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled in a 5-4 decision that the Second Amendment to the Constitution of the United States protects an individual right to possess a firearm, unconnected with service in a militia, and the use of that firearm for traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home. The decision in Heller affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, which declared three provisions of the District of Columbia's Firearms Control Regulation Act unconstitutional. The provisions specifically ruled on were: DC Code § [phone number scrubbed].02, which generally barred the registration of handguns; DC Code § 22-4504, which prohibited carrying a pistol without a license, insofar as the provision would prevent a registrant from moving a gun from one room to another within his or her home; and DC Code § [phone number scrubbed].02, which required that all lawfully owned firearms be kept unloaded and disassembled or bound by a trigger lock or similar device. In noting that the District's approach "totally bans handgun possession in the home," the Supreme Court declared that the inherent right of self-defense is central to the Second Amendment right, and that the District's handgun ban amounted to a prohibition of an entire class of arms that has been overwhelmingly utilized by American society for that purpose.
The Court in Heller conducted an extensive analysis of the Second Amendment to interpret its meaning, but the decision left unanswered other significant constitutional questions, including the standard of scrutiny that should be applied to laws regulating the possession and use of firearms, and whether the Second Amendment is incorporated, or applies to, the states.
After Heller, three federal Courts of Appeals addressed the question of incorporation. Two of these decisions, from the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second Circuit and the Seventh Circuit, held that the Second Amendment did not apply to the states, whereas the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the Second Amendment is incorporated under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, although this decision has since been vacated. In McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and held that the Second Amendment applies to the states.
With respect to the Heller decision, this report provides an overview of judicial treatment of the Second Amendment over the past 70 years in both the Supreme Court and federal appellate courts. With respect to the McDonald decision, this report presents an overview of the principles of incorporation, early cases that addressed the application of the Second Amendment to state governments, and the federal appellate cases that addressed incorporation of the Second Amendment since the Heller decision. Lastly, this report provides an analysis of the Court's opinions in Heller and McDonald and the potential implications of these decisions for firearms legislation at the federal, state, and local levels. |
crs_R40934 | crs_R40934_0 | Introduction
Introduced in various incarnations in every congressional session since the 103 rd Congress, the proposed Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA; H.R. 1755 / S. 815 in the 113 th Congress) would prohibit discrimination based on an individual's actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity by public and private employers in hiring, discharge, compensation, and other terms and conditions of employment. The stated purpose of the legislation is "to address the history and persistent, widespread pattern of discrimination, including unconstitutional discrimination, on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity by private sector employers and local, State, and Federal Government employers," as well as to provide effective remedies for such discrimination. Patterned on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the act would be enforced by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). | Introduced in various incarnations in every congressional session since the 103rd Congress, the proposed Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA; H.R. 1755/S. 815 in the 113th Congress) would prohibit discrimination based on an individual's actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity by public and private employers in hiring, discharge, compensation, and other terms and conditions of employment. The stated purpose of the legislation is "to address the history and persistent, widespread pattern of discrimination, including unconstitutional discrimination, on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity by private sector employers and local, State, and Federal Government employers," as well as to provide effective remedies for such discrimination. Patterned on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the act would be enforced by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). |
crs_R42674 | crs_R42674_0 | Main Points
Russia will host the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation's (APEC) week-long series of senior-level meetings in Vladivostok on September 2-9, 2012. The main event for the week will be the 20 th APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting to be held September 8-9, 2012. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will represent the United States. The November 2011 APEC Meetings in Honolulu
On November 12-13, 2011, the United States hosted the 19 th APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting in Honolulu. In addition, the nine leaders of the nations that were then negotiating the TPP agreement—Australia, Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam—met and announced what the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) described as "the broad outlines of an ambitious, 21 st century Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement." For the United States, another important outcome of the 2011 APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting was the agreement to set a cap tariff rate on "environmental goods" of 5%, and to phase out tariffs on environmental goods by 2015. However, the 21 APEC members could not reach a final agreement on which goods would be considered "environmental goods." The Agenda for the 2012 Economic Leaders' Meeting
As host for the 20 th APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting, Russia has the lead in setting the agenda for the two-day event. According to the APEC 2012 webpage, the main priorities are:
trade and investment liberalization and regional economic integration; strengthening food security; establishing reliable supply chains; and intensive cooperation to foster innovative growth. The United States has also enhanced relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), by appointing the first resident U.S. The heightened U.S. engagement in the Asia-Pacific region has raised questions about APEC's continued role and relevance in U.S. foreign policy, particularly given the growing number of alternative regional events or organizations at which the United States can present its views. Some Chinese scholars and officials have expressed considerable concern about U.S motivations behind fostering a comprehensive free trade agreement in the Asia-Pacific region, perceiving TPP as part of a U.S. containment policy aimed at China. Implications for Congress
Congressional interest in APEC has generally focused on three issues—implications for U.S. trade policy in general, potential effects on relations with China, and budgetary matters. On occasion, the trade liberalization measures proposed to APEC by the United States in its Individual Action Plan (IAP) have required changes in U.S. trade laws (such as the lowering of tariff rates) or trade policy. Finally, as an APEC member, the United States must contribute to the annual budget of APEC to maintain the APEC Secretariat in Singapore and finance various APEC activities and programs. The Congressional Budget Justification for FY2013 includes a request for $1.028 million for APEC support. | Russia will host the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation's (APEC) week-long series of senior-level meetings in Vladivostok on September 2-9, 2012. The main event for the week will be the 20th APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting to be held September 8-9, 2012. President Barack Obama will not attend the event; Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will lead the U.S. delegation.
As host for the 20th APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting, Russia has set the main agenda items as: advancing trade and investment liberalization and regional economic integration; strengthening food security; establishing reliable supply chains; and promoting cooperation to foster innovative growth. The United States hopes to complete priorities established at last year's Economic Leaders' Meeting in Honolulu and support Russia's agenda in cases where the two nations share a common objective.
On November 12-13, 2011, the United States hosted the 19th APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting in Honolulu. While in Honolulu, the nine leaders of negotiating nations—Australia, Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam—met and announced the broad outline for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement, which to the United States and some other APEC members may serve as a stepping stone for a broader Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific open to all APEC members. However, not all APEC members support such a vision for the TPP.
Following the 19th APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting, the APEC leaders issued a declaration, reaffirming their opposition to protectionism and pledging to advance regional integration and the expansion of trade among APEC members. The leaders also agreed to set a cap tariff rate on "environmental goods" of 5%, and to phase out tariffs on environmental goods by 2015. However, they could not reach a final agreement on which goods would be considered "environmental goods."
Given the growing number of alternative regional events or organizations at which the United States can present its views, the heightened U.S. engagement in the Asia-Pacific region has raised questions about APEC's continued role and relevance in U.S. foreign policy. Since taking office, President Obama has strengthened ties with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the East Asian Summit (EAS), raising questions about the roles of each of these groups in U.S. relations in the region. In addition, China has grown concerned about greater U.S. interest in the region, with some Chinese officials viewing it as part of a U.S. containment policy aimed at China.
Congressional interest in APEC has generally focused on three issues—implications for U.S. trade policy in general, potential effects on relations with China, and budgetary matters. On occasion, the trade liberalization measures proposed to APEC by the United States have required changes in U.S. trade laws. As an APEC member, the United States must contribute to the annual budget of APEC. The Congressional Budget Justification for FY2013 includes a request for $1.028 million for APEC support. |
crs_R40098 | crs_R40098_0 | Introduction
Although much progress has been made in achieving the ambitious goals that Congress established more than 35 years ago to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation's waters, long-standing problems persist, and new problems have emerged. Water quality problems are diverse, ranging from pollution runoff from farms and ranches, city streets, and other diffuse or "nonpoint" sources, to "point" source discharges of metals and organic and inorganic toxic substances from factories and sewage treatment plants. Since then, no comprehensive reauthorization legislation has been introduced, but beginning in the 106 th Congress, a number of bills dealing with specific water quality issues in the law have been enacted—especially, legislation to reauthorize several existing CWA programs. Since the 107 th Congress, one of the dominant CWA issues has been water infrastructure financing—that is, extension and modification of provisions of the act authorizing financial assistance for municipal wastewater treatment projects. However, there is less agreement about what solutions are needed and whether new legislation is required. For some time, efforts to comprehensively amend the act have stalled as interests have debated whether and exactly how to change the law. These factors partly explain why Congress has recently favored focusing legislative attention on narrow bills to extend or modify selected CWA programs, rather than taking up comprehensive proposals. Funding for water infrastructure projects, discussed next in this report, received early attention in the 111 th Congress in light of interest in utilizing increased investment in public works projects—including wastewater—in order to stimulate the faltering U.S. economy, but the Obama Administration did not present specific legislative proposals concerning water quality. Two bills amending the CWA were enacted and are discussed. One dealt with extending a moratorium for CWA permitting of certain vessels ( P.L. 111-215 ), and the other dealt with ensuring that federal agencies and departments pay localities for reasonable costs associated with managing stormwater pollution from federal properties ( P.L. At issue has been what the federal role should be in assisting states and cities, especially in view of such high projected funding needs. In that Congress, House and Senate committees approved bills to extend the act's SRF program and increase federal assistance ( H.R. The House passed a bill, and legislation was reported by a Senate committee. Several issues contributed to the fact that, once again, no legislation was enacted. 1262
On March 12, 2009, the House approved legislation to reauthorize the SRF program and several related programs in the CWA ( H.R. S. 1005
Companion legislation was approved by the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee in May 2009 ( S. 1005 , the Water Infrastructure Financing Act), but the Senate did not consider the bill. Regulatory Protection of Wetlands
How best to protect the nation's remaining wetlands and regulate activities taking place in wetlands has become one of the most contentious environmental policy issues, especially in the context of the CWA, which contains a key wetlands regulatory tool, the permit program in Section 404. On June 18, 2009, the Environment and Public Works Committee approved, 12-7, an amended version of S. 787 , the Clean Water Restoration Act. 5088 , America's Commitment to Clean Water Act). 111-378 ). 111-5 ). President Obama signed the bill on October 30, 2009 ( P.L. | Although much progress has been made in achieving the ambitious goals that Congress established more than 35 years ago in the Clean Water Act (CWA) to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation's waters, long-standing problems persist, and new problems have emerged. Water quality problems are diverse, ranging from pollution runoff from farms and ranches, city streets, and other diffuse or "nonpoint" sources, to toxic substances discharged from factories and sewage treatment plants.
There is little agreement among stakeholders about what solutions are needed and whether new legislation is required to address the nation's remaining water pollution problems. For some time, efforts to comprehensively amend the CWA have stalled as interests have debated whether and exactly how to change the law. Congress has instead focused legislative attention on enacting narrow bills to extend or modify selected CWA programs, but not any comprehensive proposals.
For several years, the most prominent legislative water quality issue has concerned financial assistance for municipal wastewater treatment projects. House and Senate committees have approved bills on several occasions, but, for various reasons, no legislation has been enacted. At issue has been how the federal government will assist states and cities in meeting needs to rebuild, repair, and upgrade wastewater treatment plants, especially in light of capital costs that are projected to be as much as $390 billion. In the 111th Congress, interest in increased investment in public works infrastructure—including wastewater—in order to stimulate the faltering U.S. economy brought greater attention to water infrastructure issues. Acting quickly, in February 2009, Congress passed and the President signed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (P.L. 111-5). Among its provisions, the legislation appropriated $4.0 billion in additional CWA assistance for wastewater projects. In addition, in March 2009, the House passed legislation to reauthorize the CWA's State Revolving Fund (SRF) program to finance wastewater infrastructure and several related provisions of the act (H.R. 1262). A companion bill was approved by the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee (S. 1005). No legislation was enacted.
Programs that regulate activities in wetlands also have been of interest, especially CWA Section 404, which has been criticized by landowners for intruding on private land-use decisions and imposing excessive economic burdens. Environmentalists view this regulatory program as essential for maintaining the health of wetland ecosystems, and they are concerned about court rulings that narrowed regulatory protection of wetlands and about related administrative actions. Many stakeholders desire clarification of the act's regulatory jurisdiction, but they differ on what solutions are appropriate. In the 111th Congress, the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee approved a bill that sought to clarify but not expand the CWA's geographic scope (the Clean Water Restoration Act, S. 787). A companion bill was introduced in the House (H.R. 5088). Because some stakeholders believe that the bills would expand federal jurisdiction—not simply clarify it—the bills were controversial, and no legislation was enacted.
The 111th Congress considered a number of water quality issues through oversight and legislation. Two bills amending the CWA were enacted and are discussed. One dealt with extending a moratorium for CWA permitting of certain vessels (P.L. 111-215), and the other dealt with ensuring that federal agencies and departments pay localities for reasonable costs associated with managing stormwater pollution from federal properties (P.L. 111-378). |
crs_RL32587 | crs_RL32587_0 | In one common usage, outsourcing simply means the use by a firm of inputs produced outside the firm, either by foreigners or unrelated domestic firms—the important fact is simply that someone else performs the function. The focus of this report, however, is the international economy; its analysis is confined to what might be termed "offshore" outsourcing. A second use of "outsourcing" has also referred to international trade, but to flows of goods rather than services. The basic analysis of taxes and trade is the same whether the trade is in services or goods; thus, it is important to look at the first two examples of outsourcing together, combining our assessment of the direct use of foreign labor with that of the importation of goods. In terms of the outsourcing debate, taxes do not affect the net amount of the first type of outsourcing identified above, the use of foreign labor services or inputs made by foreign firms. Current U.S. tax law poses a mix of incentives and disincentives towards overseas investment; its net result is uncertain. In part, this is because the focus of this report is on how taxes affect outsourcing, not how outsourcing, in turn, affects variables such as employment. Importantly, in this usage of the term "outsourcing" we rule out items produced by the U.S. firm's own foreign facilities. As applied to the outsourcing debate, theory thus indicates that taxes have little impact on the extent to which the economy as a whole engages in this type of outsourcing, at least as compared to the country's level of exports. The ETI benefit was designed to boost U.S. exports by cutting taxes on export income. Taxes will shift investment from foreign locations to the domestic economy if taxes are relatively lower on domestic investment, and taxes will have no impact on (will be "neutral" towards) the location of investment if their burden is the same in each location. The Impact of the Current System and Recent Legislation
In the preceding section we saw how taxes can have an impact on the overall level and composition of trade, though not the trade balance; they can also alter the type of outsourcing that consists of overseas production by U.S. firms. We do not provide a detailed assessment here of the impact of the current tax system on the level and composition of trade (again, the system does not have a direct impact on the balance of trade). Tax Policy and Foreign Investment
Economic theory also provides a framework for interpreting taxes' impact on foreign investment from the perspective of economic efficiency and economic welfare. Outsourcing and Domestic Employment
The preceding economic analysis concluded that taxes best promote economic efficiency and economic welfare when they neither encourage nor discourage outsourcing, whether that outsourcing consists of imports of goods or services or exports of capital investment. Summary and Conclusions
A recent focus of tax policy debate has been the impact of taxes on the extent to which firms use imported inputs rather than domestic goods and services and whether taxes encourage U.S. firms to establish operations abroad rather than in the United States. In terms of the outsourcing debate, theory holds that taxes best promote economic welfare when they do not distort the level or composition of outsourcing. With outsourcing that occurs through investment, theory similarly indicates taxes best promote world economic efficiency and economic welfare when they do not distort investment flows. | The impact of taxes on international trade and investment has been debated for decades. Most recently, a variety of bills addressing international taxation were introduced in the 110th Congress—some would have cut taxes for U.S. firms overseas, while others would have increased taxes on foreign investment. The debate over taxes and foreign outsourcing has tended to grow more heated during times of domestic economic weakness and high unemployment; questions arise over whether taxes contribute to such weakness by discouraging exports (or encouraging imports) or by encouraging U.S. firms to move abroad. The debate over international taxation has again become prominent as a part of the wider debate over "outsourcing." With taxes, the debate asks how the current system affects outsourcing, and whether policies designed to limit the phenomenon might be desirable.
The precise meaning of the term "outsourcing" varies, depending on the context. In one usage, outsourcing simply refers to the use by domestic firms of inputs produced by other firms. Other usages, however, refer exclusively to the international sector. The analysis in this report focuses on two types of such "offshore" outsourcing: the use by domestic firms of imported foreign inputs, including both the use of foreign technical services and the use of foreign-made goods; and the shifting by U.S. firms of domestic operations abroad. The analysis of the first of these types of outsourcing focuses primarily on how taxes affect trade while investment is held constant. The assessment of the second type looks at how taxes affect investment.
Taxes probably have little impact on the balance of trade (what might be termed "net" outsourcing), apart from indirect effects that may result from their impact on investment flows. In the language of the outsourcing debate, taxes likely do not change the extent to which the economy as a whole engages in the use of foreign, rather than domestic, inputs (compared to the extent the economy exports). In contrast, taxes can affect the flow of direct investment abroad—that is, the establishment of overseas production facilities by U.S. firms. Thus, if outsourcing is taken to mean the use by U.S. firms of foreign rather than domestic labor, taxes can have an impact. The current U.S. system, however, produces a variety of incentives, disincentives, and neutrality towards overseas investment, and the net impact of the system on the flow of investment is not clear. Similarly, the likely impact of recently enacted legislation is not clear.
Economic theory provides frameworks for evaluating the efficiency effect of taxes on international trade and investment, and their subsequent impact on economic welfare. According to theory, taxes best promote economic efficiency—and thus best promote economic welfare—when they do not distort the level or composition of trade or alter the allocation of investment between foreign and domestic uses. In short, taxes best promote economic efficiency and aggregate economic welfare when they do not distort the level of outsourcing, in the sense it is used in this report. With respect to employment, outsourcing may cause sector-specific and near-term job losses but likely does not have a substantial long-run impact on overall employment. This report will be updated only when major legislative developments occur. |
crs_RS21903 | crs_RS21903_0 | Despite this, the Muslims of Asia are perceived to be on the periphery of the Islamic core based in the Arab Middle East. Some analysts believe that as long as the Muslim world views the U.S.-led war against terror as a war against Islam there will be significant limits on the extent to which Muslim states will be able to cooperate with the United States in the war against terror. The Islamic revival has a complex relationship to the level of extremism in Asia. While Islam in Southeast Asia has been moderate in character, it is undergoing a process of revivalist change in some segments of society. China is home to an estimated 17.5 to 36 million Muslims. | There exists much diversity within the Islamic world. This is particularly evident in Asia. This diversity is to be found in the different ethnic backgrounds and in the different practices of Islam. The Muslim world of Asia has been experiencing an Islamic revival. This has had an effect on moderate as well as radical Muslims. An understanding of the dynamics of Islam in Asia should help inform United States' policy to develop respect between America and Muslim peoples, to foster economic policies to encourage development of open societies, to support education in Muslim states, and to identify and prioritize terrorist sanctuaries in order to pursue more effectively the war against terror. This report will be updated. |
crs_R44107 | crs_R44107_0 | In some instances, the President makes these appointments using authorities granted by law to the President alone. Other appointments are made with the advice and consent of the Senate via the nomination and confirmation of appointees. This report identifies, for the 113 th Congress, all nominations submitted to the Senate for executive-level full-time positions in the 15 executive departments for which the Senate provides advice and consent. Information for this report was compiled using the Senate nominations database of the Legislative Information System (LIS) ( http://www.lis.gov/nomis/ ) , the Congressional Record (daily edition), the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents , telephone discussions with agency officials, agency websites, the United States Code , and the 2012 Plum Book ( United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions ). President Barack H. Obama submitted 273 nominations to the Senate for full-time positions in executive departments. Of these 273 nominations, 162 were confirmed; 8 were withdrawn; and 103 were returned to the President under the provisions of Senate rules. This report provides, for each executive department nomination confirmed in the 113 th Congress, the number of days between nomination and confirmation ("days to confirm"). For confirmed nominations, a mean of 119.2 days elapsed between nomination and confirmation. The median number of days elapsed was 92.0. | The President makes appointments to positions within the federal government, either using the authorities granted by law to the President alone, or with the advice and consent of the Senate. There are some 351 full-time leadership positions in the 15 executive departments for which the Senate provides advice and consent. This report identifies all nominations submitted to the Senate during the 113 th Congress for full-time positions in these 15 executive departments.
Information for each department is presented in tables. The tables include full-time positions confirmed by the Senate, pay levels for these positions, and appointment action within each executive department. Additional summary information across all 15 executive departments appears in the Appendix.
During the 113 th Congress, the President submitted 273 nominations to the Senate for full-time positions in executive departments. Of these 273 nominations, 162 were confirmed, 8 were withdrawn, and 103 were returned to him in accordance with Senate rules. For those nominations that were confirmed, a mean (average) of 119.2 days elapsed between nomination and confirmation. The median number of days elapsed was 92.0.
Information for this report was compiled using the Senate nominations database of the Legislative Information System (LIS) ( http://www.lis.gov/nomis/ ) , the Congressional Record (daily edition), the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents , telephone discussions with agency officials, agency websites, the United States Code , and the 2012 Plum Book ( United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions ).
This report will not be updated. |
crs_R41475 | crs_R41475_0 | Scope of the Agriculture Appropriations Bill
The Agriculture appropriations bill—formally known as the Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act—provides funding for the following agencies and departments:
all of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (except the Forest Service, which is funded by the Interior appropriations bill), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the Department of Health and Human Services, and in the House, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). In the House, appropriations jurisdiction for CFTC remains with the Agriculture Appropriations Subcommittee. Prior to 2008, it was with the Senate Agriculture Appropriations Subcommittee. 1. 3. 4. Action on FY2011 Appropriations
For the FY2011 Agriculture appropriations bill, no separate floor action and limited formal committee action occurred in the 111 th Congress. The full Senate Appropriations Committee reported an Agriculture appropriations bill ( S. 3606 , S.Rept. The House Agriculture Appropriations Subcommittee marked up its draft on June 30, 2010, but the bill did not see full committee action nor was it reported. 112-10 ) was enacted with many line-item changes on April 15, 2011. On February 19, 2011, the House passed H.R. 1 , a full-year continuing resolution for FY2011 covering all 12 regular appropriations bills (vote of 235-189). On March 9, 2011, the Senate voted on H.R. 1 , but failed to pass it by a vote of 44-56. Later on March 9, 2011, the Senate also voted on a substitute amendment to H.R. 1 , S.Amdt. It failed by a vote of 42-58. 111-221 ) on July 15, 2010. Full-Year Continuing Resolution
P.L. 112-10 provided $19.9 billion in discretionary appropriations for accounts in the Agriculture appropriations bill, resulting in a $3.4 billion reduction from FY2010 levels (-15%) ( Table 2 ). Discretionary agriculture-related programs fell to $6.89 billion, 6% below FY2010; discretionary conservation programs fell to $889 million, 12% below FY2010; rural development fell to $2.64 billion, 11% below FY2010; discretionary nutrition assistance fell to $7.13 billion, 7% below FY2010; and foreign assistance fell to $1.89 billion, 9% below FY2010. CFTC increased to $202 million, 20% above FY2010 ( Table 3 ). Reductions in Short-Term Continuing Resolutions
Before final agreement was reached on the full-year appropriation, seven short-term continuing resolutions (CRs) were enacted. The total amount is divided between discretionary domestic nutrition assistance programs and the rest of the bill. For FY2011, P.L. 149 ). Of the $3.4 billion total reduction in discretionary programs, about half of the cut ($1.7 billion) was the increase in the amount of rescissions and farm bill limitations. | The Agriculture appropriations bill provides funding for all of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) except the Forest Service, plus the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and, in some cases, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). Appropriations jurisdiction for the CFTC is split between two subcommittees—the House Agriculture Appropriations Subcommittee and the Senate Financial Services Appropriations Subcommittee.
For the FY2011 Agriculture appropriations bill, no separate floor action and limited formal committee action occurred in the 111th Congress. The full Senate Appropriations Committee reported an Agriculture appropriations bill (S. 3606, S.Rept. 111-221) on July 15, 2010. The House Agriculture Appropriations Subcommittee marked up its draft on June 30, 2010, but the bill did not see full committee action nor was it reported. None of the 12 appropriations bills was enacted in 2010.
In the 112th Congress, the House passed H.R. 1, a full-year continuing resolution for FY2011, by a vote of 235-189 on February 19, 2011. For Agriculture, H.R. 1 would have made $5.3 billion in cuts to discretionary programs (-23%), reducing them from $23.4 billion in FY2010 to $18.1 billion for FY2011.
On March 9, 2011, the Senate voted on H.R. 1, but failed to pass it by a vote of 44-56. Later on March 9, 2011, the Senate also voted on a substitute amendment, S.Amdt. 149; it failed by a vote of 42-58. S.Amdt. 149 would have reduced discretionary Agriculture appropriations by $1.7 billion (-7%) from the FY2010 level of $23.4 billion to $21.7 billion.
On April 15, 2011, a final, full-year continuing resolution was enacted as Division B of the Department of Defense appropriation, P.L. 112-10. Seven short-term continuing resolutions (CRs) were enacted in between, some with spending reductions, to prevent a government shutdown before the final agreement was reached for the full-year continuing resolution.
P.L. 112-10 provides $19.9 billion of discretionary funding for Agriculture appropriations, a 15% reduction (-$3.4 billion) from FY2010 levels. Mandatory appropriations for farm programs and domestic nutrition increased a net 7% to $105.1 billion. Thus, the total Agriculture appropriation (mandatory plus discretionary) for FY2011 is $125.0 billion, 3% greater than FY2010.
Discretionary agriculture-related programs fell to $6.89 billion, 6% below FY2010; discretionary conservation programs fell to $889 million, 12% below FY2010; rural development fell to $2.64 billion, 11% below FY2010; discretionary nutrition assistance fell to $7.13 billion, 7% below FY2010; and foreign assistance fell to $1.89 billion, 9% below FY2010. FDA increased to $2.46 billion, 4% above FY2010, and CFTC increased to $202 million, 20% above FY2010.
Cuts to individual agricultural agencies' operating budgets would have been even bigger had it not been for usually large amounts of rescissions of unobligated prior-year balances and limitations on mandatory farm bill programs. Of the $3.4 billion total reduction in discretionary appropriations from FY2010, about half of the cut was the increase in the amount of rescissions and farm bill limitations. |
crs_RL34536 | crs_RL34536_0 | In the consolidated cases of Boumediene v. Bush and Al Odah v. United States , decided June 12, 2008, the Supreme Court held in a 5-4 opinion that aliens designated as enemy combatants and detained at the U.S. Naval Station in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, have the constitutional privilege of habeas corpus . The Court also found that § 7 of the Military Commissions Act (MCA), which limited judicial review of executive determinations of the petitioners' enemy combatant status, did not provide an adequate habeas substitute and therefore acted as an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas . The immediate impact of the Boumediene decision is that detainees at Guantanamo may petition a federal district court for habeas review of the circumstances of their detention. For discussion of litigation challenging detention policy, see CRS Report RL33180, Enemy Combatant Detainees: Habeas Corpus Challenges in Federal Court , by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]. | In the consolidated cases of Boumediene v. Bush and Al Odah v. United States, decided June 12, 2008, the Supreme Court held in a 5-4 opinion that aliens designated as enemy combatants and detained at the U.S. Naval Station in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, have the constitutional privilege of habeas corpus. The Court also found that § 7 of the Military Commissions Act (MCA), which limited judicial review of executive determinations of the petitioners' enemy combatant status, did not provide an adequate habeas substitute and therefore acted as an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas. The immediate impact of the Boumediene decision is that detainees at Guantanamo may petition a federal district court for habeas review of the circumstances of their detention. This report summarizes the Boumediene decision and analyzes several of its major implications for the U.S. detention of alien enemy combatants and legislation that limits detainees' access to judicial review. For discussion of litigation challenging detention policy, see CRS Report RL33180, Enemy Combatant Detainees: Habeas Corpus Challenges in Federal Court, by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R41275 | crs_R41275_0 | Background on the Blockade
Israel withdrew from the Gaza Strip in 2005, but retained control of the territory's borders. Some countries and organizations, including Turkey, consider Hamas a democratically elected, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Hamas remains in control of Gaza. In recent years, humanitarian aid groups have sent supply ships and activists to Gaza. However, Israel directs them to land at its port of Ashdod for inspection before delivery to Gaza. A six-ship flotilla then set sail for the Gaza Strip with the intent to deliver 10,000 tons of humanitarian aid and to break the Israeli blockade. On May 30, the ships refused Israel's offer to unload at the port of Ashdod so that their cargos could be inspected before delivery accompanied by representatives of the non-governmental organizations. Nine passengers were killed, including eight Turks and a Turkish-American; 24 were injured, including one American, and 10 commandos were injured. After Operation Cast Lead, however, Israel began intercepting Free Gaza Movement ships before they reached Gaza. It is not a U.S. State Department-designated terrorist group, although it is part of a Saudi-based, Hamas-created umbrella group of Muslim charities called Union of Good that the U.S. Treasury has designated as a terrorist organization. Israel's leaders appear to believe that the blockade of the Gaza Strip, the security barrier that Israel has constructed in the West Bank, the successes of the Palestinian security forces and economy in the West Bank, and what it views as enhanced deterrence in the aftermath of military campaigns against Hezbollah in Lebanon in 2006 and Hamas in the Gaza Strip from December 2008 to January 2009 have brought about a kind of quiet, if not peace. International Reactions
There has been near-universal condemnation of Israel's actions. Investigations/Inquiries
In response to international calls for an investigation of the incident, Israel has launched several probes. We believe that Israel, as a country which attacked on a civil convoy in international waters, will not conduct an impartial inquiry. He also said that "international participation in a commission established by Israel does not give it an international quality." Position
Policy
The United States is caught between two long-time allies—Israel and Turkey—and the Obama Administration seems interested in finding a path between them that will not antagonize either party. He also stated that the Administration had been "cajoling" Israel to allow building materials into Gaza. That slated in some way for Gaza includes $40 million to support the United Nations Relief and Works Agency's (UNRWA) Emergency Appeal for Gaza and the West Bank to help improve educational and health services, increase job creation, and repair shelters in Gaza, while also addressing core humanitarian needs in the West Bank; $14.5 million for school rehabilitation, small-scale agriculture, the repair of a hospital and other community infrastructure in Gaza; $10 million for the construction of five new UNRWA schools in Gaza; and $5 million to complete five USAID-funded projects to repair water distribution and wastewater collection systems in Gaza. Yet, there was a dearth of ideas from those who called on Israel to end the blockade concerning creative ways for Israel to do that and to continue to prevent the arming of Hamas and its development as a more deadly threat to Israel. However, the naval blockade would not be lifted. Turkish-Israeli Relations
The current crisis is undoubtedly a turning point in Turkish-Israeli relations. To prohibit the United States participation on the U.N. Human Rights Council and prohibit contributions to the U.N. for the purpose of paying for any U.N. investigation into the flotilla incident. | Israel unilaterally withdrew from the Gaza Strip in 2005, but retained control of its borders. Hamas, a U.S. State Department-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), won the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections and forcibly seized control of the territory in 2007. Israel imposed a tighter blockade of Gaza in response to Hamas's takeover and tightened the flow of goods and materials into Gaza after its military offensive against Hamas from December 2008 to January 2009. That offensive destroyed much of Gaza's infrastructure, but Israel has obstructed the delivery of rebuilding materials that it said could also be used to manufacture weapons and for other military purposes. Israel, the U.N., and international non-governmental organizations differ about the severity of the blockade's effects on the humanitarian situation of Palestinian residents of Gaza. Nonetheless, it is clear that the territory's economy and people are suffering.
In recent years, humanitarian aid groups have sent supply ships and activists to Gaza. However, Israel directs them to its port of Ashdod for inspection before delivery to Gaza. In May 2010, the pro-Palestinian Free Gaza Movement and the pro-Hamas Turkish Humanitarian Relief Fund organized a six-ship flotilla to deliver humanitarian aid to Gaza and to break Israel's blockade of the territory. The ships refused an Israeli offer to deliver the goods to Ashdod. On May 31, Israeli naval special forces intercepted the convoy in international waters. They took control of five of the ships without resistance. However, some activists on a large Turkish passenger vessel challenged the commandos. The confrontation resulted in eight Turks and one Turkish-American killed, more than 20 passengers injured, and 10 commandos injured.
Israel considered its actions to be legitimate self-defense. Turkey, whose nationals comprised the largest contingent in the flotilla and among the casualties, considered them to be unjustifiable and in contravention of international law. There was near-universal international condemnation of Israel's actions. The U.N. Security Council in a U.S.-Turkish compromise condemned "the acts" that resulted in lost lives and called for an
impartial inquiry. Several inquiries are underway in Israel, but Turkey will not be satisfied unless there is an international one under U.N. auspices.
The Obama Administration tried to walk a fine line between two allies, Israel and Turkey, and not allow the incident to derail efforts to ameliorate relations with Israel in order to protect Israeli-Palestinian talks now underway. It urged Israel to include international participants in its probe of the incident, and announced an aid package for the Palestinians that does not require new appropriations. However, the Administration's reaction displeased Turkey, and may contribute to that country's ongoing pursuit of a more independent foreign policy course. Turkish-Israeli relations, which had been deteriorating for some time, have reached a low point. In the aftermath of the incident, Israel has eased restrictions on the passage of goods and people into Gaza, while continuing to prevent shipments of weapons and dual-use items to Hamas. |
crs_R44915 | crs_R44915_0 | Introduction
The Trump Administration requested $75.1 billion for the Department of Transportation (DOT) for FY2018, 2.6% ($2 billion) less than DOT received in FY2017. On July 21, 2017, the House Committee on Appropriations reported H.R. 3353 . The committee recommended $77.5 billion for DOT, a 0.5% ($430 million) increase over the comparable FY2017 amount and 3% ($2.4 billion) above the Administration request. On July 27, 2017, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported S. 1655 . It recommended a total of $78.6 billion in new budget authority for DOT for FY2018 ($78.5 billion after scorekeeping adjustments), 2% ($1.6 billion) above the comparable FY2017 amount and 4.7% ($3.5 billion) over the Administration request. Conflicts over funding levels and spending limits for federal agencies delayed action on final FY2018 appropriations until March 2018. Until that time, a series of continuing resolutions provided temporary funding for federal agencies. Finally, after passing legislation raising the spending limits for federal agencies for FY2018, Congress passed an omnibus spending bill, P.L. 115-141 , which included increased spending for most agencies. Title I of Division L, the DOT Appropriations Act, provided $86.2 billion, 11.8% ($9.1 billion) more than in FY2017. Two large trust funds, the Highway Trust Fund and the Airport and Airway Trust Fund, have typically provided around 90% of DOT's annual funding in recent years (92% in FY2017), but in FY2018 a significant increase in discretionary budget authority resulted in the proportion drawn from trust funds dropping to 83%, despite the actual amount increasing by $1 billion; see Table 2 . One reason for the shortfall in the fund is that the federal gas tax has not been raised since 1993. The Senate bill also recommended that the portion of funding allocated to projects in rural areas be increased from 20% to 30%; the same change was included in the Senate-passed DOT appropriations bills in FY2016 and FY2017, but was not enacted. Congress has continued to support the TIGER program through annual DOT appropriations. As Table 5 illustrates, the TIGER grant appropriation process has followed a pattern for several years, with the Obama Administration requesting as much as or more than Congress had previously provided; the House zeroing out the program or proposing a large cut; the Senate proposing an amount similar to the previous appropriation; and Congress agreeing on a final enacted amount similar to the previously enacted amount. Additional Infrastructure Funding
The FY2018 enacted legislation included significant increases in funding for infrastructure for aviation, highways, passenger rail, and transit, in some cases beyond the authorized levels, in other cases provided in newly created accounts. The Trump Administration's FY2018 budget request did not include any funding for the cost of PTC implementation, nor did the House or Senate Appropriations Committees recommend any funding for this purpose. They contend that the higher federal share makes highway projects relatively more attractive than public transportation projects for communities considering how to address transportation problems. Since the new tunnel would carry both intercity and commuter rail traffic, it is eligible for DOT funding from both the intercity rail program and the public transportation Capital Investment Grants program. | Congress appropriated $86.2 billion for the Department of Transportation (DOT) for FY2018. This represented a $9.1 billion (11.8%) increase over the amount provided in FY2017. The principal reason for the higher spending level was increases in funding from the general fund for highways, public transportation capital investments, and passenger rail projects. The appropriation was included in an omnibus spending bill, P.L. 115-141, Title I of Division L, the DOT Appropriations Act.
The DOT appropriations bill funds federal programs covering aviation, highways and highway safety, public transit, intercity rail, maritime safety, pipelines, and related activities. Federal highway, transit, and rail programs were reauthorized in fall 2015, and their future funding authorizations were somewhat increased.
The Trump Administration proposed a $75 billion budget for DOT for FY2018, including $16.4 billion in discretionary funding and $58.7 billion in mandatory funding. That was approximately $2 billion less than was provided for FY2017. The budget request reflected the Administration's call for significant cuts in funding for transit and rail programs.
The annual appropriations for DOT are combined with those for the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in the Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies (THUD) appropriations bill. The House Appropriations Committee reported H.R. 3353, the THUD FY2018 appropriations bill, in which Division A provided FY2018 appropriations for DOT. The committee recommended $77.5 billion in new budget authority for DOT, 0.5% ($400 million) more than ultimately approved for FY2017 and roughly 3% ($2.4 billion) more than the Administration requested.
The Senate Appropriations Committee reported out an FY2018 THUD bill, S. 1655, which was not taken up by the full Senate. The Senate committee recommended $78.6 billion in new budget authority, 2% ($1.6 billion) more than the comparable FY2017 amount and 4.7% ($3.5 billion) more than the Administration requested.
Conflicts over funding levels and limits delayed action on final FY2018 appropriations until March 2018. Until that time, a series of continuing resolutions provided temporary funding for federal agencies.
There is general agreement that more funding is needed for transportation infrastructure, and the Trump Administration has proposed an increase in spending on infrastructure, but Congress has not been able to agree on a source that could provide the additional funding. The federal excise tax on motor fuel, which is the primary funding source for federal highway and transit programs, has not been increased in over 20 years, and does not raise enough revenue to support even the current level of spending. To address this shortfall, Congress has transferred money from the general fund to the Highway Trust Fund on several occasions since 2008 to provide sufficient funding for the programs. Revenue estimates by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) suggest that general fund transfers will continue to be required in future years to support the currently authorized level of highway and public transportation spending. |
crs_R43438 | crs_R43438_0 | Introduction
In vitro diagnostic (IVD) devices, including genetic tests, provide information that is used to inform health care decision making. Federal oversight of IVDs spans several federal agencies, including the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). The use of an IVD companion diagnostic device to select the best therapy, at the right dose, at the correct time for a particular patient is often referred to as personalized medicine. Traditionally, most genetic tests have not been subject to premarket review by the FDA. It has been noted that, in the past, genetic tests were developed mostly by academic or research laboratories primarily for in-house use—tests referred to as laboratory-developed tests (LDTs)—to diagnose rare diseases and were highly dependent on expert interpretation. In recent years, LDTs have been developed to assess relatively common diseases and conditions, such as various cancers. The extent to which all LDTs should be regulated by the FDA has been a subject of debate. On July 31, 2014, the FDA officially notified the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions and the House Committee on Energy and Commerce that it would be issuing draft guidance on LDT regulation; on October 3, 2014, the agency published a notice in the Federal Register announcing the availability of the guidance documents and requesting comments within 120 days to ensure their consideration in the development of final guidance. The agency announced in November 2016 that it would be delaying finalization of the draft guidance. In January 2017, FDA released a discussion paper on LDTs that included a possible approach to LDT oversight (for more detail, see " FDA's January 2017 Discussion Paper: A Possible Approach to LDT Oversight "). Genetic testing has become increasingly available for direct purchase by consumers, generally over the Internet. This report provides an overview of federal regulation of IVDs by FDA, through the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (FFDCA) and the Public Health Service Act (PHSA), and by CMS, through the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments (CLIA) of 1988. FDA's Authority to Regulate In Vitro Diagnostic (IVD) Devices
IVDs that are used in the clinical management of patients generally fall under the definition of medical device and therefore are subject to regulation by the FDA. The FDA derives its authority to regulate the sale and distribution of medical devices from the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA, P.L. Commercial Test Kits vs. Examples include tests for infectious disease, blood glucose tests, and pregnancy tests. FDA regulation "addresses the safety and effectiveness of the diagnostic tests themselves and the quality of the design and manufacture of the diagnostic tests." Agency Activity
On July 31, 2014, the agency officially notified Congress of its intent to begin regulating LDTs in fulfillment of a statutory requirement in the Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act of 2012 (FDASIA, P.L. In the lead paragraph of the discussion paper, the agency states that it would not be issuing "a final guidance on the oversight of laboratory developed tests (LDTs) at the request of various stakeholders to allow for further public discussion on an appropriate oversight approach, and to give our congressional authorizing committees the opportunity to develop a legislative solution." On the other hand, some representatives of clinical laboratories and manufacturers of LDTs, such as the American Clinical Laboratory Association (ACLA), have asserted that LDTs should be outside of the FDA's regulatory purview. In June 2010, FDA announced it would hold a public meeting the following month to allow stakeholders the opportunity to discuss the agency's decision to exercise its regulatory authority over all LDTs. Section 1143 of FDASIA stipulates that the agency "may not issue any draft or final guidance on the regulation" of LDTs without, "at least 60 days prior to such issuance," first notifying Congress "of the anticipated details of such action." The framework generally identifies classes of LDTs that will be (1) exempt from regulation entirely; (2) only required to meet registration and listing (or notification) and adverse event reporting requirements; and (3) required to meet registration and listing (or notification), adverse event reporting, applicable premarket review (PMA or 510(k) notification), and quality system regulation requirements. Once classification has taken place, the FDA will enforce premarket review requirements, prioritizing the highest risk class III tests. The agency anticipates the entire process of bringing all LDTs into compliance will take nine years to complete. | In vitro diagnostic (IVD) devices are used in the analysis of human samples, such as blood or tissue, to provide information in making health care decisions. Examples of IVDs include (1) pregnancy test kits or blood glucose tests for home use; (2) laboratory tests for infectious disease, such as HIV or hepatitis, and routine blood tests, such as cholesterol and anemia; and (3) tests for various genetic diseases or conditions. More recently, a specific type of diagnostic test—called a companion diagnostic—has been developed that may be used to select the best therapy, at the right dose, at the correct time for a particular patient; this is often referred to as personalized or precision medicine.
Federal agencies involved in the regulation of IVDs include the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). FDA derives its authority to regulate the sale and distribution of medical devices, such as IVDs, from the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act and the Public Health Service Act. CMS's authority to regulate IVDs is through the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988. FDA regulates the safety and effectiveness of the diagnostic test, as well as the quality of the design and manufacture of the diagnostic test. CMS regulates the quality of clinical laboratories and the clinical testing process.
Traditionally, most genetic tests have not been subject to premarket review by the FDA. This is because in the past, genetic tests were developed by laboratories primarily for their in-house use—referred to as laboratory-developed tests (LDTs)—to diagnose mostly rare diseases and were highly dependent on expert interpretation. However, more recently, LDTs have been developed to assess relatively common diseases and conditions, thus affecting more people, and direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic testing has become more available over the Internet. The extent to which LDTs should be regulated by the FDA, in conjunction with CMS, has traditionally been a subject of debate. Some clinical laboratories and manufacturers of LDTs have maintained that LDTs should be outside of the FDA's regulatory purview. Legislation was introduced in the 110th and 112th Congresses with the aim of clarifying regulatory oversight and supporting innovation.
In June 2010, FDA announced its decision to exercise its authority over all LDTs. A provision in the Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act of 2012 stipulates that the agency "may not issue any draft or final guidance on the regulation" of LDTs without, "at least 60 days prior to such issuance," first notifying Congress "of the anticipated details of such action." On July 31, 2014, in fulfillment of this statutory requirement, the FDA officially notified the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions and the House Committee on Energy and Commerce that it would issue draft guidance on the regulation of LDTs, and included the anticipated details of that regulatory framework. On October 3, 2014, the FDA formally issued these documents as draft guidance in the Federal Register, giving 120 days for comment.
The draft guidance identifies groups of LDTs that would be (1) exempt from regulation entirely; (2) only required to meet notification and adverse event reporting requirements; and (3) required to meet notification, adverse event reporting, applicable premarket review, and other regulatory requirements. FDA would classify LDTs, based on risk, using information obtained through the notification process. Next FDA would enforce premarket review requirements, prioritizing the highest-risk tests. Bringing all LDTs into compliance was estimated to take nine years.
However, in November 2016 the agency announced it will be delaying finalization of the guidance indefinitely "to allow for further public discussion on an appropriate oversight approach and to give our congressional authorizing committees the opportunity to develop a legislative solution." In January 2017, FDA released a discussion paper on LDTs that included a possible approach to LDT oversight. |
crs_98-666 | crs_98-666_0 | Natural phenomena—predators, droughts, floods, and fluctuating oceanic conditions—stress salmonids and contribute to the variable abundance of their populations. Currently, 28 distinct population segments of five salmonid species have been listed as either endangered or threatened under the Endangered Species Act (ESA, see Table 1 ), with three additional populations identified as "species of concern." While no species of anadromous trout or salmon is in danger of near-term extinction, individual distinct population segments (designated as "evolutionarily significant units" or ESUs) within these species have declined substantially or have even been extirpated. The American Fisheries Society considers at least 214 Pacific Coast anadromous fish populations to be "at risk," while at least 106 other historically abundant populations have already become extinct. Human activities—logging, grazing, mining, agriculture, urban development, and consumptive water use—can degrade aquatic habitat. Silt can cover streambed gravel, smothering eggs. Poorly constructed roads often increase siltation in streams where adult salmon spawn and young salmon rear. Removal of streamside trees and shade frequently leads to higher water temperatures. Grazing cattle remove streamside vegetation and exacerbate streambank erosion. Urbanization typically brings stream channelization and filled wetlands, altering food supplies and nursery habitat. Habitat alterations can lead to increased salmonid predation by marine mammals, birds, and other fish. Dams for hydropower, flood control, and irrigation substantially alter aquatic habitat and can have significant impacts on anadromous fish. Protection and Restoration Efforts
The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS, also popularly referred to as "NOAA Fisheries") in the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Department of Commerce, implements the ESA for anadromous salmonids. When a federal activity may harm an ESA-listed salmonid, the ESA requires the federal agency to consult with NMFS to determine whether the activity is likely to jeopardize the survival and recovery of the species or adversely modify its critical habitat. In the Columbia River Basin, the Northwest Power and Conservation Council took the lead under the 1980 Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act ( P.L. 96-501 ), by attempting to protect salmon and their habitat while also providing inexpensive electric power to the region. Although federal agencies and public utilities have spent hundreds of millions of dollars on technical improvements for dams, habitat enhancement, and water purchases to improve salmon survival, some populations have continued to decline. Recent years have seen an increased interest by state governments and tribal councils in developing comprehensive salmon management efforts. | Along the Pacific Coast, 28 distinct population segments of Pacific salmon and steelhead trout are listed as either endangered or threatened under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), with three additional populations identified as "species of concern." While no species of anadromous trout or salmon is in danger of near-term extinction, individual population segments within these species have declined substantially or have even been extirpated. The American Fisheries Society considers at least 214 Pacific Coast anadromous fish populations to be "at risk," while at least 106 other historically abundant populations have already become extinct.
Human activities—logging, grazing, mining, agriculture, urban development, and consumptive water use—can degrade aquatic habitat. Silt can cover streambed gravel, smothering fish eggs. Poorly constructed roads often increase siltation in streams where adult salmon spawn and young salmon rear. Removal of streamside trees and shade frequently leads to higher water temperatures. Grazing cattle remove streamside vegetation and exacerbate streambank erosion. Urbanization typically brings stream channelization and filled wetlands, altering food supplies and nursery habitat. Habitat alterations can lead to increased salmonid predation by marine mammals, birds, and other fish. Dams for hydropower, flood control, and irrigation substantially alter aquatic habitat and can have significant impacts on anadromous fish. In addition, natural phenomena stress fish populations and contribute to their variable abundance.
Current management efforts aim to restore the abundance of ESA-listed native northeast Pacific salmonids to historic, sustainable population levels. The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS, also popularly referred to as "NOAA Fisheries") in the Department of Commerce implements the ESA for anadromous salmonids. When a federal activity may harm an ESA-listed salmonid, the ESA requires the federal agency to consult with NMFS to determine whether the activity is likely to jeopardize the survival and recovery of the species or adversely modify its critical habitat.
Prior to the listing of salmonid "evolutionarily significant units" (ESUs) under the ESA, the Northwest Power and Conservation Council took the lead in the Columbia River Basin under the 1980 Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act, by attempting to protect salmon and their habitat while also providing inexpensive electric power to the region. Under this effort, federal agencies and public utilities have spent hundreds of millions of dollars on technical improvements for dams, habitat enhancement, and water purchases to improve salmon survival. Recent years have seen an increased interest by state governments and tribal councils in developing comprehensive salmon management efforts.
This report summarizes the reasons for ESA listings and outlines efforts to protect ESA-listed species. |
crs_R40143 | crs_R40143_0 | While not yet fully understood, the ecological and economic consequences of ocean acidification could be substantial. What Is Ocean Acidification? As increasing CO 2 from the atmosphere dissolves in seawater, seawater chemistry is altered. As the number of hydrogen ions increases, the pH of the ocean decreases, and the water becomes less alkaline. Scientists are concerned that this change in seawater pH could alter biogeochemical cycles, disrupt physiological processes of marine organisms, and damage marine ecosystems. This report does not discuss the effects of increasing thermal stress to marine organisms and ecosystems (e.g., coral bleaching) related to climate change. However, marine ecosystems are likely to be affected by the synergistic effects of factors involved in both thermal and chemical processes. The Federal Ocean Acidification Research and Monitoring Act of 2009 (FOARAM; P.L. In the 111 th Congress, FOARAM directed the Secretary of Commerce to establish an ocean acidification program within NOAA, established an interagency committee to develop an ocean acidification research and monitoring plan, and authorized appropriations through FY2012 for NOAA and the National Science Foundation. The only bill related to ocean acidification that has been introduced during the 113 th Congress is the Coral Reef Conservation Act Amendments of 2013 ( S. 839 ). S. 839 would include ocean acidification in the criteria used to evaluate project proposals for studying threats to coral reefs and developing responses to coral reef losses. On July 30, 2013, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation ordered S. 839 to be reported. | With increasing concentrations of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the atmosphere, the extent of effects on the ocean and marine resources is an increasing concern. One aspect of this issue is the ongoing process (known as ocean acidification) whereby seawater becomes less alkaline as more CO2 dissolves in it, causing hydrogen ion concentration in seawater to increase. Scientists are concerned that increasing hydrogen ion concentration could reduce growth or even cause death of shell-forming animals (e.g., corals, mollusks, and certain planktonic organisms) as well as disrupt marine food webs and the reproductive physiology of certain species. While not yet fully understood, the ecological and economic consequences of ocean acidification could be substantial.
Scientists are concerned that increasing hydrogen ion concentration in seawater could alter biogeochemical cycles, disrupt physiological processes of marine organisms, and damage marine ecosystems. This report does not discuss the effects of increasing thermal stress to marine organisms and ecosystems (e.g., coral bleaching) related to climate change. However, marine ecosystems are likely to be affected by the synergistic effects of factors involved in both thermal and chemical processes.
Congress is beginning to focus attention on better understanding ocean acidification and determining how this concern might be addressed. In the 111th Congress, the Federal Ocean Acidification Research and Monitoring Act of 2009 (Title XII, Subtitle D, of P.L. 111-11) directed the Secretary of Commerce to establish an ocean acidification program within NOAA, established an interagency committee to develop an ocean acidification research and monitoring plan, and authorized appropriations through FY2012 for NOAA and the National Science Foundation. The only bill related to ocean acidification that has been introduced during the 113th Congress is the Coral Reef Conservation Act Amendments of 2013 (S. 839). S. 839 would include ocean acidification in the criteria used to evaluate project proposals for studying threats to coral reefs and developing responses to coral reef losses. On July 30, 2013, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation ordered S. 839 to be reported. |
crs_RS20995 | crs_RS20995_0 | RS20995 -- India and Pakistan: U.S. Economic Sanctions
Updated February 3, 2003
Recap of Nuclear Tests Sanctions (1)
In May 1998, India and Pakistan each conducted tests of nuclear explosive devices, triggering sweeping U.S. economic sanctions as required by the ArmsExport Control Act (AECA) and the Export-Import Bank Act. In theUnited States, the law required the President toimpose the following restrictions or prohibitions on U.S. relations with both India and Pakistan: termination of U.S.foreign assistance other than humanitarianor food assistance; termination of U.S. government sales of defense articles and services, design and constructionservices, licenses for exporting U.S.Munitions List (USML) items; termination of foreign military financing; denial of most U.S. government-backedcredit or financial assistance; U.S. oppositionto loans or assistance from any international financial institution; prohibition of most U.S. bank-backed loans orcredits; prohibition on licensing exports of"specific goods and technology"; and denial of credit or other Export-Import Bank support for exports to eithercountry. Throughout the first eight months of 2001, the Bush administration hadhinted that the United States would like to remove the sanctions imposed against India and, to a lesser extent,Pakistan. As a result, the President exercised the authority granted him in the Defense Appropriations Act, FY2000,on September 22, 2001, when he lifted allnuclear test-related economic sanctions against the two countries after finding that denying export licenses andassistance was not in the national securityinterests of the United States. (9) Today, the solevestige of the nuclear sanctions is the listing of four Indian and 20 Pakistani entities (and their subsidiaries) onthe Commerce Department's list of entities for which export licenses are required. By comparison, restricted entitiesnumbered in the hundreds in the wake ofthe 1998 nuclear tests. Pakistan's current leader, General PervezMusharraf seized power and overthrew a democratically elected government in October 1999. Pakistan wasalso denied most U.S. foreign assistance for falling into arrears in servicing its debt to the United States. | In 1998, India and Pakistan each conducted tests of nuclear explosive devices, drawingworld condemnation. TheUnited States and a number of India's and Pakistan's major trading partners imposed economic sanctions in response. Most U.S. economic sanctions werelifted or eased within a few months of their imposition, however, and Congress gave the President the authority toremove all remaining restrictions in 1999.
The sanctions were lifted incrementally. President Bush issued a final determination on September 22, 2001,to remove the remaining restrictions, finding that denying export licenses and assistance was not in the national security interests of the United States.
Today, four Indian and 20 Pakistani entities (and their subsidiaries) remain on the Commerce Department's listof entities for which export licenses arerequired. By comparison, restricted entities numbered in the hundreds in the wake of the 1998 nuclear tests. Anexport license is still required to ship missiletechnology-controlled or nuclear proliferation-controlled items to users in either country, but the Department ofCommerce no longer views such licenseapplications with a presumption of denying their issuance.
Apart from the sanctions imposed following the nuclear tests, the United States prohibited foreign aid toPakistan when that country fell into arrears in servicingits debt to the United States in late 1998, a prohibition reenforced when Pakistan's military forces overthrew thedemocratic government in late 1999. Post-September 11 cooperation between the United States and Pakistan included a rescheduling of the debt and newlegislation to waive the so-calleddemocracy sanctions. Pakistan thus became eligible to receive U.S. foreign assistance through FY2003 when, unlessit holds free and fair elections, restrictionson foreign aid could be reimposed. |
crs_R42618 | crs_R42618_0 | Overview
The term "conflict minerals" is used to describe metal ores that, when mined, sold, or traded, are widely reported to play key roles in fueling armed conflict and human rights abuses in several far eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC, formerly Zaire). The main minerals at issue are columbite-tantalite (coltan, a source of tantalum and niobium), cassiterite (tin ore), wolframite (tungsten ore), and gold—and their derivatives. Multiple congressional hearings have investigated various aspects of the DRC's conflicts, and multiple resolutions and bills have been introduced to help end them or mitigate their effects. Several have become law. The most extensive U.S. law aimed at halting the trade in conflict minerals, specifically the 3TGs, is Section 1502 of Title XV of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act ( P.L. 111-203 ). It is the subject of an ongoing Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rule-making process that is expected to lead to adoption of "final" Section 1502 implementing rules. Other donor-backed mining sector reform efforts also seek to reduce links between mining and conflict and boost legitimate trade. Minerals
The main conflict minerals at issue are the 3TGs and their derivatives, which Section 1502 explicitly and formally defines as "conflict minerals." OECD Due Diligence System
Most of a handful of initiatives that are being established or piloted (see Appendix B ) use as an operational standard a detailed set of conflict-free mineral sourcing due diligence guidelines crafted by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 4173 , is the culmination of several prior congressional efforts to help break links between mineral trade and conflict in eastern DRC. At its core is a requirement that SEC-regulated firms that use the 3TGs in their products publicly report whether or not they obtain their supplies of these minerals from the DRC, and if so, what due diligence they exercise to ensure that these purchases do not benefit armed groups. Supporters of a phase-in cite the need for existing mineral certification pilot projects to mature and a need to build understanding of and compliance with traceability schemes among local actors in eastern DRC. Delays in Rule-Making
The large volume of comments submitted to the SEC on Section 1502 and the complex prospective rule implementation issues that these comments have raised pose substantial challenges for the SEC, as do possible court suits. The SEC has proposed that such tools would likely not be affected, but has solicited feedback on this issue. Indirect "finance or benefit" to armed groups arising from association with a conflict mineral. U.S. Programs
Responsible Minerals Trade
Several programs designed to implement the U.S. conflict minerals strategy and the objectives of Section 1502 are under way. Ultimately, however, their potential for sustained success is likely to depend on efforts to ensure overall security and stability, to end impunity for human rights abuses and illicit activities, and to undertake reforms and related actions, such as
Military and police training and broader security sector reform; Use of armed force by the state to seize and maintain control of mining sites and wider areas controlled by armed groups and, ultimately, neutralize these groups, including rogue elements of the national military; Political agreements and compromise over control of mining sites, and assured scope for civil society actors in the mineral sector to freely advocate reform policies and undertake investigations; National and international criminal prosecution for human rights violators and imposition of targeted international sanctions, in addition to U.N. sanctions already in place, possibly specifically directed at those who engage in conflict-related mineral transactions; Institutional capacity building for trade regulation, mining, and border control and related agencies in the DRC and neighboring countries; Targeted sustainable employment and working condition-focused assistance for artisanal miners and mining communities affected by externally driven due diligence initiatives and outcomes such as the de facto boycott; Reform of DRC mineral tax rates and revenue sharing formulas; Increased state and third party mineral sector and trade data reporting, as well as public and private sector adherence to international extractive sector transparency initiatives, such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI); and Reform of mining contracts and laws, taking into consideration multiple interest groups, including the state, large-scale mining concerns, and artisanal miners. Potential Prospective Congressional Role
In the short to medium term, interested Members of Congress are likely to closely monitor Section 1502 rule-making and the effectiveness of any eventual rule and other conflict mineral-focused programs as they are implemented. Both SEC rule-making and prospective rule implementation are likely to continue to pose complex challenges, and may spur Congress, ultimately, to revisit the approach taken in the Section 1502 rule. While substantial financial and applied efforts are being invested in such activities, conflict in eastern DRC has long posed a complex set of intractable security, governance, and human rights challenges, which trade-focused efforts alone are unlikely to overcome. iTSCi has been in development since 2008. | "Conflict minerals" are ores that, when sold or traded, have played key roles in helping to fuel conflict and extensive human rights abuses, since the late 1990s, in far eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The main conflict minerals are the so-called the "3TGs": ores of tantalum and niobium, tin, tungsten, and gold, and their derivatives. Diverse international efforts to break the link between mineral commerce and conflict in central Africa have been proposed or are under way. Key initiatives include government and industry-led mineral tracking and certification schemes. These are designed to monitor trade in minerals to keep armed groups from financially benefitting from this commerce, in compliance with firm-level and/or industry due diligence policies that prohibit transactions with armed groups.
Congress has long been concerned about conflicts and human rights abuses in the DRC. Hearings during successive Congresses have focused on ways to help end or mitigate their effects, and multiple resolutions and bills seeking the same goals have been introduced. Several have become law. The most extensive U.S. law aimed at halting the trade in conflict minerals, specifically the 3TGs, is Section 1502 of Title XV of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (P.L. 111-203). Among other ends, Section 1502 requires the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to issue rules mandating that SEC-regulated businesses that use conflict minerals in their products
report if they obtained their mineral supplies from the DRC or nearby countries; be permitted to label as "DRC conflict free" products that they can credibly demonstrate do not incorporate minerals sourced in a manner that directly or indirectly finances or benefits armed groups in DRC or adjoining countries; and publicly report to the SEC on those of their products which do incorporate minerals that are not "DRC conflict free"—and which may not be labeled as such—and on diligence measures used to obtain these minerals.
Section 1502 raises complex rule design, compliance, cost estimate, and implementation questions, and Section 1502 advocates and critics—many politically influential—have been urging the SEC to issue rules favorable to their respective views and interests. The complexity of the matters at issue and diversity of interests affected have prompted the SEC to repeatedly delay issuance of a final rule, although it is expected to act on the matter in mid-August 2012. Key rule-making issues under debate include
timing and a possible phase-in of rule implementation; and what due diligence standards are to be used.
There is widespread support for use of due diligence guidelines developed by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in eventual Section 1502 rules, both to ensure complementarity between U.S. and international conflict mineral trade abatement efforts, most of which employ the OECD guidelines, and to enable these schemes to mature.
The State Department has provided to Congress a strategy aimed at breaking the link between mineral trade and conflict and, together with the U.S. Agency for International Development, is implementing programs in central Africa to support tracking and certification schemes; local small-scale mining communities; anti-mining labor abuse efforts; and related ends.
In the short to medium term, Congress is likely to closely monitor Section 1502 rule-making and the effectiveness of any eventual rule and other conflict mineral-focused programs as they are implemented. Implementation is likely to be complex. While substantial financial and applied efforts are being invested in such efforts, conflict in eastern DRC has long posed a complex set of intractable security, governance, and human rights challenges, which such efforts alone are unlikely to overcome—and may complicate. An example of a possible unintended consequence of Section 1502 is a de facto buyers' boycott of minerals from eastern DRC attributed to the delayed rule-making process and to other factors. It has generated a local economic crisis and increased smuggling of minerals, but also reportedly reduced conflict funding and spurred conflict mineral trade control efforts. |
crs_R44271 | crs_R44271_0 | Introduction
The United Republic of Tanzania is an East African country of nearly 54 million people that is about twice as large as California. The country has substantial natural resource wealth and agricultural potential, however, and multiple socioeconomic development indicators have generally improved in recent years. President John Magufuli was elected in 2015 and is serving his first five-year term in office. Administrations. Such concerns have centered on the nullification of the 2015 election results (and the subsequent rerun in 2016) in the semiautonomous coastal region of Zanzibar, restrictions on civil liberties, and similar issues. Citing such concerns, in March 2016, the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Board announced it would suspend its partnership with Tanzania, deferring a vote on the country's continued eligibility for a potential second large development compact; this effectively ended, for the time being, the development of a second MCC compact with Tanzania, following its completion of an initial compact between 2008 and 2013. How bilateral ties may proceed under the Trump Administration and during the 115 th Congress has yet to be determined, but they appear likely to remain on a positive track. In 2014 Tanzania was selected as one of six initial partner countries under the Obama Administration's African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership (APRRP). Background
Tanzania, formed in 1964, is a union of Tanganyika, the mainland territory, which gained independence from Britain in 1961, and the Zanzibar archipelago. Despite a stated commitment to reform, corruption and poor service delivery have hampered Tanzania's efforts to curb widespread poverty and reduce reliance on subsistence agriculture. Politics and Governance
Tanzania's ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM, Swahili for Party of the Revolution), was created by Nyerere in 1977 through the merger of the ruling parties of the mainland and Zanzibar. Still, opposition parties reportedly face periodic harassment and de facto restrictions on their activities. Then-President Kikwete was constitutionally barred from running for a third term, but his CCM party was widely favored to win the polls, given its power of incumbency. Security Challenges and Human Rights Trends
While Tanzania is generally stable and peaceful, there are periodic, usually generally limited threats to state and public security. There have also been occasional bombings of Christian churches, among other targets, that analysts have speculatively attributed to Islamist radicals. Tanzania has occasionally arrested Islamic extremists, including 10 alleged members of the Somali Al Qaeda-linked terrorist group Al Shabaab, in April 2015. This growth has been based largely on earnings from agricultural exports, such as coffee, tea, and cotton; tourism, which has steadily increased and is a key source of hard currency; and exports of gold, the price of which rose over the past decade and spiked in 2011, but has since declined. Energy and Mining Sectors
Since 2010, the discovery of large reserves of natural gas off the southern coast, in a region near far larger reserves in Mozambican territory, has increased foreign investment and raised the prospect of export revenue. In addition to being a troop contributor to United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping operations, with personnel deployed in multiple African countries and Lebanon, Tanzania hosts large numbers of refugees from the region, including from Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Former President Kikwete was the first African head of state to meet with former President Obama after Obama took office in 2009. Trade Issues
Tanzania is eligible for U.S. trade preferences, including apparel benefits, under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA, reauthorized under P.L. Bilateral Assistance
U.S. assistance to Tanzania has focused primarily on health, food security, agricultural development, infrastructure, and environmental conservation. Security Cooperation
U.S. security cooperation and assistance has grown since the 1998 Al Qaeda bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Dar es Salaam, but it remains limited compared to that pursued with Tanzania's East African neighbors. | Tanzania is an East African country comprising a union of Tanganyika, the mainland territory, and the semiautonomous Zanzibar archipelago. The United States has long considered Tanzania a partner in economic development and, increasingly, in regional security efforts. With nearly 54 million people, Tanzania is one of the largest countries in Africa by population and is endowed with substantial natural resource wealth and agricultural potential. Over the past decade, it has experienced robust economic growth based largely on favorably high gold prices and tourism; growth has averaged nearly 7% annually. The ongoing development of large reserves of offshore natural gas discovered in 2010 has raised the prospect of substantial foreign investment inflows and export revenue. Nevertheless, corruption and poor service delivery have hindered efforts to curb widespread poverty, and extensive development challenges remain.
Since 1977, Tanzanian politics have been dominated by the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM, Party of the Revolution), created through the merger that year of the single parties that had controlled the mainland and Zanzibar since 1964. Opposition parties face periodic harassment and de facto restrictions on their activities. President John Magufuli, who leads the CCM, was elected in late October 2015 and is serving his first five-year term in office. His predecessor, Jakaya Kikwete, also of the CCM, assumed power in 2005 and won reelection in 2010, but was constitutionally barred from running for a third term. The 2015 polls featured a close contest between the CCM and a coalition of the leading opposition parties.
Tanzania is generally stable and peaceful, despite periodic threats to public safety. These include sporadic attacks on tourists in Zanzibar, several unattributed armed attacks on police, and occasional bombings of Christian churches and other targets. Tanzania has occasionally arrested suspected Islamic extremists, as in April 2015, when a group of 10 alleged members of the Somali Al Qaeda-linked terrorist group Al Shabaab were taken into custody.
U.S.-Tanzanian relations are cordial, but have suffered tensions over the contentious 2015/2016 election in Zanzibar, restrictions on civil liberties, and other issues. President Kikwete was the first African head of state to meet with former President Obama after the latter took office, and President Obama stated that a "shared commitment to the development and the dignity of the people of Tanzania" underpins bilateral ties. Tanzania also maintains close economic and political ties with China.
Under the Obama Administration, aid cooperation was generally robust. How ties and assistance cooperation may proceed under the Administration of President Donald Trump and during the 115th Congress has yet to be determined. U.S. aid for Tanzania has focused primarily on health, food security, agricultural development, and infrastructure, largely under multiple major presidential initiatives. U.S. assistance has also supported Tanzania's hosting of large numbers of refugees from the region. Tanzania is eligible for African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) trade benefits and in 2013 completed a $698 million Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compact focused on poverty reduction and economic growth. The MCC has since suspended activity in support of a possible second compact, citing governance concerns.
U.S. security assistance increased after the 1998 Al Qaeda bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Dar es Salaam. Tanzania was one of six initial participants in the Obama Administration's African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership (APRRP), which aims to build the peacekeeping capacity of African militaries. Tanzania is a troop contributor to United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping operations in multiple African countries and Lebanon. |
crs_R44226 | crs_R44226_0 | By and large in identical language, the two would amend existing mandatory minimum sentence provisions found in federal drug and firearms laws, by and large in identical language. The most obvious difference is that the Senate proposal, S. 2123 , the Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act of 2015, features an extensive corrections title, which the House proposal, H.R. 3713 , the Sentencing Reform Act of 2015, lacks. 3713 would reduce the mandatory minimum sentences that must be imposed on repeat offenders. S. 2123 and H.R. 3713 would modify the safety valve in several respects. Third, the bills would create additional safety valve. The mini-safety valve would only apply to future convictions. One, the so-called three strikes provision, also known as the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), imposes a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence on an offender convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm who has three prior convictions for a drug offense or a violent felony. S. 2123 and H.R. 3713 would reduce the mandatory minimum penalty from 15 years to 10 years. 3713 's retroactivity would only apply to defendants without a prior serious violent felony conviction. The mandatory minimums, imposed in addition to the sentence imposed for the underlying crime of violence or drug trafficking, vary depending upon the circumstances:
imprisonment for not less than 5 years, unless one of the higher mandatory minimums below applies; imprisonment for not less than 7 years, if a firearm is brandished; imprisonment for not less than 10 years, if a firearm is discharged; imprisonment for not less than 10 years, if a firearm is a short-barreled rifle or shotgun or is a semi-automatic weapon; imprisonment for not less than 15 years, if the offense involves armor-piercing ammunition; imprisonment for not less than 25 years, if the offender has a prior conviction for violation of §924(c); imprisonment for not less than 30 years, if the firearm is a machine gun or destructive device or is equipped with a silencer; and imprisonment for life, if the offender has a prior conviction for violation of §924(c) and if the firearm is a machine gun or destructive device or is equipped with a silencer. S. 2123 and H.R. S. 2123 and H.R. New Mandatory Minimums
H.R. 3713 would create no new mandatory minimum sentencing provisions. S. 2123 , on the other hand, would establish two: one for interstate domestic violence offenses and another for certain violations of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). Section 109 of the bill would direct the Attorney General to prepare and provide the House and Senate Committees on the Judiciary an inventory of federal statutory crimes and of federal regulatory offenses. | As introduced, the Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act of 2015, S. 2123, and the Sentencing Reform Act of 2015, H.R. 3713, use virtually identical language to reduce the impact of the mandatory minimum sentences which federal courts must now impose for certain drug trafficking and firearms offenses.
Key Takeaways
Existing law requires long minimum sentences for certain drug traffickers who have prior drug convictions. S. 2123 and H.R. 3713 would shorten the mandatory minimums, but apply them for both prior drug and violent felony convictions. The safety valve permits judges to ignore mandatory minimums for certain low-level, nonviolent drug traffickers with virtually no criminal record. The bills would make the safety valve available to traffickers with slightly more serious criminal records. The bills would establish a mini-safety valve which would permit judges to treat the 10-year drug trafficking mandatory minimums as if they were 5-year mandatory minimums for the benefit of nonviolent defendants with no prior serious drug or violent crime convictions. The proposals would permit retroactive application of the 2010 Fair Sentencing Act crack/powder cocaine amendments under some circumstances. S. 2123 and H.R. 3713 would reduce the Armed Career Criminal mandatory minimum to 10 years from 15 years. The bills would increase to 15 years the maximum penalties for possession of a firearm by a felon and various other firearms offenses. H.R. 3713, but not S. 2123, would add a consecutive term of imprisonment for not more than five years to the mandatory minimums in drug trafficking cases which involve heroin or fentanyl (a heroin cutter and counterfeit). S. 2123, but not H.R. 3713, would establish new mandatory minimums for certain interstate domestic violence offenses and International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) violations. S. 2123, but not H.R. 3713, would direct the Attorney General to prepare an inventory of federal statutory crimes and various federal agencies to prepare a comparable inventory of federal regulatory offenses. |
crs_RL34192 | crs_RL34192_0 | Background
HIV/AIDS
Revised Epidemic Estimates
The Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) estimates that 33.2 million people are living with human immunodeficiency virus/ acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS); some 16% fewer people than it initially estimated in 2006 (about 39.5 million). UNAIDS predicts that 2.5 million people will contract HIV in 2007, compared to the estimated 3.2 million who became HIV-positive in 2001. In FY2006, Congress provided $3.4 billion for global HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis (TB), and malaria programs ( Table 3 ). Policy Options for Congress
In 2003, Congress authorized $3 billion for each fiscal year from 2004 through 2008 to support the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEFAR). The United States remains the largest single donor for global HIV/AIDS efforts in the world, providing nearly 50% of all donor funds. As Congress prepares to consider whether, and at what level, to reauthorize PEPFAR, there has been considerable debate about the effectiveness of PEPFAR. Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 ( P.L. 108-25 ), requires the President to submit annual reports to appropriation committees that describe how U.S. funds support efforts to prevent HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria and provide care and treatment for those affected by the three diseases. However, since President Bush launched the President's Malaria Initiative (PMI) in June 2005, the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator (OGAC) determined that it would no longer include malaria spending in its annual reports to Congress and that budgetary requests for the disease would be made separately from HIV/AIDS and TB requests. The Administration requests support for PMI through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) as the coordinating agency. In 2001, about 240,000 people had access to anti-retroviral treatment (ARVs); in 2006, more than 2 million were treated. In 2006, 4.3 million people contracted HIV, 2.8 million of whom were African (65%), and 2.9 million people died of AIDS, 2.1 million of whom were African (72%). Increase Prevention of Mother to Child HIV Transmission (PMTCT) Initiatives
Many health experts advocate greater spending on PMTCT initiatives. UNAIDS estimates that in 2005, just less than 8% of pregnant women in low- and middle-income countries had access to services that could prevent the transmission of HIV to their babies. The House and Senate included language in their reports ( H.Rept. The Administration asserted that WHO's prequalification process was inadequate, and that generic drugs purchased with PEPFAR funds had to be first inspected by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA). In March 2007, IOM found that in many of the Focus Countries, a number of those implementing HIV/AIDS programs complained that the U.S. treatment policy complicated national treatment efforts. According to WHO, Africa is the only region in the world where incidence of new TB infections continues to rise, due in large part to HIV/AIDS co-infection. The report also asserted that PEPFAR should increase support to the education of new health professionals. The Bank estimates that it has lent $15 billion in health, nutrition, and population funds from 1997 to 2006; an average of about $1.5 billion per year. Nearly 90% of all HIV-positive children live in sub-Saharan Africa. Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 authorizes 10% of HIV/AIDS funds to be used to support children affected by the virus. According to UNAIDS, more than 2.5 million children and infants are living with HIV/AIDS worldwide, representing more than 7% of all cases; and some 420,000 children under 15 years are expected to contract the virus in 2007, almost 17% of all new HIV infections. | The Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) estimates that 33.2 million people are living with human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS). The U.N. organization believes that in 2007, some 2.5 million people will contract HIV and it will kill about 2.1 million. Sub-Saharan Africa is the most affected region, with about 68% of the world's HIV-positive population, 90% of all HIV-infected children, and more than 11 million children who have lost one or both parents to the virus. UNAIDS anticipates that in 2007, about 420,000 children will contract HIV, due in large part to inadequate access to drugs that prevent mother-to-child HIV transmission; about 8% of pregnant women in low- and middle-income countries have access to PMTCT services.
In January 2003, President George Bush proposed that the United States spend $15 billion over five years to combat HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis (TB), and malaria through the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). The President proposed concentrating most of the resources ($9 billion) in 15 countries, where the Administration estimated 50% of all HIV-positive people lived. The proposal allotted $5 billion of the funds to research and other bilateral HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria programs, and $1 billion for contributions to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (Global Fund). The President estimated that from FY2004 to FY2008, PEPFAR funds would support the purchase of anti-retroviral treatments (ARV) for 2 million people; the prevention of 7 million HIV infections; and care for 10 million people affected by HIV/AIDS, including children orphaned by AIDS.
In May 2003, Congress passed the U.S. Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (P.L. 108-25), which authorized funds for PEPFAR and created the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator (OGAC) to manage U.S. funds aimed at addressing the three diseases in 15 Focus Countries. As of March 31, 2007, PEPFAR has supported the treatment of 1.1 million people; and as of September 30, 2006, supported PMTCT service provision during more than 6 million pregnancies and facilitated care for nearly 4.5 million people, including more than 2 million orphans and vulnerable children. From FY2004 to FY2007, Congress provided nearly $13.5 billion for U.S. global HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria programs. In FY2008, the President requested $5.8 billion for global HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria efforts; the House and Senate proposed spending almost $6.2 billion and nearly $6.1 billion, respectively.
On May 30, 2007, President Bush requested that Congress authorize $30 billion to fund PEPFAR an additional five years. The President asserts that from FY2009 to FY2013, the plan would support treatment for 2.5 million people, prevent more than 12 million new infections, and care for more than 12 million people, including 5 million orphans and vulnerable children. Supporters of the Administration's plan applauded the President and congratulated him for leading global efforts to address HIV/AIDS. Critics asserted that PEPFAR could treat more than 2.5 million HIV-infected people and that PEPFAR's spending requirements should be eliminated. This report focuses on some of the key issues that Congress might consider as it faces the issue of whether, and at what level, to reauthorize PEPFAR. |
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