Datasets:

AdaptLLM

/

law-tasks

like 25

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nwith regard to the modification of previously granted spousal support awards. The divorce court has no express or implied authority to modify retroactively a spousal support award that was merely erroneous and not entered as a result of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties or as a result of fraud upon the court. In such cases, until prospectively modified or terminated by the divorce court, the obligated spouse is required to make his or her spousal support payments in accordance with the terms of the court’s decree. See generally Richardson v. Moore, 217 Va. 422, 229 S.E.2d 864 (1976); Cofer v. Cofer, 205 Va. 834, 140 S.E.2d 663 (1965); Newton v. Newton, 202 Va. 515, 118 S.E.2d 656 (1961); accord Martin v. Bales, 7 Va. App. 141, 147, 371 S.E.2d 823, 826 (1988) (holding that a court is without authority to modify its spousal support decree retroactively and relieve a party of the obligation to pay past due installments", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nwith regard to the modification of previously granted spousal support awards. The divorce court has no express or implied authority to modify retroactively a spousal support award that was merely erroneous and not entered as a result of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties or as a result of fraud upon the court. In such cases, until prospectively modified or terminated by the divorce court, the obligated spouse is required to make his or her spousal support payments in accordance with the terms of the court’s decree. See generally Richardson v. Moore, 217 Va. 422, 229 S.E.2d 864 (1976); Cofer v. Cofer, 205 Va. 834, 140 S.E.2d 663 (1965); Newton v. Newton, 202 Va. 515, 118 S.E.2d 656 (1961); accord Martin v. Bales, 7 Va. App. 141, 147, 371 S.E.2d 823, 826 (1988) (holding that the trial court was without authority to modify a spousal support obligation when the modification proceeding was initiated ten years after the obligation to pay spousal support under the dissolution judgment had been terminated by order", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nwith regard to the modification of previously granted spousal support awards. The divorce court has no express or implied authority to modify retroactively a spousal support award that was merely erroneous and not entered as a result of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties or as a result of fraud upon the court. In such cases, until prospectively modified or terminated by the divorce court, the obligated spouse is required to make his or her spousal support payments in accordance with the terms of the court’s decree. See generally Richardson v. Moore, 217 Va. 422, 229 S.E.2d 864 (1976); Cofer v. Cofer, 205 Va. 834, 140 S.E.2d 663 (1965); Newton v. Newton, 202 Va. 515, 118 S.E.2d 656 (1961); accord Martin v. Bales, 7 Va. App. 141, 147, 371 S.E.2d 823, 826 (1988) (holding that the trial court lacked authority to renew spousal support payments pursuant to a motion that was filed after the expiration of time during which spousal support was required to be paid under the original judgment", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nwith regard to the modification of previously granted spousal support awards. The divorce court has no express or implied authority to modify retroactively a spousal support award that was merely erroneous and not entered as a result of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties or as a result of fraud upon the court. In such cases, until prospectively modified or terminated by the divorce court, the obligated spouse is required to make his or her spousal support payments in accordance with the terms of the court’s decree. See generally Richardson v. Moore, 217 Va. 422, 229 S.E.2d 864 (1976); Cofer v. Cofer, 205 Va. 834, 140 S.E.2d 663 (1965); Newton v. Newton, 202 Va. 515, 118 S.E.2d 656 (1961); accord Martin v. Bales, 7 Va. App. 141, 147, 371 S.E.2d 823, 826 (1988) (holding that where payments are made on past due support they must first be applied to current child support installments due then to accrued and outstanding interest on delinquent child support obligations and finally to the principal amount due on unpaid child support", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nwith regard to the modification of previously granted spousal support awards. The divorce court has no express or implied authority to modify retroactively a spousal support award that was merely erroneous and not entered as a result of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties or as a result of fraud upon the court. In such cases, until prospectively modified or terminated by the divorce court, the obligated spouse is required to make his or her spousal support payments in accordance with the terms of the court’s decree. See generally Richardson v. Moore, 217 Va. 422, 229 S.E.2d 864 (1976); Cofer v. Cofer, 205 Va. 834, 140 S.E.2d 663 (1965); Newton v. Newton, 202 Va. 515, 118 S.E.2d 656 (1961); accord Martin v. Bales, 7 Va. App. 141, 147, 371 S.E.2d 823, 826 (1988) (holding that a trial court has broad discretion to modify a spousal maintenance award" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nof influencing the grand jury as to any proper matter pertaining to its inquiry or which might have influenced the grand jury or impeded its inquiry.” United States v. Doherty, 906 F.2d 41, 44 (1st Cir.1990); see also United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509, 115 S.Ct. 2310, 132 L.Ed.2d 444 (1995). To be material, the statement “need not directly concern an element of the crime” being investigated, “nor need it actually influence the jury.” Doherty, 906 F.2d at 44. Because materiality is a mixed question of fact and law for the jury, Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 512-15, 115 S.Ct. 2310, a court may only decide the issue, as a matter of law, when no reasonable juror could find materiality on the evidence presented, cf. In re Stone & Webster, Inc., Sec. Litig., 414 F.3d 187, 209 (1st Cir.2005) (holding that a district court may find acquitted conduct by a preponderance of the evidence", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nof influencing the grand jury as to any proper matter pertaining to its inquiry or which might have influenced the grand jury or impeded its inquiry.” United States v. Doherty, 906 F.2d 41, 44 (1st Cir.1990); see also United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509, 115 S.Ct. 2310, 132 L.Ed.2d 444 (1995). To be material, the statement “need not directly concern an element of the crime” being investigated, “nor need it actually influence the jury.” Doherty, 906 F.2d at 44. Because materiality is a mixed question of fact and law for the jury, Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 512-15, 115 S.Ct. 2310, a court may only decide the issue, as a matter of law, when no reasonable juror could find materiality on the evidence presented, cf. In re Stone & Webster, Inc., Sec. Litig., 414 F.3d 187, 209 (1st Cir.2005) (recognizing only that the guidelines must be advisory not that judges may find no facts", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nof influencing the grand jury as to any proper matter pertaining to its inquiry or which might have influenced the grand jury or impeded its inquiry.” United States v. Doherty, 906 F.2d 41, 44 (1st Cir.1990); see also United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509, 115 S.Ct. 2310, 132 L.Ed.2d 444 (1995). To be material, the statement “need not directly concern an element of the crime” being investigated, “nor need it actually influence the jury.” Doherty, 906 F.2d at 44. Because materiality is a mixed question of fact and law for the jury, Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 512-15, 115 S.Ct. 2310, a court may only decide the issue, as a matter of law, when no reasonable juror could find materiality on the evidence presented, cf. In re Stone & Webster, Inc., Sec. Litig., 414 F.3d 187, 209 (1st Cir.2005) (holding that to find negligence jury need not find violation of federal motorcarrier regulation", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nof influencing the grand jury as to any proper matter pertaining to its inquiry or which might have influenced the grand jury or impeded its inquiry.” United States v. Doherty, 906 F.2d 41, 44 (1st Cir.1990); see also United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509, 115 S.Ct. 2310, 132 L.Ed.2d 444 (1995). To be material, the statement “need not directly concern an element of the crime” being investigated, “nor need it actually influence the jury.” Doherty, 906 F.2d at 44. Because materiality is a mixed question of fact and law for the jury, Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 512-15, 115 S.Ct. 2310, a court may only decide the issue, as a matter of law, when no reasonable juror could find materiality on the evidence presented, cf. In re Stone & Webster, Inc., Sec. Litig., 414 F.3d 187, 209 (1st Cir.2005) (holding in a securities fraud action that a court may only find the lack of materiality where a jury could not reasonably find materiality", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nof influencing the grand jury as to any proper matter pertaining to its inquiry or which might have influenced the grand jury or impeded its inquiry.” United States v. Doherty, 906 F.2d 41, 44 (1st Cir.1990); see also United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509, 115 S.Ct. 2310, 132 L.Ed.2d 444 (1995). To be material, the statement “need not directly concern an element of the crime” being investigated, “nor need it actually influence the jury.” Doherty, 906 F.2d at 44. Because materiality is a mixed question of fact and law for the jury, Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 512-15, 115 S.Ct. 2310, a court may only decide the issue, as a matter of law, when no reasonable juror could find materiality on the evidence presented, cf. In re Stone & Webster, Inc., Sec. Litig., 414 F.3d 187, 209 (1st Cir.2005) (holding in securities law context that in cases involving nondisclosure of material facts materiality rather than reliance becomes the decisive element of causation" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nis agreeing to the imposition of a criminal sentence for the crime charged.” State v. Burgess, 639 N.W.2d 564, 567 (Iowa 2001). The plea only differs from the traditional guilty plea \"in that when a defendant enters an Alford plea, he or she does not admit participation in the acts constituting the crime.” Id. at n. 1. 2 . We acknowledge our decision today is the third within a year that recognizes collateral consequences based on the court’s acceptance of the plea notwithstanding the defendant’s deferred judgment. See Daughenbaugh v. State, 805 N.W.2d 591, 592, 598 (Iowa 2011) (defendant lost federal pharmacy license as result of a plea to three felonies for taking prescription pills notwithstanding the deferred judgment); State v. Deng Kon Tong, 805 N.W.2d 599, 603 (Iowa 2011) (holding a deferred judgment is not a final judgment of sentence from which a defendant may appeal under iowa code section 8146", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nis agreeing to the imposition of a criminal sentence for the crime charged.” State v. Burgess, 639 N.W.2d 564, 567 (Iowa 2001). The plea only differs from the traditional guilty plea \"in that when a defendant enters an Alford plea, he or she does not admit participation in the acts constituting the crime.” Id. at n. 1. 2 . We acknowledge our decision today is the third within a year that recognizes collateral consequences based on the court’s acceptance of the plea notwithstanding the defendant’s deferred judgment. See Daughenbaugh v. State, 805 N.W.2d 591, 592, 598 (Iowa 2011) (defendant lost federal pharmacy license as result of a plea to three felonies for taking prescription pills notwithstanding the deferred judgment); State v. Deng Kon Tong, 805 N.W.2d 599, 603 (Iowa 2011) (holding that petitioners prior guilty plea and deferred adjudication for forgery did not amount to a conviction within the meaning of the immigration reform and control act 8 usc 1255a", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nis agreeing to the imposition of a criminal sentence for the crime charged.” State v. Burgess, 639 N.W.2d 564, 567 (Iowa 2001). The plea only differs from the traditional guilty plea \"in that when a defendant enters an Alford plea, he or she does not admit participation in the acts constituting the crime.” Id. at n. 1. 2 . We acknowledge our decision today is the third within a year that recognizes collateral consequences based on the court’s acceptance of the plea notwithstanding the defendant’s deferred judgment. See Daughenbaugh v. State, 805 N.W.2d 591, 592, 598 (Iowa 2011) (defendant lost federal pharmacy license as result of a plea to three felonies for taking prescription pills notwithstanding the deferred judgment); State v. Deng Kon Tong, 805 N.W.2d 599, 603 (Iowa 2011) (holding that a guilty plea for which the defendant received a deferred adjudication counted as a conviction under federal law for purposes of ussg 4b11", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nis agreeing to the imposition of a criminal sentence for the crime charged.” State v. Burgess, 639 N.W.2d 564, 567 (Iowa 2001). The plea only differs from the traditional guilty plea \"in that when a defendant enters an Alford plea, he or she does not admit participation in the acts constituting the crime.” Id. at n. 1. 2 . We acknowledge our decision today is the third within a year that recognizes collateral consequences based on the court’s acceptance of the plea notwithstanding the defendant’s deferred judgment. See Daughenbaugh v. State, 805 N.W.2d 591, 592, 598 (Iowa 2011) (defendant lost federal pharmacy license as result of a plea to three felonies for taking prescription pills notwithstanding the deferred judgment); State v. Deng Kon Tong, 805 N.W.2d 599, 603 (Iowa 2011) (holding a guilty plea pursuant to a deferred judgment is a conviction for purposes of the feloninpossessionofafirearm statute iowa code section 72426", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nis agreeing to the imposition of a criminal sentence for the crime charged.” State v. Burgess, 639 N.W.2d 564, 567 (Iowa 2001). The plea only differs from the traditional guilty plea \"in that when a defendant enters an Alford plea, he or she does not admit participation in the acts constituting the crime.” Id. at n. 1. 2 . We acknowledge our decision today is the third within a year that recognizes collateral consequences based on the court’s acceptance of the plea notwithstanding the defendant’s deferred judgment. See Daughenbaugh v. State, 805 N.W.2d 591, 592, 598 (Iowa 2011) (defendant lost federal pharmacy license as result of a plea to three felonies for taking prescription pills notwithstanding the deferred judgment); State v. Deng Kon Tong, 805 N.W.2d 599, 603 (Iowa 2011) (holding that determining what care is reasonable under iowa code section 8527 is a question of fact" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nN.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1103(a)(3) (2005), which provides: A petition or motion to terminate the parental rights of either or both parents to his, her, or their minor juvenile may only be filed by one or more of the following: . . . Any county department of social services, consolidated county human services agency, or licensed child-placing agency to whom custody of the juvenile has been given by a court of competent jurisdiction. Second, the trial court in D.D.J. had no jurisdiction to enter the 17 March 2004 order on termination subsequent to granting “full custody” of the juveniles to custodial guardians on 26 September 2003 and specifying that “this case is closed.” See In re P.L.P., 173 N.C. App. 1, 7, 618 S.E.2d 241, 245 (2005), aff'd per curiam, 360 N.C. 360, 625 S.E.2d 779 (2006) (holding that the district courts order refusing to exercise jurisdiction and remanding to the magistrate court for trial was sufficiently final for purposes of appeal and then determining that the remand was in error", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nN.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1103(a)(3) (2005), which provides: A petition or motion to terminate the parental rights of either or both parents to his, her, or their minor juvenile may only be filed by one or more of the following: . . . Any county department of social services, consolidated county human services agency, or licensed child-placing agency to whom custody of the juvenile has been given by a court of competent jurisdiction. Second, the trial court in D.D.J. had no jurisdiction to enter the 17 March 2004 order on termination subsequent to granting “full custody” of the juveniles to custodial guardians on 26 September 2003 and specifying that “this case is closed.” See In re P.L.P., 173 N.C. App. 1, 7, 618 S.E.2d 241, 245 (2005), aff'd per curiam, 360 N.C. 360, 625 S.E.2d 779 (2006) (holding that jurisdiction in the district court was terminated by the trial courts order to close the case and that dss was required to file a new petition alleging neglect", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nN.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1103(a)(3) (2005), which provides: A petition or motion to terminate the parental rights of either or both parents to his, her, or their minor juvenile may only be filed by one or more of the following: . . . Any county department of social services, consolidated county human services agency, or licensed child-placing agency to whom custody of the juvenile has been given by a court of competent jurisdiction. Second, the trial court in D.D.J. had no jurisdiction to enter the 17 March 2004 order on termination subsequent to granting “full custody” of the juveniles to custodial guardians on 26 September 2003 and specifying that “this case is closed.” See In re P.L.P., 173 N.C. App. 1, 7, 618 S.E.2d 241, 245 (2005), aff'd per curiam, 360 N.C. 360, 625 S.E.2d 779 (2006) (holding that because the state failed to properly file the complaint the district court lacked jurisdiction to proceed to trial", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nN.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1103(a)(3) (2005), which provides: A petition or motion to terminate the parental rights of either or both parents to his, her, or their minor juvenile may only be filed by one or more of the following: . . . Any county department of social services, consolidated county human services agency, or licensed child-placing agency to whom custody of the juvenile has been given by a court of competent jurisdiction. Second, the trial court in D.D.J. had no jurisdiction to enter the 17 March 2004 order on termination subsequent to granting “full custody” of the juveniles to custodial guardians on 26 September 2003 and specifying that “this case is closed.” See In re P.L.P., 173 N.C. App. 1, 7, 618 S.E.2d 241, 245 (2005), aff'd per curiam, 360 N.C. 360, 625 S.E.2d 779 (2006) (holding that an untimely petition for a rehearingreconsideration of a motion in a criminal case was beyond the district courts jurisdiction", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nN.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1103(a)(3) (2005), which provides: A petition or motion to terminate the parental rights of either or both parents to his, her, or their minor juvenile may only be filed by one or more of the following: . . . Any county department of social services, consolidated county human services agency, or licensed child-placing agency to whom custody of the juvenile has been given by a court of competent jurisdiction. Second, the trial court in D.D.J. had no jurisdiction to enter the 17 March 2004 order on termination subsequent to granting “full custody” of the juveniles to custodial guardians on 26 September 2003 and specifying that “this case is closed.” See In re P.L.P., 173 N.C. App. 1, 7, 618 S.E.2d 241, 245 (2005), aff'd per curiam, 360 N.C. 360, 625 S.E.2d 779 (2006) (holding that even where postconviction petitioner reserved the option to file an amended petition in his opening petition simply filing an amended petition is insufficient to request leave to file an amended petition a motion for leave to file an amended petition was required before it was necessary for the district judge to consider the amended petition" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nwas reasonable, it believes that plaintiffs have met the Tenth Circuit’s modified interpretation of the “likelihood of success” requirement. The court believes that plaintiffs have successfully shown “questions going to the merits so serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful, as to make the issues fair ground for litigation and deserving of more deliberate investigation.” See Buca, 18 F.Supp.2d at 1201 (citing City of Chanule, 754 F.2d 310 and Otero Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 665 F.2d 275). Moreover, the court believes that if plaintiffs ultimately prevail on a theory of promissory estoppel, the covenant would be enforceable to the extent that it protects any legitimate business interest beyond mere competition. See Eastern Distrib. Co., Inc. v. Flynn, 222 Kan. 666, 567 P.2d 1371 (1977) (holding that the restraint of a covenant not to compete must be reasonable under the facts and circumstances of the particular case and that only a legitimate business interest may be protected by the covenant", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nwas reasonable, it believes that plaintiffs have met the Tenth Circuit’s modified interpretation of the “likelihood of success” requirement. The court believes that plaintiffs have successfully shown “questions going to the merits so serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful, as to make the issues fair ground for litigation and deserving of more deliberate investigation.” See Buca, 18 F.Supp.2d at 1201 (citing City of Chanule, 754 F.2d 310 and Otero Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 665 F.2d 275). Moreover, the court believes that if plaintiffs ultimately prevail on a theory of promissory estoppel, the covenant would be enforceable to the extent that it protects any legitimate business interest beyond mere competition. See Eastern Distrib. Co., Inc. v. Flynn, 222 Kan. 666, 567 P.2d 1371 (1977) (holding employment agreement consisting entirely of a covenant not to compete unenforceable because the covenant must be supported by valuable consideration", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nwas reasonable, it believes that plaintiffs have met the Tenth Circuit’s modified interpretation of the “likelihood of success” requirement. The court believes that plaintiffs have successfully shown “questions going to the merits so serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful, as to make the issues fair ground for litigation and deserving of more deliberate investigation.” See Buca, 18 F.Supp.2d at 1201 (citing City of Chanule, 754 F.2d 310 and Otero Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 665 F.2d 275). Moreover, the court believes that if plaintiffs ultimately prevail on a theory of promissory estoppel, the covenant would be enforceable to the extent that it protects any legitimate business interest beyond mere competition. See Eastern Distrib. Co., Inc. v. Flynn, 222 Kan. 666, 567 P.2d 1371 (1977) (holding that michigan courts would not enforce a covenant not to compete which violates mcla 445761 even though the covenant would have been enforceable in missouri where the contract was executed", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nwas reasonable, it believes that plaintiffs have met the Tenth Circuit’s modified interpretation of the “likelihood of success” requirement. The court believes that plaintiffs have successfully shown “questions going to the merits so serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful, as to make the issues fair ground for litigation and deserving of more deliberate investigation.” See Buca, 18 F.Supp.2d at 1201 (citing City of Chanule, 754 F.2d 310 and Otero Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 665 F.2d 275). Moreover, the court believes that if plaintiffs ultimately prevail on a theory of promissory estoppel, the covenant would be enforceable to the extent that it protects any legitimate business interest beyond mere competition. See Eastern Distrib. Co., Inc. v. Flynn, 222 Kan. 666, 567 P.2d 1371 (1977) (holding that a covenant not to compete for two years was enforceable", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nwas reasonable, it believes that plaintiffs have met the Tenth Circuit’s modified interpretation of the “likelihood of success” requirement. The court believes that plaintiffs have successfully shown “questions going to the merits so serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful, as to make the issues fair ground for litigation and deserving of more deliberate investigation.” See Buca, 18 F.Supp.2d at 1201 (citing City of Chanule, 754 F.2d 310 and Otero Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 665 F.2d 275). Moreover, the court believes that if plaintiffs ultimately prevail on a theory of promissory estoppel, the covenant would be enforceable to the extent that it protects any legitimate business interest beyond mere competition. See Eastern Distrib. Co., Inc. v. Flynn, 222 Kan. 666, 567 P.2d 1371 (1977) (holding that in the employment context cause of action seeking tort remedies for breach of implied covenant is not permitted recovery for breach of this covenant is limited to contract remedies" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nit is relatively well-settled, despite some ambiguity in the statutory language, that an injury to Body Part X resulting in a functional impairment to Body Part Y will be classified according to X and not according to Y under the schedule. Our Circuit was the first to articulate this “situs of the injury” rule, in Long v. Director, OWCP, 767 F.2d 1578 (9th Cir.1985), which construed the Act to mandate recovery under § 908(c)(21) rather than under the schedule “for impairments to limbs caused by an accidental injury to a part of the body not specified in the schedule.” 767 F.2d at 1582. Since then, the First and Fifth Circuits have both followed Long, while no other circuit has taken a contravening approach. See Barker v. U.S. Dept. of Labor, 138 F.3d 431, 434-435 (1st Cir.1998) (holding that to have standing a plaintiff must establish an injury in fact a casual connection between the injury and that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nit is relatively well-settled, despite some ambiguity in the statutory language, that an injury to Body Part X resulting in a functional impairment to Body Part Y will be classified according to X and not according to Y under the schedule. Our Circuit was the first to articulate this “situs of the injury” rule, in Long v. Director, OWCP, 767 F.2d 1578 (9th Cir.1985), which construed the Act to mandate recovery under § 908(c)(21) rather than under the schedule “for impairments to limbs caused by an accidental injury to a part of the body not specified in the schedule.” 767 F.2d at 1582. Since then, the First and Fifth Circuits have both followed Long, while no other circuit has taken a contravening approach. See Barker v. U.S. Dept. of Labor, 138 F.3d 431, 434-435 (1st Cir.1998) (holding that while the language of sec tion 908c may admit of differing interpretations an injury to a body part not included in the schedule must be compensated as an unscheduled injury no matter that the petitioners symptoms extend beyond the injured area", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nit is relatively well-settled, despite some ambiguity in the statutory language, that an injury to Body Part X resulting in a functional impairment to Body Part Y will be classified according to X and not according to Y under the schedule. Our Circuit was the first to articulate this “situs of the injury” rule, in Long v. Director, OWCP, 767 F.2d 1578 (9th Cir.1985), which construed the Act to mandate recovery under § 908(c)(21) rather than under the schedule “for impairments to limbs caused by an accidental injury to a part of the body not specified in the schedule.” 767 F.2d at 1582. Since then, the First and Fifth Circuits have both followed Long, while no other circuit has taken a contravening approach. See Barker v. U.S. Dept. of Labor, 138 F.3d 431, 434-435 (1st Cir.1998) (holding that in order to establish standing a plaintiff must show 1 it has suffered an injury in fact 2 the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and 3 it is likely as opposed to merely speculative that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nit is relatively well-settled, despite some ambiguity in the statutory language, that an injury to Body Part X resulting in a functional impairment to Body Part Y will be classified according to X and not according to Y under the schedule. Our Circuit was the first to articulate this “situs of the injury” rule, in Long v. Director, OWCP, 767 F.2d 1578 (9th Cir.1985), which construed the Act to mandate recovery under § 908(c)(21) rather than under the schedule “for impairments to limbs caused by an accidental injury to a part of the body not specified in the schedule.” 767 F.2d at 1582. Since then, the First and Fifth Circuits have both followed Long, while no other circuit has taken a contravening approach. See Barker v. U.S. Dept. of Labor, 138 F.3d 431, 434-435 (1st Cir.1998) (holding that the fatal injury to a murder victim may be considered as satisfying the bodily injury component of the capital felony of kidnapping with bodily injury", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nit is relatively well-settled, despite some ambiguity in the statutory language, that an injury to Body Part X resulting in a functional impairment to Body Part Y will be classified according to X and not according to Y under the schedule. Our Circuit was the first to articulate this “situs of the injury” rule, in Long v. Director, OWCP, 767 F.2d 1578 (9th Cir.1985), which construed the Act to mandate recovery under § 908(c)(21) rather than under the schedule “for impairments to limbs caused by an accidental injury to a part of the body not specified in the schedule.” 767 F.2d at 1582. Since then, the First and Fifth Circuits have both followed Long, while no other circuit has taken a contravening approach. See Barker v. U.S. Dept. of Labor, 138 F.3d 431, 434-435 (1st Cir.1998) (holding that use of tangible property must be proximate cause of injury and that property does not cause injury if it does no more than furnish the condition that makes the injury possible" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nU.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). Thus, in the absence of an injury and with no “real and substantial” dispute, the court properly declined to entertain Count I upon removal. In its Dismissal Opinion, the district court compared this proceeding to the situation in Bowen v. First Family Financial Services, Inc., 233 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir.2000). In Bowen, the class action plaintiffs lacked standing to question whether arbitration agreements are generally unenforceable under the Truth-in-Lending Act. The Eleventh Circuit so ruled because “there [was] no allegation that First Family has invoked, or threatened to invoke, the arbitration agreement to compel the plaintiffs to submit any claim to arbitration.” Id. at 1339. This action is similar to Bo 02, 704 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (holding that a dispute arising out of an insurance policy was not covered by the arbitration provision in the parties separate premium payment agreement because if the party had intended to subject this dispute to the arbitration provision it could easily clearly and unequivocally have done so either by including an arbitration provision in the insurance policy itself or by adding to the above arbitration provision", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nU.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). Thus, in the absence of an injury and with no “real and substantial” dispute, the court properly declined to entertain Count I upon removal. In its Dismissal Opinion, the district court compared this proceeding to the situation in Bowen v. First Family Financial Services, Inc., 233 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir.2000). In Bowen, the class action plaintiffs lacked standing to question whether arbitration agreements are generally unenforceable under the Truth-in-Lending Act. The Eleventh Circuit so ruled because “there [was] no allegation that First Family has invoked, or threatened to invoke, the arbitration agreement to compel the plaintiffs to submit any claim to arbitration.” Id. at 1339. This action is similar to Bo 02, 704 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (recognizing as nonjusticiable challenge to arbitration provision absent sufficient indications that it would be invoked", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nU.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). Thus, in the absence of an injury and with no “real and substantial” dispute, the court properly declined to entertain Count I upon removal. In its Dismissal Opinion, the district court compared this proceeding to the situation in Bowen v. First Family Financial Services, Inc., 233 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir.2000). In Bowen, the class action plaintiffs lacked standing to question whether arbitration agreements are generally unenforceable under the Truth-in-Lending Act. The Eleventh Circuit so ruled because “there [was] no allegation that First Family has invoked, or threatened to invoke, the arbitration agreement to compel the plaintiffs to submit any claim to arbitration.” Id. at 1339. This action is similar to Bo 02, 704 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (holding that an arbitration provision that waived class actions and thus required the consumer to pay a 125 fee to vindicate a 150 claim was substantively unconscionable but also holding that the waiver provision was severable from the remainder of the arbitration provision which would be enforced", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nU.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). Thus, in the absence of an injury and with no “real and substantial” dispute, the court properly declined to entertain Count I upon removal. In its Dismissal Opinion, the district court compared this proceeding to the situation in Bowen v. First Family Financial Services, Inc., 233 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir.2000). In Bowen, the class action plaintiffs lacked standing to question whether arbitration agreements are generally unenforceable under the Truth-in-Lending Act. The Eleventh Circuit so ruled because “there [was] no allegation that First Family has invoked, or threatened to invoke, the arbitration agreement to compel the plaintiffs to submit any claim to arbitration.” Id. at 1339. This action is similar to Bo 02, 704 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (holding that the trial court not the arbitrator must decide a challenge to an arbitration provision based on public policy", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nU.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). Thus, in the absence of an injury and with no “real and substantial” dispute, the court properly declined to entertain Count I upon removal. In its Dismissal Opinion, the district court compared this proceeding to the situation in Bowen v. First Family Financial Services, Inc., 233 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir.2000). In Bowen, the class action plaintiffs lacked standing to question whether arbitration agreements are generally unenforceable under the Truth-in-Lending Act. The Eleventh Circuit so ruled because “there [was] no allegation that First Family has invoked, or threatened to invoke, the arbitration agreement to compel the plaintiffs to submit any claim to arbitration.” Id. at 1339. This action is similar to Bo 02, 704 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (holding that 4 does not empower court to rewrite venue provisions of arbitration clause or to order arbitration within district absent contractual provision so indicating" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthat conclusion in Leimkuehler, rejecting arguments that Plan servicers met the requirements of subsection (i) of the functional fiduciary definition by selecting which mutual fund share classes to include on the investment menu offered to a 401(k) plan; by exercising authority or control over the management and disposition of plan assets in the separate accounts because that task had nothing to do with the alleged breach of fiduciary duty; and by reserving the right to substitute or delete funds made available to the Plan participants for the same reason. 713 F.3d at 911-12. It is worth noting that in Leimkuehler, the Seventh Circuit only addressed the fund-substitution theory under subsection (i) of the functional fiduciary definition, and attributed th , 270 (W.D.N.Y.2010) (holding that a payment is under the plan when the debt is provided for in the plan", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthat conclusion in Leimkuehler, rejecting arguments that Plan servicers met the requirements of subsection (i) of the functional fiduciary definition by selecting which mutual fund share classes to include on the investment menu offered to a 401(k) plan; by exercising authority or control over the management and disposition of plan assets in the separate accounts because that task had nothing to do with the alleged breach of fiduciary duty; and by reserving the right to substitute or delete funds made available to the Plan participants for the same reason. 713 F.3d at 911-12. It is worth noting that in Leimkuehler, the Seventh Circuit only addressed the fund-substitution theory under subsection (i) of the functional fiduciary definition, and attributed th , 270 (W.D.N.Y.2010) (holding that plan language giving plan administrator power to determine which employees are eligible to participate in the plan and providing all parties dealing with the plan an interpretation of plan provisions on request indicates deferential standard of review of trustee eligibility decisions", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthat conclusion in Leimkuehler, rejecting arguments that Plan servicers met the requirements of subsection (i) of the functional fiduciary definition by selecting which mutual fund share classes to include on the investment menu offered to a 401(k) plan; by exercising authority or control over the management and disposition of plan assets in the separate accounts because that task had nothing to do with the alleged breach of fiduciary duty; and by reserving the right to substitute or delete funds made available to the Plan participants for the same reason. 713 F.3d at 911-12. It is worth noting that in Leimkuehler, the Seventh Circuit only addressed the fund-substitution theory under subsection (i) of the functional fiduciary definition, and attributed th , 270 (W.D.N.Y.2010) (holding that insurer was a fiduciary to a 401k plan because the insurer had the ability to substitute investment options and the plan had no meaningful opportunity to reject substitutions because of the penalty charges associated with doing so", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthat conclusion in Leimkuehler, rejecting arguments that Plan servicers met the requirements of subsection (i) of the functional fiduciary definition by selecting which mutual fund share classes to include on the investment menu offered to a 401(k) plan; by exercising authority or control over the management and disposition of plan assets in the separate accounts because that task had nothing to do with the alleged breach of fiduciary duty; and by reserving the right to substitute or delete funds made available to the Plan participants for the same reason. 713 F.3d at 911-12. It is worth noting that in Leimkuehler, the Seventh Circuit only addressed the fund-substitution theory under subsection (i) of the functional fiduciary definition, and attributed th , 270 (W.D.N.Y.2010) (holding that service provider which offered a big menu of investment options from which 401k the plan trustee selected a smaller plan menu was not a fiduciary because provider did not have ultimate authority over which investments were included in the plans", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthat conclusion in Leimkuehler, rejecting arguments that Plan servicers met the requirements of subsection (i) of the functional fiduciary definition by selecting which mutual fund share classes to include on the investment menu offered to a 401(k) plan; by exercising authority or control over the management and disposition of plan assets in the separate accounts because that task had nothing to do with the alleged breach of fiduciary duty; and by reserving the right to substitute or delete funds made available to the Plan participants for the same reason. 713 F.3d at 911-12. It is worth noting that in Leimkuehler, the Seventh Circuit only addressed the fund-substitution theory under subsection (i) of the functional fiduciary definition, and attributed th , 270 (W.D.N.Y.2010) (holding that plan servicer which provided 401k plan a menu of investment options was not a fiduciary because parties contract required servicer to give the plan notice of and opportunity to reject any changes to the menu" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n■ after the LHWCA’s enactment, ■ however, courts struggled to define when an injured worker was entitled • to relief. Initially, the LHWCA provided coverage on the basis of a “situs test” alone, allowing recovery for a work-related injury as long as,the injury occurred on “navigable waters” and the employer had at least one employee (but not necessarily the injured employee) who was engaged in maritime employment'. Ne. Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 264, 97 S.Ct. 2348, 53 L.Ed.2d 320 (1977) (citing Pa. R.R. Co. v. O’Rourke, 344 U.S. 334, 340-42, 73 S.Ct. 302, 97 L.Ed. 367 (1953)). Thus construed, however, the situs test often produced arbitrarily restrictive outcomes. See, e.g., Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212, 224-25, 90 S.Ct. 347, 24 L.Ed.2d 371 (1969) (holding evidence insufficient for conviction for possession of controlled dangerous substances when the drugs were not found on the person of or in the same room as the defendant but were only found on other persons on the premises", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n■ after the LHWCA’s enactment, ■ however, courts struggled to define when an injured worker was entitled • to relief. Initially, the LHWCA provided coverage on the basis of a “situs test” alone, allowing recovery for a work-related injury as long as,the injury occurred on “navigable waters” and the employer had at least one employee (but not necessarily the injured employee) who was engaged in maritime employment'. Ne. Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 264, 97 S.Ct. 2348, 53 L.Ed.2d 320 (1977) (citing Pa. R.R. Co. v. O’Rourke, 344 U.S. 334, 340-42, 73 S.Ct. 302, 97 L.Ed. 367 (1953)). Thus construed, however, the situs test often produced arbitrarily restrictive outcomes. See, e.g., Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212, 224-25, 90 S.Ct. 347, 24 L.Ed.2d 371 (1969) (holding that the elements of a claim under 3729a2 are 1 that the defendant made used or caused to be made or used a record or statement to get a claim against the united states paid or approved 2 the record or statement and the claim were false or fraudulent and 3 the defendant knew that the record or statement and the claim were false or fraudulent emphasis added", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n■ after the LHWCA’s enactment, ■ however, courts struggled to define when an injured worker was entitled • to relief. Initially, the LHWCA provided coverage on the basis of a “situs test” alone, allowing recovery for a work-related injury as long as,the injury occurred on “navigable waters” and the employer had at least one employee (but not necessarily the injured employee) who was engaged in maritime employment'. Ne. Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 264, 97 S.Ct. 2348, 53 L.Ed.2d 320 (1977) (citing Pa. R.R. Co. v. O’Rourke, 344 U.S. 334, 340-42, 73 S.Ct. 302, 97 L.Ed. 367 (1953)). Thus construed, however, the situs test often produced arbitrarily restrictive outcomes. See, e.g., Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212, 224-25, 90 S.Ct. 347, 24 L.Ed.2d 371 (1969) (holding that longshoremen killed or injured on a pier while loading or unloading a ship were not covered under the act but would be if they had been thrown into the water or were on the deck of the ship when the accident happened", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n■ after the LHWCA’s enactment, ■ however, courts struggled to define when an injured worker was entitled • to relief. Initially, the LHWCA provided coverage on the basis of a “situs test” alone, allowing recovery for a work-related injury as long as,the injury occurred on “navigable waters” and the employer had at least one employee (but not necessarily the injured employee) who was engaged in maritime employment'. Ne. Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 264, 97 S.Ct. 2348, 53 L.Ed.2d 320 (1977) (citing Pa. R.R. Co. v. O’Rourke, 344 U.S. 334, 340-42, 73 S.Ct. 302, 97 L.Ed. 367 (1953)). Thus construed, however, the situs test often produced arbitrarily restrictive outcomes. See, e.g., Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212, 224-25, 90 S.Ct. 347, 24 L.Ed.2d 371 (1969) (holding that where the claimants were servicemen injured or killed while on active duty due to the negligence of others in the armed forces they could not seek recovery under the ftca for injuries sustained that arose out of or were incident to their military service", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n■ after the LHWCA’s enactment, ■ however, courts struggled to define when an injured worker was entitled • to relief. Initially, the LHWCA provided coverage on the basis of a “situs test” alone, allowing recovery for a work-related injury as long as,the injury occurred on “navigable waters” and the employer had at least one employee (but not necessarily the injured employee) who was engaged in maritime employment'. Ne. Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 264, 97 S.Ct. 2348, 53 L.Ed.2d 320 (1977) (citing Pa. R.R. Co. v. O’Rourke, 344 U.S. 334, 340-42, 73 S.Ct. 302, 97 L.Ed. 367 (1953)). Thus construed, however, the situs test often produced arbitrarily restrictive outcomes. See, e.g., Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212, 224-25, 90 S.Ct. 347, 24 L.Ed.2d 371 (1969) (holding for the purposes of the california public records act that a city disclosed all documents in a reasonably timely manner when records that had not been in the citys possession or could not be found were promptly disclosed when they were found or became available" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nhearing is only necessary if “the movant makes a sufficient threshold showing that material facts are in doubt or dispute, and that such facts cannot reliably be resolved on a paper record.” U.S. v. Staula, 80 F.3d 596, 603 (1st Cir.1996). There is no such showing made here, the basic facts are undisputed. 3 . The undisputed facts relevant to the instant motion are drawn entirely from the Affidavit of Special Agent Jeffrey Commander (\"the affidavit”) filed along with the complaint (Docket Entry # 1, Exhibit 1), incorporated by reference within claimant’s memorandum (Docket Entry # 15) as \"anticipated facts” and within the government's opposition (Docket Entry # 18). 4 . The court distinguishes this case from those cited by claimant, namely, U.S. v. Freeman, 209 F.3d 464 (6th Cir.2000) (holding failure to promote was an isolated incident of discrimination which is insufficient to prove a continuing violation", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nhearing is only necessary if “the movant makes a sufficient threshold showing that material facts are in doubt or dispute, and that such facts cannot reliably be resolved on a paper record.” U.S. v. Staula, 80 F.3d 596, 603 (1st Cir.1996). There is no such showing made here, the basic facts are undisputed. 3 . The undisputed facts relevant to the instant motion are drawn entirely from the Affidavit of Special Agent Jeffrey Commander (\"the affidavit”) filed along with the complaint (Docket Entry # 1, Exhibit 1), incorporated by reference within claimant’s memorandum (Docket Entry # 15) as \"anticipated facts” and within the government's opposition (Docket Entry # 18). 4 . The court distinguishes this case from those cited by claimant, namely, U.S. v. Freeman, 209 F.3d 464 (6th Cir.2000) (holding that an isolated incident of a vehicle crossing into the emergency lane of a roadway does not violate state statutes requirement that vehicles remain entirely in a single lane as nearly as practical", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nhearing is only necessary if “the movant makes a sufficient threshold showing that material facts are in doubt or dispute, and that such facts cannot reliably be resolved on a paper record.” U.S. v. Staula, 80 F.3d 596, 603 (1st Cir.1996). There is no such showing made here, the basic facts are undisputed. 3 . The undisputed facts relevant to the instant motion are drawn entirely from the Affidavit of Special Agent Jeffrey Commander (\"the affidavit”) filed along with the complaint (Docket Entry # 1, Exhibit 1), incorporated by reference within claimant’s memorandum (Docket Entry # 15) as \"anticipated facts” and within the government's opposition (Docket Entry # 18). 4 . The court distinguishes this case from those cited by claimant, namely, U.S. v. Freeman, 209 F.3d 464 (6th Cir.2000) (holding that one in stance of weaving does not constitute a violation of utah code ann 416611", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nhearing is only necessary if “the movant makes a sufficient threshold showing that material facts are in doubt or dispute, and that such facts cannot reliably be resolved on a paper record.” U.S. v. Staula, 80 F.3d 596, 603 (1st Cir.1996). There is no such showing made here, the basic facts are undisputed. 3 . The undisputed facts relevant to the instant motion are drawn entirely from the Affidavit of Special Agent Jeffrey Commander (\"the affidavit”) filed along with the complaint (Docket Entry # 1, Exhibit 1), incorporated by reference within claimant’s memorandum (Docket Entry # 15) as \"anticipated facts” and within the government's opposition (Docket Entry # 18). 4 . The court distinguishes this case from those cited by claimant, namely, U.S. v. Freeman, 209 F.3d 464 (6th Cir.2000) (holding that one isolated incident of partially weaving into emergency lane does not constitute a traffic violation in tennessee", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nhearing is only necessary if “the movant makes a sufficient threshold showing that material facts are in doubt or dispute, and that such facts cannot reliably be resolved on a paper record.” U.S. v. Staula, 80 F.3d 596, 603 (1st Cir.1996). There is no such showing made here, the basic facts are undisputed. 3 . The undisputed facts relevant to the instant motion are drawn entirely from the Affidavit of Special Agent Jeffrey Commander (\"the affidavit”) filed along with the complaint (Docket Entry # 1, Exhibit 1), incorporated by reference within claimant’s memorandum (Docket Entry # 15) as \"anticipated facts” and within the government's opposition (Docket Entry # 18). 4 . The court distinguishes this case from those cited by claimant, namely, U.S. v. Freeman, 209 F.3d 464 (6th Cir.2000) (holding that a uhaul trucks similar one time entry into the emergency lane failed to constitute a violation of a statute nearly identical to the statute at issue" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nsnowshoe hare ruby-crowned kinglet pygmy nuthatch white-tailed ptarmigan white-crowned sparrow merriam’s turkey yellow-bellied sapsucker macgillivray’s warbler northern three-toed woodpecker Tr. Vol. XV, 190-95, 203-04. 10 . See Tr. Vol. XV, 178-79. 11 . See Tr. Vol. I, 162. 12 . See Tr. Vol. I, 125. 13 . As the Herrington court noted, the fact that a computer model is approved for use in this case does not necessarily justify agency use of the model in all future cases. Herrington, 768 F.2d at 1391. Rather, the agency is under a continuing duty to evaluate the accuracy of a computer model, through empirical testing if possible, and to abandon or improve the model if shown to be unreliable. Id. See also Ohio v. E.P.A., 784 F.2d 224, 226-31, affd, 798 F.2d 880, 882 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that a motion for administrative reconsideration which congress did not order the agency to entertain which the agency dismissed in relevant part on procedural grounds and which the petitioner filed over sixty days after the agency acted cannot effectively extend retroactively the thirtyday period congress specified for judicial review petitions", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nsnowshoe hare ruby-crowned kinglet pygmy nuthatch white-tailed ptarmigan white-crowned sparrow merriam’s turkey yellow-bellied sapsucker macgillivray’s warbler northern three-toed woodpecker Tr. Vol. XV, 190-95, 203-04. 10 . See Tr. Vol. XV, 178-79. 11 . See Tr. Vol. I, 162. 12 . See Tr. Vol. I, 125. 13 . As the Herrington court noted, the fact that a computer model is approved for use in this case does not necessarily justify agency use of the model in all future cases. Herrington, 768 F.2d at 1391. Rather, the agency is under a continuing duty to evaluate the accuracy of a computer model, through empirical testing if possible, and to abandon or improve the model if shown to be unreliable. Id. See also Ohio v. E.P.A., 784 F.2d 224, 226-31, affd, 798 F.2d 880, 882 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that an order by the trial court remanding the cause to the agency to impose a sanction other than the one imposed by the agency was not a final and appealable order because it did not terminate the litigation between the parties on the merits", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nsnowshoe hare ruby-crowned kinglet pygmy nuthatch white-tailed ptarmigan white-crowned sparrow merriam’s turkey yellow-bellied sapsucker macgillivray’s warbler northern three-toed woodpecker Tr. Vol. XV, 190-95, 203-04. 10 . See Tr. Vol. XV, 178-79. 11 . See Tr. Vol. I, 162. 12 . See Tr. Vol. I, 125. 13 . As the Herrington court noted, the fact that a computer model is approved for use in this case does not necessarily justify agency use of the model in all future cases. Herrington, 768 F.2d at 1391. Rather, the agency is under a continuing duty to evaluate the accuracy of a computer model, through empirical testing if possible, and to abandon or improve the model if shown to be unreliable. Id. See also Ohio v. E.P.A., 784 F.2d 224, 226-31, affd, 798 F.2d 880, 882 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that while every agency use of computer models need not be validated at each site for which the model is used where the statutory language required the agency to gather empirical data and where there was a factor which all parties agreed was significant but the effect of which was untested and unknown the agency was not entitled to rely on the model without empirically testing it at the site", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nsnowshoe hare ruby-crowned kinglet pygmy nuthatch white-tailed ptarmigan white-crowned sparrow merriam’s turkey yellow-bellied sapsucker macgillivray’s warbler northern three-toed woodpecker Tr. Vol. XV, 190-95, 203-04. 10 . See Tr. Vol. XV, 178-79. 11 . See Tr. Vol. I, 162. 12 . See Tr. Vol. I, 125. 13 . As the Herrington court noted, the fact that a computer model is approved for use in this case does not necessarily justify agency use of the model in all future cases. Herrington, 768 F.2d at 1391. Rather, the agency is under a continuing duty to evaluate the accuracy of a computer model, through empirical testing if possible, and to abandon or improve the model if shown to be unreliable. Id. See also Ohio v. E.P.A., 784 F.2d 224, 226-31, affd, 798 F.2d 880, 882 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that agency interpretation which is reasonable is entitled to deference", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nsnowshoe hare ruby-crowned kinglet pygmy nuthatch white-tailed ptarmigan white-crowned sparrow merriam’s turkey yellow-bellied sapsucker macgillivray’s warbler northern three-toed woodpecker Tr. Vol. XV, 190-95, 203-04. 10 . See Tr. Vol. XV, 178-79. 11 . See Tr. Vol. I, 162. 12 . See Tr. Vol. I, 125. 13 . As the Herrington court noted, the fact that a computer model is approved for use in this case does not necessarily justify agency use of the model in all future cases. Herrington, 768 F.2d at 1391. Rather, the agency is under a continuing duty to evaluate the accuracy of a computer model, through empirical testing if possible, and to abandon or improve the model if shown to be unreliable. Id. See also Ohio v. E.P.A., 784 F.2d 224, 226-31, affd, 798 F.2d 880, 882 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that the power of any administrative agency to reconsider its final decision exists only where the statutory provisions creating the agency indicate a legislative intent to permit the agency to carry into effect such power" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nupon a highway, it most certainly could have done so. Statutes providing for forfeiture of driving privileges or punishment for habitual violations of the traffic statutes are designed to protect the public from persons who have demonstrated that they are unable to obey traffic laws established for the safety of citizens and that their driving presents a hazard to life and property. See Owens v. State (1978), 178 Ind.App. 406, 382 N.E.2d 1312, 1314-1315. The absence of limiting language in L.C. 9-30-10-16 reveals the legislature's recognition that the danger to the public is equally as great on private property used by the public, such as shopping center parking lots and apartment complex roads, as it is on public highways. See Huey v. State (1987), Ind.App., 503 N.E.2d 623, 626-627 (holding that corpus delicti of dwi is that someone drove or operated motor vehicle in public place while intoxicated", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nupon a highway, it most certainly could have done so. Statutes providing for forfeiture of driving privileges or punishment for habitual violations of the traffic statutes are designed to protect the public from persons who have demonstrated that they are unable to obey traffic laws established for the safety of citizens and that their driving presents a hazard to life and property. See Owens v. State (1978), 178 Ind.App. 406, 382 N.E.2d 1312, 1314-1315. The absence of limiting language in L.C. 9-30-10-16 reveals the legislature's recognition that the danger to the public is equally as great on private property used by the public, such as shopping center parking lots and apartment complex roads, as it is on public highways. See Huey v. State (1987), Ind.App., 503 N.E.2d 623, 626-627 (holding that indianas operating while intoxicated statute which states that a person who operates a vehicle while intoxicated commits a class a misdemeanor is not limited to operation of motor vehicles on public highways", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nupon a highway, it most certainly could have done so. Statutes providing for forfeiture of driving privileges or punishment for habitual violations of the traffic statutes are designed to protect the public from persons who have demonstrated that they are unable to obey traffic laws established for the safety of citizens and that their driving presents a hazard to life and property. See Owens v. State (1978), 178 Ind.App. 406, 382 N.E.2d 1312, 1314-1315. The absence of limiting language in L.C. 9-30-10-16 reveals the legislature's recognition that the danger to the public is equally as great on private property used by the public, such as shopping center parking lots and apartment complex roads, as it is on public highways. See Huey v. State (1987), Ind.App., 503 N.E.2d 623, 626-627 (holding that misdemeanor offense of driving while intoxicated constitutes a crime of violence under ussg 4b12a", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nupon a highway, it most certainly could have done so. Statutes providing for forfeiture of driving privileges or punishment for habitual violations of the traffic statutes are designed to protect the public from persons who have demonstrated that they are unable to obey traffic laws established for the safety of citizens and that their driving presents a hazard to life and property. See Owens v. State (1978), 178 Ind.App. 406, 382 N.E.2d 1312, 1314-1315. The absence of limiting language in L.C. 9-30-10-16 reveals the legislature's recognition that the danger to the public is equally as great on private property used by the public, such as shopping center parking lots and apartment complex roads, as it is on public highways. See Huey v. State (1987), Ind.App., 503 N.E.2d 623, 626-627 (holding dwi intoxicated operation of a motor vehicle in a public place is clearly not a crime of violence under 18 usc 16b", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nupon a highway, it most certainly could have done so. Statutes providing for forfeiture of driving privileges or punishment for habitual violations of the traffic statutes are designed to protect the public from persons who have demonstrated that they are unable to obey traffic laws established for the safety of citizens and that their driving presents a hazard to life and property. See Owens v. State (1978), 178 Ind.App. 406, 382 N.E.2d 1312, 1314-1315. The absence of limiting language in L.C. 9-30-10-16 reveals the legislature's recognition that the danger to the public is equally as great on private property used by the public, such as shopping center parking lots and apartment complex roads, as it is on public highways. See Huey v. State (1987), Ind.App., 503 N.E.2d 623, 626-627 (holding that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendants conviction for operating a vehicle while intoxicated causing death as a class c felony" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nlocal branches of government. DECISION Because respondents’ remaining claims present a nonjusticiable political question, we reverse the district court’s order refusing to dismiss for lack of justiciability, without addressing appellants’ other assignments of error. Reversed. 1 . Although respondents supported their constitutional claims with allegations of segregation, respondents did not make a traditional segregation claim based on racial discrimination. Instead, respondents' claims are rooted in a purported right to an education of a certain quality under the Education Clause, Article XIII, section 1, of the Minnesota Constitution. A segregation claim based on racial discrimination is justiciable. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495, 74 S.Ct. 686, 692, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954) (holding that segregation in public education is a denial of equal protection of the laws", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nlocal branches of government. DECISION Because respondents’ remaining claims present a nonjusticiable political question, we reverse the district court’s order refusing to dismiss for lack of justiciability, without addressing appellants’ other assignments of error. Reversed. 1 . Although respondents supported their constitutional claims with allegations of segregation, respondents did not make a traditional segregation claim based on racial discrimination. Instead, respondents' claims are rooted in a purported right to an education of a certain quality under the Education Clause, Article XIII, section 1, of the Minnesota Constitution. A segregation claim based on racial discrimination is justiciable. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495, 74 S.Ct. 686, 692, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954) (holding that the concept of separate but equal has no place in public education", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nlocal branches of government. DECISION Because respondents’ remaining claims present a nonjusticiable political question, we reverse the district court’s order refusing to dismiss for lack of justiciability, without addressing appellants’ other assignments of error. Reversed. 1 . Although respondents supported their constitutional claims with allegations of segregation, respondents did not make a traditional segregation claim based on racial discrimination. Instead, respondents' claims are rooted in a purported right to an education of a certain quality under the Education Clause, Article XIII, section 1, of the Minnesota Constitution. A segregation claim based on racial discrimination is justiciable. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495, 74 S.Ct. 686, 692, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954) (holding that lprs are entitled to the protection of the equal protection clause", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nlocal branches of government. DECISION Because respondents’ remaining claims present a nonjusticiable political question, we reverse the district court’s order refusing to dismiss for lack of justiciability, without addressing appellants’ other assignments of error. Reversed. 1 . Although respondents supported their constitutional claims with allegations of segregation, respondents did not make a traditional segregation claim based on racial discrimination. Instead, respondents' claims are rooted in a purported right to an education of a certain quality under the Education Clause, Article XIII, section 1, of the Minnesota Constitution. A segregation claim based on racial discrimination is justiciable. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495, 74 S.Ct. 686, 692, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954) (holding that wisconsin violated equal protection rights of handicapped children by denying them an education at public expense", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nlocal branches of government. DECISION Because respondents’ remaining claims present a nonjusticiable political question, we reverse the district court’s order refusing to dismiss for lack of justiciability, without addressing appellants’ other assignments of error. Reversed. 1 . Although respondents supported their constitutional claims with allegations of segregation, respondents did not make a traditional segregation claim based on racial discrimination. Instead, respondents' claims are rooted in a purported right to an education of a certain quality under the Education Clause, Article XIII, section 1, of the Minnesota Constitution. A segregation claim based on racial discrimination is justiciable. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495, 74 S.Ct. 686, 692, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954) (holding that a claim of inadvertent errors in administration of election procedure without some allegation of intentional discriminatory conduct did not properly allege a denial of equal protection of the laws" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nhim leading up to the decision to seek his termination amounted to “progressive discipline” and were close enough in time to his purportedly protected speech to allow a reasonable fact finder to infer that the actions were taken because of that speech. That discipline, Kidwell contends, was composed of the following five incidents: the written reprimand on April 15, 2008; the restrictions on when and how he may meet with informants in late April 2008; the cancellation of his COPS Unit assignment in June 2008; the two-day suspension he received in September 2008; and the fact that the police department sought to terminate him following the car accident in September 2008. At the outset, we note that suspicious timing will “ ‘rarely be sufficient in and of itself to c 6-97 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that a two to threeday time period between the employees complaint and his discharge was sufficient", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nhim leading up to the decision to seek his termination amounted to “progressive discipline” and were close enough in time to his purportedly protected speech to allow a reasonable fact finder to infer that the actions were taken because of that speech. That discipline, Kidwell contends, was composed of the following five incidents: the written reprimand on April 15, 2008; the restrictions on when and how he may meet with informants in late April 2008; the cancellation of his COPS Unit assignment in June 2008; the two-day suspension he received in September 2008; and the fact that the police department sought to terminate him following the car accident in September 2008. At the outset, we note that suspicious timing will “ ‘rarely be sufficient in and of itself to c 6-97 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that motion to extend time period for filing dischargeability complaint must be made before the running of that period and that court lacks discretion to grant late filed motion to extend time to file dischargeability complaint", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nhim leading up to the decision to seek his termination amounted to “progressive discipline” and were close enough in time to his purportedly protected speech to allow a reasonable fact finder to infer that the actions were taken because of that speech. That discipline, Kidwell contends, was composed of the following five incidents: the written reprimand on April 15, 2008; the restrictions on when and how he may meet with informants in late April 2008; the cancellation of his COPS Unit assignment in June 2008; the two-day suspension he received in September 2008; and the fact that the police department sought to terminate him following the car accident in September 2008. At the outset, we note that suspicious timing will “ ‘rarely be sufficient in and of itself to c 6-97 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that a oneday time period between the employees complaint and her supervisors recommendation to fire her was sufficient", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nhim leading up to the decision to seek his termination amounted to “progressive discipline” and were close enough in time to his purportedly protected speech to allow a reasonable fact finder to infer that the actions were taken because of that speech. That discipline, Kidwell contends, was composed of the following five incidents: the written reprimand on April 15, 2008; the restrictions on when and how he may meet with informants in late April 2008; the cancellation of his COPS Unit assignment in June 2008; the two-day suspension he received in September 2008; and the fact that the police department sought to terminate him following the car accident in September 2008. At the outset, we note that suspicious timing will “ ‘rarely be sufficient in and of itself to c 6-97 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that the threeday grace period in fed rcivp 6e does not apply to motions for a new trial under fedrcivp 59 in part because the time period for filing those motions begins to run from entry of judgment", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nhim leading up to the decision to seek his termination amounted to “progressive discipline” and were close enough in time to his purportedly protected speech to allow a reasonable fact finder to infer that the actions were taken because of that speech. That discipline, Kidwell contends, was composed of the following five incidents: the written reprimand on April 15, 2008; the restrictions on when and how he may meet with informants in late April 2008; the cancellation of his COPS Unit assignment in June 2008; the two-day suspension he received in September 2008; and the fact that the police department sought to terminate him following the car accident in September 2008. At the outset, we note that suspicious timing will “ ‘rarely be sufficient in and of itself to c 6-97 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that a 17 month time period between the employees protected speech and his termination could not support an inference of causation" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthey qualified as an excited utterance exception to the rule against hearsay. As well, we agree with Haygood that the circuit court erred in distinguishing this case from Crawford on the bases that the statement in Crawford (1) was taken in a custodial interrogation and (2) was not an excited utterance. First, the fact that the statements here were not taken at a police station during custodial interrogation, although a proper factor to consider, is not dispositive. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 827, 126 S.Ct. 2266 (considering the difference in the level of formality between the interview in the station house in Crawford and the frantic 911 call in Davis as one of the factors in determining whether the statements from the 911 call were testimonial); Hammon, 547 U.S. at 830, 126 S.Ct. 2266 (recognizing the crawford interrogation was more formal but determining the interrogation of hammons wife was formal enough in considering that factor and determining the wifes statements were testimonial", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthey qualified as an excited utterance exception to the rule against hearsay. As well, we agree with Haygood that the circuit court erred in distinguishing this case from Crawford on the bases that the statement in Crawford (1) was taken in a custodial interrogation and (2) was not an excited utterance. First, the fact that the statements here were not taken at a police station during custodial interrogation, although a proper factor to consider, is not dispositive. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 827, 126 S.Ct. 2266 (considering the difference in the level of formality between the interview in the station house in Crawford and the frantic 911 call in Davis as one of the factors in determining whether the statements from the 911 call were testimonial); Hammon, 547 U.S. at 830, 126 S.Ct. 2266 (recognizing that there are no formal procedures for determining the validity of rs 2477 claims", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthey qualified as an excited utterance exception to the rule against hearsay. As well, we agree with Haygood that the circuit court erred in distinguishing this case from Crawford on the bases that the statement in Crawford (1) was taken in a custodial interrogation and (2) was not an excited utterance. First, the fact that the statements here were not taken at a police station during custodial interrogation, although a proper factor to consider, is not dispositive. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 827, 126 S.Ct. 2266 (considering the difference in the level of formality between the interview in the station house in Crawford and the frantic 911 call in Davis as one of the factors in determining whether the statements from the 911 call were testimonial); Hammon, 547 U.S. at 830, 126 S.Ct. 2266 (holding that edwards protection only extends to interrogation and that denial of counsel is only one factor to be considered in determining whether consent was voluntarily given but it is not a decisive fact", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthey qualified as an excited utterance exception to the rule against hearsay. As well, we agree with Haygood that the circuit court erred in distinguishing this case from Crawford on the bases that the statement in Crawford (1) was taken in a custodial interrogation and (2) was not an excited utterance. First, the fact that the statements here were not taken at a police station during custodial interrogation, although a proper factor to consider, is not dispositive. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 827, 126 S.Ct. 2266 (considering the difference in the level of formality between the interview in the station house in Crawford and the frantic 911 call in Davis as one of the factors in determining whether the statements from the 911 call were testimonial); Hammon, 547 U.S. at 830, 126 S.Ct. 2266 (holding that the district court did not err in admitting evidence of an allegedly coerced interrogation where the taped interrogation was played for jurors and the defendant crossexamined the witness at length about the interrogation", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthey qualified as an excited utterance exception to the rule against hearsay. As well, we agree with Haygood that the circuit court erred in distinguishing this case from Crawford on the bases that the statement in Crawford (1) was taken in a custodial interrogation and (2) was not an excited utterance. First, the fact that the statements here were not taken at a police station during custodial interrogation, although a proper factor to consider, is not dispositive. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 827, 126 S.Ct. 2266 (considering the difference in the level of formality between the interview in the station house in Crawford and the frantic 911 call in Davis as one of the factors in determining whether the statements from the 911 call were testimonial); Hammon, 547 U.S. at 830, 126 S.Ct. 2266 (holding that the sixth amendment generally permits interrogation of a represented person only 1 if it was the defendant and not the government who initiated the interrogation and 2 if the defendant voluntarily waived his right to counsel" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndid not apply because the wife had failed to file her petition with the clerk until after the sale. 43 Kan. at 596-97. Similarly, in Graham v. Pepple, 129 Kan. 735, 284 Pac. 394 (1930), a wife filed a petition for divorce asking for 53% acres in Washington County as alimony. The husband later sold this land to a third party. The Kansas Supreme Court held the real estate was sufficiently described for purposes of lis pendens because the husband owned only one 53%-acre tract in Washington County: “If the derelict husband had owned a hundred acres and she had merely laid claim to some undefined portion of it,” there may have been sufficient ambiguity in the description to uphold the transfer to the third party. 129 Kan. at 737; see also Rumsey v. Rumsey, 150 Kan. 49, 90 P.2d 1093 (1939) (holding that words which expressly refer to adequate legal description provide nucleus of description that is legally sufficient for statute of frauds", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndid not apply because the wife had failed to file her petition with the clerk until after the sale. 43 Kan. at 596-97. Similarly, in Graham v. Pepple, 129 Kan. 735, 284 Pac. 394 (1930), a wife filed a petition for divorce asking for 53% acres in Washington County as alimony. The husband later sold this land to a third party. The Kansas Supreme Court held the real estate was sufficiently described for purposes of lis pendens because the husband owned only one 53%-acre tract in Washington County: “If the derelict husband had owned a hundred acres and she had merely laid claim to some undefined portion of it,” there may have been sufficient ambiguity in the description to uphold the transfer to the third party. 129 Kan. at 737; see also Rumsey v. Rumsey, 150 Kan. 49, 90 P.2d 1093 (1939) (holding that a void decree has no legal effect", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndid not apply because the wife had failed to file her petition with the clerk until after the sale. 43 Kan. at 596-97. Similarly, in Graham v. Pepple, 129 Kan. 735, 284 Pac. 394 (1930), a wife filed a petition for divorce asking for 53% acres in Washington County as alimony. The husband later sold this land to a third party. The Kansas Supreme Court held the real estate was sufficiently described for purposes of lis pendens because the husband owned only one 53%-acre tract in Washington County: “If the derelict husband had owned a hundred acres and she had merely laid claim to some undefined portion of it,” there may have been sufficient ambiguity in the description to uphold the transfer to the third party. 129 Kan. at 737; see also Rumsey v. Rumsey, 150 Kan. 49, 90 P.2d 1093 (1939) (holding that an unconstitutional act of congress has no legal effect", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndid not apply because the wife had failed to file her petition with the clerk until after the sale. 43 Kan. at 596-97. Similarly, in Graham v. Pepple, 129 Kan. 735, 284 Pac. 394 (1930), a wife filed a petition for divorce asking for 53% acres in Washington County as alimony. The husband later sold this land to a third party. The Kansas Supreme Court held the real estate was sufficiently described for purposes of lis pendens because the husband owned only one 53%-acre tract in Washington County: “If the derelict husband had owned a hundred acres and she had merely laid claim to some undefined portion of it,” there may have been sufficient ambiguity in the description to uphold the transfer to the third party. 129 Kan. at 737; see also Rumsey v. Rumsey, 150 Kan. 49, 90 P.2d 1093 (1939) (holding to the same effect", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndid not apply because the wife had failed to file her petition with the clerk until after the sale. 43 Kan. at 596-97. Similarly, in Graham v. Pepple, 129 Kan. 735, 284 Pac. 394 (1930), a wife filed a petition for divorce asking for 53% acres in Washington County as alimony. The husband later sold this land to a third party. The Kansas Supreme Court held the real estate was sufficiently described for purposes of lis pendens because the husband owned only one 53%-acre tract in Washington County: “If the derelict husband had owned a hundred acres and she had merely laid claim to some undefined portion of it,” there may have been sufficient ambiguity in the description to uphold the transfer to the third party. 129 Kan. at 737; see also Rumsey v. Rumsey, 150 Kan. 49, 90 P.2d 1093 (1939) (holding divorce petition giving full legal description specific enough to generate lis pendens effect" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nof action. The components of proximate cause are cause in fact and foreseeability. The test for cause in fact, or “but for causation,” is whether the act or omission was a substantial factor in causing the injury without which the harm would not have occurred. A finding of cause in fact may be based on either direct or circumstantial evidence, but cannot be supported by mere conjecture, guess, or speculation. 106 S.W.3d 724, 727 (Tex.2003) (citations omitted). In explaining further, the court went on to remind: “as we have frequently said, some suspicion linked to other suspicion produces only more suspicion, which is not the same as some evidence. We have also said that an inference stacked only on other inferences is not legally sufficient evidence.” Id. at 728 (citations omitted) (holding that experts opinion that doctor performed surgeries in order to avoid financial losses due to insurance deductibles was nothing more than conjecture and speculation", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nof action. The components of proximate cause are cause in fact and foreseeability. The test for cause in fact, or “but for causation,” is whether the act or omission was a substantial factor in causing the injury without which the harm would not have occurred. A finding of cause in fact may be based on either direct or circumstantial evidence, but cannot be supported by mere conjecture, guess, or speculation. 106 S.W.3d 724, 727 (Tex.2003) (citations omitted). In explaining further, the court went on to remind: “as we have frequently said, some suspicion linked to other suspicion produces only more suspicion, which is not the same as some evidence. We have also said that an inference stacked only on other inferences is not legally sufficient evidence.” Id. at 728 (citations omitted) (holding that mere conjecture or speculation is insufficient under a preponderance standard", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nof action. The components of proximate cause are cause in fact and foreseeability. The test for cause in fact, or “but for causation,” is whether the act or omission was a substantial factor in causing the injury without which the harm would not have occurred. A finding of cause in fact may be based on either direct or circumstantial evidence, but cannot be supported by mere conjecture, guess, or speculation. 106 S.W.3d 724, 727 (Tex.2003) (citations omitted). In explaining further, the court went on to remind: “as we have frequently said, some suspicion linked to other suspicion produces only more suspicion, which is not the same as some evidence. We have also said that an inference stacked only on other inferences is not legally sufficient evidence.” Id. at 728 (citations omitted) (holding that causation cannot be proved based on speculation", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nof action. The components of proximate cause are cause in fact and foreseeability. The test for cause in fact, or “but for causation,” is whether the act or omission was a substantial factor in causing the injury without which the harm would not have occurred. A finding of cause in fact may be based on either direct or circumstantial evidence, but cannot be supported by mere conjecture, guess, or speculation. 106 S.W.3d 724, 727 (Tex.2003) (citations omitted). In explaining further, the court went on to remind: “as we have frequently said, some suspicion linked to other suspicion produces only more suspicion, which is not the same as some evidence. We have also said that an inference stacked only on other inferences is not legally sufficient evidence.” Id. at 728 (citations omitted) (holding that burden of clear and convincing proof cannot be satisfied by mere conjecture or speculation", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nof action. The components of proximate cause are cause in fact and foreseeability. The test for cause in fact, or “but for causation,” is whether the act or omission was a substantial factor in causing the injury without which the harm would not have occurred. A finding of cause in fact may be based on either direct or circumstantial evidence, but cannot be supported by mere conjecture, guess, or speculation. 106 S.W.3d 724, 727 (Tex.2003) (citations omitted). In explaining further, the court went on to remind: “as we have frequently said, some suspicion linked to other suspicion produces only more suspicion, which is not the same as some evidence. We have also said that an inference stacked only on other inferences is not legally sufficient evidence.” Id. at 728 (citations omitted) (holding that experts opinion on proximate causation amounted to no more than mere conjecture and speculation as to events surrounding accident" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthe circuit court is to “hear the testimony of witnesses and try the case de novo.” Tenn.Code Ann. § 37-l-159(a). While the record of the juvenile court proceedings is required to be provided to the circuit court on appeal, Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-l-159(c), the circuit court is not limited to that record. On the contrary, the circuit court in a dependency and neglect proceeding may not rely solely on the record made before the juvenile court, but under Tenn.Code Ann. § 37-1-159(c) must try the case de n fact in support of the ultimate issues, we review the factual findings pursuant to Tenn. R.App. P. 13(d), de novo with a presumption of correctness unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. In re A.T.P., No. M2006-02697-COA-R3-JV, 2008 WL 115538, at *4 (Tenn.Ct.App. Jan.10, 2008) (holding the findings of fact required to support an alimony award are sufficient if findings of fact have been made on the ultimate facts at issue in the case and the findings of fact show the trial court properly applied the law in the case", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthe circuit court is to “hear the testimony of witnesses and try the case de novo.” Tenn.Code Ann. § 37-l-159(a). While the record of the juvenile court proceedings is required to be provided to the circuit court on appeal, Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-l-159(c), the circuit court is not limited to that record. On the contrary, the circuit court in a dependency and neglect proceeding may not rely solely on the record made before the juvenile court, but under Tenn.Code Ann. § 37-1-159(c) must try the case de n fact in support of the ultimate issues, we review the factual findings pursuant to Tenn. R.App. P. 13(d), de novo with a presumption of correctness unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. In re A.T.P., No. M2006-02697-COA-R3-JV, 2008 WL 115538, at *4 (Tenn.Ct.App. Jan.10, 2008) (holding that findings of fact in a dependency and neglect action for severe child abuse are presumed to be correct unless the evidence preponderates against them", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthe circuit court is to “hear the testimony of witnesses and try the case de novo.” Tenn.Code Ann. § 37-l-159(a). While the record of the juvenile court proceedings is required to be provided to the circuit court on appeal, Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-l-159(c), the circuit court is not limited to that record. On the contrary, the circuit court in a dependency and neglect proceeding may not rely solely on the record made before the juvenile court, but under Tenn.Code Ann. § 37-1-159(c) must try the case de n fact in support of the ultimate issues, we review the factual findings pursuant to Tenn. R.App. P. 13(d), de novo with a presumption of correctness unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. In re A.T.P., No. M2006-02697-COA-R3-JV, 2008 WL 115538, at *4 (Tenn.Ct.App. Jan.10, 2008) (holding that actions for neglect and dependency governed by uccja", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthe circuit court is to “hear the testimony of witnesses and try the case de novo.” Tenn.Code Ann. § 37-l-159(a). While the record of the juvenile court proceedings is required to be provided to the circuit court on appeal, Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-l-159(c), the circuit court is not limited to that record. On the contrary, the circuit court in a dependency and neglect proceeding may not rely solely on the record made before the juvenile court, but under Tenn.Code Ann. § 37-1-159(c) must try the case de n fact in support of the ultimate issues, we review the factual findings pursuant to Tenn. R.App. P. 13(d), de novo with a presumption of correctness unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. In re A.T.P., No. M2006-02697-COA-R3-JV, 2008 WL 115538, at *4 (Tenn.Ct.App. Jan.10, 2008) (holding a woman may be prosecuted for child neglect and endangering a child for prenatal substance abuse", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthe circuit court is to “hear the testimony of witnesses and try the case de novo.” Tenn.Code Ann. § 37-l-159(a). While the record of the juvenile court proceedings is required to be provided to the circuit court on appeal, Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-l-159(c), the circuit court is not limited to that record. On the contrary, the circuit court in a dependency and neglect proceeding may not rely solely on the record made before the juvenile court, but under Tenn.Code Ann. § 37-1-159(c) must try the case de n fact in support of the ultimate issues, we review the factual findings pursuant to Tenn. R.App. P. 13(d), de novo with a presumption of correctness unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. In re A.T.P., No. M2006-02697-COA-R3-JV, 2008 WL 115538, at *4 (Tenn.Ct.App. Jan.10, 2008) (holding that findings of fact made in administrative proceedings are considered to be prima facie correct and that where a district court has heard and considered additional evidence we review its findings of fact for clear error" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\na situation where Christopher-son was alone with him and able to have sexual contact. Id. [¶ 15.] In Perkins, 444 N.W.2d at 36, the defendant was charged with three counts of second-degree rape stemming from three incidents of sexual contact with a female minor, D.J.K. All three incidents occurred when D.J.K. was babysitting or visiting in Perkins’ home. The circuit court admitted testimony of two other girls indicating that Perkins had initiated sexual contact with them when they were babysitting his children or otherwise visiting his home. We concluded that “[t]he challenged testimony demonstrat[ed] a consistent pattern of molesting young girls with whom Perkins was long acquainted, when they were within his home.” Id. at 38. See also State v. Roden, 380 N.W.2d 669, 670-71 (S.D.1986) (holding that the striking similarity between the acts alleged in the indictment and the prior incidents rendered incidents that occurred fifteen years prior to the acts alleged in the indictment relevant and admissible under rule 404b", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\na situation where Christopher-son was alone with him and able to have sexual contact. Id. [¶ 15.] In Perkins, 444 N.W.2d at 36, the defendant was charged with three counts of second-degree rape stemming from three incidents of sexual contact with a female minor, D.J.K. All three incidents occurred when D.J.K. was babysitting or visiting in Perkins’ home. The circuit court admitted testimony of two other girls indicating that Perkins had initiated sexual contact with them when they were babysitting his children or otherwise visiting his home. We concluded that “[t]he challenged testimony demonstrat[ed] a consistent pattern of molesting young girls with whom Perkins was long acquainted, when they were within his home.” Id. at 38. See also State v. Roden, 380 N.W.2d 669, 670-71 (S.D.1986) (holding that a defendant must show that the victim had previously been exposed to a sexual act and that the prior sexual act was sufficiently similar to the present sexual act to give the victim the experience and ability to contrive or imagine the molestation charge", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\na situation where Christopher-son was alone with him and able to have sexual contact. Id. [¶ 15.] In Perkins, 444 N.W.2d at 36, the defendant was charged with three counts of second-degree rape stemming from three incidents of sexual contact with a female minor, D.J.K. All three incidents occurred when D.J.K. was babysitting or visiting in Perkins’ home. The circuit court admitted testimony of two other girls indicating that Perkins had initiated sexual contact with them when they were babysitting his children or otherwise visiting his home. We concluded that “[t]he challenged testimony demonstrat[ed] a consistent pattern of molesting young girls with whom Perkins was long acquainted, when they were within his home.” Id. at 38. See also State v. Roden, 380 N.W.2d 669, 670-71 (S.D.1986) (holding that evidence was insufficient where the victim testified that she was awake and communicated her desire not to have sexual intercourse with the defendant", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\na situation where Christopher-son was alone with him and able to have sexual contact. Id. [¶ 15.] In Perkins, 444 N.W.2d at 36, the defendant was charged with three counts of second-degree rape stemming from three incidents of sexual contact with a female minor, D.J.K. All three incidents occurred when D.J.K. was babysitting or visiting in Perkins’ home. The circuit court admitted testimony of two other girls indicating that Perkins had initiated sexual contact with them when they were babysitting his children or otherwise visiting his home. We concluded that “[t]he challenged testimony demonstrat[ed] a consistent pattern of molesting young girls with whom Perkins was long acquainted, when they were within his home.” Id. at 38. See also State v. Roden, 380 N.W.2d 669, 670-71 (S.D.1986) (holding other acts testimony showed a common scheme where defendants stepdaughter testified to incidents of sexual contact which paralleled the complaint made by the present victim", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\na situation where Christopher-son was alone with him and able to have sexual contact. Id. [¶ 15.] In Perkins, 444 N.W.2d at 36, the defendant was charged with three counts of second-degree rape stemming from three incidents of sexual contact with a female minor, D.J.K. All three incidents occurred when D.J.K. was babysitting or visiting in Perkins’ home. The circuit court admitted testimony of two other girls indicating that Perkins had initiated sexual contact with them when they were babysitting his children or otherwise visiting his home. We concluded that “[t]he challenged testimony demonstrat[ed] a consistent pattern of molesting young girls with whom Perkins was long acquainted, when they were within his home.” Id. at 38. See also State v. Roden, 380 N.W.2d 669, 670-71 (S.D.1986) (holding that uncharged sexual acts committed upon the same victim are admissible to show the conduct of the defendant toward the victim and to corroborate the evidence of the offense charged in the indictment" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nat 6) (citing Rybarczyk, 235 F.3d at 986; EEOC v. Wooster Brush Co. Emps. Relief Ass’n, 727 F.2d 566, 579 (6th Cir.1984); Lorenzen v. Emps. Ret. Plan of Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 896 F.2d 228, 236-37 (7th Cir.1990)); Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 281 (2d Cir.1984). COOK, Circuit Judge, joined by MOORE, Circuit Judge. Though we concur with Judge Gwin’s conclusions with respect to the statute-of-limitations, ICCTA-retroactivity, and prejudgment-interest issues, we write separately on the issue of damages. Courts speak through judgments, and the judgment appealed here represents Comerica’s first adverse judgment as opposed to “calculation” or “finding” as referenced by the dissent on damages. See California v. Rooney, 483 U.S. 307, 311, 107 S.Ct. 2852, 97 L.Ed.2d 258 (1987) (per curiam) (recognizing that our courts will normally not enforce foreign tax judgments", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nat 6) (citing Rybarczyk, 235 F.3d at 986; EEOC v. Wooster Brush Co. Emps. Relief Ass’n, 727 F.2d 566, 579 (6th Cir.1984); Lorenzen v. Emps. Ret. Plan of Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 896 F.2d 228, 236-37 (7th Cir.1990)); Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 281 (2d Cir.1984). COOK, Circuit Judge, joined by MOORE, Circuit Judge. Though we concur with Judge Gwin’s conclusions with respect to the statute-of-limitations, ICCTA-retroactivity, and prejudgment-interest issues, we write separately on the issue of damages. Courts speak through judgments, and the judgment appealed here represents Comerica’s first adverse judgment as opposed to “calculation” or “finding” as referenced by the dissent on damages. See California v. Rooney, 483 U.S. 307, 311, 107 S.Ct. 2852, 97 L.Ed.2d 258 (1987) (per curiam) (holding that judgments rendered by courts not having authority to enter such are not subject to collateral attack because judges entering those judgments were de facto officers", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nat 6) (citing Rybarczyk, 235 F.3d at 986; EEOC v. Wooster Brush Co. Emps. Relief Ass’n, 727 F.2d 566, 579 (6th Cir.1984); Lorenzen v. Emps. Ret. Plan of Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 896 F.2d 228, 236-37 (7th Cir.1990)); Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 281 (2d Cir.1984). COOK, Circuit Judge, joined by MOORE, Circuit Judge. Though we concur with Judge Gwin’s conclusions with respect to the statute-of-limitations, ICCTA-retroactivity, and prejudgment-interest issues, we write separately on the issue of damages. Courts speak through judgments, and the judgment appealed here represents Comerica’s first adverse judgment as opposed to “calculation” or “finding” as referenced by the dissent on damages. See California v. Rooney, 483 U.S. 307, 311, 107 S.Ct. 2852, 97 L.Ed.2d 258 (1987) (per curiam) (holding that the discovery rule does not apply to bill of review claims to set aside probate judgments", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nat 6) (citing Rybarczyk, 235 F.3d at 986; EEOC v. Wooster Brush Co. Emps. Relief Ass’n, 727 F.2d 566, 579 (6th Cir.1984); Lorenzen v. Emps. Ret. Plan of Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 896 F.2d 228, 236-37 (7th Cir.1990)); Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 281 (2d Cir.1984). COOK, Circuit Judge, joined by MOORE, Circuit Judge. Though we concur with Judge Gwin’s conclusions with respect to the statute-of-limitations, ICCTA-retroactivity, and prejudgment-interest issues, we write separately on the issue of damages. Courts speak through judgments, and the judgment appealed here represents Comerica’s first adverse judgment as opposed to “calculation” or “finding” as referenced by the dissent on damages. See California v. Rooney, 483 U.S. 307, 311, 107 S.Ct. 2852, 97 L.Ed.2d 258 (1987) (per curiam) (recognizing that judgments of arizona courts on foreign judgments will not be conclusive in the jurisdiction of origin", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nat 6) (citing Rybarczyk, 235 F.3d at 986; EEOC v. Wooster Brush Co. Emps. Relief Ass’n, 727 F.2d 566, 579 (6th Cir.1984); Lorenzen v. Emps. Ret. Plan of Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 896 F.2d 228, 236-37 (7th Cir.1990)); Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 281 (2d Cir.1984). COOK, Circuit Judge, joined by MOORE, Circuit Judge. Though we concur with Judge Gwin’s conclusions with respect to the statute-of-limitations, ICCTA-retroactivity, and prejudgment-interest issues, we write separately on the issue of damages. Courts speak through judgments, and the judgment appealed here represents Comerica’s first adverse judgment as opposed to “calculation” or “finding” as referenced by the dissent on damages. See California v. Rooney, 483 U.S. 307, 311, 107 S.Ct. 2852, 97 L.Ed.2d 258 (1987) (per curiam) (holding that courts review judgments not statements in opinions" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe District Court applied the correct version of the Sentencing Guidelines. See United States v. Bertoli 40 F.3d 1384, 1403 (3d Cir.1994). The ex post facto clause is violated when a court applies a change in the law which is adverse to the interests of a defendant where that change occurred after the commission of the crime. See U.S. Const., art. I, § 9, cl. 3. Accordingly, when the court in a criminal case is confronted with post-offense amendments which call for a more severe sentence than th ncealment of assets listed in Count One of the indictment was determined by either the evidence produced at trial, or the date the concealment was detected, both of which he claims point to an end date prior to November 2000. See United States v. Bakker, 925 F.2d 728, 739 (4th Cir.1991) (holding that where the date of the offense is not an element of the charge a variance between the indictment date and the proof at trial is not fatal so long as the acts charged were committed within the statute of limitations period and prior to the return date of the indictment", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe District Court applied the correct version of the Sentencing Guidelines. See United States v. Bertoli 40 F.3d 1384, 1403 (3d Cir.1994). The ex post facto clause is violated when a court applies a change in the law which is adverse to the interests of a defendant where that change occurred after the commission of the crime. See U.S. Const., art. I, § 9, cl. 3. Accordingly, when the court in a criminal case is confronted with post-offense amendments which call for a more severe sentence than th ncealment of assets listed in Count One of the indictment was determined by either the evidence produced at trial, or the date the concealment was detected, both of which he claims point to an end date prior to November 2000. See United States v. Bakker, 925 F.2d 728, 739 (4th Cir.1991) (holding that court should not use ending date of indictment as determination of when continuing violation ended but should look at the evidence introduced at trial", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe District Court applied the correct version of the Sentencing Guidelines. See United States v. Bertoli 40 F.3d 1384, 1403 (3d Cir.1994). The ex post facto clause is violated when a court applies a change in the law which is adverse to the interests of a defendant where that change occurred after the commission of the crime. See U.S. Const., art. I, § 9, cl. 3. Accordingly, when the court in a criminal case is confronted with post-offense amendments which call for a more severe sentence than th ncealment of assets listed in Count One of the indictment was determined by either the evidence produced at trial, or the date the concealment was detected, both of which he claims point to an end date prior to November 2000. See United States v. Bakker, 925 F.2d 728, 739 (4th Cir.1991) (recognizing trial court should not weigh evidence", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe District Court applied the correct version of the Sentencing Guidelines. See United States v. Bertoli 40 F.3d 1384, 1403 (3d Cir.1994). The ex post facto clause is violated when a court applies a change in the law which is adverse to the interests of a defendant where that change occurred after the commission of the crime. See U.S. Const., art. I, § 9, cl. 3. Accordingly, when the court in a criminal case is confronted with post-offense amendments which call for a more severe sentence than th ncealment of assets listed in Count One of the indictment was determined by either the evidence produced at trial, or the date the concealment was detected, both of which he claims point to an end date prior to November 2000. See United States v. Bakker, 925 F.2d 728, 739 (4th Cir.1991) (holding that an offer to reimburse plaintiff for costs is not a precondition but an important factor for trial court to look at in determining whether it should grant a new trial", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe District Court applied the correct version of the Sentencing Guidelines. See United States v. Bertoli 40 F.3d 1384, 1403 (3d Cir.1994). The ex post facto clause is violated when a court applies a change in the law which is adverse to the interests of a defendant where that change occurred after the commission of the crime. See U.S. Const., art. I, § 9, cl. 3. Accordingly, when the court in a criminal case is confronted with post-offense amendments which call for a more severe sentence than th ncealment of assets listed in Count One of the indictment was determined by either the evidence produced at trial, or the date the concealment was detected, both of which he claims point to an end date prior to November 2000. See United States v. Bakker, 925 F.2d 728, 739 (4th Cir.1991) (holding that valuation should occur on the date of the trial at which property issues are determined" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\namendment that must be applied retroactively. Id. at 2-3. The district court denied Williams’s motion, concluding that Amendment 709 is not retroactive. Rl-66. II. DISCUSSION On appeal, Williams argues, pro se, that the district court abused its authority by denying his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) motion. He contends that the court erroneously assigned him a criminal history category of IV, and that his true criminal history category was II. Accordingly, his guideline range was calculated incorrectly, and his sentence is unjust. Williams’ pro se argument may be liberally construed as a contention that the district court erred in concluding that Amendment 709 did not entitle him to a § 3582(c)(2) reduction. See Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir.1998) (per curiam) (holding to ensure substantial justice to the parties the pleadings must be liberally construed", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\namendment that must be applied retroactively. Id. at 2-3. The district court denied Williams’s motion, concluding that Amendment 709 is not retroactive. Rl-66. II. DISCUSSION On appeal, Williams argues, pro se, that the district court abused its authority by denying his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) motion. He contends that the court erroneously assigned him a criminal history category of IV, and that his true criminal history category was II. Accordingly, his guideline range was calculated incorrectly, and his sentence is unjust. Williams’ pro se argument may be liberally construed as a contention that the district court erred in concluding that Amendment 709 did not entitle him to a § 3582(c)(2) reduction. See Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir.1998) (per curiam) (holding that pro se pleadings will be liberally construed", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\namendment that must be applied retroactively. Id. at 2-3. The district court denied Williams’s motion, concluding that Amendment 709 is not retroactive. Rl-66. II. DISCUSSION On appeal, Williams argues, pro se, that the district court abused its authority by denying his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) motion. He contends that the court erroneously assigned him a criminal history category of IV, and that his true criminal history category was II. Accordingly, his guideline range was calculated incorrectly, and his sentence is unjust. Williams’ pro se argument may be liberally construed as a contention that the district court erred in concluding that Amendment 709 did not entitle him to a § 3582(c)(2) reduction. See Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir.1998) (per curiam) (holding that pleadings under the rico act are to be liberally construed", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\namendment that must be applied retroactively. Id. at 2-3. The district court denied Williams’s motion, concluding that Amendment 709 is not retroactive. Rl-66. II. DISCUSSION On appeal, Williams argues, pro se, that the district court abused its authority by denying his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) motion. He contends that the court erroneously assigned him a criminal history category of IV, and that his true criminal history category was II. Accordingly, his guideline range was calculated incorrectly, and his sentence is unjust. Williams’ pro se argument may be liberally construed as a contention that the district court erred in concluding that Amendment 709 did not entitle him to a § 3582(c)(2) reduction. See Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir.1998) (per curiam) (recognizing courts special duty to construe liberally a pro se plaintiffs pleadings", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\namendment that must be applied retroactively. Id. at 2-3. The district court denied Williams’s motion, concluding that Amendment 709 is not retroactive. Rl-66. II. DISCUSSION On appeal, Williams argues, pro se, that the district court abused its authority by denying his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) motion. He contends that the court erroneously assigned him a criminal history category of IV, and that his true criminal history category was II. Accordingly, his guideline range was calculated incorrectly, and his sentence is unjust. Williams’ pro se argument may be liberally construed as a contention that the district court erred in concluding that Amendment 709 did not entitle him to a § 3582(c)(2) reduction. See Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir.1998) (per curiam) (holding that although pro se briefs are liberally construed even pro se litigants must brief arguments in order to preserve them" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nin confinement.” 864 So.2d at 1121. See also Moore. We have held that a trial court does not have jurisdiction to split a 20-year sentence so that the defendant serves less than the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment. The State has established the prerequisites for the issuance of this writ of mandamus. For the foregoing reasons, this petition is due to be, and is hereby, granted. Judge McCormick is directed to resen-tence Gaines. As this Court ordered in Austin: “Because the 20-year sentence was valid, the circuit court may not change it. See Wood [v. State, 602 So.2d 1195 (Ala.Crim.App.1992)]. However, the court may split the sentence in compliance with § 15-18-8, i.e., with no more than 5 years in confinement, see, e.g., Soles v. State, 820 So.2d 163, 165 (Ala.Crim.App.2001) (holding that the newly amended 15188 allows a trial judge to suspend a sentence imposed upon application of the schoolhousing enhancements despite the prohibition against probation in 13a12250 and 13a12270", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nin confinement.” 864 So.2d at 1121. See also Moore. We have held that a trial court does not have jurisdiction to split a 20-year sentence so that the defendant serves less than the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment. The State has established the prerequisites for the issuance of this writ of mandamus. For the foregoing reasons, this petition is due to be, and is hereby, granted. Judge McCormick is directed to resen-tence Gaines. As this Court ordered in Austin: “Because the 20-year sentence was valid, the circuit court may not change it. See Wood [v. State, 602 So.2d 1195 (Ala.Crim.App.1992)]. However, the court may split the sentence in compliance with § 15-18-8, i.e., with no more than 5 years in confinement, see, e.g., Soles v. State, 820 So.2d 163, 165 (Ala.Crim.App.2001) (holding that probation is not a sentence", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nin confinement.” 864 So.2d at 1121. See also Moore. We have held that a trial court does not have jurisdiction to split a 20-year sentence so that the defendant serves less than the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment. The State has established the prerequisites for the issuance of this writ of mandamus. For the foregoing reasons, this petition is due to be, and is hereby, granted. Judge McCormick is directed to resen-tence Gaines. As this Court ordered in Austin: “Because the 20-year sentence was valid, the circuit court may not change it. See Wood [v. State, 602 So.2d 1195 (Ala.Crim.App.1992)]. However, the court may split the sentence in compliance with § 15-18-8, i.e., with no more than 5 years in confinement, see, e.g., Soles v. State, 820 So.2d 163, 165 (Ala.Crim.App.2001) (holding that upon revocation of probation a court must grant credit for time served on probation and community control towards any newly imposed term of imprisonment and probation so that the total period of control probation and imprisonment does not exceed the statutory maximum", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nin confinement.” 864 So.2d at 1121. See also Moore. We have held that a trial court does not have jurisdiction to split a 20-year sentence so that the defendant serves less than the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment. The State has established the prerequisites for the issuance of this writ of mandamus. For the foregoing reasons, this petition is due to be, and is hereby, granted. Judge McCormick is directed to resen-tence Gaines. As this Court ordered in Austin: “Because the 20-year sentence was valid, the circuit court may not change it. See Wood [v. State, 602 So.2d 1195 (Ala.Crim.App.1992)]. However, the court may split the sentence in compliance with § 15-18-8, i.e., with no more than 5 years in confinement, see, e.g., Soles v. State, 820 So.2d 163, 165 (Ala.Crim.App.2001) (holding that where original sentencing judge imposed a guidelines sentence defendant could not be sentenced as a habitual offender upon violation of probation", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nin confinement.” 864 So.2d at 1121. See also Moore. We have held that a trial court does not have jurisdiction to split a 20-year sentence so that the defendant serves less than the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment. The State has established the prerequisites for the issuance of this writ of mandamus. For the foregoing reasons, this petition is due to be, and is hereby, granted. Judge McCormick is directed to resen-tence Gaines. As this Court ordered in Austin: “Because the 20-year sentence was valid, the circuit court may not change it. See Wood [v. State, 602 So.2d 1195 (Ala.Crim.App.1992)]. However, the court may split the sentence in compliance with § 15-18-8, i.e., with no more than 5 years in confinement, see, e.g., Soles v. State, 820 So.2d 163, 165 (Ala.Crim.App.2001) (holding that judge found sentence enhancements mandatorily imposed under the guidelines that result in a sentence greater than that authorized by the jury verdict or facts admitted by the defendant violate the sixth amendments guarantee of the right to trial by jury" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n(“Plaintiffs ask that the Court “dismiss this action without prejudice and with leave to amend so that Plaintiffs can attempt to cure any perceived pleading deficiencies” in the event the Court finds that plaintiffs have not sufficiently demonstrated demand futility.”). 60 . Kenney, 426 F.Supp.2d at 1188 (\"The Court finds no basis for allowing plaintiffs to amend their complaint.”). 61 . West Coast, 914 A.2d at 645-46. 62 . Id. at 643-44; see also id. at 646 (\"Thus, the language of the [Colorado plenary court’s] opinion and the decision to deny leave to replead support the conclusion that the without prejudice order was not intended to permit West Coast to relitigate its claim.”). 63 . Id. at 638, 645-46. 64 . See Melzer v. CNET Networks, Inc., 934 A.2d 912, 917-19 (Del.Ch.2007) (holding that while the excerpt from the original complaint was competent as evidence as a pleading it was superseded by the amended complaint", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n(“Plaintiffs ask that the Court “dismiss this action without prejudice and with leave to amend so that Plaintiffs can attempt to cure any perceived pleading deficiencies” in the event the Court finds that plaintiffs have not sufficiently demonstrated demand futility.”). 60 . Kenney, 426 F.Supp.2d at 1188 (\"The Court finds no basis for allowing plaintiffs to amend their complaint.”). 61 . West Coast, 914 A.2d at 645-46. 62 . Id. at 643-44; see also id. at 646 (\"Thus, the language of the [Colorado plenary court’s] opinion and the decision to deny leave to replead support the conclusion that the without prejudice order was not intended to permit West Coast to relitigate its claim.”). 63 . Id. at 638, 645-46. 64 . See Melzer v. CNET Networks, Inc., 934 A.2d 912, 917-19 (Del.Ch.2007) (holding that plaintiff lacked a proper purpose for bringing a section 220 action because the federal judge in kenney had denied plaintiffs request to replead demand futility in an amended complaint", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n(“Plaintiffs ask that the Court “dismiss this action without prejudice and with leave to amend so that Plaintiffs can attempt to cure any perceived pleading deficiencies” in the event the Court finds that plaintiffs have not sufficiently demonstrated demand futility.”). 60 . Kenney, 426 F.Supp.2d at 1188 (\"The Court finds no basis for allowing plaintiffs to amend their complaint.”). 61 . West Coast, 914 A.2d at 645-46. 62 . Id. at 643-44; see also id. at 646 (\"Thus, the language of the [Colorado plenary court’s] opinion and the decision to deny leave to replead support the conclusion that the without prejudice order was not intended to permit West Coast to relitigate its claim.”). 63 . Id. at 638, 645-46. 64 . See Melzer v. CNET Networks, Inc., 934 A.2d 912, 917-19 (Del.Ch.2007) (holding that plaintiffs wishing to inspect books and records for purposes of pleading demand futility in an amended derivative complaint had a proper purpose", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n(“Plaintiffs ask that the Court “dismiss this action without prejudice and with leave to amend so that Plaintiffs can attempt to cure any perceived pleading deficiencies” in the event the Court finds that plaintiffs have not sufficiently demonstrated demand futility.”). 60 . Kenney, 426 F.Supp.2d at 1188 (\"The Court finds no basis for allowing plaintiffs to amend their complaint.”). 61 . West Coast, 914 A.2d at 645-46. 62 . Id. at 643-44; see also id. at 646 (\"Thus, the language of the [Colorado plenary court’s] opinion and the decision to deny leave to replead support the conclusion that the without prejudice order was not intended to permit West Coast to relitigate its claim.”). 63 . Id. at 638, 645-46. 64 . See Melzer v. CNET Networks, Inc., 934 A.2d 912, 917-19 (Del.Ch.2007) (holding that a demand for jury trial should be denied if the issues in the original complaint and the amended complaint turn on the same matrix of facts", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n(“Plaintiffs ask that the Court “dismiss this action without prejudice and with leave to amend so that Plaintiffs can attempt to cure any perceived pleading deficiencies” in the event the Court finds that plaintiffs have not sufficiently demonstrated demand futility.”). 60 . Kenney, 426 F.Supp.2d at 1188 (\"The Court finds no basis for allowing plaintiffs to amend their complaint.”). 61 . West Coast, 914 A.2d at 645-46. 62 . Id. at 643-44; see also id. at 646 (\"Thus, the language of the [Colorado plenary court’s] opinion and the decision to deny leave to replead support the conclusion that the without prejudice order was not intended to permit West Coast to relitigate its claim.”). 63 . Id. at 638, 645-46. 64 . See Melzer v. CNET Networks, Inc., 934 A.2d 912, 917-19 (Del.Ch.2007) (holding that amended pleading did not commence a new action for the purposes of cafa because the claims were exactly the same in both pleadings and the replacement representative was a member of the putative class in the original pleading" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nAnnual Report, attached to the Complaint as Exhibit D, rather than the bare allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint. However, for the reasons discussed below, the Court concludes that, for the purposes of resolving this motion, the statements in Exhibit D do not prevail over the allegations in the Complaint. 3 . Arguably, the fact that the chief of police exercises authority \"under the supervision of the City Manager” might indicate that the City Manager has final policy making authority over the police department. However, in light of City Defendants’ failure to dispute the authority of the chief of police and the absence of any indication within the Newport News City Code of the manner in which the City Manager exercises supervision over the chief of police, cf. Lytle, 326 F.3d at 472 (holding that a city manager was the final policymaker for purposes of section 1983 liability because of provisions in the norfolk city code requiring that all orders rules and regulations applicable to the entire police department must be approved by the city manager other than some police standard operating procedures", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nAnnual Report, attached to the Complaint as Exhibit D, rather than the bare allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint. However, for the reasons discussed below, the Court concludes that, for the purposes of resolving this motion, the statements in Exhibit D do not prevail over the allegations in the Complaint. 3 . Arguably, the fact that the chief of police exercises authority \"under the supervision of the City Manager” might indicate that the City Manager has final policy making authority over the police department. However, in light of City Defendants’ failure to dispute the authority of the chief of police and the absence of any indication within the Newport News City Code of the manner in which the City Manager exercises supervision over the chief of police, cf. Lytle, 326 F.3d at 472 (holding that citys enforcement of the entire state penal code would not constitute a city policy because the city was required to follow state law", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nAnnual Report, attached to the Complaint as Exhibit D, rather than the bare allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint. However, for the reasons discussed below, the Court concludes that, for the purposes of resolving this motion, the statements in Exhibit D do not prevail over the allegations in the Complaint. 3 . Arguably, the fact that the chief of police exercises authority \"under the supervision of the City Manager” might indicate that the City Manager has final policy making authority over the police department. However, in light of City Defendants’ failure to dispute the authority of the chief of police and the absence of any indication within the Newport News City Code of the manner in which the City Manager exercises supervision over the chief of police, cf. Lytle, 326 F.3d at 472 (holding that city attorneys promise in an oral settlement agreement for city to annex and rezone land was within the legal authority of the city of joliet to accomplish and were not absolutely void acts per se therefore city could be estopped from avoiding enforcement of contract", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nAnnual Report, attached to the Complaint as Exhibit D, rather than the bare allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint. However, for the reasons discussed below, the Court concludes that, for the purposes of resolving this motion, the statements in Exhibit D do not prevail over the allegations in the Complaint. 3 . Arguably, the fact that the chief of police exercises authority \"under the supervision of the City Manager” might indicate that the City Manager has final policy making authority over the police department. However, in light of City Defendants’ failure to dispute the authority of the chief of police and the absence of any indication within the Newport News City Code of the manner in which the City Manager exercises supervision over the chief of police, cf. Lytle, 326 F.3d at 472 (holding that a jurys finding that a city had delegated its final policymaking authority in the area of law enforcement to a city police chief was supported by the evidence and warranted imposing liability upon the city", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nAnnual Report, attached to the Complaint as Exhibit D, rather than the bare allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint. However, for the reasons discussed below, the Court concludes that, for the purposes of resolving this motion, the statements in Exhibit D do not prevail over the allegations in the Complaint. 3 . Arguably, the fact that the chief of police exercises authority \"under the supervision of the City Manager” might indicate that the City Manager has final policy making authority over the police department. However, in light of City Defendants’ failure to dispute the authority of the chief of police and the absence of any indication within the Newport News City Code of the manner in which the City Manager exercises supervision over the chief of police, cf. Lytle, 326 F.3d at 472 (holding that city managers act of raping a woman that worked for him at the city was done under color of state law reasoning that he intervened with the citys police chief who had offered to give the plaintiff a ride home thus invokeing his authority as city manager to create the opportunity to be alone with the plaintiff to take her home and then to rape her" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nthere is a presumption that the Legislature intended the two to coexist and that it “did not intend an absurd or unreasonable result.” Id. Therefore, the statute with more specific language “relating to a particular subject will prevail over the general terms of another statute.” Id. ANALYSIS AND DECISION [¶ 8.] 1. Whether a guardianship proceeding commenced by a non-parent and based upon allegations of abuse and neglect is a proper proceeding to terminate the custodial rights of a natural parent. [¶ 9.] Proceedings instituted under the South Dakota Guardianship Act, set forth in SDCL chapter 29A-5, are not the proper means of transferring custody from a parent to a non-parent without a prior determination of a parent’s unfitness. See Blow v. Lottman, 75 S.D. 127, 59 N.W.2d 825 (1953) (recognizing that injury is a prerequisite to liability", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nthere is a presumption that the Legislature intended the two to coexist and that it “did not intend an absurd or unreasonable result.” Id. Therefore, the statute with more specific language “relating to a particular subject will prevail over the general terms of another statute.” Id. ANALYSIS AND DECISION [¶ 8.] 1. Whether a guardianship proceeding commenced by a non-parent and based upon allegations of abuse and neglect is a proper proceeding to terminate the custodial rights of a natural parent. [¶ 9.] Proceedings instituted under the South Dakota Guardianship Act, set forth in SDCL chapter 29A-5, are not the proper means of transferring custody from a parent to a non-parent without a prior determination of a parent’s unfitness. See Blow v. Lottman, 75 S.D. 127, 59 N.W.2d 825 (1953) (holding that article iii standing is not a prerequisite to intervention", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nthere is a presumption that the Legislature intended the two to coexist and that it “did not intend an absurd or unreasonable result.” Id. Therefore, the statute with more specific language “relating to a particular subject will prevail over the general terms of another statute.” Id. ANALYSIS AND DECISION [¶ 8.] 1. Whether a guardianship proceeding commenced by a non-parent and based upon allegations of abuse and neglect is a proper proceeding to terminate the custodial rights of a natural parent. [¶ 9.] Proceedings instituted under the South Dakota Guardianship Act, set forth in SDCL chapter 29A-5, are not the proper means of transferring custody from a parent to a non-parent without a prior determination of a parent’s unfitness. See Blow v. Lottman, 75 S.D. 127, 59 N.W.2d 825 (1953) (holding that a coa is a jurisdictional prerequisite", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nthere is a presumption that the Legislature intended the two to coexist and that it “did not intend an absurd or unreasonable result.” Id. Therefore, the statute with more specific language “relating to a particular subject will prevail over the general terms of another statute.” Id. ANALYSIS AND DECISION [¶ 8.] 1. Whether a guardianship proceeding commenced by a non-parent and based upon allegations of abuse and neglect is a proper proceeding to terminate the custodial rights of a natural parent. [¶ 9.] Proceedings instituted under the South Dakota Guardianship Act, set forth in SDCL chapter 29A-5, are not the proper means of transferring custody from a parent to a non-parent without a prior determination of a parent’s unfitness. See Blow v. Lottman, 75 S.D. 127, 59 N.W.2d 825 (1953) (holding that a finding of plaintiffs bad faith is not a prerequisite to the trial courts exercise of discretion to award fees", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nthere is a presumption that the Legislature intended the two to coexist and that it “did not intend an absurd or unreasonable result.” Id. Therefore, the statute with more specific language “relating to a particular subject will prevail over the general terms of another statute.” Id. ANALYSIS AND DECISION [¶ 8.] 1. Whether a guardianship proceeding commenced by a non-parent and based upon allegations of abuse and neglect is a proper proceeding to terminate the custodial rights of a natural parent. [¶ 9.] Proceedings instituted under the South Dakota Guardianship Act, set forth in SDCL chapter 29A-5, are not the proper means of transferring custody from a parent to a non-parent without a prior determination of a parent’s unfitness. See Blow v. Lottman, 75 S.D. 127, 59 N.W.2d 825 (1953) (holding mothers disqualification as custodian is prerequisite to award of custody to any other person" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nobjectives, and spirit of the statute based on good sound reasoning.’ ” Scott v. Ashland Healthcare Ctr., Inc., 49 S.W.3d 281, 286 (Tenn.2001) (quoting State v. Turner, 913 S.W.2d 158, 160 (Tenn.1995)). Component parts of a statute are to be construed, if possible, consistently and reasonably. See State v. Alford, 970 S.W.2d 944, 946 (Tenn.1998). Aiding in our interpretation of legislative intent are the maxims of nosci-tur a sociis and ejusdem generis. Under the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, “the meaning of questionable or doubtful words or phrases in a statute may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of other words or phrases associated with it.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1060 (6th ed.1990); see also Hammer v. Franklin Interurban Co., 209 Tenn. 399, 354 S.W.2d 241, 242 (1962) (holding that the phrases in connection with and associated with are synonymous with the terms with respect to with reference to and relating to which mean connected by reason of an established or discoverable relation", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nobjectives, and spirit of the statute based on good sound reasoning.’ ” Scott v. Ashland Healthcare Ctr., Inc., 49 S.W.3d 281, 286 (Tenn.2001) (quoting State v. Turner, 913 S.W.2d 158, 160 (Tenn.1995)). Component parts of a statute are to be construed, if possible, consistently and reasonably. See State v. Alford, 970 S.W.2d 944, 946 (Tenn.1998). Aiding in our interpretation of legislative intent are the maxims of nosci-tur a sociis and ejusdem generis. Under the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, “the meaning of questionable or doubtful words or phrases in a statute may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of other words or phrases associated with it.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1060 (6th ed.1990); see also Hammer v. Franklin Interurban Co., 209 Tenn. 399, 354 S.W.2d 241, 242 (1962) (holding that statutory terms should be construed with reference to their associated words and phrases", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nobjectives, and spirit of the statute based on good sound reasoning.’ ” Scott v. Ashland Healthcare Ctr., Inc., 49 S.W.3d 281, 286 (Tenn.2001) (quoting State v. Turner, 913 S.W.2d 158, 160 (Tenn.1995)). Component parts of a statute are to be construed, if possible, consistently and reasonably. See State v. Alford, 970 S.W.2d 944, 946 (Tenn.1998). Aiding in our interpretation of legislative intent are the maxims of nosci-tur a sociis and ejusdem generis. Under the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, “the meaning of questionable or doubtful words or phrases in a statute may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of other words or phrases associated with it.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1060 (6th ed.1990); see also Hammer v. Franklin Interurban Co., 209 Tenn. 399, 354 S.W.2d 241, 242 (1962) (holding that if the statutory terms are unambiguous a courts review ends and the statute is construed according to the plain meaning of its words", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nobjectives, and spirit of the statute based on good sound reasoning.’ ” Scott v. Ashland Healthcare Ctr., Inc., 49 S.W.3d 281, 286 (Tenn.2001) (quoting State v. Turner, 913 S.W.2d 158, 160 (Tenn.1995)). Component parts of a statute are to be construed, if possible, consistently and reasonably. See State v. Alford, 970 S.W.2d 944, 946 (Tenn.1998). Aiding in our interpretation of legislative intent are the maxims of nosci-tur a sociis and ejusdem generis. Under the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, “the meaning of questionable or doubtful words or phrases in a statute may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of other words or phrases associated with it.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1060 (6th ed.1990); see also Hammer v. Franklin Interurban Co., 209 Tenn. 399, 354 S.W.2d 241, 242 (1962) (recognizing that in the absence of a statutory definition statutory terms are construed in accordance with their ordinary or natural meaning", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nobjectives, and spirit of the statute based on good sound reasoning.’ ” Scott v. Ashland Healthcare Ctr., Inc., 49 S.W.3d 281, 286 (Tenn.2001) (quoting State v. Turner, 913 S.W.2d 158, 160 (Tenn.1995)). Component parts of a statute are to be construed, if possible, consistently and reasonably. See State v. Alford, 970 S.W.2d 944, 946 (Tenn.1998). Aiding in our interpretation of legislative intent are the maxims of nosci-tur a sociis and ejusdem generis. Under the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, “the meaning of questionable or doubtful words or phrases in a statute may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of other words or phrases associated with it.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1060 (6th ed.1990); see also Hammer v. Franklin Interurban Co., 209 Tenn. 399, 354 S.W.2d 241, 242 (1962) (holding that the meaning of doubtful terms or phrases may be determined by reference to their relationship with other associated words or phrases noscitur a sociis" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nobtained [the funds] in the first place, but no longer [has] a valid claim to retain them” because they were “in excess of his fee for the services rendered” in the Oxford actions and (2) that he “was not found to have himself violated the securities laws and has not been alleged to have committed other acts of fraud by the SEC.” Id. at 24, 27 (citing In re Sherman, 491 F.3d at 959). The SEC argues in contrast that there is no “consensus” among courts that § 523(a)(19) applies only when the debt derives from a securities law violation by the debtor. Id. at 10. The SEC contends that none of the cases cited by Sherman involved a nominal defendant and that In re Matthews is the only case presenting similar facts. Id. (citing Case No. 07-10108-BH (Bankr.W.D.Okla. Dec. 12, 2008) (holding that puffery is not actionable under the securities laws", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nobtained [the funds] in the first place, but no longer [has] a valid claim to retain them” because they were “in excess of his fee for the services rendered” in the Oxford actions and (2) that he “was not found to have himself violated the securities laws and has not been alleged to have committed other acts of fraud by the SEC.” Id. at 24, 27 (citing In re Sherman, 491 F.3d at 959). The SEC argues in contrast that there is no “consensus” among courts that § 523(a)(19) applies only when the debt derives from a securities law violation by the debtor. Id. at 10. The SEC contends that none of the cases cited by Sherman involved a nominal defendant and that In re Matthews is the only case presenting similar facts. Id. (citing Case No. 07-10108-BH (Bankr.W.D.Okla. Dec. 12, 2008) (holding that the defendant was nondisehargeable where the plaintiff estab lished a violation of oklahoma securities laws by showing that defendants were in possession of funds that belonged to other investors", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nobtained [the funds] in the first place, but no longer [has] a valid claim to retain them” because they were “in excess of his fee for the services rendered” in the Oxford actions and (2) that he “was not found to have himself violated the securities laws and has not been alleged to have committed other acts of fraud by the SEC.” Id. at 24, 27 (citing In re Sherman, 491 F.3d at 959). The SEC argues in contrast that there is no “consensus” among courts that § 523(a)(19) applies only when the debt derives from a securities law violation by the debtor. Id. at 10. The SEC contends that none of the cases cited by Sherman involved a nominal defendant and that In re Matthews is the only case presenting similar facts. Id. (citing Case No. 07-10108-BH (Bankr.W.D.Okla. Dec. 12, 2008) (holding that the in connection with requirement of rule 10b5 was satisfied where investors were injured as investors through respondents deceptions and the scheme to defraud and the sale of securities coineided", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nobtained [the funds] in the first place, but no longer [has] a valid claim to retain them” because they were “in excess of his fee for the services rendered” in the Oxford actions and (2) that he “was not found to have himself violated the securities laws and has not been alleged to have committed other acts of fraud by the SEC.” Id. at 24, 27 (citing In re Sherman, 491 F.3d at 959). The SEC argues in contrast that there is no “consensus” among courts that § 523(a)(19) applies only when the debt derives from a securities law violation by the debtor. Id. at 10. The SEC contends that none of the cases cited by Sherman involved a nominal defendant and that In re Matthews is the only case presenting similar facts. Id. (citing Case No. 07-10108-BH (Bankr.W.D.Okla. Dec. 12, 2008) (holding that morrison precludes securities claims brought by us investors who purchase securities on a foreign exchange even where those securities are also listed on a us exchange", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nobtained [the funds] in the first place, but no longer [has] a valid claim to retain them” because they were “in excess of his fee for the services rendered” in the Oxford actions and (2) that he “was not found to have himself violated the securities laws and has not been alleged to have committed other acts of fraud by the SEC.” Id. at 24, 27 (citing In re Sherman, 491 F.3d at 959). The SEC argues in contrast that there is no “consensus” among courts that § 523(a)(19) applies only when the debt derives from a securities law violation by the debtor. Id. at 10. The SEC contends that none of the cases cited by Sherman involved a nominal defendant and that In re Matthews is the only case presenting similar facts. Id. (citing Case No. 07-10108-BH (Bankr.W.D.Okla. Dec. 12, 2008) (holding that nyseg telling its investors that it would not compromise its financial integrity was not actionable under the securities laws" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nliability under the law of the state where the accident occurred. See Eugene F. Scoles et al., Conflict of Laws § 17.56 (4th ed. 2004) (citing cases showing split of authority whether insureds must prove they are legally entitled to recover under law of state where policy was issued or state in which accident occurred, for purposes of UM or UIM coverage). This application of Crossley is supported by cases from other jurisdictions cited in that opinion. See, Bachman v. American Mutual Insurance Co. of Boston, 338 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Kan. 1972) (concluding in action against decedent’s insurer that plaintiff had failed to sustain his burden of showing uninsured motorist was liable for injuries to plaintiff’s son); Noland v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 413 S.W.2d 530, 533 (Mo. App. 1967) (holding a personal profit exclusion applicable to an insured corporation where the purpose of the exclusion was to exclude coverage when the insured received profits to which the insured was not legally entitled", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nliability under the law of the state where the accident occurred. See Eugene F. Scoles et al., Conflict of Laws § 17.56 (4th ed. 2004) (citing cases showing split of authority whether insureds must prove they are legally entitled to recover under law of state where policy was issued or state in which accident occurred, for purposes of UM or UIM coverage). This application of Crossley is supported by cases from other jurisdictions cited in that opinion. See, Bachman v. American Mutual Insurance Co. of Boston, 338 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Kan. 1972) (concluding in action against decedent’s insurer that plaintiff had failed to sustain his burden of showing uninsured motorist was liable for injuries to plaintiff’s son); Noland v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 413 S.W.2d 530, 533 (Mo. App. 1967) (holding that waiver of um coverage was ineffective under south carolina law because insurer did not adequately advise insured party about um coverage", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nliability under the law of the state where the accident occurred. See Eugene F. Scoles et al., Conflict of Laws § 17.56 (4th ed. 2004) (citing cases showing split of authority whether insureds must prove they are legally entitled to recover under law of state where policy was issued or state in which accident occurred, for purposes of UM or UIM coverage). This application of Crossley is supported by cases from other jurisdictions cited in that opinion. See, Bachman v. American Mutual Insurance Co. of Boston, 338 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Kan. 1972) (concluding in action against decedent’s insurer that plaintiff had failed to sustain his burden of showing uninsured motorist was liable for injuries to plaintiff’s son); Noland v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 413 S.W.2d 530, 533 (Mo. App. 1967) (holding public policy of um statute not violated by exclusion of um coverage for passenger of vehicle driven by excluded driver", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nliability under the law of the state where the accident occurred. See Eugene F. Scoles et al., Conflict of Laws § 17.56 (4th ed. 2004) (citing cases showing split of authority whether insureds must prove they are legally entitled to recover under law of state where policy was issued or state in which accident occurred, for purposes of UM or UIM coverage). This application of Crossley is supported by cases from other jurisdictions cited in that opinion. See, Bachman v. American Mutual Insurance Co. of Boston, 338 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Kan. 1972) (concluding in action against decedent’s insurer that plaintiff had failed to sustain his burden of showing uninsured motorist was liable for injuries to plaintiff’s son); Noland v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 413 S.W.2d 530, 533 (Mo. App. 1967) (holding that where missouri insured was injured in missouri when car in which she was riding was struck by separate uninsured vehicle driven by her husband and where missouri law precluded wife from suing husband insured was not entitled to um benefits because coverage was provided only when um motorist was legally responsible for damages noting that action against insurer was upon contract not tort and that the terms of the contract govern", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nliability under the law of the state where the accident occurred. See Eugene F. Scoles et al., Conflict of Laws § 17.56 (4th ed. 2004) (citing cases showing split of authority whether insureds must prove they are legally entitled to recover under law of state where policy was issued or state in which accident occurred, for purposes of UM or UIM coverage). This application of Crossley is supported by cases from other jurisdictions cited in that opinion. See, Bachman v. American Mutual Insurance Co. of Boston, 338 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Kan. 1972) (concluding in action against decedent’s insurer that plaintiff had failed to sustain his burden of showing uninsured motorist was liable for injuries to plaintiff’s son); Noland v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 413 S.W.2d 530, 533 (Mo. App. 1967) (holding that while the owner of several vehicles by paying a single premium for um coverage applicable to only one of them secures um coverage for himself and his family while occupying the uninsured vehicles as well as the insured vehicle the number of uninsured motorist coverages available to be stacked should be based upon the number of coverages for which uninsured motorist premiums were paid" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n\"person\" is defined in AS 23.30.045 and 055. 13 . AS 01.10.040(b). 14 . Minutes, Sen. Judiciary Comm. Hearing on S.B. 323, 23d Leg.2d Sess. at 34 (Apr. 14, 2004) (statement of Sen. Scott Ogan). 15 . Id. at 35 (testimony of Jack Miller). 16 . Id. 17 . Minutes, Sen. Judiciary Comm. Hearing on S.B. 323, 23d Leg.2d Sess. at 20 (Apr. 2, 2004) (statement of Sen. Ralph Seekins); Minutes, Sen. Judiciary Comm. Hearing on S$.B. 323, 23d Leg.2d Sess. at 9-10 (Apr. 16, 2004) (statement of Sen. Ralph Seekins). 18 . Cf. Seward Marine Servs., Inc. v. Anderson, 643 P.2d 493, 496-97 n. 8 (Alaska 1982) (noting committee testimony must have been \"endorsed by the legislature or relied on\" to be persuasive evidence of legislative intent). 19 . See Mustafoski v. State, 867 P.2d 824, 833-34 (Alaska App.1994) (holding that a state is not a person within the meaning of 1983", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n\"person\" is defined in AS 23.30.045 and 055. 13 . AS 01.10.040(b). 14 . Minutes, Sen. Judiciary Comm. Hearing on S.B. 323, 23d Leg.2d Sess. at 34 (Apr. 14, 2004) (statement of Sen. Scott Ogan). 15 . Id. at 35 (testimony of Jack Miller). 16 . Id. 17 . Minutes, Sen. Judiciary Comm. Hearing on S.B. 323, 23d Leg.2d Sess. at 20 (Apr. 2, 2004) (statement of Sen. Ralph Seekins); Minutes, Sen. Judiciary Comm. Hearing on S$.B. 323, 23d Leg.2d Sess. at 9-10 (Apr. 16, 2004) (statement of Sen. Ralph Seekins). 18 . Cf. Seward Marine Servs., Inc. v. Anderson, 643 P.2d 493, 496-97 n. 8 (Alaska 1982) (noting committee testimony must have been \"endorsed by the legislature or relied on\" to be persuasive evidence of legislative intent). 19 . See Mustafoski v. State, 867 P.2d 824, 833-34 (Alaska App.1994) (holding state university is not a person under 1983", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n\"person\" is defined in AS 23.30.045 and 055. 13 . AS 01.10.040(b). 14 . Minutes, Sen. Judiciary Comm. Hearing on S.B. 323, 23d Leg.2d Sess. at 34 (Apr. 14, 2004) (statement of Sen. Scott Ogan). 15 . Id. at 35 (testimony of Jack Miller). 16 . Id. 17 . Minutes, Sen. Judiciary Comm. Hearing on S.B. 323, 23d Leg.2d Sess. at 20 (Apr. 2, 2004) (statement of Sen. Ralph Seekins); Minutes, Sen. Judiciary Comm. Hearing on S$.B. 323, 23d Leg.2d Sess. at 9-10 (Apr. 16, 2004) (statement of Sen. Ralph Seekins). 18 . Cf. Seward Marine Servs., Inc. v. Anderson, 643 P.2d 493, 496-97 n. 8 (Alaska 1982) (noting committee testimony must have been \"endorsed by the legislature or relied on\" to be persuasive evidence of legislative intent). 19 . See Mustafoski v. State, 867 P.2d 824, 833-34 (Alaska App.1994) (holding that this statute was the most analogous state statute for purposes of erisa action filed in utah", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n\"person\" is defined in AS 23.30.045 and 055. 13 . AS 01.10.040(b). 14 . Minutes, Sen. Judiciary Comm. Hearing on S.B. 323, 23d Leg.2d Sess. at 34 (Apr. 14, 2004) (statement of Sen. Scott Ogan). 15 . Id. at 35 (testimony of Jack Miller). 16 . Id. 17 . Minutes, Sen. Judiciary Comm. Hearing on S.B. 323, 23d Leg.2d Sess. at 20 (Apr. 2, 2004) (statement of Sen. Ralph Seekins); Minutes, Sen. Judiciary Comm. Hearing on S$.B. 323, 23d Leg.2d Sess. at 9-10 (Apr. 16, 2004) (statement of Sen. Ralph Seekins). 18 . Cf. Seward Marine Servs., Inc. v. Anderson, 643 P.2d 493, 496-97 n. 8 (Alaska 1982) (noting committee testimony must have been \"endorsed by the legislature or relied on\" to be persuasive evidence of legislative intent). 19 . See Mustafoski v. State, 867 P.2d 824, 833-34 (Alaska App.1994) (holding kansas public employees retirement system is not as a state agency considered a person for purposes of 1983 liability", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n\"person\" is defined in AS 23.30.045 and 055. 13 . AS 01.10.040(b). 14 . Minutes, Sen. Judiciary Comm. Hearing on S.B. 323, 23d Leg.2d Sess. at 34 (Apr. 14, 2004) (statement of Sen. Scott Ogan). 15 . Id. at 35 (testimony of Jack Miller). 16 . Id. 17 . Minutes, Sen. Judiciary Comm. Hearing on S.B. 323, 23d Leg.2d Sess. at 20 (Apr. 2, 2004) (statement of Sen. Ralph Seekins); Minutes, Sen. Judiciary Comm. Hearing on S$.B. 323, 23d Leg.2d Sess. at 9-10 (Apr. 16, 2004) (statement of Sen. Ralph Seekins). 18 . Cf. Seward Marine Servs., Inc. v. Anderson, 643 P.2d 493, 496-97 n. 8 (Alaska 1982) (noting committee testimony must have been \"endorsed by the legislature or relied on\" to be persuasive evidence of legislative intent). 19 . See Mustafoski v. State, 867 P.2d 824, 833-34 (Alaska App.1994) (holding state is person for purposes of judicial recusal statute" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nto be credible, id. at 140, and we cannot say that finding was clearly erroneous. The fact that the sponsors may receive an incidental benefit from the Happy Holidays sign — in the form of publicity and good will — does not refute Mr. Hall’s testimony as to the sign’s purpose. Indeed, any benefit that accrues to the sponsors ultimately serves the City’s interests by providing current and putative sponsors with an incentive to contribute to the Keep the Lights Foundation in the future. In this sense, the sign is comparable to the enhanced underwriter acknowledgments in Knights of the KKK. See 203 F.3d at 1088, 1093-94 & nn. 10-11. Second, it is uncontroverted that the City built, paid for, and erected the sign. Aplt.App. at 86-87; see also Knights of the KKK, 203 F.3d at 1094 n. 9 (holding that the validity of a collateral waiver is a threshold issue", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nto be credible, id. at 140, and we cannot say that finding was clearly erroneous. The fact that the sponsors may receive an incidental benefit from the Happy Holidays sign — in the form of publicity and good will — does not refute Mr. Hall’s testimony as to the sign’s purpose. Indeed, any benefit that accrues to the sponsors ultimately serves the City’s interests by providing current and putative sponsors with an incentive to contribute to the Keep the Lights Foundation in the future. In this sense, the sign is comparable to the enhanced underwriter acknowledgments in Knights of the KKK. See 203 F.3d at 1088, 1093-94 & nn. 10-11. Second, it is uncontroverted that the City built, paid for, and erected the sign. Aplt.App. at 86-87; see also Knights of the KKK, 203 F.3d at 1094 n. 9 (recognizing this rule", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nto be credible, id. at 140, and we cannot say that finding was clearly erroneous. The fact that the sponsors may receive an incidental benefit from the Happy Holidays sign — in the form of publicity and good will — does not refute Mr. Hall’s testimony as to the sign’s purpose. Indeed, any benefit that accrues to the sponsors ultimately serves the City’s interests by providing current and putative sponsors with an incentive to contribute to the Keep the Lights Foundation in the future. In this sense, the sign is comparable to the enhanced underwriter acknowledgments in Knights of the KKK. See 203 F.3d at 1088, 1093-94 & nn. 10-11. Second, it is uncontroverted that the City built, paid for, and erected the sign. Aplt.App. at 86-87; see also Knights of the KKK, 203 F.3d at 1094 n. 9 (recognizing the narrow exception created by almendareztorres but noting that it was not directly at issue in alleyne", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nto be credible, id. at 140, and we cannot say that finding was clearly erroneous. The fact that the sponsors may receive an incidental benefit from the Happy Holidays sign — in the form of publicity and good will — does not refute Mr. Hall’s testimony as to the sign’s purpose. Indeed, any benefit that accrues to the sponsors ultimately serves the City’s interests by providing current and putative sponsors with an incentive to contribute to the Keep the Lights Foundation in the future. In this sense, the sign is comparable to the enhanced underwriter acknowledgments in Knights of the KKK. See 203 F.3d at 1088, 1093-94 & nn. 10-11. Second, it is uncontroverted that the City built, paid for, and erected the sign. Aplt.App. at 86-87; see also Knights of the KKK, 203 F.3d at 1094 n. 9 (recognizing that the announcements at issue served primarily to identify sponsors but noting that conveyance of this collateral information remains a communicative act of the government", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nto be credible, id. at 140, and we cannot say that finding was clearly erroneous. The fact that the sponsors may receive an incidental benefit from the Happy Holidays sign — in the form of publicity and good will — does not refute Mr. Hall’s testimony as to the sign’s purpose. Indeed, any benefit that accrues to the sponsors ultimately serves the City’s interests by providing current and putative sponsors with an incentive to contribute to the Keep the Lights Foundation in the future. In this sense, the sign is comparable to the enhanced underwriter acknowledgments in Knights of the KKK. See 203 F.3d at 1088, 1093-94 & nn. 10-11. Second, it is uncontroverted that the City built, paid for, and erected the sign. Aplt.App. at 86-87; see also Knights of the KKK, 203 F.3d at 1094 n. 9 (recognizing a split of authority on this issue" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nmortgagor without adhering to the due on sale clause is not permitted to cure the mortgage defaults through the Chapter 13 plan over the objection of the mortgage holder.” In re Tewell, 355 B.R. at 682. Here, the Debtor seeks to do exactly that under the Plan. Wells Fargo has objected to the Plan and argues that it impermissi-bly modifies Wells Fargo’s rights in violation of § 1322(b)(2). This Court agrees. The Plan allows the Debtor to keep the Property and also keeps the automatic stay in place to prevent Wells Fargo from foreclosing on the Property; meanwhile, the Debtor is supposed to make payments to the Morgans pursuant to the terms of the Second Lien Note, and the Morgans would presumably then turn around and remit payment to Wells Fargo under the First Lien Note. Under th 1) (holding that a debtor may cure a default after acceleration but expressing no limit on the right", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nmortgagor without adhering to the due on sale clause is not permitted to cure the mortgage defaults through the Chapter 13 plan over the objection of the mortgage holder.” In re Tewell, 355 B.R. at 682. Here, the Debtor seeks to do exactly that under the Plan. Wells Fargo has objected to the Plan and argues that it impermissi-bly modifies Wells Fargo’s rights in violation of § 1322(b)(2). This Court agrees. The Plan allows the Debtor to keep the Property and also keeps the automatic stay in place to prevent Wells Fargo from foreclosing on the Property; meanwhile, the Debtor is supposed to make payments to the Morgans pursuant to the terms of the Second Lien Note, and the Morgans would presumably then turn around and remit payment to Wells Fargo under the First Lien Note. Under th 1) (holding debtor could include property because the bank accepted payments directly from the debtor and had previously allowed the debtor to cure default", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nmortgagor without adhering to the due on sale clause is not permitted to cure the mortgage defaults through the Chapter 13 plan over the objection of the mortgage holder.” In re Tewell, 355 B.R. at 682. Here, the Debtor seeks to do exactly that under the Plan. Wells Fargo has objected to the Plan and argues that it impermissi-bly modifies Wells Fargo’s rights in violation of § 1322(b)(2). This Court agrees. The Plan allows the Debtor to keep the Property and also keeps the automatic stay in place to prevent Wells Fargo from foreclosing on the Property; meanwhile, the Debtor is supposed to make payments to the Morgans pursuant to the terms of the Second Lien Note, and the Morgans would presumably then turn around and remit payment to Wells Fargo under the First Lien Note. Under th 1) (holding that the debtor had the right to cure the default because the foreclosure sale was not complete under state law until it was confirmed by a court", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nmortgagor without adhering to the due on sale clause is not permitted to cure the mortgage defaults through the Chapter 13 plan over the objection of the mortgage holder.” In re Tewell, 355 B.R. at 682. Here, the Debtor seeks to do exactly that under the Plan. Wells Fargo has objected to the Plan and argues that it impermissi-bly modifies Wells Fargo’s rights in violation of § 1322(b)(2). This Court agrees. The Plan allows the Debtor to keep the Property and also keeps the automatic stay in place to prevent Wells Fargo from foreclosing on the Property; meanwhile, the Debtor is supposed to make payments to the Morgans pursuant to the terms of the Second Lien Note, and the Morgans would presumably then turn around and remit payment to Wells Fargo under the First Lien Note. Under th 1) (holding debtor could cure after the debtor had previously made payments to the bank", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nmortgagor without adhering to the due on sale clause is not permitted to cure the mortgage defaults through the Chapter 13 plan over the objection of the mortgage holder.” In re Tewell, 355 B.R. at 682. Here, the Debtor seeks to do exactly that under the Plan. Wells Fargo has objected to the Plan and argues that it impermissi-bly modifies Wells Fargo’s rights in violation of § 1322(b)(2). This Court agrees. The Plan allows the Debtor to keep the Property and also keeps the automatic stay in place to prevent Wells Fargo from foreclosing on the Property; meanwhile, the Debtor is supposed to make payments to the Morgans pursuant to the terms of the Second Lien Note, and the Morgans would presumably then turn around and remit payment to Wells Fargo under the First Lien Note. Under th 1) (holding debtor could cure default partly because the bank held a recourse loan and therefore could recover against the original borrower personally" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nnotices. And the only places that the word “credit” appears are in the notification that Plaintiff could stop receiving prescreened offers of credit by calling a toll-free number, and in the last sentence of the “PreScreen & Opt Out Notice” on the reverse side of the letter, telling Plaintiff that if she “did not wish to receive any further promotional offers, please call (888) 567-8688, to opt out of the credit bureau mailing list.” Although Congress chose a broad definition of a “firm offer of credit,” and courts have been lender-friendly in finding less-than-complete offers to constitute a firm offer of credit, the Court concludes that here, Defendant has not met the minimum requirements of the Act. Cf, e.g., Sullivan v. Greenwood Credit Union, 520 F.3d 70, 71, 76 (1st Cir.2008) (holding that a mailing which stated because of your excellent credit you have been preapproved for a home loan up to 100 of the value of your home was a firm offer of credit", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nnotices. And the only places that the word “credit” appears are in the notification that Plaintiff could stop receiving prescreened offers of credit by calling a toll-free number, and in the last sentence of the “PreScreen & Opt Out Notice” on the reverse side of the letter, telling Plaintiff that if she “did not wish to receive any further promotional offers, please call (888) 567-8688, to opt out of the credit bureau mailing list.” Although Congress chose a broad definition of a “firm offer of credit,” and courts have been lender-friendly in finding less-than-complete offers to constitute a firm offer of credit, the Court concludes that here, Defendant has not met the minimum requirements of the Act. Cf, e.g., Sullivan v. Greenwood Credit Union, 520 F.3d 70, 71, 76 (1st Cir.2008) (holding that the fcras provision that a lender may only use and obtain consumer credit information for the purpose of making a firm offer of credit requires that the lender offer something of value as an extension of credit alone", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nnotices. And the only places that the word “credit” appears are in the notification that Plaintiff could stop receiving prescreened offers of credit by calling a toll-free number, and in the last sentence of the “PreScreen & Opt Out Notice” on the reverse side of the letter, telling Plaintiff that if she “did not wish to receive any further promotional offers, please call (888) 567-8688, to opt out of the credit bureau mailing list.” Although Congress chose a broad definition of a “firm offer of credit,” and courts have been lender-friendly in finding less-than-complete offers to constitute a firm offer of credit, the Court concludes that here, Defendant has not met the minimum requirements of the Act. Cf, e.g., Sullivan v. Greenwood Credit Union, 520 F.3d 70, 71, 76 (1st Cir.2008) (recognizing statutory credit", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nnotices. And the only places that the word “credit” appears are in the notification that Plaintiff could stop receiving prescreened offers of credit by calling a toll-free number, and in the last sentence of the “PreScreen & Opt Out Notice” on the reverse side of the letter, telling Plaintiff that if she “did not wish to receive any further promotional offers, please call (888) 567-8688, to opt out of the credit bureau mailing list.” Although Congress chose a broad definition of a “firm offer of credit,” and courts have been lender-friendly in finding less-than-complete offers to constitute a firm offer of credit, the Court concludes that here, Defendant has not met the minimum requirements of the Act. Cf, e.g., Sullivan v. Greenwood Credit Union, 520 F.3d 70, 71, 76 (1st Cir.2008) (holding victims with poor credit histories were particularly susceptible to schemes involving offers of preapproved credit cards", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nnotices. And the only places that the word “credit” appears are in the notification that Plaintiff could stop receiving prescreened offers of credit by calling a toll-free number, and in the last sentence of the “PreScreen & Opt Out Notice” on the reverse side of the letter, telling Plaintiff that if she “did not wish to receive any further promotional offers, please call (888) 567-8688, to opt out of the credit bureau mailing list.” Although Congress chose a broad definition of a “firm offer of credit,” and courts have been lender-friendly in finding less-than-complete offers to constitute a firm offer of credit, the Court concludes that here, Defendant has not met the minimum requirements of the Act. Cf, e.g., Sullivan v. Greenwood Credit Union, 520 F.3d 70, 71, 76 (1st Cir.2008) (holding that because the fcra does not require the disclosure in a firm offer of credit of amount of credit and interest rates courts should not imply such additional disclosure requirements explaining that the import of cole was that a firm offer of credit must have economic value rather than which terms must be included" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat although states are free to grant citizens greater protection based on state constitutional provisions than the United States Supreme Court divines from the United States Constitution, most states that have addressed the use of drug-detecting canines have followed United States v. Place in holding that their use does not constitute a search); see generally Brian L. Porto, Annotation, Use of Trained Dog To Detect Narcotics Or Drugs As Unweasonable Search In Violation Of Fourth Amendment,. 150 ALR. Fed. 399 (2001). Those courts reason that dog sniffs are not searches because they are only minimally intrusive and because they occur in places where individuals do not have heightened expectations of privacy. E.g., United States v. Morales-Zamora, 914 F.2d 200, 205 (10th Cir.1990) (holding that a dog sniff of the area outside the door of a hotel room is not a search under the fourth amendment or the texas constitution because the dogs sniff does not explore the details of the hotel room and the sniff reveals nothing about the room other than the presence of cocaine in which there is no legitimate privacy interest", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat although states are free to grant citizens greater protection based on state constitutional provisions than the United States Supreme Court divines from the United States Constitution, most states that have addressed the use of drug-detecting canines have followed United States v. Place in holding that their use does not constitute a search); see generally Brian L. Porto, Annotation, Use of Trained Dog To Detect Narcotics Or Drugs As Unweasonable Search In Violation Of Fourth Amendment,. 150 ALR. Fed. 399 (2001). Those courts reason that dog sniffs are not searches because they are only minimally intrusive and because they occur in places where individuals do not have heightened expectations of privacy. E.g., United States v. Morales-Zamora, 914 F.2d 200, 205 (10th Cir.1990) (holding that there is no intrusion on a legitimate privacy interest where a dog sniff of an automobile reveals only information regarding contraband items and concluding that society does not recognize a legitimate expectation of privacy in the public airspace surrounding a vehicle where the odor of narcotics escapes from the interi or of a vehicle into that public airspace", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat although states are free to grant citizens greater protection based on state constitutional provisions than the United States Supreme Court divines from the United States Constitution, most states that have addressed the use of drug-detecting canines have followed United States v. Place in holding that their use does not constitute a search); see generally Brian L. Porto, Annotation, Use of Trained Dog To Detect Narcotics Or Drugs As Unweasonable Search In Violation Of Fourth Amendment,. 150 ALR. Fed. 399 (2001). Those courts reason that dog sniffs are not searches because they are only minimally intrusive and because they occur in places where individuals do not have heightened expectations of privacy. E.g., United States v. Morales-Zamora, 914 F.2d 200, 205 (10th Cir.1990) (holding that a dog sniff during a legitimate traffic stop does not constitute a search because there is no expectation of privacy in contraband and a dog sniff does not violate any privacy interest", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat although states are free to grant citizens greater protection based on state constitutional provisions than the United States Supreme Court divines from the United States Constitution, most states that have addressed the use of drug-detecting canines have followed United States v. Place in holding that their use does not constitute a search); see generally Brian L. Porto, Annotation, Use of Trained Dog To Detect Narcotics Or Drugs As Unweasonable Search In Violation Of Fourth Amendment,. 150 ALR. Fed. 399 (2001). Those courts reason that dog sniffs are not searches because they are only minimally intrusive and because they occur in places where individuals do not have heightened expectations of privacy. E.g., United States v. Morales-Zamora, 914 F.2d 200, 205 (10th Cir.1990) (holding that society recognizes a reasonable expectation of privacy", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat although states are free to grant citizens greater protection based on state constitutional provisions than the United States Supreme Court divines from the United States Constitution, most states that have addressed the use of drug-detecting canines have followed United States v. Place in holding that their use does not constitute a search); see generally Brian L. Porto, Annotation, Use of Trained Dog To Detect Narcotics Or Drugs As Unweasonable Search In Violation Of Fourth Amendment,. 150 ALR. Fed. 399 (2001). Those courts reason that dog sniffs are not searches because they are only minimally intrusive and because they occur in places where individuals do not have heightened expectations of privacy. E.g., United States v. Morales-Zamora, 914 F.2d 200, 205 (10th Cir.1990) (holding that a dog sniff of a vehicle during a traffic stop conducted absent reasonable suspicion of illegal drug activity did not violate the fourth amendment because it did not implicate any legitimate privacy interest" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nSecond, \"[o}rderly procedure ... requires that a party must present his entire case and his theory ... of recovery to the trial court.\" Dansie v. City of Herriman, 2006 UT 23, ¶ 30, 134 P.3d 1139 (first and second alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). The policy of judicial economy is most directly frustrated when an appellant asserts unpreserved claims that require factual predicates. For this reason, the preservation rule should be more strictly applied when the asserted new issue or theory \"depends on controverted factual questions whose relevance thereto was not made to appear at trial.\" James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah Ct.App.1987) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Turtle Mgmt., Inc. v. Haggis Mgmt., Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 672 (Utah 1982) (holding that an issue was not properly before the court on appeal because the trial court did not have the opportunity to make any findings of fact regarding it", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nSecond, \"[o}rderly procedure ... requires that a party must present his entire case and his theory ... of recovery to the trial court.\" Dansie v. City of Herriman, 2006 UT 23, ¶ 30, 134 P.3d 1139 (first and second alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). The policy of judicial economy is most directly frustrated when an appellant asserts unpreserved claims that require factual predicates. For this reason, the preservation rule should be more strictly applied when the asserted new issue or theory \"depends on controverted factual questions whose relevance thereto was not made to appear at trial.\" James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah Ct.App.1987) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Turtle Mgmt., Inc. v. Haggis Mgmt., Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 672 (Utah 1982) (holding the findings of fact required to support an alimony award are sufficient if findings of fact have been made on the ultimate facts at issue in the case and the findings of fact show the trial court properly applied the law in the case", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nSecond, \"[o}rderly procedure ... requires that a party must present his entire case and his theory ... of recovery to the trial court.\" Dansie v. City of Herriman, 2006 UT 23, ¶ 30, 134 P.3d 1139 (first and second alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). The policy of judicial economy is most directly frustrated when an appellant asserts unpreserved claims that require factual predicates. For this reason, the preservation rule should be more strictly applied when the asserted new issue or theory \"depends on controverted factual questions whose relevance thereto was not made to appear at trial.\" James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah Ct.App.1987) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Turtle Mgmt., Inc. v. Haggis Mgmt., Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 672 (Utah 1982) (holding that a letter utilized by the appellant in his argument would not be considered on appeal because it was not properly before the trial court", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nSecond, \"[o}rderly procedure ... requires that a party must present his entire case and his theory ... of recovery to the trial court.\" Dansie v. City of Herriman, 2006 UT 23, ¶ 30, 134 P.3d 1139 (first and second alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). The policy of judicial economy is most directly frustrated when an appellant asserts unpreserved claims that require factual predicates. For this reason, the preservation rule should be more strictly applied when the asserted new issue or theory \"depends on controverted factual questions whose relevance thereto was not made to appear at trial.\" James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah Ct.App.1987) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Turtle Mgmt., Inc. v. Haggis Mgmt., Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 672 (Utah 1982) (holding that trial court made sufficient findings of fact when it dismissed appeal", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nSecond, \"[o}rderly procedure ... requires that a party must present his entire case and his theory ... of recovery to the trial court.\" Dansie v. City of Herriman, 2006 UT 23, ¶ 30, 134 P.3d 1139 (first and second alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). The policy of judicial economy is most directly frustrated when an appellant asserts unpreserved claims that require factual predicates. For this reason, the preservation rule should be more strictly applied when the asserted new issue or theory \"depends on controverted factual questions whose relevance thereto was not made to appear at trial.\" James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah Ct.App.1987) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Turtle Mgmt., Inc. v. Haggis Mgmt., Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 672 (Utah 1982) (holding that it is not an appellate courts function to make findings of fact" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\n1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974). Moreover, suits against a state, brought in federal court, for violation of a state law, are also barred by the Eleventh Amendment, even if the court would otherwise have supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984); see also McNeilus Truck & Mfg., Inc. v. Ohio ex rel. Montgomery, 226 F.3d 429, 438 (6th Cir.2000). Plaintiff has not'pointed the Court to any provision of state or federal law that would waive Maryland’s sovereign immunity, and the Court does not find a waiver in any of the state or federal statutes that plaintiff cites as the basis for his claims. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 239-40, 105 S.Ct. 3142, 87 L.Ed.2d 171 (1985) (holding that a statute shall not be given retroactive effect unless such construction is required by explicit language or by necessary implication", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\n1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974). Moreover, suits against a state, brought in federal court, for violation of a state law, are also barred by the Eleventh Amendment, even if the court would otherwise have supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984); see also McNeilus Truck & Mfg., Inc. v. Ohio ex rel. Montgomery, 226 F.3d 429, 438 (6th Cir.2000). Plaintiff has not'pointed the Court to any provision of state or federal law that would waive Maryland’s sovereign immunity, and the Court does not find a waiver in any of the state or federal statutes that plaintiff cites as the basis for his claims. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 239-40, 105 S.Ct. 3142, 87 L.Ed.2d 171 (1985) (holding that courts will only find a waiver of sovereign immunity by the most express language or by such overwhelming implication from the text as will leave no room for any other reasonable construction", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\n1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974). Moreover, suits against a state, brought in federal court, for violation of a state law, are also barred by the Eleventh Amendment, even if the court would otherwise have supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984); see also McNeilus Truck & Mfg., Inc. v. Ohio ex rel. Montgomery, 226 F.3d 429, 438 (6th Cir.2000). Plaintiff has not'pointed the Court to any provision of state or federal law that would waive Maryland’s sovereign immunity, and the Court does not find a waiver in any of the state or federal statutes that plaintiff cites as the basis for his claims. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 239-40, 105 S.Ct. 3142, 87 L.Ed.2d 171 (1985) (holding that indiana courts will only engage in statutory interpretation if the language of the statute is ambiguous", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\n1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974). Moreover, suits against a state, brought in federal court, for violation of a state law, are also barred by the Eleventh Amendment, even if the court would otherwise have supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984); see also McNeilus Truck & Mfg., Inc. v. Ohio ex rel. Montgomery, 226 F.3d 429, 438 (6th Cir.2000). Plaintiff has not'pointed the Court to any provision of state or federal law that would waive Maryland’s sovereign immunity, and the Court does not find a waiver in any of the state or federal statutes that plaintiff cites as the basis for his claims. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 239-40, 105 S.Ct. 3142, 87 L.Ed.2d 171 (1985) (holding that we will not grant relief unless the indictment is so obviously defective as not to charge the offense alleged by any reasonable construction", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\n1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974). Moreover, suits against a state, brought in federal court, for violation of a state law, are also barred by the Eleventh Amendment, even if the court would otherwise have supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984); see also McNeilus Truck & Mfg., Inc. v. Ohio ex rel. Montgomery, 226 F.3d 429, 438 (6th Cir.2000). Plaintiff has not'pointed the Court to any provision of state or federal law that would waive Maryland’s sovereign immunity, and the Court does not find a waiver in any of the state or federal statutes that plaintiff cites as the basis for his claims. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 239-40, 105 S.Ct. 3142, 87 L.Ed.2d 171 (1985) (holding same as to an easement by implication" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nnot against the public policy of North Dakota. [¶ 8] “Comity is a principle under which the courts of one state give effect to the laws of another state ... not as a rule of law, but rather out of deference or respect.” Trillium USA, Inc. v. Bd. of County Com’rs of Broward County, 37 P.3d 1093,1098 (Utah 2001). Courts apply comity “.to foster cooperation, promote harmony, and build good will.” Id. This Court has stated comity is “a willingness to grant a privilege, not as a matter of right, but out of deference and good will.” Dow v. Lillie, 26 N.D. 512, 529, 144 N.W. 1082, 1088 (1914). A primary concern is whether the forum state’s public policies will be compromised if comity is applied. Idr, Schoeberlein v. Purdue Univ., 129 Ill.2d 372, 135 Ill.Dec. 787, 544 N.E.2d 283, 288 (1989) (holding that illinois public policy did not require the application of illinois law to an illinois accident involving only indiana residents insured in indiana", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nnot against the public policy of North Dakota. [¶ 8] “Comity is a principle under which the courts of one state give effect to the laws of another state ... not as a rule of law, but rather out of deference or respect.” Trillium USA, Inc. v. Bd. of County Com’rs of Broward County, 37 P.3d 1093,1098 (Utah 2001). Courts apply comity “.to foster cooperation, promote harmony, and build good will.” Id. This Court has stated comity is “a willingness to grant a privilege, not as a matter of right, but out of deference and good will.” Dow v. Lillie, 26 N.D. 512, 529, 144 N.W. 1082, 1088 (1914). A primary concern is whether the forum state’s public policies will be compromised if comity is applied. Idr, Schoeberlein v. Purdue Univ., 129 Ill.2d 372, 135 Ill.Dec. 787, 544 N.E.2d 283, 288 (1989) (holding comity was appropriate when the forum state could not be sued under its laws in similar circumstances and application of a sister states law was consistent with illinois policies", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nnot against the public policy of North Dakota. [¶ 8] “Comity is a principle under which the courts of one state give effect to the laws of another state ... not as a rule of law, but rather out of deference or respect.” Trillium USA, Inc. v. Bd. of County Com’rs of Broward County, 37 P.3d 1093,1098 (Utah 2001). Courts apply comity “.to foster cooperation, promote harmony, and build good will.” Id. This Court has stated comity is “a willingness to grant a privilege, not as a matter of right, but out of deference and good will.” Dow v. Lillie, 26 N.D. 512, 529, 144 N.W. 1082, 1088 (1914). A primary concern is whether the forum state’s public policies will be compromised if comity is applied. Idr, Schoeberlein v. Purdue Univ., 129 Ill.2d 372, 135 Ill.Dec. 787, 544 N.E.2d 283, 288 (1989) (holding that the united states was a statutory loaning employer under illinois law", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nnot against the public policy of North Dakota. [¶ 8] “Comity is a principle under which the courts of one state give effect to the laws of another state ... not as a rule of law, but rather out of deference or respect.” Trillium USA, Inc. v. Bd. of County Com’rs of Broward County, 37 P.3d 1093,1098 (Utah 2001). Courts apply comity “.to foster cooperation, promote harmony, and build good will.” Id. This Court has stated comity is “a willingness to grant a privilege, not as a matter of right, but out of deference and good will.” Dow v. Lillie, 26 N.D. 512, 529, 144 N.W. 1082, 1088 (1914). A primary concern is whether the forum state’s public policies will be compromised if comity is applied. Idr, Schoeberlein v. Purdue Univ., 129 Ill.2d 372, 135 Ill.Dec. 787, 544 N.E.2d 283, 288 (1989) (holding that in the event that parties are from different states and the subject matter is national in scope and where the contract states it shall be deemed to be made under the laws of the state of new york and for all purposes construed in accordance with laws of said state new york law applies as the parties choice of law", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nnot against the public policy of North Dakota. [¶ 8] “Comity is a principle under which the courts of one state give effect to the laws of another state ... not as a rule of law, but rather out of deference or respect.” Trillium USA, Inc. v. Bd. of County Com’rs of Broward County, 37 P.3d 1093,1098 (Utah 2001). Courts apply comity “.to foster cooperation, promote harmony, and build good will.” Id. This Court has stated comity is “a willingness to grant a privilege, not as a matter of right, but out of deference and good will.” Dow v. Lillie, 26 N.D. 512, 529, 144 N.W. 1082, 1088 (1914). A primary concern is whether the forum state’s public policies will be compromised if comity is applied. Idr, Schoeberlein v. Purdue Univ., 129 Ill.2d 372, 135 Ill.Dec. 787, 544 N.E.2d 283, 288 (1989) (holding that in interpreting a contract we look to the conflict of laws rules of the forum state to determine which states laws will be controlling" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\na line for the employee’s signature, a clear disclaimer that the handbook was not intended to form a separate contract as well as a statement that “all of the provisions of the handbook ... are only guidelines.” Id. at 53. Massachusetts courts have so recognized the legal effect of employee manuals. See O’Brien v. New England Telephone & Telegraph Company, 422 Mass. 686, 693, 664 N.E.2d 843 (“Of course, the provisions of a personnel manual on analysis may grant no rights. [Jackson v. Action for Boston Cmty. Dev., Inc., 403 Mass. 8, 525 N.E.2d 411 (1988) ] noted that, if the manual states that it provides only guidance as to the employer’s policies ..., it may not create any enforceable rights.”); cf. Ferguson v. Host Int’l, Inc., 53 Mass.App.Ct. 96, 103, 757 N.E.2d 267 (2001) (holding that a defendants stipulation to the facts establishing guilt was the functional equivalent of guilty plea", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\na line for the employee’s signature, a clear disclaimer that the handbook was not intended to form a separate contract as well as a statement that “all of the provisions of the handbook ... are only guidelines.” Id. at 53. Massachusetts courts have so recognized the legal effect of employee manuals. See O’Brien v. New England Telephone & Telegraph Company, 422 Mass. 686, 693, 664 N.E.2d 843 (“Of course, the provisions of a personnel manual on analysis may grant no rights. [Jackson v. Action for Boston Cmty. Dev., Inc., 403 Mass. 8, 525 N.E.2d 411 (1988) ] noted that, if the manual states that it provides only guidance as to the employer’s policies ..., it may not create any enforceable rights.”); cf. Ferguson v. Host Int’l, Inc., 53 Mass.App.Ct. 96, 103, 757 N.E.2d 267 (2001) (holding inconspicuous written disclaimer to be unenforceable absent actual knowledge of the disclaimer", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\na line for the employee’s signature, a clear disclaimer that the handbook was not intended to form a separate contract as well as a statement that “all of the provisions of the handbook ... are only guidelines.” Id. at 53. Massachusetts courts have so recognized the legal effect of employee manuals. See O’Brien v. New England Telephone & Telegraph Company, 422 Mass. 686, 693, 664 N.E.2d 843 (“Of course, the provisions of a personnel manual on analysis may grant no rights. [Jackson v. Action for Boston Cmty. Dev., Inc., 403 Mass. 8, 525 N.E.2d 411 (1988) ] noted that, if the manual states that it provides only guidance as to the employer’s policies ..., it may not create any enforceable rights.”); cf. Ferguson v. Host Int’l, Inc., 53 Mass.App.Ct. 96, 103, 757 N.E.2d 267 (2001) (holding that where the disclaimer provisions in the employee manual properly could be viewed by the fact finder as the functional equivalent of fine print they did not pre vent the formation of a contract", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\na line for the employee’s signature, a clear disclaimer that the handbook was not intended to form a separate contract as well as a statement that “all of the provisions of the handbook ... are only guidelines.” Id. at 53. Massachusetts courts have so recognized the legal effect of employee manuals. See O’Brien v. New England Telephone & Telegraph Company, 422 Mass. 686, 693, 664 N.E.2d 843 (“Of course, the provisions of a personnel manual on analysis may grant no rights. [Jackson v. Action for Boston Cmty. Dev., Inc., 403 Mass. 8, 525 N.E.2d 411 (1988) ] noted that, if the manual states that it provides only guidance as to the employer’s policies ..., it may not create any enforceable rights.”); cf. Ferguson v. Host Int’l, Inc., 53 Mass.App.Ct. 96, 103, 757 N.E.2d 267 (2001) (holding that a change in the method of compensation met the consideration requirement of contract formation", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\na line for the employee’s signature, a clear disclaimer that the handbook was not intended to form a separate contract as well as a statement that “all of the provisions of the handbook ... are only guidelines.” Id. at 53. Massachusetts courts have so recognized the legal effect of employee manuals. See O’Brien v. New England Telephone & Telegraph Company, 422 Mass. 686, 693, 664 N.E.2d 843 (“Of course, the provisions of a personnel manual on analysis may grant no rights. [Jackson v. Action for Boston Cmty. Dev., Inc., 403 Mass. 8, 525 N.E.2d 411 (1988) ] noted that, if the manual states that it provides only guidance as to the employer’s policies ..., it may not create any enforceable rights.”); cf. Ferguson v. Host Int’l, Inc., 53 Mass.App.Ct. 96, 103, 757 N.E.2d 267 (2001) (holding an employee manual did not create contract restricting the employmentatwill relationship" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n332, 90 S.Ct. 518, 24 L.Ed.2d 549 (1970); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1940); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 589, 16 S.Ct. 904, 40 L.Ed. 1075 (1896). 72 . 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(2). 73 . Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86, 6 D.Me.1968) (rejecting attack on insufficient proof of discrimination and not lack of cognizability). 80 . See also United States v. DiTommaso, 405 F.2d 385, 388 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 934, 89 S.Ct. 1209, 22 L.Ed.2d 465 (1969) prima facie case not established by evidence that while over 50% of eligible population had less than a high school diploma, only 33% were drawn for the petit jury venire and only 21.9% served on grand jury. But see United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564, 571 (1st Cir. 1970) (holding that when defendant was guilty of burglary but the only evidence that he was armed was from his own statement existence of the firearm went only to the degree of the offense and was not as an element of proof", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n332, 90 S.Ct. 518, 24 L.Ed.2d 549 (1970); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1940); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 589, 16 S.Ct. 904, 40 L.Ed. 1075 (1896). 72 . 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(2). 73 . Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86, 6 D.Me.1968) (rejecting attack on insufficient proof of discrimination and not lack of cognizability). 80 . See also United States v. DiTommaso, 405 F.2d 385, 388 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 934, 89 S.Ct. 1209, 22 L.Ed.2d 465 (1969) prima facie case not established by evidence that while over 50% of eligible population had less than a high school diploma, only 33% were drawn for the petit jury venire and only 21.9% served on grand jury. But see United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564, 571 (1st Cir. 1970) (holding that the burden of proof is on the claimant", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n332, 90 S.Ct. 518, 24 L.Ed.2d 549 (1970); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1940); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 589, 16 S.Ct. 904, 40 L.Ed. 1075 (1896). 72 . 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(2). 73 . Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86, 6 D.Me.1968) (rejecting attack on insufficient proof of discrimination and not lack of cognizability). 80 . See also United States v. DiTommaso, 405 F.2d 385, 388 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 934, 89 S.Ct. 1209, 22 L.Ed.2d 465 (1969) prima facie case not established by evidence that while over 50% of eligible population had less than a high school diploma, only 33% were drawn for the petit jury venire and only 21.9% served on grand jury. But see United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564, 571 (1st Cir. 1970) (holding that the father had to pay college costs because the agreement provided him no explicit veto over college selection", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n332, 90 S.Ct. 518, 24 L.Ed.2d 549 (1970); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1940); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 589, 16 S.Ct. 904, 40 L.Ed. 1075 (1896). 72 . 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(2). 73 . Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86, 6 D.Me.1968) (rejecting attack on insufficient proof of discrimination and not lack of cognizability). 80 . See also United States v. DiTommaso, 405 F.2d 385, 388 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 934, 89 S.Ct. 1209, 22 L.Ed.2d 465 (1969) prima facie case not established by evidence that while over 50% of eligible population had less than a high school diploma, only 33% were drawn for the petit jury venire and only 21.9% served on grand jury. But see United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564, 571 (1st Cir. 1970) (holding that proof that 836 of jury pools had high school diplomas while only 432 of population over 25 did and proof that 181 of pool had college degree as compared with 5 of the population gave rise to inference of discrimination", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n332, 90 S.Ct. 518, 24 L.Ed.2d 549 (1970); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1940); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 589, 16 S.Ct. 904, 40 L.Ed. 1075 (1896). 72 . 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(2). 73 . Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86, 6 D.Me.1968) (rejecting attack on insufficient proof of discrimination and not lack of cognizability). 80 . See also United States v. DiTommaso, 405 F.2d 385, 388 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 934, 89 S.Ct. 1209, 22 L.Ed.2d 465 (1969) prima facie case not established by evidence that while over 50% of eligible population had less than a high school diploma, only 33% were drawn for the petit jury venire and only 21.9% served on grand jury. But see United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564, 571 (1st Cir. 1970) (holding that removal from house arrest and return to general prison population was a matter of inmate classification" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nH.W. Arant, Rationale of the Rule that an Obligee’s Premature Payment Discharges His Surety, 80 U. Pa. L.Rev. 842, 851 (1932): The function of the surety is to secure the creditor in the enjoyment of the performance promised by the principal. It seems reasonable to assume that his undertaking is intended to operate as a security so long as the creditor acts with good faith and reasonable prudence. Advancing percentages [that] might be retained, under some circumstances, is consistent with both. 27 . See Argonaut Ins. Co., 699 F.2d at 420 (concluding that, where unauthorized advances are expended for the purposes of completing a bonded contract, the amount at risk to the surety is, therefore, unaffected); Ramada Dev. Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 626 F.2d 517, 522 (6th Cir.1980) (holding that a surety has standing to sue for a progress payment released by the government after notification by the surety of unpaid subcontractors", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nH.W. Arant, Rationale of the Rule that an Obligee’s Premature Payment Discharges His Surety, 80 U. Pa. L.Rev. 842, 851 (1932): The function of the surety is to secure the creditor in the enjoyment of the performance promised by the principal. It seems reasonable to assume that his undertaking is intended to operate as a security so long as the creditor acts with good faith and reasonable prudence. Advancing percentages [that] might be retained, under some circumstances, is consistent with both. 27 . See Argonaut Ins. Co., 699 F.2d at 420 (concluding that, where unauthorized advances are expended for the purposes of completing a bonded contract, the amount at risk to the surety is, therefore, unaffected); Ramada Dev. Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 626 F.2d 517, 522 (6th Cir.1980) (holding that a plaintiff surety had to pay all outstanding claims owed by the contractor or it otherwise would not be permitted to share in any retained funds held by the government", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nH.W. Arant, Rationale of the Rule that an Obligee’s Premature Payment Discharges His Surety, 80 U. Pa. L.Rev. 842, 851 (1932): The function of the surety is to secure the creditor in the enjoyment of the performance promised by the principal. It seems reasonable to assume that his undertaking is intended to operate as a security so long as the creditor acts with good faith and reasonable prudence. Advancing percentages [that] might be retained, under some circumstances, is consistent with both. 27 . See Argonaut Ins. Co., 699 F.2d at 420 (concluding that, where unauthorized advances are expended for the purposes of completing a bonded contract, the amount at risk to the surety is, therefore, unaffected); Ramada Dev. Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 626 F.2d 517, 522 (6th Cir.1980) (holding that the surety was not released to the extent of improper ly paid funds because the contractor had applied the released funds to progress on the contract", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nH.W. Arant, Rationale of the Rule that an Obligee’s Premature Payment Discharges His Surety, 80 U. Pa. L.Rev. 842, 851 (1932): The function of the surety is to secure the creditor in the enjoyment of the performance promised by the principal. It seems reasonable to assume that his undertaking is intended to operate as a security so long as the creditor acts with good faith and reasonable prudence. Advancing percentages [that] might be retained, under some circumstances, is consistent with both. 27 . See Argonaut Ins. Co., 699 F.2d at 420 (concluding that, where unauthorized advances are expended for the purposes of completing a bonded contract, the amount at risk to the surety is, therefore, unaffected); Ramada Dev. Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 626 F.2d 517, 522 (6th Cir.1980) (holding that there is no privity of contract between the government and a surety since the government is not a party to the agreement between the surety and the contractor the government never undertakes an obligation to the surety", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nH.W. Arant, Rationale of the Rule that an Obligee’s Premature Payment Discharges His Surety, 80 U. Pa. L.Rev. 842, 851 (1932): The function of the surety is to secure the creditor in the enjoyment of the performance promised by the principal. It seems reasonable to assume that his undertaking is intended to operate as a security so long as the creditor acts with good faith and reasonable prudence. Advancing percentages [that] might be retained, under some circumstances, is consistent with both. 27 . See Argonaut Ins. Co., 699 F.2d at 420 (concluding that, where unauthorized advances are expended for the purposes of completing a bonded contract, the amount at risk to the surety is, therefore, unaffected); Ramada Dev. Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 626 F.2d 517, 522 (6th Cir.1980) (holding that companys president was trustee of trust funds because he had control and direction over the funds" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n11. Courts have adopted different definitions. Stranz v. Ice Cream Liquidation, Inc. (In re Ice Cream Liquidation, Inc.), 281 B.R. 154, 160 (Bankr.D.Conn.2002) (citing cases). Some courts adopt the narrow view that a personal injury tort claim is “a tort [claim] with[ ] trauma or bodily injury.” Id. at 160 (citing In re Atron Inc. of Mich., 172 B.R. 541 (Bankr.W.D.Mich.1994); Perino v. Cohen (In re Cohen), 107 B.R. 453 (S.D.N.Y.1989)). Other courts adopt the broader view and define a personal injury tort claim as one that arises out of “any injury which is an invasion of personal rights.” Id. (quoting Leathem v. von Volkmar (In re von Volkmar), 217 B.R. 561, 566 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1998)); see also Thomas v. Adams (In re Gary Brew Enters. Ltd.), 198 B.R. 616, 619-20 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1996) (holding that the states personal injury statutes of limitation should be applied for claims under section 1983", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n11. Courts have adopted different definitions. Stranz v. Ice Cream Liquidation, Inc. (In re Ice Cream Liquidation, Inc.), 281 B.R. 154, 160 (Bankr.D.Conn.2002) (citing cases). Some courts adopt the narrow view that a personal injury tort claim is “a tort [claim] with[ ] trauma or bodily injury.” Id. at 160 (citing In re Atron Inc. of Mich., 172 B.R. 541 (Bankr.W.D.Mich.1994); Perino v. Cohen (In re Cohen), 107 B.R. 453 (S.D.N.Y.1989)). Other courts adopt the broader view and define a personal injury tort claim as one that arises out of “any injury which is an invasion of personal rights.” Id. (quoting Leathem v. von Volkmar (In re von Volkmar), 217 B.R. 561, 566 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1998)); see also Thomas v. Adams (In re Gary Brew Enters. Ltd.), 198 B.R. 616, 619-20 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1996) (holding that a negligence claim is not a personal injury tort claim", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n11. Courts have adopted different definitions. Stranz v. Ice Cream Liquidation, Inc. (In re Ice Cream Liquidation, Inc.), 281 B.R. 154, 160 (Bankr.D.Conn.2002) (citing cases). Some courts adopt the narrow view that a personal injury tort claim is “a tort [claim] with[ ] trauma or bodily injury.” Id. at 160 (citing In re Atron Inc. of Mich., 172 B.R. 541 (Bankr.W.D.Mich.1994); Perino v. Cohen (In re Cohen), 107 B.R. 453 (S.D.N.Y.1989)). Other courts adopt the broader view and define a personal injury tort claim as one that arises out of “any injury which is an invasion of personal rights.” Id. (quoting Leathem v. von Volkmar (In re von Volkmar), 217 B.R. 561, 566 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1998)); see also Thomas v. Adams (In re Gary Brew Enters. Ltd.), 198 B.R. 616, 619-20 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1996) (holding that claim brought under section 1983 of the civil rights act constituted a personal injury tort claim because section 1983 confers a general remedy for injuries to personal rights", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n11. Courts have adopted different definitions. Stranz v. Ice Cream Liquidation, Inc. (In re Ice Cream Liquidation, Inc.), 281 B.R. 154, 160 (Bankr.D.Conn.2002) (citing cases). Some courts adopt the narrow view that a personal injury tort claim is “a tort [claim] with[ ] trauma or bodily injury.” Id. at 160 (citing In re Atron Inc. of Mich., 172 B.R. 541 (Bankr.W.D.Mich.1994); Perino v. Cohen (In re Cohen), 107 B.R. 453 (S.D.N.Y.1989)). Other courts adopt the broader view and define a personal injury tort claim as one that arises out of “any injury which is an invasion of personal rights.” Id. (quoting Leathem v. von Volkmar (In re von Volkmar), 217 B.R. 561, 566 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1998)); see also Thomas v. Adams (In re Gary Brew Enters. Ltd.), 198 B.R. 616, 619-20 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1996) (holding that a civil rights deprivation is a personal injury tort", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n11. Courts have adopted different definitions. Stranz v. Ice Cream Liquidation, Inc. (In re Ice Cream Liquidation, Inc.), 281 B.R. 154, 160 (Bankr.D.Conn.2002) (citing cases). Some courts adopt the narrow view that a personal injury tort claim is “a tort [claim] with[ ] trauma or bodily injury.” Id. at 160 (citing In re Atron Inc. of Mich., 172 B.R. 541 (Bankr.W.D.Mich.1994); Perino v. Cohen (In re Cohen), 107 B.R. 453 (S.D.N.Y.1989)). Other courts adopt the broader view and define a personal injury tort claim as one that arises out of “any injury which is an invasion of personal rights.” Id. (quoting Leathem v. von Volkmar (In re von Volkmar), 217 B.R. 561, 566 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1998)); see also Thomas v. Adams (In re Gary Brew Enters. Ltd.), 198 B.R. 616, 619-20 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1996) (holding that a defamation claim is a personal injury tort claim" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ninference, however, is totally lacking because the corrective work contained three important elements that were not present in the original plans: (1) a waterproofing agent was added, (2) expanding foam insulation sealed any gaps between the structural support and the Styrofoam block, and (3) butyl caulk sealant was applied to the top of all T superstructures. A party claiming a breach of contract must establish by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that there was a contract, (2) that the other party breached the contract and, (3) that the party asserting breach of contract suffered damages as a result of the breach. Stevenson v Brotherhoods Mut Benefit, 312 Mich 81, 90-91; 19 NW2d 494 (1945); Residential Ratepayer Consortium v Pub Serv Comm, 198 Mich App 144, 149; 497 NW2d 558 (1993) (holding that the proper standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ninference, however, is totally lacking because the corrective work contained three important elements that were not present in the original plans: (1) a waterproofing agent was added, (2) expanding foam insulation sealed any gaps between the structural support and the Styrofoam block, and (3) butyl caulk sealant was applied to the top of all T superstructures. A party claiming a breach of contract must establish by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that there was a contract, (2) that the other party breached the contract and, (3) that the party asserting breach of contract suffered damages as a result of the breach. Stevenson v Brotherhoods Mut Benefit, 312 Mich 81, 90-91; 19 NW2d 494 (1945); Residential Ratepayer Consortium v Pub Serv Comm, 198 Mich App 144, 149; 497 NW2d 558 (1993) (holding the fedrevid 801d2e requires proof of the conspiracy by a preponderance of the evidence and allows consideration of the offered declaration as part of the proof of the conspiracy", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ninference, however, is totally lacking because the corrective work contained three important elements that were not present in the original plans: (1) a waterproofing agent was added, (2) expanding foam insulation sealed any gaps between the structural support and the Styrofoam block, and (3) butyl caulk sealant was applied to the top of all T superstructures. A party claiming a breach of contract must establish by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that there was a contract, (2) that the other party breached the contract and, (3) that the party asserting breach of contract suffered damages as a result of the breach. Stevenson v Brotherhoods Mut Benefit, 312 Mich 81, 90-91; 19 NW2d 494 (1945); Residential Ratepayer Consortium v Pub Serv Comm, 198 Mich App 144, 149; 497 NW2d 558 (1993) (recognizing that the preponderance of the evidence is the quantum of proof in civil cases", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ninference, however, is totally lacking because the corrective work contained three important elements that were not present in the original plans: (1) a waterproofing agent was added, (2) expanding foam insulation sealed any gaps between the structural support and the Styrofoam block, and (3) butyl caulk sealant was applied to the top of all T superstructures. A party claiming a breach of contract must establish by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that there was a contract, (2) that the other party breached the contract and, (3) that the party asserting breach of contract suffered damages as a result of the breach. Stevenson v Brotherhoods Mut Benefit, 312 Mich 81, 90-91; 19 NW2d 494 (1945); Residential Ratepayer Consortium v Pub Serv Comm, 198 Mich App 144, 149; 497 NW2d 558 (1993) (holding that the standard of proof in revocation proceedings is a preponderance of the evidence", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ninference, however, is totally lacking because the corrective work contained three important elements that were not present in the original plans: (1) a waterproofing agent was added, (2) expanding foam insulation sealed any gaps between the structural support and the Styrofoam block, and (3) butyl caulk sealant was applied to the top of all T superstructures. A party claiming a breach of contract must establish by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that there was a contract, (2) that the other party breached the contract and, (3) that the party asserting breach of contract suffered damages as a result of the breach. Stevenson v Brotherhoods Mut Benefit, 312 Mich 81, 90-91; 19 NW2d 494 (1945); Residential Ratepayer Consortium v Pub Serv Comm, 198 Mich App 144, 149; 497 NW2d 558 (1993) (holding that the standard of proof for dischargeability actions is the preponderance of the evidence standard" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwho have taken authorized maternity leave. See, e.g., Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 206, 111 S.Ct. 1196, 1207, 113 L.Ed.2d 158, 178 (1991); Smith v. F.W. Morse & Co., 76 F.3d 413, 424 (1st Cir. 1996). When interpreting' discrimination claims under Iowa Code chapter 216, we turn to federal law, including Title VII of the United States Civil Rights Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. See Bd. of Supervisors v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, 584 N.W.2d 252, 256 (Iowa 1998) (“In deciding gender discrimination disputes, we adhere to the Title VII analytical framework. ...”); Fuller v. Iowa Dep’t of Human Servs., 576 N.W.2d 324, 329 (Iowa 1998) (“In considering a disability d 00 F.3d 466, 470 (6th Cir.2005) (holding that where employee gave notice to employer of injury and employer told employee that nothing could be done for him through workmans compensation employer had breached statute and was liable for medical treatment which was reasonable and necessary to restore employee to maximum usefulness", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwho have taken authorized maternity leave. See, e.g., Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 206, 111 S.Ct. 1196, 1207, 113 L.Ed.2d 158, 178 (1991); Smith v. F.W. Morse & Co., 76 F.3d 413, 424 (1st Cir. 1996). When interpreting' discrimination claims under Iowa Code chapter 216, we turn to federal law, including Title VII of the United States Civil Rights Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. See Bd. of Supervisors v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, 584 N.W.2d 252, 256 (Iowa 1998) (“In deciding gender discrimination disputes, we adhere to the Title VII analytical framework. ...”); Fuller v. Iowa Dep’t of Human Servs., 576 N.W.2d 324, 329 (Iowa 1998) (“In considering a disability d 00 F.3d 466, 470 (6th Cir.2005) (holding federal statute covers situation where employer refused to rehire employee because she might become pregnant again", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwho have taken authorized maternity leave. See, e.g., Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 206, 111 S.Ct. 1196, 1207, 113 L.Ed.2d 158, 178 (1991); Smith v. F.W. Morse & Co., 76 F.3d 413, 424 (1st Cir. 1996). When interpreting' discrimination claims under Iowa Code chapter 216, we turn to federal law, including Title VII of the United States Civil Rights Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. See Bd. of Supervisors v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, 584 N.W.2d 252, 256 (Iowa 1998) (“In deciding gender discrimination disputes, we adhere to the Title VII analytical framework. ...”); Fuller v. Iowa Dep’t of Human Servs., 576 N.W.2d 324, 329 (Iowa 1998) (“In considering a disability d 00 F.3d 466, 470 (6th Cir.2005) (holding that an employer must remedy situation of sexual harassment", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwho have taken authorized maternity leave. See, e.g., Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 206, 111 S.Ct. 1196, 1207, 113 L.Ed.2d 158, 178 (1991); Smith v. F.W. Morse & Co., 76 F.3d 413, 424 (1st Cir. 1996). When interpreting' discrimination claims under Iowa Code chapter 216, we turn to federal law, including Title VII of the United States Civil Rights Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. See Bd. of Supervisors v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, 584 N.W.2d 252, 256 (Iowa 1998) (“In deciding gender discrimination disputes, we adhere to the Title VII analytical framework. ...”); Fuller v. Iowa Dep’t of Human Servs., 576 N.W.2d 324, 329 (Iowa 1998) (“In considering a disability d 00 F.3d 466, 470 (6th Cir.2005) (holding injured employee who asked his employer for medical assistance and employer refused and employee then went to physician of his own choice employee could recover medical benefits", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwho have taken authorized maternity leave. See, e.g., Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 206, 111 S.Ct. 1196, 1207, 113 L.Ed.2d 158, 178 (1991); Smith v. F.W. Morse & Co., 76 F.3d 413, 424 (1st Cir. 1996). When interpreting' discrimination claims under Iowa Code chapter 216, we turn to federal law, including Title VII of the United States Civil Rights Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. See Bd. of Supervisors v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, 584 N.W.2d 252, 256 (Iowa 1998) (“In deciding gender discrimination disputes, we adhere to the Title VII analytical framework. ...”); Fuller v. Iowa Dep’t of Human Servs., 576 N.W.2d 324, 329 (Iowa 1998) (“In considering a disability d 00 F.3d 466, 470 (6th Cir.2005) (holding that where employer acknowledges respondeat superior liability for the conduct of its employee direct negligence claims become duplicative" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nnot dealing with what the law calls sexual penetration. He admits to Detective Herrick that she was defending herself. He says that his fingers may have gone in her vagina. And you, again, you get to decide whether that can happen inadvertently, especially under the circumstances urider which this would admittedly perform. Because he said “I talked about Chris from Barrow and that was a sexual matter.” 1 . Op. at 774. 2 . See Op. at 774 (citing AS 12.45.045(a) (\"In prosecutions for the crimes of sexual assault in any degree, ... evidence of the complaining witness’ previous sexual conduct may not be admitted nor may reference be made to it in the presence of the jury....”)). 3 . 703 P.2d 436, 442 (Alaska App.1985). 4 . See id.; Johnson v. State, 889 P.2d 1076, 1078 (Alaska App.1995) (holding that court was within its discretion to refuse to consider reports that did not meet the supreme courts standards for admitting reports into evidence", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nnot dealing with what the law calls sexual penetration. He admits to Detective Herrick that she was defending herself. He says that his fingers may have gone in her vagina. And you, again, you get to decide whether that can happen inadvertently, especially under the circumstances urider which this would admittedly perform. Because he said “I talked about Chris from Barrow and that was a sexual matter.” 1 . Op. at 774. 2 . See Op. at 774 (citing AS 12.45.045(a) (\"In prosecutions for the crimes of sexual assault in any degree, ... evidence of the complaining witness’ previous sexual conduct may not be admitted nor may reference be made to it in the presence of the jury....”)). 3 . 703 P.2d 436, 442 (Alaska App.1985). 4 . See id.; Johnson v. State, 889 P.2d 1076, 1078 (Alaska App.1995) (holding corporate officer liable as aider and abettor in filing of false reports even though reports were not authorized or approved of by officers", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nnot dealing with what the law calls sexual penetration. He admits to Detective Herrick that she was defending herself. He says that his fingers may have gone in her vagina. And you, again, you get to decide whether that can happen inadvertently, especially under the circumstances urider which this would admittedly perform. Because he said “I talked about Chris from Barrow and that was a sexual matter.” 1 . Op. at 774. 2 . See Op. at 774 (citing AS 12.45.045(a) (\"In prosecutions for the crimes of sexual assault in any degree, ... evidence of the complaining witness’ previous sexual conduct may not be admitted nor may reference be made to it in the presence of the jury....”)). 3 . 703 P.2d 436, 442 (Alaska App.1985). 4 . See id.; Johnson v. State, 889 P.2d 1076, 1078 (Alaska App.1995) (recognizing that the defendant bears the burden of establishing that plain error was prejudicial", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nnot dealing with what the law calls sexual penetration. He admits to Detective Herrick that she was defending herself. He says that his fingers may have gone in her vagina. And you, again, you get to decide whether that can happen inadvertently, especially under the circumstances urider which this would admittedly perform. Because he said “I talked about Chris from Barrow and that was a sexual matter.” 1 . Op. at 774. 2 . See Op. at 774 (citing AS 12.45.045(a) (\"In prosecutions for the crimes of sexual assault in any degree, ... evidence of the complaining witness’ previous sexual conduct may not be admitted nor may reference be made to it in the presence of the jury....”)). 3 . 703 P.2d 436, 442 (Alaska App.1985). 4 . See id.; Johnson v. State, 889 P.2d 1076, 1078 (Alaska App.1995) (holding that appellant bears burden of establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nnot dealing with what the law calls sexual penetration. He admits to Detective Herrick that she was defending herself. He says that his fingers may have gone in her vagina. And you, again, you get to decide whether that can happen inadvertently, especially under the circumstances urider which this would admittedly perform. Because he said “I talked about Chris from Barrow and that was a sexual matter.” 1 . Op. at 774. 2 . See Op. at 774 (citing AS 12.45.045(a) (\"In prosecutions for the crimes of sexual assault in any degree, ... evidence of the complaining witness’ previous sexual conduct may not be admitted nor may reference be made to it in the presence of the jury....”)). 3 . 703 P.2d 436, 442 (Alaska App.1985). 4 . See id.; Johnson v. State, 889 P.2d 1076, 1078 (Alaska App.1995) (recognizing that we have consistently held that a party who wishes to introduce evidence of past false reports of sexual assault bears the threshold burden of establishing the falsity of the past reports" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n“guilty” as Chambers is here, for there is no doubt that Congress could “properly reach” the conduct there at issue — bribery in Guam. There, as here, we faced only the question whether Congress had done so through a valid statute. Even though the defendants in Sood had engaged in prohibitable and morally blameworthy conduct, we granted collateral relief because Congress had not prohibited their conduct through a valid enactment. Similarly, even if we assume that Chambers’ conduct fell within the core of the child pornography exception to the First Amendment, there is no valid statute on the books in this circuit that prohibits it. While perhaps morally “guilty,” he is legally innocent. There is d Cir.1982) (same) with Williams v. United States, 805 F.2d 1301, 1303-07 (7th Cir.1986) (holding frady applicable", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n“guilty” as Chambers is here, for there is no doubt that Congress could “properly reach” the conduct there at issue — bribery in Guam. There, as here, we faced only the question whether Congress had done so through a valid statute. Even though the defendants in Sood had engaged in prohibitable and morally blameworthy conduct, we granted collateral relief because Congress had not prohibited their conduct through a valid enactment. Similarly, even if we assume that Chambers’ conduct fell within the core of the child pornography exception to the First Amendment, there is no valid statute on the books in this circuit that prohibits it. While perhaps morally “guilty,” he is legally innocent. There is d Cir.1982) (same) with Williams v. United States, 805 F.2d 1301, 1303-07 (7th Cir.1986) (holding frady inapplicable", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n“guilty” as Chambers is here, for there is no doubt that Congress could “properly reach” the conduct there at issue — bribery in Guam. There, as here, we faced only the question whether Congress had done so through a valid statute. Even though the defendants in Sood had engaged in prohibitable and morally blameworthy conduct, we granted collateral relief because Congress had not prohibited their conduct through a valid enactment. Similarly, even if we assume that Chambers’ conduct fell within the core of the child pornography exception to the First Amendment, there is no valid statute on the books in this circuit that prohibits it. While perhaps morally “guilty,” he is legally innocent. There is d Cir.1982) (same) with Williams v. United States, 805 F.2d 1301, 1303-07 (7th Cir.1986) (holding rule applicable to witness", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n“guilty” as Chambers is here, for there is no doubt that Congress could “properly reach” the conduct there at issue — bribery in Guam. There, as here, we faced only the question whether Congress had done so through a valid statute. Even though the defendants in Sood had engaged in prohibitable and morally blameworthy conduct, we granted collateral relief because Congress had not prohibited their conduct through a valid enactment. Similarly, even if we assume that Chambers’ conduct fell within the core of the child pornography exception to the First Amendment, there is no valid statute on the books in this circuit that prohibits it. While perhaps morally “guilty,” he is legally innocent. There is d Cir.1982) (same) with Williams v. United States, 805 F.2d 1301, 1303-07 (7th Cir.1986) (holding that the penalty is applicable", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n“guilty” as Chambers is here, for there is no doubt that Congress could “properly reach” the conduct there at issue — bribery in Guam. There, as here, we faced only the question whether Congress had done so through a valid statute. Even though the defendants in Sood had engaged in prohibitable and morally blameworthy conduct, we granted collateral relief because Congress had not prohibited their conduct through a valid enactment. Similarly, even if we assume that Chambers’ conduct fell within the core of the child pornography exception to the First Amendment, there is no valid statute on the books in this circuit that prohibits it. While perhaps morally “guilty,” he is legally innocent. There is d Cir.1982) (same) with Williams v. United States, 805 F.2d 1301, 1303-07 (7th Cir.1986) (holding rehabilitation act applicable" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nSee Padilla, 122 N.M. at 97, 920 P.2d at 1051 (noting that showmp identification lacked reli ability where witness had no opportunity to see the perpetrator’s face). {24} A second factor is the accuracy of the pre-identification descriptions the witnesses gave. See Manson, 432 U.S. at 114, 97 S.Ct. 2243; Neil, 409 U.S. at 199, 93 S.Ct. 375. Petitioner is African-American, and only one of the two witnesses identified the perpetrator as African-American prior to the showup identification. The other witness described the perpetrator as Hispanic. A description of the race of the perpetrator that does not match the race of the defendant casts doubt on the reliability of the subsequent showup identification. See United States v. de Jesus-Rios, 990 F.2d 672, 678 (1st Cir.1993) (holding that more favorable treatment of similarly situated employees outside the race classification is required to make a prima facie race discrimination case", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nSee Padilla, 122 N.M. at 97, 920 P.2d at 1051 (noting that showmp identification lacked reli ability where witness had no opportunity to see the perpetrator’s face). {24} A second factor is the accuracy of the pre-identification descriptions the witnesses gave. See Manson, 432 U.S. at 114, 97 S.Ct. 2243; Neil, 409 U.S. at 199, 93 S.Ct. 375. Petitioner is African-American, and only one of the two witnesses identified the perpetrator as African-American prior to the showup identification. The other witness described the perpetrator as Hispanic. A description of the race of the perpetrator that does not match the race of the defendant casts doubt on the reliability of the subsequent showup identification. See United States v. de Jesus-Rios, 990 F.2d 672, 678 (1st Cir.1993) (recognizing that certain forms of race consciousness do not lead inevitably to impermissible race discrimination", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nSee Padilla, 122 N.M. at 97, 920 P.2d at 1051 (noting that showmp identification lacked reli ability where witness had no opportunity to see the perpetrator’s face). {24} A second factor is the accuracy of the pre-identification descriptions the witnesses gave. See Manson, 432 U.S. at 114, 97 S.Ct. 2243; Neil, 409 U.S. at 199, 93 S.Ct. 375. Petitioner is African-American, and only one of the two witnesses identified the perpetrator as African-American prior to the showup identification. The other witness described the perpetrator as Hispanic. A description of the race of the perpetrator that does not match the race of the defendant casts doubt on the reliability of the subsequent showup identification. See United States v. de Jesus-Rios, 990 F.2d 672, 678 (1st Cir.1993) (holding that showup identification should have been suppressed where witnesss description of the perpetrators race did not accurately describe the defendants race", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nSee Padilla, 122 N.M. at 97, 920 P.2d at 1051 (noting that showmp identification lacked reli ability where witness had no opportunity to see the perpetrator’s face). {24} A second factor is the accuracy of the pre-identification descriptions the witnesses gave. See Manson, 432 U.S. at 114, 97 S.Ct. 2243; Neil, 409 U.S. at 199, 93 S.Ct. 375. Petitioner is African-American, and only one of the two witnesses identified the perpetrator as African-American prior to the showup identification. The other witness described the perpetrator as Hispanic. A description of the race of the perpetrator that does not match the race of the defendant casts doubt on the reliability of the subsequent showup identification. See United States v. de Jesus-Rios, 990 F.2d 672, 678 (1st Cir.1993) (holding that the race of the prosecutor is irrelevant", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nSee Padilla, 122 N.M. at 97, 920 P.2d at 1051 (noting that showmp identification lacked reli ability where witness had no opportunity to see the perpetrator’s face). {24} A second factor is the accuracy of the pre-identification descriptions the witnesses gave. See Manson, 432 U.S. at 114, 97 S.Ct. 2243; Neil, 409 U.S. at 199, 93 S.Ct. 375. Petitioner is African-American, and only one of the two witnesses identified the perpetrator as African-American prior to the showup identification. The other witness described the perpetrator as Hispanic. A description of the race of the perpetrator that does not match the race of the defendant casts doubt on the reliability of the subsequent showup identification. See United States v. de Jesus-Rios, 990 F.2d 672, 678 (1st Cir.1993) (holding that custody decision based on race is not justified" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nalso claims that he was prejudiced by the prosecutor’s closing argument concerning his prior convictions. According to defendant, the State’s comment was improper in that it called attention to the fact that his prior convictions were of the same crime with which he was charged here. Defendant waived this argument. In order to preserve an error for review, a defendant must both object to the alleged error at trial and renew the objection in his written posttrial motion. People v. Hunter, 331 Ill. App. 3d 1017, 1029 (2002); People v. Bennett, 304 Ill. App. 3d 69, 71 (1999). In this case, defendant failed to preserve this error for review because he did not object to the State’s comment at the time it was made and he abandoned his posttrial motions. See Land, 178 Ill. App. 3d at 256 (holding that failure to file a postjudgment motion on alleged error of law relating to ruling on exception to the statute of frauds that was committed for first time in the judgment waives any objection to that ruling and that in the absence of any other formal objection the issue is not preserved for appellate review", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nalso claims that he was prejudiced by the prosecutor’s closing argument concerning his prior convictions. According to defendant, the State’s comment was improper in that it called attention to the fact that his prior convictions were of the same crime with which he was charged here. Defendant waived this argument. In order to preserve an error for review, a defendant must both object to the alleged error at trial and renew the objection in his written posttrial motion. People v. Hunter, 331 Ill. App. 3d 1017, 1029 (2002); People v. Bennett, 304 Ill. App. 3d 69, 71 (1999). In this case, defendant failed to preserve this error for review because he did not object to the State’s comment at the time it was made and he abandoned his posttrial motions. See Land, 178 Ill. App. 3d at 256 (holding issues not raised to and ruled upon by the trial court are not preserved for appellate review", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nalso claims that he was prejudiced by the prosecutor’s closing argument concerning his prior convictions. According to defendant, the State’s comment was improper in that it called attention to the fact that his prior convictions were of the same crime with which he was charged here. Defendant waived this argument. In order to preserve an error for review, a defendant must both object to the alleged error at trial and renew the objection in his written posttrial motion. People v. Hunter, 331 Ill. App. 3d 1017, 1029 (2002); People v. Bennett, 304 Ill. App. 3d 69, 71 (1999). In this case, defendant failed to preserve this error for review because he did not object to the State’s comment at the time it was made and he abandoned his posttrial motions. See Land, 178 Ill. App. 3d at 256 (holding that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment the trial court is limited to the grounds raised in the motion", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nalso claims that he was prejudiced by the prosecutor’s closing argument concerning his prior convictions. According to defendant, the State’s comment was improper in that it called attention to the fact that his prior convictions were of the same crime with which he was charged here. Defendant waived this argument. In order to preserve an error for review, a defendant must both object to the alleged error at trial and renew the objection in his written posttrial motion. People v. Hunter, 331 Ill. App. 3d 1017, 1029 (2002); People v. Bennett, 304 Ill. App. 3d 69, 71 (1999). In this case, defendant failed to preserve this error for review because he did not object to the State’s comment at the time it was made and he abandoned his posttrial motions. See Land, 178 Ill. App. 3d at 256 (holding that appellants failure to obtain a ruling at the trial level even on a constitutional issue precluded review on appeal", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nalso claims that he was prejudiced by the prosecutor’s closing argument concerning his prior convictions. According to defendant, the State’s comment was improper in that it called attention to the fact that his prior convictions were of the same crime with which he was charged here. Defendant waived this argument. In order to preserve an error for review, a defendant must both object to the alleged error at trial and renew the objection in his written posttrial motion. People v. Hunter, 331 Ill. App. 3d 1017, 1029 (2002); People v. Bennett, 304 Ill. App. 3d 69, 71 (1999). In this case, defendant failed to preserve this error for review because he did not object to the State’s comment at the time it was made and he abandoned his posttrial motions. See Land, 178 Ill. App. 3d at 256 (holding that the failure to obtain a ruling on a motion for new trial waives the issues raised for appellate review" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ndistrict court, the USPS relies more heavily on a different argument: that the Award is improper because it requires the discharge of an employee who was not a party to the arbitration proceeding. But this argument also was not raised in arbitration and thus is also waived. The USPS urges that this argument is not waivable because it is based on due process and the civil service statutes; thus, if upheld, this argument would render the CBA and the Joint Statement unenforceable on public policy grounds. Our precedent does not support this position, however. See Dist. 17, 179 F.3d at 140 (finding waiver of First Amendment claim not raised during arbitration); see also AAOT Foreign Econ. Ass’n (VO) Technostroyexport v. Int’l Dev. & Trade Servs., Inc., 139 F.3d 980, 981-82 (2d Cir.1998) (holding that party waived public policy challenge by failing to raise it during arbitration", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ndistrict court, the USPS relies more heavily on a different argument: that the Award is improper because it requires the discharge of an employee who was not a party to the arbitration proceeding. But this argument also was not raised in arbitration and thus is also waived. The USPS urges that this argument is not waivable because it is based on due process and the civil service statutes; thus, if upheld, this argument would render the CBA and the Joint Statement unenforceable on public policy grounds. Our precedent does not support this position, however. See Dist. 17, 179 F.3d at 140 (finding waiver of First Amendment claim not raised during arbitration); see also AAOT Foreign Econ. Ass’n (VO) Technostroyexport v. Int’l Dev. & Trade Servs., Inc., 139 F.3d 980, 981-82 (2d Cir.1998) (holding that the defendant waived an argument by failing to raise it in his appellants brief", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ndistrict court, the USPS relies more heavily on a different argument: that the Award is improper because it requires the discharge of an employee who was not a party to the arbitration proceeding. But this argument also was not raised in arbitration and thus is also waived. The USPS urges that this argument is not waivable because it is based on due process and the civil service statutes; thus, if upheld, this argument would render the CBA and the Joint Statement unenforceable on public policy grounds. Our precedent does not support this position, however. See Dist. 17, 179 F.3d at 140 (finding waiver of First Amendment claim not raised during arbitration); see also AAOT Foreign Econ. Ass’n (VO) Technostroyexport v. Int’l Dev. & Trade Servs., Inc., 139 F.3d 980, 981-82 (2d Cir.1998) (holding that appellant waived issue by failing to raise it in opening brief", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ndistrict court, the USPS relies more heavily on a different argument: that the Award is improper because it requires the discharge of an employee who was not a party to the arbitration proceeding. But this argument also was not raised in arbitration and thus is also waived. The USPS urges that this argument is not waivable because it is based on due process and the civil service statutes; thus, if upheld, this argument would render the CBA and the Joint Statement unenforceable on public policy grounds. Our precedent does not support this position, however. See Dist. 17, 179 F.3d at 140 (finding waiver of First Amendment claim not raised during arbitration); see also AAOT Foreign Econ. Ass’n (VO) Technostroyexport v. Int’l Dev. & Trade Servs., Inc., 139 F.3d 980, 981-82 (2d Cir.1998) (holding that party waived argument by failing to brief it on appeal", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ndistrict court, the USPS relies more heavily on a different argument: that the Award is improper because it requires the discharge of an employee who was not a party to the arbitration proceeding. But this argument also was not raised in arbitration and thus is also waived. The USPS urges that this argument is not waivable because it is based on due process and the civil service statutes; thus, if upheld, this argument would render the CBA and the Joint Statement unenforceable on public policy grounds. Our precedent does not support this position, however. See Dist. 17, 179 F.3d at 140 (finding waiver of First Amendment claim not raised during arbitration); see also AAOT Foreign Econ. Ass’n (VO) Technostroyexport v. Int’l Dev. & Trade Servs., Inc., 139 F.3d 980, 981-82 (2d Cir.1998) (holding that a party abandoned an issue by failing to raise it in the opening brief" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nfact subject to independent appellate review); Lightbourne v. State, 742 So.2d 238, 247-48 (Fla.1999) (requiring cumulative analysis of Brady material). The second issue is whether the trial court erred in denying relief based on erroneous jury instructions as to the CCP and HAC aggravators. The trial court properly denied relief as to appellant’s claims regarding the CCP and HAC instructions. First, the State’s argument (based on the trial court’s ruling) that appellant failed to preserve the error as to the CCP instruction is supported by the record. On direct appeal, appellant failed to specifically argue that the CCP instruction was unconstitutionally vague, even though he advanced the argument with respect to the HAC instruction. See Jackson v. State, 648 So.2d 85, 90 (Fla.1994) (holding party may not argue one ground at trial and another on appeal where appellant did not object to testimony at trial on the grounds raised on appeal that it was improper character evidence but objected only on the basis of relevancy issue was not preserved for review", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nfact subject to independent appellate review); Lightbourne v. State, 742 So.2d 238, 247-48 (Fla.1999) (requiring cumulative analysis of Brady material). The second issue is whether the trial court erred in denying relief based on erroneous jury instructions as to the CCP and HAC aggravators. The trial court properly denied relief as to appellant’s claims regarding the CCP and HAC instructions. First, the State’s argument (based on the trial court’s ruling) that appellant failed to preserve the error as to the CCP instruction is supported by the record. On direct appeal, appellant failed to specifically argue that the CCP instruction was unconstitutionally vague, even though he advanced the argument with respect to the HAC instruction. See Jackson v. State, 648 So.2d 85, 90 (Fla.1994) (holding factor b is not unconstitutionally vague", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nfact subject to independent appellate review); Lightbourne v. State, 742 So.2d 238, 247-48 (Fla.1999) (requiring cumulative analysis of Brady material). The second issue is whether the trial court erred in denying relief based on erroneous jury instructions as to the CCP and HAC aggravators. The trial court properly denied relief as to appellant’s claims regarding the CCP and HAC instructions. First, the State’s argument (based on the trial court’s ruling) that appellant failed to preserve the error as to the CCP instruction is supported by the record. On direct appeal, appellant failed to specifically argue that the CCP instruction was unconstitutionally vague, even though he advanced the argument with respect to the HAC instruction. See Jackson v. State, 648 So.2d 85, 90 (Fla.1994) (holding that an issue was not preserved for appellate review because appellants trial objection does not comport with the issue he raised on appeal", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nfact subject to independent appellate review); Lightbourne v. State, 742 So.2d 238, 247-48 (Fla.1999) (requiring cumulative analysis of Brady material). The second issue is whether the trial court erred in denying relief based on erroneous jury instructions as to the CCP and HAC aggravators. The trial court properly denied relief as to appellant’s claims regarding the CCP and HAC instructions. First, the State’s argument (based on the trial court’s ruling) that appellant failed to preserve the error as to the CCP instruction is supported by the record. On direct appeal, appellant failed to specifically argue that the CCP instruction was unconstitutionally vague, even though he advanced the argument with respect to the HAC instruction. See Jackson v. State, 648 So.2d 85, 90 (Fla.1994) (holding that an issue is preserved for appeal where the issue was sufficiently raised for the court to rule on it ", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nfact subject to independent appellate review); Lightbourne v. State, 742 So.2d 238, 247-48 (Fla.1999) (requiring cumulative analysis of Brady material). The second issue is whether the trial court erred in denying relief based on erroneous jury instructions as to the CCP and HAC aggravators. The trial court properly denied relief as to appellant’s claims regarding the CCP and HAC instructions. First, the State’s argument (based on the trial court’s ruling) that appellant failed to preserve the error as to the CCP instruction is supported by the record. On direct appeal, appellant failed to specifically argue that the CCP instruction was unconstitutionally vague, even though he advanced the argument with respect to the HAC instruction. See Jackson v. State, 648 So.2d 85, 90 (Fla.1994) (holding that issue of unconstitutionally vague instruction relative to aggravating factor was properly preserved for postconviction review where the defendant objected to the vagueness at trial and raised the issue on direct appeal" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\ncourt must use the filing date of March 24, 2005, in its calculations. 2 . The number of days between November 19, 2001, and September 20, 2002, is actually 306 days when including September 20, 2002, in the calculation. 3 . The Fifth Circuit has considered 28 U.S.C. 04) (stating that the petitioner could have learned of his counsel’s potential conflict of interest with the exercise of due diligence given that his lawyer’s affiliation with the assistant district attorney was widely known in the small legal community); Easterwood v. Champion, 213 F.3d 1321, 1323 (10th Cir.2000) (stating that a prisoner does not fail to act with due diligence when he does not learn of a new case until it is accessible in the prison law library); Downes v. Carroll, 348 F.Supp.2d 296, 301 (D.Del.2004) (holding that a prisoner had failed to demonstrate diligence for purposes of equitable tolling for the same reason that he had failed to show diligence to invoke the statute of limitations under 2255f4 where he had waited several years before pursuing expungement of his disciplinary actions", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\ncourt must use the filing date of March 24, 2005, in its calculations. 2 . The number of days between November 19, 2001, and September 20, 2002, is actually 306 days when including September 20, 2002, in the calculation. 3 . The Fifth Circuit has considered 28 U.S.C. 04) (stating that the petitioner could have learned of his counsel’s potential conflict of interest with the exercise of due diligence given that his lawyer’s affiliation with the assistant district attorney was widely known in the small legal community); Easterwood v. Champion, 213 F.3d 1321, 1323 (10th Cir.2000) (stating that a prisoner does not fail to act with due diligence when he does not learn of a new case until it is accessible in the prison law library); Downes v. Carroll, 348 F.Supp.2d 296, 301 (D.Del.2004) (holding that the district court did not err in continuing the trial without defendant when the trial had commenced in defendants presence he vigorously expressed his desire to be absent he was given ample opportunity to change his mind despite the disturbance he had created he had competent counsel and he knew of his right to be present", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\ncourt must use the filing date of March 24, 2005, in its calculations. 2 . The number of days between November 19, 2001, and September 20, 2002, is actually 306 days when including September 20, 2002, in the calculation. 3 . The Fifth Circuit has considered 28 U.S.C. 04) (stating that the petitioner could have learned of his counsel’s potential conflict of interest with the exercise of due diligence given that his lawyer’s affiliation with the assistant district attorney was widely known in the small legal community); Easterwood v. Champion, 213 F.3d 1321, 1323 (10th Cir.2000) (stating that a prisoner does not fail to act with due diligence when he does not learn of a new case until it is accessible in the prison law library); Downes v. Carroll, 348 F.Supp.2d 296, 301 (D.Del.2004) (holding that the petitioner could have learned of the factual predicate for his claims before the date of the affidavits in question if he had exercised reasonable diligence given that he was able to obtain the affidavits without any problems while in prison", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\ncourt must use the filing date of March 24, 2005, in its calculations. 2 . The number of days between November 19, 2001, and September 20, 2002, is actually 306 days when including September 20, 2002, in the calculation. 3 . The Fifth Circuit has considered 28 U.S.C. 04) (stating that the petitioner could have learned of his counsel’s potential conflict of interest with the exercise of due diligence given that his lawyer’s affiliation with the assistant district attorney was widely known in the small legal community); Easterwood v. Champion, 213 F.3d 1321, 1323 (10th Cir.2000) (stating that a prisoner does not fail to act with due diligence when he does not learn of a new case until it is accessible in the prison law library); Downes v. Carroll, 348 F.Supp.2d 296, 301 (D.Del.2004) (holding that the plaintiffs assertion that he neither knew nor in the exercise of reasonable diligence could have known about the governments possible liability for his injury was irrelevant to accrual of his ftca claim", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\ncourt must use the filing date of March 24, 2005, in its calculations. 2 . The number of days between November 19, 2001, and September 20, 2002, is actually 306 days when including September 20, 2002, in the calculation. 3 . The Fifth Circuit has considered 28 U.S.C. 04) (stating that the petitioner could have learned of his counsel’s potential conflict of interest with the exercise of due diligence given that his lawyer’s affiliation with the assistant district attorney was widely known in the small legal community); Easterwood v. Champion, 213 F.3d 1321, 1323 (10th Cir.2000) (stating that a prisoner does not fail to act with due diligence when he does not learn of a new case until it is accessible in the prison law library); Downes v. Carroll, 348 F.Supp.2d 296, 301 (D.Del.2004) (holding that the state courts determination that the petitioner could not show prejudice because he did not allege that the witness was available to testify was a reasonable application of federal law to the facts of the case" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nIncorporated in June 2001, approximately six months after the judgments for bad faith litigation were entered against Fischer, MBI was formed to acquire substantially all of the assets of Montgomery Doughnuts, Inc., a bankrupt bakery. On October 8, 2001, Paley Rothman served a writ of attachment directing MBI to withhold “25% of [Benson Fischer’s] disposable wages for each workweek or other pay period.” MBI filed an answer, see D.C.Code § 16-551 (2001), stating that it did not employ Fischer and had paid no salary or wages to him. MBI also answered interrogatories, and Paley Roth-man requested a traverse hearing pursuant to D.C.Code § 16-553. After hearings were held on July 18, 2002, and October 22, 2003, the court found that MBI “is owned by Benson Fischer, his wife Mona Fischer (holding that prejudgment interest may include compound interest", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nIncorporated in June 2001, approximately six months after the judgments for bad faith litigation were entered against Fischer, MBI was formed to acquire substantially all of the assets of Montgomery Doughnuts, Inc., a bankrupt bakery. On October 8, 2001, Paley Rothman served a writ of attachment directing MBI to withhold “25% of [Benson Fischer’s] disposable wages for each workweek or other pay period.” MBI filed an answer, see D.C.Code § 16-551 (2001), stating that it did not employ Fischer and had paid no salary or wages to him. MBI also answered interrogatories, and Paley Roth-man requested a traverse hearing pursuant to D.C.Code § 16-553. After hearings were held on July 18, 2002, and October 22, 2003, the court found that MBI “is owned by Benson Fischer, his wife Mona Fischer (holding that a married couple filing a joint return can deduct interest paid on 1 million of acquisition indebtedness", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nIncorporated in June 2001, approximately six months after the judgments for bad faith litigation were entered against Fischer, MBI was formed to acquire substantially all of the assets of Montgomery Doughnuts, Inc., a bankrupt bakery. On October 8, 2001, Paley Rothman served a writ of attachment directing MBI to withhold “25% of [Benson Fischer’s] disposable wages for each workweek or other pay period.” MBI filed an answer, see D.C.Code § 16-551 (2001), stating that it did not employ Fischer and had paid no salary or wages to him. MBI also answered interrogatories, and Paley Roth-man requested a traverse hearing pursuant to D.C.Code § 16-553. After hearings were held on July 18, 2002, and October 22, 2003, the court found that MBI “is owned by Benson Fischer, his wife Mona Fischer (holding that there was no community of interest because the alleged joint venturers did not have an equal proprietary interest and only one of the alleged joint venturers bore the risks and paid the expenses", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nIncorporated in June 2001, approximately six months after the judgments for bad faith litigation were entered against Fischer, MBI was formed to acquire substantially all of the assets of Montgomery Doughnuts, Inc., a bankrupt bakery. On October 8, 2001, Paley Rothman served a writ of attachment directing MBI to withhold “25% of [Benson Fischer’s] disposable wages for each workweek or other pay period.” MBI filed an answer, see D.C.Code § 16-551 (2001), stating that it did not employ Fischer and had paid no salary or wages to him. MBI also answered interrogatories, and Paley Roth-man requested a traverse hearing pursuant to D.C.Code § 16-553. After hearings were held on July 18, 2002, and October 22, 2003, the court found that MBI “is owned by Benson Fischer, his wife Mona Fischer (holding that joint employment determination was a complex mixed question of law and fact properly determined by jury", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nIncorporated in June 2001, approximately six months after the judgments for bad faith litigation were entered against Fischer, MBI was formed to acquire substantially all of the assets of Montgomery Doughnuts, Inc., a bankrupt bakery. On October 8, 2001, Paley Rothman served a writ of attachment directing MBI to withhold “25% of [Benson Fischer’s] disposable wages for each workweek or other pay period.” MBI filed an answer, see D.C.Code § 16-551 (2001), stating that it did not employ Fischer and had paid no salary or wages to him. MBI also answered interrogatories, and Paley Roth-man requested a traverse hearing pursuant to D.C.Code § 16-553. After hearings were held on July 18, 2002, and October 22, 2003, the court found that MBI “is owned by Benson Fischer, his wife Mona Fischer (holding a 50 joint interest" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nfor purposes of placing surveillance equipment. The only jurisdictional limitation the government acknowledges is that the listening post must be located in the issuing court’s jurisdiction. Of course, the statute does not refer to a “listening post,” and none of the cases cited by the government addresses the jurisdiction of the issuing court to authorize law enforcement officers to covertly place a listening device on private property. All of those cases addressed phone taps, and as the Seventh Circuit explained, “a tap is not placed in the telephone handset itself; it is attached to the telephone line at some distance from the handset.” United States v. Ramirez, 112 F.3d 849, 853 (7th Cir.1997); see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464, 48 S.Ct. 564, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928) (holding that although search of passenger compartment was legal search of trunk was not", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nfor purposes of placing surveillance equipment. The only jurisdictional limitation the government acknowledges is that the listening post must be located in the issuing court’s jurisdiction. Of course, the statute does not refer to a “listening post,” and none of the cases cited by the government addresses the jurisdiction of the issuing court to authorize law enforcement officers to covertly place a listening device on private property. All of those cases addressed phone taps, and as the Seventh Circuit explained, “a tap is not placed in the telephone handset itself; it is attached to the telephone line at some distance from the handset.” United States v. Ramirez, 112 F.3d 849, 853 (7th Cir.1997); see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464, 48 S.Ct. 564, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928) (holding that a wiretap was not a search because tjhere was no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nfor purposes of placing surveillance equipment. The only jurisdictional limitation the government acknowledges is that the listening post must be located in the issuing court’s jurisdiction. Of course, the statute does not refer to a “listening post,” and none of the cases cited by the government addresses the jurisdiction of the issuing court to authorize law enforcement officers to covertly place a listening device on private property. All of those cases addressed phone taps, and as the Seventh Circuit explained, “a tap is not placed in the telephone handset itself; it is attached to the telephone line at some distance from the handset.” United States v. Ramirez, 112 F.3d 849, 853 (7th Cir.1997); see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464, 48 S.Ct. 564, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928) (holding that no jury could reasonably fail to find that it was objectively reasonable for the officers to take the actions they did when the only invasion of privacy that occurred was entry and an emergency sweep a search of the premises was not conducted until the magistrate informed of what the officers had learned on the scene prior to entry explicitly authorized a search of the third house", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nfor purposes of placing surveillance equipment. The only jurisdictional limitation the government acknowledges is that the listening post must be located in the issuing court’s jurisdiction. Of course, the statute does not refer to a “listening post,” and none of the cases cited by the government addresses the jurisdiction of the issuing court to authorize law enforcement officers to covertly place a listening device on private property. All of those cases addressed phone taps, and as the Seventh Circuit explained, “a tap is not placed in the telephone handset itself; it is attached to the telephone line at some distance from the handset.” United States v. Ramirez, 112 F.3d 849, 853 (7th Cir.1997); see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464, 48 S.Ct. 564, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928) (holding that the defendants entry into the foyer of a fraternity house was an entry into a dwelling", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nfor purposes of placing surveillance equipment. The only jurisdictional limitation the government acknowledges is that the listening post must be located in the issuing court’s jurisdiction. Of course, the statute does not refer to a “listening post,” and none of the cases cited by the government addresses the jurisdiction of the issuing court to authorize law enforcement officers to covertly place a listening device on private property. All of those cases addressed phone taps, and as the Seventh Circuit explained, “a tap is not placed in the telephone handset itself; it is attached to the telephone line at some distance from the handset.” United States v. Ramirez, 112 F.3d 849, 853 (7th Cir.1997); see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464, 48 S.Ct. 564, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928) (holding that search of backpack constituted a search of defendants person and was not authorized by search warrant for premises" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n§ 3553(a)(7) to justify the magistrate’s decision to depart. Guideline § 5K2.0 permits departure based on “ ‘mitigating circumstance[s] of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission.’ ” U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)). The sentencing judge may not depart unless he or she has legal authority under the Guidelines to do so. United States v. Lira-Barraza, 941 F.2d 745, 746 (9th Cir.1991) (en banc) (notmg that “legal authority” is first of three-part test for departure under the Guidelines). Although in United States v. Miller, 991 F.2d 552 (9th Cir.1993), and United States v. Berlier, 948 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir.1991), we analyzed the related question of the scope of § 3E1.1 departures based on pre-trial restitution Cir.1991) (holding that the district court was not required to state affirmatively on the record that it knew it possessed the authority to depart downward", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n§ 3553(a)(7) to justify the magistrate’s decision to depart. Guideline § 5K2.0 permits departure based on “ ‘mitigating circumstance[s] of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission.’ ” U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)). The sentencing judge may not depart unless he or she has legal authority under the Guidelines to do so. United States v. Lira-Barraza, 941 F.2d 745, 746 (9th Cir.1991) (en banc) (notmg that “legal authority” is first of three-part test for departure under the Guidelines). Although in United States v. Miller, 991 F.2d 552 (9th Cir.1993), and United States v. Berlier, 948 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir.1991), we analyzed the related question of the scope of § 3E1.1 departures based on pre-trial restitution Cir.1991) (holding that this court does not review decisions of a district court not to depart downward unless the record reflects that the district court was not aware of or did not understand its discretion to make such a departure", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n§ 3553(a)(7) to justify the magistrate’s decision to depart. Guideline § 5K2.0 permits departure based on “ ‘mitigating circumstance[s] of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission.’ ” U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)). The sentencing judge may not depart unless he or she has legal authority under the Guidelines to do so. United States v. Lira-Barraza, 941 F.2d 745, 746 (9th Cir.1991) (en banc) (notmg that “legal authority” is first of three-part test for departure under the Guidelines). Although in United States v. Miller, 991 F.2d 552 (9th Cir.1993), and United States v. Berlier, 948 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir.1991), we analyzed the related question of the scope of § 3E1.1 departures based on pre-trial restitution Cir.1991) (recognizing that a defendant may appeal a district courts refusal to depart downward if the sentence was imposed in violation of law because the district court misconstrued its authority to depart", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n§ 3553(a)(7) to justify the magistrate’s decision to depart. Guideline § 5K2.0 permits departure based on “ ‘mitigating circumstance[s] of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission.’ ” U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)). The sentencing judge may not depart unless he or she has legal authority under the Guidelines to do so. United States v. Lira-Barraza, 941 F.2d 745, 746 (9th Cir.1991) (en banc) (notmg that “legal authority” is first of three-part test for departure under the Guidelines). Although in United States v. Miller, 991 F.2d 552 (9th Cir.1993), and United States v. Berlier, 948 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir.1991), we analyzed the related question of the scope of § 3E1.1 departures based on pre-trial restitution Cir.1991) (holding that district court may not depart downward to preserve defendants ability to make restitution", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n§ 3553(a)(7) to justify the magistrate’s decision to depart. Guideline § 5K2.0 permits departure based on “ ‘mitigating circumstance[s] of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission.’ ” U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)). The sentencing judge may not depart unless he or she has legal authority under the Guidelines to do so. United States v. Lira-Barraza, 941 F.2d 745, 746 (9th Cir.1991) (en banc) (notmg that “legal authority” is first of three-part test for departure under the Guidelines). Although in United States v. Miller, 991 F.2d 552 (9th Cir.1993), and United States v. Berlier, 948 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir.1991), we analyzed the related question of the scope of § 3E1.1 departures based on pre-trial restitution Cir.1991) (holding that a circuit court has no jurisdiction to review a district courts discretionary decision not to depart downward from the guidelines but would have jurisdiction if the district court based its decision on the belief that it did not have the authority to depart" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nagents to exercise unfettered discretion, in part by explicitly placing conditions on execution). Consistent with these purposes, the conditions governing the warrant’s execution should be “explicit, clear, and narrowly drawn so as to avoid misunderstanding or manipulation by government agents.” Garcia, 882 F.2d at 703-04; accord Dennis, 115 F.3d at 528; Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d at 12. The particularity with which the magistrate should specify the conditions, however, will vary based on the individual facts of each case. Although the conditions precedent ensure that an anticipatory warrant will not be executed prematurely, such conditions do not serve as a substitute for the magistrate’s probable cause determination. See United States v. Hendricks, 743 F.2d 653, 654-56 (9th Cir.1984) (holding anticipatory warrant for search of defendants home was invalid because facts made known to magistrate did not establish at time warrant was issued the required nexus between the contraband to be seized which was mailed to defendants post office box and defendants home", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nagents to exercise unfettered discretion, in part by explicitly placing conditions on execution). Consistent with these purposes, the conditions governing the warrant’s execution should be “explicit, clear, and narrowly drawn so as to avoid misunderstanding or manipulation by government agents.” Garcia, 882 F.2d at 703-04; accord Dennis, 115 F.3d at 528; Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d at 12. The particularity with which the magistrate should specify the conditions, however, will vary based on the individual facts of each case. Although the conditions precedent ensure that an anticipatory warrant will not be executed prematurely, such conditions do not serve as a substitute for the magistrate’s probable cause determination. See United States v. Hendricks, 743 F.2d 653, 654-56 (9th Cir.1984) (holding anticipatory warrant for search of defendants home was invalid when defendant was required to pick up suitcase containing contraband at airport and there was no assurance at time warrant was issued that defendant would take suitcase to his home", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nagents to exercise unfettered discretion, in part by explicitly placing conditions on execution). Consistent with these purposes, the conditions governing the warrant’s execution should be “explicit, clear, and narrowly drawn so as to avoid misunderstanding or manipulation by government agents.” Garcia, 882 F.2d at 703-04; accord Dennis, 115 F.3d at 528; Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d at 12. The particularity with which the magistrate should specify the conditions, however, will vary based on the individual facts of each case. Although the conditions precedent ensure that an anticipatory warrant will not be executed prematurely, such conditions do not serve as a substitute for the magistrate’s probable cause determination. See United States v. Hendricks, 743 F.2d 653, 654-56 (9th Cir.1984) (holding anticipatory warrant for search of defendants home was invalid because contraband was picked up by defendant rather than being delivered to his home and affidavit failed to provide facts establishing a nexus between contraband and defendants home", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nagents to exercise unfettered discretion, in part by explicitly placing conditions on execution). Consistent with these purposes, the conditions governing the warrant’s execution should be “explicit, clear, and narrowly drawn so as to avoid misunderstanding or manipulation by government agents.” Garcia, 882 F.2d at 703-04; accord Dennis, 115 F.3d at 528; Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d at 12. The particularity with which the magistrate should specify the conditions, however, will vary based on the individual facts of each case. Although the conditions precedent ensure that an anticipatory warrant will not be executed prematurely, such conditions do not serve as a substitute for the magistrate’s probable cause determination. See United States v. Hendricks, 743 F.2d 653, 654-56 (9th Cir.1984) (holding anticipatory warrant for search of defendants home was invalid when defendant was required to pick up suitcase containing contraband at airport and there was no information indicating defendant would take suitcase home or otherwise linking defendants residence to illegal activity", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nagents to exercise unfettered discretion, in part by explicitly placing conditions on execution). Consistent with these purposes, the conditions governing the warrant’s execution should be “explicit, clear, and narrowly drawn so as to avoid misunderstanding or manipulation by government agents.” Garcia, 882 F.2d at 703-04; accord Dennis, 115 F.3d at 528; Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d at 12. The particularity with which the magistrate should specify the conditions, however, will vary based on the individual facts of each case. Although the conditions precedent ensure that an anticipatory warrant will not be executed prematurely, such conditions do not serve as a substitute for the magistrate’s probable cause determination. See United States v. Hendricks, 743 F.2d 653, 654-56 (9th Cir.1984) (holding anticipatory warrant for search of defendants home was invalid because affidavit provided no assurance that defendant would take package to his home after collecting it at the airport despite fact that warrant contained condition that it was not to be executed until package arrived at defendants house" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nWhile these observations by Hines \"express an opinion regarding the ultimate resolution of [a] disputed issue,\" the testimony does not eross the line drawn by rule 704 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. See State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1363 (Utah 1993). Hines's testimony was relevant in \"help{ing] the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,\" see Utah R. Evid. 702(a), by explaining what concerns may drive an investor's decision to purchase a security. Compare Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1861 (determining that an expert's opinion testimony \"that some of the material that [the defendant] had omitted from the securities documents could have been important or significant to an investor\" was admissible), with State v. Tenney, 913 P.2d 750, 756 (Utah Ct.App.1996) (holding that such information is not material under securities law", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nWhile these observations by Hines \"express an opinion regarding the ultimate resolution of [a] disputed issue,\" the testimony does not eross the line drawn by rule 704 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. See State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1363 (Utah 1993). Hines's testimony was relevant in \"help{ing] the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,\" see Utah R. Evid. 702(a), by explaining what concerns may drive an investor's decision to purchase a security. Compare Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1861 (determining that an expert's opinion testimony \"that some of the material that [the defendant] had omitted from the securities documents could have been important or significant to an investor\" was admissible), with State v. Tenney, 913 P.2d 750, 756 (Utah Ct.App.1996) (holding that omission of information about shares held in corporations was material even if the securities were worthless at the time", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nWhile these observations by Hines \"express an opinion regarding the ultimate resolution of [a] disputed issue,\" the testimony does not eross the line drawn by rule 704 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. See State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1363 (Utah 1993). Hines's testimony was relevant in \"help{ing] the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,\" see Utah R. Evid. 702(a), by explaining what concerns may drive an investor's decision to purchase a security. Compare Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1861 (determining that an expert's opinion testimony \"that some of the material that [the defendant] had omitted from the securities documents could have been important or significant to an investor\" was admissible), with State v. Tenney, 913 P.2d 750, 756 (Utah Ct.App.1996) (holding that under certain conditions a bank assumes a duty to disclose facts material to a transaction", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nWhile these observations by Hines \"express an opinion regarding the ultimate resolution of [a] disputed issue,\" the testimony does not eross the line drawn by rule 704 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. See State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1363 (Utah 1993). Hines's testimony was relevant in \"help{ing] the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,\" see Utah R. Evid. 702(a), by explaining what concerns may drive an investor's decision to purchase a security. Compare Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1861 (determining that an expert's opinion testimony \"that some of the material that [the defendant] had omitted from the securities documents could have been important or significant to an investor\" was admissible), with State v. Tenney, 913 P.2d 750, 756 (Utah Ct.App.1996) (holding that purely factual material may be withheld from disclosure under exemption 5 if that material would expose the deliberative process of an agency", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nWhile these observations by Hines \"express an opinion regarding the ultimate resolution of [a] disputed issue,\" the testimony does not eross the line drawn by rule 704 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. See State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1363 (Utah 1993). Hines's testimony was relevant in \"help{ing] the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,\" see Utah R. Evid. 702(a), by explaining what concerns may drive an investor's decision to purchase a security. Compare Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1861 (determining that an expert's opinion testimony \"that some of the material that [the defendant] had omitted from the securities documents could have been important or significant to an investor\" was admissible), with State v. Tenney, 913 P.2d 750, 756 (Utah Ct.App.1996) (holding inadmissible expert testimony that included statements that failure to disclose certain enumerated information would be a material omission under utah law that the material actually provided to investors did not meet disclosure requirements under the act and that the agreements at issue were securities under utah law" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nId. If there is evidence in the record, including affidavits, exhibits, interrogatory answers, and depositions, as to any material fact from which an inference could be drawn in favor of the non-movant, summary judgment is unavailable. See Lane v. New York State Electric & Gas Corp., 18 F.3d 172, 176 (2d Cir.1994). Notably, “the trial court’s task at the summary judgment motion state of litigation is carefully limited to discerning whether there are genuine issues of material fact to be tried, not to decide them. Its duty, in short, is confined at this point to issue-finding, it does not extend to issue resolution.” Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs. Ltd., 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir.1994); see Donahue v. Windsor Locks Board of Fire Commissioners, 834 F.2d 54, 57 (2d Cir.1987) (holding that on a motion for summary judgment the court cannot try issues of fact it can only determine whether there are issues to be tried", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nId. If there is evidence in the record, including affidavits, exhibits, interrogatory answers, and depositions, as to any material fact from which an inference could be drawn in favor of the non-movant, summary judgment is unavailable. See Lane v. New York State Electric & Gas Corp., 18 F.3d 172, 176 (2d Cir.1994). Notably, “the trial court’s task at the summary judgment motion state of litigation is carefully limited to discerning whether there are genuine issues of material fact to be tried, not to decide them. Its duty, in short, is confined at this point to issue-finding, it does not extend to issue resolution.” Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs. Ltd., 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir.1994); see Donahue v. Windsor Locks Board of Fire Commissioners, 834 F.2d 54, 57 (2d Cir.1987) (holding that under florida law a court hearing a case on a motion for a summary judgment can only consider those issues raised by the pleadings", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nId. If there is evidence in the record, including affidavits, exhibits, interrogatory answers, and depositions, as to any material fact from which an inference could be drawn in favor of the non-movant, summary judgment is unavailable. See Lane v. New York State Electric & Gas Corp., 18 F.3d 172, 176 (2d Cir.1994). Notably, “the trial court’s task at the summary judgment motion state of litigation is carefully limited to discerning whether there are genuine issues of material fact to be tried, not to decide them. Its duty, in short, is confined at this point to issue-finding, it does not extend to issue resolution.” Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs. Ltd., 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir.1994); see Donahue v. Windsor Locks Board of Fire Commissioners, 834 F.2d 54, 57 (2d Cir.1987) (holding that the function of the trial court on a motion for summary judgment is to determine whether issues of fact exist and not to decide the merits of the issues themselves", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nId. If there is evidence in the record, including affidavits, exhibits, interrogatory answers, and depositions, as to any material fact from which an inference could be drawn in favor of the non-movant, summary judgment is unavailable. See Lane v. New York State Electric & Gas Corp., 18 F.3d 172, 176 (2d Cir.1994). Notably, “the trial court’s task at the summary judgment motion state of litigation is carefully limited to discerning whether there are genuine issues of material fact to be tried, not to decide them. Its duty, in short, is confined at this point to issue-finding, it does not extend to issue resolution.” Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs. Ltd., 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir.1994); see Donahue v. Windsor Locks Board of Fire Commissioners, 834 F.2d 54, 57 (2d Cir.1987) (holding that a probable cause determination is appropriate for summary judgment where there are no genuine issues of material fact and no credibility issues", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nId. If there is evidence in the record, including affidavits, exhibits, interrogatory answers, and depositions, as to any material fact from which an inference could be drawn in favor of the non-movant, summary judgment is unavailable. See Lane v. New York State Electric & Gas Corp., 18 F.3d 172, 176 (2d Cir.1994). Notably, “the trial court’s task at the summary judgment motion state of litigation is carefully limited to discerning whether there are genuine issues of material fact to be tried, not to decide them. Its duty, in short, is confined at this point to issue-finding, it does not extend to issue resolution.” Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs. Ltd., 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir.1994); see Donahue v. Windsor Locks Board of Fire Commissioners, 834 F.2d 54, 57 (2d Cir.1987) (holding that when there are no genuine issues of material fact summary judgment is appropriate" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nLet us say we have a trial against the asbestos companies and the plaintiffs lose because the plaintiff is found to have not been exposed to asbestos in a way in which exposure was a substantial factor in producing the plaintiff’s injuries. Now, what happens in a case where we proceed against the tobacco companies? Are we collaterally estopped from asserting a synergy argument against the tobacco companies because a jury has formerly held that the plaintiffs injury was not caused by asbestos? And despite that, can the tobacco companies nonetheless proceed and enter a defense and argue to a jury that in fact it's asbestos that caused the injury and not. tobacco? 9 . In Forbes v. American Tobacco Co., 37 F.R.D. 530 (E.D.Wis.1965), the court severed claims again 9, 641-42 (N.D.Ga.1993) (holding joinder of two defendants was proper where plaintiffs filed a products liability claim against general motors and a negligent roadway design claim against a local government for injuries caused by an automobile accident", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nLet us say we have a trial against the asbestos companies and the plaintiffs lose because the plaintiff is found to have not been exposed to asbestos in a way in which exposure was a substantial factor in producing the plaintiff’s injuries. Now, what happens in a case where we proceed against the tobacco companies? Are we collaterally estopped from asserting a synergy argument against the tobacco companies because a jury has formerly held that the plaintiffs injury was not caused by asbestos? And despite that, can the tobacco companies nonetheless proceed and enter a defense and argue to a jury that in fact it's asbestos that caused the injury and not. tobacco? 9 . In Forbes v. American Tobacco Co., 37 F.R.D. 530 (E.D.Wis.1965), the court severed claims again 9, 641-42 (N.D.Ga.1993) (holding automobile exclusion in general liability policy did not apply because plaintiffs claim of negligent supervision and training was a separate and distinct theory of recovery from the use of an automobile", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nLet us say we have a trial against the asbestos companies and the plaintiffs lose because the plaintiff is found to have not been exposed to asbestos in a way in which exposure was a substantial factor in producing the plaintiff’s injuries. Now, what happens in a case where we proceed against the tobacco companies? Are we collaterally estopped from asserting a synergy argument against the tobacco companies because a jury has formerly held that the plaintiffs injury was not caused by asbestos? And despite that, can the tobacco companies nonetheless proceed and enter a defense and argue to a jury that in fact it's asbestos that caused the injury and not. tobacco? 9 . In Forbes v. American Tobacco Co., 37 F.R.D. 530 (E.D.Wis.1965), the court severed claims again 9, 641-42 (N.D.Ga.1993) (recognizing that limitation of coverage in automobile liability policy to accident s was founded on the elemental proposition that injuries will not be deemed caused by accident where the injuries are intentionally inflicted this generally being considered a risk which it would be against public policy to insure", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nLet us say we have a trial against the asbestos companies and the plaintiffs lose because the plaintiff is found to have not been exposed to asbestos in a way in which exposure was a substantial factor in producing the plaintiff’s injuries. Now, what happens in a case where we proceed against the tobacco companies? Are we collaterally estopped from asserting a synergy argument against the tobacco companies because a jury has formerly held that the plaintiffs injury was not caused by asbestos? And despite that, can the tobacco companies nonetheless proceed and enter a defense and argue to a jury that in fact it's asbestos that caused the injury and not. tobacco? 9 . In Forbes v. American Tobacco Co., 37 F.R.D. 530 (E.D.Wis.1965), the court severed claims again 9, 641-42 (N.D.Ga.1993) (recognizing products liability and products actions based on negligence as part of the general maritime law", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nLet us say we have a trial against the asbestos companies and the plaintiffs lose because the plaintiff is found to have not been exposed to asbestos in a way in which exposure was a substantial factor in producing the plaintiff’s injuries. Now, what happens in a case where we proceed against the tobacco companies? Are we collaterally estopped from asserting a synergy argument against the tobacco companies because a jury has formerly held that the plaintiffs injury was not caused by asbestos? And despite that, can the tobacco companies nonetheless proceed and enter a defense and argue to a jury that in fact it's asbestos that caused the injury and not. tobacco? 9 . In Forbes v. American Tobacco Co., 37 F.R.D. 530 (E.D.Wis.1965), the court severed claims again 9, 641-42 (N.D.Ga.1993) (holding joinder of a hospital medical malpractice claim and a drug manufacturer products liability theory was proper in claim alleging injury from administering a drug" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe reasonableness inquiry into his unavailability,” the district court appropriately concluded that there was no Ninth Circuit precedent directly addressing the key issue raised in this appeal. V Several of our sister circuits, as well as a district court in our own circuit, have however, “addressed the issue of whether the government’s conduct in a case involving alien witnesses who subsequently left the United States was reasonable and in good faith.” See, e.g., Wilson, 36 F.Supp.2d at 1181-82 (surveying cases from the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, before concluding that the government has a duty to make reasonable and good faith efforts to procure the witness’s attendance at trial before the witness leaves the United States); see also Mann, 590 F.2d at 368 (holding that in order to state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure to call a witness to testify the claimant must allege 1 the identity of the potential witness 2 that the witness was available to testify at trial 3 the substance of the witnesss testimony and 4 an explanation of how the omission of the testimony prejudiced the case", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe reasonableness inquiry into his unavailability,” the district court appropriately concluded that there was no Ninth Circuit precedent directly addressing the key issue raised in this appeal. V Several of our sister circuits, as well as a district court in our own circuit, have however, “addressed the issue of whether the government’s conduct in a case involving alien witnesses who subsequently left the United States was reasonable and in good faith.” See, e.g., Wilson, 36 F.Supp.2d at 1181-82 (surveying cases from the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, before concluding that the government has a duty to make reasonable and good faith efforts to procure the witness’s attendance at trial before the witness leaves the United States); see also Mann, 590 F.2d at 368 (holding that testimonial hearsay statements of a witness who does not appear at trial are inadmissible under the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment unless the witness is unavailable to testify and the defendant has had a prior opportunity to crossexamine the witness", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe reasonableness inquiry into his unavailability,” the district court appropriately concluded that there was no Ninth Circuit precedent directly addressing the key issue raised in this appeal. V Several of our sister circuits, as well as a district court in our own circuit, have however, “addressed the issue of whether the government’s conduct in a case involving alien witnesses who subsequently left the United States was reasonable and in good faith.” See, e.g., Wilson, 36 F.Supp.2d at 1181-82 (surveying cases from the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, before concluding that the government has a duty to make reasonable and good faith efforts to procure the witness’s attendance at trial before the witness leaves the United States); see also Mann, 590 F.2d at 368 (holding that the jury could have reasonably inferred the requisite intent to induce the witness to lie or testify falsely from the defendants statements to the witness", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe reasonableness inquiry into his unavailability,” the district court appropriately concluded that there was no Ninth Circuit precedent directly addressing the key issue raised in this appeal. V Several of our sister circuits, as well as a district court in our own circuit, have however, “addressed the issue of whether the government’s conduct in a case involving alien witnesses who subsequently left the United States was reasonable and in good faith.” See, e.g., Wilson, 36 F.Supp.2d at 1181-82 (surveying cases from the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, before concluding that the government has a duty to make reasonable and good faith efforts to procure the witness’s attendance at trial before the witness leaves the United States); see also Mann, 590 F.2d at 368 (holding that promises made by the prosecution to a witness in exchange for that witness testimony relate directly to the credibility of the witness", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe reasonableness inquiry into his unavailability,” the district court appropriately concluded that there was no Ninth Circuit precedent directly addressing the key issue raised in this appeal. V Several of our sister circuits, as well as a district court in our own circuit, have however, “addressed the issue of whether the government’s conduct in a case involving alien witnesses who subsequently left the United States was reasonable and in good faith.” See, e.g., Wilson, 36 F.Supp.2d at 1181-82 (surveying cases from the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, before concluding that the government has a duty to make reasonable and good faith efforts to procure the witness’s attendance at trial before the witness leaves the United States); see also Mann, 590 F.2d at 368 (holding that though the government acted reasonably and in good faith in trying to convince a witness to return to testify for trial the witness was not unavailable under rule 804a5 because the government made the witnesss departure from the country possible" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nmust have commenced, which, under Arkansas law, occurs when the plaintiff files the complaint and completes timely service on the defendant. Forrest City Mach. Works, Inc. v. Lyons (Lyons II), 315 Ark.173, 866 S.W.2d 372, 373 (1993). To perfect service under the Arkansas rules, “compliance must be exact” because the “service requirements are strictly construed.” Rettig, 362 S.W.3d at 262. If the plaintiff fails to perfect service within 120 days of filing the complaint, the action is subject to mandatory dismissal. Lyons v. Forrest City Mach. Works, Inc. (Lyons I), 301 Ark. 559, 785 S.W.2d 220, 222-23 (1990). Completing service for purposes of “commencing]” the action and triggering the savings statute, however, does not require perfecting service. Compare Lyons I, 785 S.W.2d at 222-23 (holding that the statutory requirement that a defendant serve any apportionment complaint within 120 days of the return date of the original complaint is mandatory and implicates a courts personal jurisdiction", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nmust have commenced, which, under Arkansas law, occurs when the plaintiff files the complaint and completes timely service on the defendant. Forrest City Mach. Works, Inc. v. Lyons (Lyons II), 315 Ark.173, 866 S.W.2d 372, 373 (1993). To perfect service under the Arkansas rules, “compliance must be exact” because the “service requirements are strictly construed.” Rettig, 362 S.W.3d at 262. If the plaintiff fails to perfect service within 120 days of filing the complaint, the action is subject to mandatory dismissal. Lyons v. Forrest City Mach. Works, Inc. (Lyons I), 301 Ark. 559, 785 S.W.2d 220, 222-23 (1990). Completing service for purposes of “commencing]” the action and triggering the savings statute, however, does not require perfecting service. Compare Lyons I, 785 S.W.2d at 222-23 (holding that noncompliance with general statutes 52102b which requires service of apportionment complaint within 120 days after return date of original complaint implicated personal jurisdiction", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nmust have commenced, which, under Arkansas law, occurs when the plaintiff files the complaint and completes timely service on the defendant. Forrest City Mach. Works, Inc. v. Lyons (Lyons II), 315 Ark.173, 866 S.W.2d 372, 373 (1993). To perfect service under the Arkansas rules, “compliance must be exact” because the “service requirements are strictly construed.” Rettig, 362 S.W.3d at 262. If the plaintiff fails to perfect service within 120 days of filing the complaint, the action is subject to mandatory dismissal. Lyons v. Forrest City Mach. Works, Inc. (Lyons I), 301 Ark. 559, 785 S.W.2d 220, 222-23 (1990). Completing service for purposes of “commencing]” the action and triggering the savings statute, however, does not require perfecting service. Compare Lyons I, 785 S.W.2d at 222-23 (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed the case without prejudice because the plaintiff failed to properly serve the defendant within 120 days after filing the complaint", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nmust have commenced, which, under Arkansas law, occurs when the plaintiff files the complaint and completes timely service on the defendant. Forrest City Mach. Works, Inc. v. Lyons (Lyons II), 315 Ark.173, 866 S.W.2d 372, 373 (1993). To perfect service under the Arkansas rules, “compliance must be exact” because the “service requirements are strictly construed.” Rettig, 362 S.W.3d at 262. If the plaintiff fails to perfect service within 120 days of filing the complaint, the action is subject to mandatory dismissal. Lyons v. Forrest City Mach. Works, Inc. (Lyons I), 301 Ark. 559, 785 S.W.2d 220, 222-23 (1990). Completing service for purposes of “commencing]” the action and triggering the savings statute, however, does not require perfecting service. Compare Lyons I, 785 S.W.2d at 222-23 (holding that because the plaintiff had not perfected service within 120 days of filing the complaint the complaint was subject to mandatory dismissal", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nmust have commenced, which, under Arkansas law, occurs when the plaintiff files the complaint and completes timely service on the defendant. Forrest City Mach. Works, Inc. v. Lyons (Lyons II), 315 Ark.173, 866 S.W.2d 372, 373 (1993). To perfect service under the Arkansas rules, “compliance must be exact” because the “service requirements are strictly construed.” Rettig, 362 S.W.3d at 262. If the plaintiff fails to perfect service within 120 days of filing the complaint, the action is subject to mandatory dismissal. Lyons v. Forrest City Mach. Works, Inc. (Lyons I), 301 Ark. 559, 785 S.W.2d 220, 222-23 (1990). Completing service for purposes of “commencing]” the action and triggering the savings statute, however, does not require perfecting service. Compare Lyons I, 785 S.W.2d at 222-23 (holding that the plaintiffs second complaint did not relate back to her first complaint because her second complaint was not an amendment to her first complaint but rather a separate filing" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nlima M. Rodriguez, a native and citizen of Colombia, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing her appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) order denying suspension of deportation and voluntary departure. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1105a. Where, as here, the BIA conducts a de novo review of the record, we review the BIA’s decision. See De Leon-Barrios v. INS, 116 F.3d 391, 393 (9th Cir.1997). We deny the petition. The BIA properly denied suspension of deportation because Rodriguez, who was deported in 1992, did not accrue the requisite seven years’ continuous presence in the United States. Cf. Barragan-Sanehez v. Rosenberg, 471 F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 1972) (holding that an aliens continuous physical presence is broken if the alien was offered and accepted the opportunity to withdraw an application for admission", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nlima M. Rodriguez, a native and citizen of Colombia, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing her appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) order denying suspension of deportation and voluntary departure. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1105a. Where, as here, the BIA conducts a de novo review of the record, we review the BIA’s decision. See De Leon-Barrios v. INS, 116 F.3d 391, 393 (9th Cir.1997). We deny the petition. The BIA properly denied suspension of deportation because Rodriguez, who was deported in 1992, did not accrue the requisite seven years’ continuous presence in the United States. Cf. Barragan-Sanehez v. Rosenberg, 471 F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 1972) (holding that the failure to notify aliens counsel of an order to appear for deportation violated the aliens statutory right to counsel", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nlima M. Rodriguez, a native and citizen of Colombia, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing her appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) order denying suspension of deportation and voluntary departure. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1105a. Where, as here, the BIA conducts a de novo review of the record, we review the BIA’s decision. See De Leon-Barrios v. INS, 116 F.3d 391, 393 (9th Cir.1997). We deny the petition. The BIA properly denied suspension of deportation because Rodriguez, who was deported in 1992, did not accrue the requisite seven years’ continuous presence in the United States. Cf. Barragan-Sanehez v. Rosenberg, 471 F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 1972) (holding bia did not err in determining request for stay of voluntary departure is not an implicit request for a withdrawal of voluntary departure", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nlima M. Rodriguez, a native and citizen of Colombia, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing her appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) order denying suspension of deportation and voluntary departure. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1105a. Where, as here, the BIA conducts a de novo review of the record, we review the BIA’s decision. See De Leon-Barrios v. INS, 116 F.3d 391, 393 (9th Cir.1997). We deny the petition. The BIA properly denied suspension of deportation because Rodriguez, who was deported in 1992, did not accrue the requisite seven years’ continuous presence in the United States. Cf. Barragan-Sanehez v. Rosenberg, 471 F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 1972) (holding that aliens continuous presence in the country was interrupted by voluntary departure under threat of deportation proceedings", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nlima M. Rodriguez, a native and citizen of Colombia, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing her appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) order denying suspension of deportation and voluntary departure. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1105a. Where, as here, the BIA conducts a de novo review of the record, we review the BIA’s decision. See De Leon-Barrios v. INS, 116 F.3d 391, 393 (9th Cir.1997). We deny the petition. The BIA properly denied suspension of deportation because Rodriguez, who was deported in 1992, did not accrue the requisite seven years’ continuous presence in the United States. Cf. Barragan-Sanehez v. Rosenberg, 471 F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 1972) (holding that because aliens two previous voluntary departures were the result of implied agreements and were not therefore strictly voluntary they constituted significant departures that precluded a finding of seven years continuous presence in the united states under a rule that excused absences that were brief casual and innocent" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\ndiscriminated against him based on a psychiatric disability, in violation of Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131 et seq., when it dismissed him from its medical program. Title II prohibits discrimination against a disabled individual regarding access to public services. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (“No qualified individual with a disability shall ... be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”). The public entities defined in the ADA are state or local governments and their instrumentalities. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1). The United States, its agencies, and employees are not public entities under the ADA. Cellular Phone Taskforce v. FCC, 217 F.3d 72, 73 (2d Cir.2000) (holding that title ii of the ada is not applicable to the federal government", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\ndiscriminated against him based on a psychiatric disability, in violation of Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131 et seq., when it dismissed him from its medical program. Title II prohibits discrimination against a disabled individual regarding access to public services. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (“No qualified individual with a disability shall ... be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”). The public entities defined in the ADA are state or local governments and their instrumentalities. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1). The United States, its agencies, and employees are not public entities under the ADA. Cellular Phone Taskforce v. FCC, 217 F.3d 72, 73 (2d Cir.2000) (holding that title ii does not apply to the states", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\ndiscriminated against him based on a psychiatric disability, in violation of Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131 et seq., when it dismissed him from its medical program. Title II prohibits discrimination against a disabled individual regarding access to public services. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (“No qualified individual with a disability shall ... be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”). The public entities defined in the ADA are state or local governments and their instrumentalities. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1). The United States, its agencies, and employees are not public entities under the ADA. Cellular Phone Taskforce v. FCC, 217 F.3d 72, 73 (2d Cir.2000) (holding that prudential limitations on standing do not apply to title ii ada claims", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\ndiscriminated against him based on a psychiatric disability, in violation of Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131 et seq., when it dismissed him from its medical program. Title II prohibits discrimination against a disabled individual regarding access to public services. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (“No qualified individual with a disability shall ... be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”). The public entities defined in the ADA are state or local governments and their instrumentalities. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1). The United States, its agencies, and employees are not public entities under the ADA. Cellular Phone Taskforce v. FCC, 217 F.3d 72, 73 (2d Cir.2000) (holding the ada and the rehabilitation act applicable", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\ndiscriminated against him based on a psychiatric disability, in violation of Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131 et seq., when it dismissed him from its medical program. Title II prohibits discrimination against a disabled individual regarding access to public services. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (“No qualified individual with a disability shall ... be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”). The public entities defined in the ADA are state or local governments and their instrumentalities. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1). The United States, its agencies, and employees are not public entities under the ADA. Cellular Phone Taskforce v. FCC, 217 F.3d 72, 73 (2d Cir.2000) (holding that title ii of the ada was a valid use of congress power under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nmost favorable to the Plaintiff, does not state a plausible claim for relief. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Rather, it continues to represent the quintessential shotgun pleading as this Court has ruled before, by wholly incorporating all paragraphs of the complaint into the second and final count. See Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriffs Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1321 (11th Cir.2015); Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Consolidated, 516 F.3d 955, 979 n. 54 (11th Cir. 2008) (collecting cases). Failure to correct such pleadings, given ample opportunity, supports dismissal. See Corsello v. Lincare, Inc., 428 F.3d 1008, 1014 (11th Cir.2005) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the plaintiffs third amended complaint with prejudice for failure to abide by rule 8 which requires that each averment of a pleading be simple concise and direct", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nmost favorable to the Plaintiff, does not state a plausible claim for relief. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Rather, it continues to represent the quintessential shotgun pleading as this Court has ruled before, by wholly incorporating all paragraphs of the complaint into the second and final count. See Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriffs Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1321 (11th Cir.2015); Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Consolidated, 516 F.3d 955, 979 n. 54 (11th Cir. 2008) (collecting cases). Failure to correct such pleadings, given ample opportunity, supports dismissal. See Corsello v. Lincare, Inc., 428 F.3d 1008, 1014 (11th Cir.2005) (holding district court did not abuse its discretion in not granting plaintiffs leave to amend complaint for a third time", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nmost favorable to the Plaintiff, does not state a plausible claim for relief. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Rather, it continues to represent the quintessential shotgun pleading as this Court has ruled before, by wholly incorporating all paragraphs of the complaint into the second and final count. See Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriffs Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1321 (11th Cir.2015); Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Consolidated, 516 F.3d 955, 979 n. 54 (11th Cir. 2008) (collecting cases). Failure to correct such pleadings, given ample opportunity, supports dismissal. See Corsello v. Lincare, Inc., 428 F.3d 1008, 1014 (11th Cir.2005) (holding district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to permit filing of third amended complaint for repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous amendments and quoting bryant v dupree 252 f3d 1161 1163 11th cir2001", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nmost favorable to the Plaintiff, does not state a plausible claim for relief. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Rather, it continues to represent the quintessential shotgun pleading as this Court has ruled before, by wholly incorporating all paragraphs of the complaint into the second and final count. See Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriffs Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1321 (11th Cir.2015); Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Consolidated, 516 F.3d 955, 979 n. 54 (11th Cir. 2008) (collecting cases). Failure to correct such pleadings, given ample opportunity, supports dismissal. See Corsello v. Lincare, Inc., 428 F.3d 1008, 1014 (11th Cir.2005) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing a complaint with prejudice based on the plaintiffs failure to amend the complaint by the deadline imposed by the court", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nmost favorable to the Plaintiff, does not state a plausible claim for relief. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Rather, it continues to represent the quintessential shotgun pleading as this Court has ruled before, by wholly incorporating all paragraphs of the complaint into the second and final count. See Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriffs Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1321 (11th Cir.2015); Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Consolidated, 516 F.3d 955, 979 n. 54 (11th Cir. 2008) (collecting cases). Failure to correct such pleadings, given ample opportunity, supports dismissal. See Corsello v. Lincare, Inc., 428 F.3d 1008, 1014 (11th Cir.2005) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to file a third amended complaint where the plaintiff had already been given opportunities to amend and did not indicate what additional facts he could plead to correct the deficiencies in his complaint" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthis reasoning is flawed. “Young does not apply if, although the action is nominally against individual officers, the state is the real, substantial party in interest and the suit in fact is against the state.” Id. at 506. Lucas names no individual officers. The Ex Parte Young exception applies only in actions against individual state officers, and not to state agencies. See id. Therefore, the Ex Parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity is inapplicable here, thus barring action against the Board. For the foregoing reasons, we will AFFIRM the dismissal of the declaratory judgment by the District Court. 1 . On appeal, Lucas cites two exceptions to the doctrine of Ex Parte Young. See Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 117 S.Ct. 2028, 138 L.Ed.2d 438 (1997) (holding a suit against an agency of the state is a suit against the state", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthis reasoning is flawed. “Young does not apply if, although the action is nominally against individual officers, the state is the real, substantial party in interest and the suit in fact is against the state.” Id. at 506. Lucas names no individual officers. The Ex Parte Young exception applies only in actions against individual state officers, and not to state agencies. See id. Therefore, the Ex Parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity is inapplicable here, thus barring action against the Board. For the foregoing reasons, we will AFFIRM the dismissal of the declaratory judgment by the District Court. 1 . On appeal, Lucas cites two exceptions to the doctrine of Ex Parte Young. See Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 117 S.Ct. 2028, 138 L.Ed.2d 438 (1997) (holding that while the fourteenth amendment is directed against state action and not private action the state action requirement is met in a civil action where state law is applied whether by statute or common law", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthis reasoning is flawed. “Young does not apply if, although the action is nominally against individual officers, the state is the real, substantial party in interest and the suit in fact is against the state.” Id. at 506. Lucas names no individual officers. The Ex Parte Young exception applies only in actions against individual state officers, and not to state agencies. See id. Therefore, the Ex Parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity is inapplicable here, thus barring action against the Board. For the foregoing reasons, we will AFFIRM the dismissal of the declaratory judgment by the District Court. 1 . On appeal, Lucas cites two exceptions to the doctrine of Ex Parte Young. See Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 117 S.Ct. 2028, 138 L.Ed.2d 438 (1997) (holding that a damages suit against a state officer in his official capacity was barred because it was functionally a suit against the state", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthis reasoning is flawed. “Young does not apply if, although the action is nominally against individual officers, the state is the real, substantial party in interest and the suit in fact is against the state.” Id. at 506. Lucas names no individual officers. The Ex Parte Young exception applies only in actions against individual state officers, and not to state agencies. See id. Therefore, the Ex Parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity is inapplicable here, thus barring action against the Board. For the foregoing reasons, we will AFFIRM the dismissal of the declaratory judgment by the District Court. 1 . On appeal, Lucas cites two exceptions to the doctrine of Ex Parte Young. See Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 117 S.Ct. 2028, 138 L.Ed.2d 438 (1997) (holding that an action cannot be maintained under young in unique circumstances where the suit against the state officer affects an essential attribute of state sovereignty in a manner that the action must be understood as one against the state", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthis reasoning is flawed. “Young does not apply if, although the action is nominally against individual officers, the state is the real, substantial party in interest and the suit in fact is against the state.” Id. at 506. Lucas names no individual officers. The Ex Parte Young exception applies only in actions against individual state officers, and not to state agencies. See id. Therefore, the Ex Parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity is inapplicable here, thus barring action against the Board. For the foregoing reasons, we will AFFIRM the dismissal of the declaratory judgment by the District Court. 1 . On appeal, Lucas cites two exceptions to the doctrine of Ex Parte Young. See Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 117 S.Ct. 2028, 138 L.Ed.2d 438 (1997) (holding that an action against an officer was not an action against the state because the relief sought would not take away any property of the state or fasten a lien on it or interfere with the disposition of funds in the treasury" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nby a plausible basis in the record. Secretary’s Br. at 7-8. Furthermore, the Secretary argues that a remand for readjudication in light of the enactment of the VCAA is not required because “the record fails to reveal the necessity for additional development ... [and the a]ppellant has been given adequate notice which detailed the law and evidence necessary to establish his claim.” Secretary’s Br. at 10. In his reply, the appellant argues that the BVA decision should be vacated and the matters remanded because of “the Board’s failure to make a finding on the question of whether the VCAA applies.” Appellant’s Reply at 1. Initially, the Court notes that it will address only those arguments adequately raised by the appellant in his briefs. See Ford v. Gober, 10 Vet.App. 531, 535-36 (1997) (holding that the court has discretion not to consider an issue abandoned on appeal", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nby a plausible basis in the record. Secretary’s Br. at 7-8. Furthermore, the Secretary argues that a remand for readjudication in light of the enactment of the VCAA is not required because “the record fails to reveal the necessity for additional development ... [and the a]ppellant has been given adequate notice which detailed the law and evidence necessary to establish his claim.” Secretary’s Br. at 10. In his reply, the appellant argues that the BVA decision should be vacated and the matters remanded because of “the Board’s failure to make a finding on the question of whether the VCAA applies.” Appellant’s Reply at 1. Initially, the Court notes that it will address only those arguments adequately raised by the appellant in his briefs. See Ford v. Gober, 10 Vet.App. 531, 535-36 (1997) (holding that an issue not presented to the trial court will not be considered on appeal", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nby a plausible basis in the record. Secretary’s Br. at 7-8. Furthermore, the Secretary argues that a remand for readjudication in light of the enactment of the VCAA is not required because “the record fails to reveal the necessity for additional development ... [and the a]ppellant has been given adequate notice which detailed the law and evidence necessary to establish his claim.” Secretary’s Br. at 10. In his reply, the appellant argues that the BVA decision should be vacated and the matters remanded because of “the Board’s failure to make a finding on the question of whether the VCAA applies.” Appellant’s Reply at 1. Initially, the Court notes that it will address only those arguments adequately raised by the appellant in his briefs. See Ford v. Gober, 10 Vet.App. 531, 535-36 (1997) (holding that claims presented to bva and not pursued on appeal are considered abandoned", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nby a plausible basis in the record. Secretary’s Br. at 7-8. Furthermore, the Secretary argues that a remand for readjudication in light of the enactment of the VCAA is not required because “the record fails to reveal the necessity for additional development ... [and the a]ppellant has been given adequate notice which detailed the law and evidence necessary to establish his claim.” Secretary’s Br. at 10. In his reply, the appellant argues that the BVA decision should be vacated and the matters remanded because of “the Board’s failure to make a finding on the question of whether the VCAA applies.” Appellant’s Reply at 1. Initially, the Court notes that it will address only those arguments adequately raised by the appellant in his briefs. See Ford v. Gober, 10 Vet.App. 531, 535-36 (1997) (holding that issues not argued on appeal are deemed abandoned", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nby a plausible basis in the record. Secretary’s Br. at 7-8. Furthermore, the Secretary argues that a remand for readjudication in light of the enactment of the VCAA is not required because “the record fails to reveal the necessity for additional development ... [and the a]ppellant has been given adequate notice which detailed the law and evidence necessary to establish his claim.” Secretary’s Br. at 10. In his reply, the appellant argues that the BVA decision should be vacated and the matters remanded because of “the Board’s failure to make a finding on the question of whether the VCAA applies.” Appellant’s Reply at 1. Initially, the Court notes that it will address only those arguments adequately raised by the appellant in his briefs. See Ford v. Gober, 10 Vet.App. 531, 535-36 (1997) (holding that a deposition that was not presented to the trial court could not be considered on appeal" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto consider the addi tional facts, and to rule on the additional claims, presented in his amended petition. Boyd has failed to preserve this issue for review. It would appear from a review of the record that Boyd is correct in maintaining that the circuit did not consider, or rule on, the additional facts and claims presented in his amended petition. However, the record also reflects that Boyd never objected to the circuit court’s failure to rule on the amended petition. As noted above, Boyd never moved for leave to file the amended petition, and the circuit court never entered an order granting Boyd leave to do so. Moreover, the circuit court never took any action indicating that it was granting Boyd leave to file an amended petition or that it would consider claims rim.App.1989) (holding that claim that the circuit courts order was deficient because it did not include specific findings of fact regarding each is sue was not preserved for review where it was not raised in the circuit court", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto consider the addi tional facts, and to rule on the additional claims, presented in his amended petition. Boyd has failed to preserve this issue for review. It would appear from a review of the record that Boyd is correct in maintaining that the circuit did not consider, or rule on, the additional facts and claims presented in his amended petition. However, the record also reflects that Boyd never objected to the circuit court’s failure to rule on the amended petition. As noted above, Boyd never moved for leave to file the amended petition, and the circuit court never entered an order granting Boyd leave to do so. Moreover, the circuit court never took any action indicating that it was granting Boyd leave to file an amended petition or that it would consider claims rim.App.1989) (holding that the appellants claim that the circuit court failed to make specific findings of fact relating to issues raised at an evidentiary hearing on the appellants postconviction petition was not preserved for review because the appellant did not raise the issue in the circuit court", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto consider the addi tional facts, and to rule on the additional claims, presented in his amended petition. Boyd has failed to preserve this issue for review. It would appear from a review of the record that Boyd is correct in maintaining that the circuit did not consider, or rule on, the additional facts and claims presented in his amended petition. However, the record also reflects that Boyd never objected to the circuit court’s failure to rule on the amended petition. As noted above, Boyd never moved for leave to file the amended petition, and the circuit court never entered an order granting Boyd leave to do so. Moreover, the circuit court never took any action indicating that it was granting Boyd leave to file an amended petition or that it would consider claims rim.App.1989) (holding that the appellants claim that the circuit court improperly adopted the states proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law in an order denying the appellants postconviction petition was not preserved for review because the appellant never objected to the circuit courts order", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto consider the addi tional facts, and to rule on the additional claims, presented in his amended petition. Boyd has failed to preserve this issue for review. It would appear from a review of the record that Boyd is correct in maintaining that the circuit did not consider, or rule on, the additional facts and claims presented in his amended petition. However, the record also reflects that Boyd never objected to the circuit court’s failure to rule on the amended petition. As noted above, Boyd never moved for leave to file the amended petition, and the circuit court never entered an order granting Boyd leave to do so. Moreover, the circuit court never took any action indicating that it was granting Boyd leave to file an amended petition or that it would consider claims rim.App.1989) (holding in an appeal from the denial of a rule 32 petition that the appellants claim that the circuit court erred in not ruling on his motion to subpoena a transcript of his guilty plea proceedings was not preserved for review because the circuit court never ruled on the motion and the appellant never objected to the circuit courts failure to rule on the motion", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto consider the addi tional facts, and to rule on the additional claims, presented in his amended petition. Boyd has failed to preserve this issue for review. It would appear from a review of the record that Boyd is correct in maintaining that the circuit did not consider, or rule on, the additional facts and claims presented in his amended petition. However, the record also reflects that Boyd never objected to the circuit court’s failure to rule on the amended petition. As noted above, Boyd never moved for leave to file the amended petition, and the circuit court never entered an order granting Boyd leave to do so. Moreover, the circuit court never took any action indicating that it was granting Boyd leave to file an amended petition or that it would consider claims rim.App.1989) (holding that the appellants claim that the circuit court erred in failing to make specific findings of fact as to all claims in the appellants rule 32 petition was not preserved for review because the appellant did not first present the claim to the circuit court" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\n914 P.2d 1246, 1249 n. 4 (Alaska 1996). 14 . Park v. Park, 986 P.2d 205, 206 (Alaska 1999). 15 . Julsen v. Julsen, 741 P.2d 642, 649 n. 10 (Alaska 1987). 16 . The dissent similarly argues that the trial court abused its discretion by not explicitly addressing these factors. See Dissent at 1051. 17 . See Park, 986 P.2d at 207 (stating that \"[w]hile a court determining custody must always consider each of these statutory factors, it need not refer to all of them in explaining its custody decision”); Borchgrevink v. Borchgrevink, 941 P.2d 132, 137-39 (Alaska 1997) (noting no error in trial court’s failure to expressly address those factors not disputed by the parties and those not favoring the parent to whom the court denied custody); Duffus v. Duffus, 932 P.2d 777, 779 (Alaska 1997) (holding that while the parties may choose to renegotiate their agreement they are under no good faith obligation to do so", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\n914 P.2d 1246, 1249 n. 4 (Alaska 1996). 14 . Park v. Park, 986 P.2d 205, 206 (Alaska 1999). 15 . Julsen v. Julsen, 741 P.2d 642, 649 n. 10 (Alaska 1987). 16 . The dissent similarly argues that the trial court abused its discretion by not explicitly addressing these factors. See Dissent at 1051. 17 . See Park, 986 P.2d at 207 (stating that \"[w]hile a court determining custody must always consider each of these statutory factors, it need not refer to all of them in explaining its custody decision”); Borchgrevink v. Borchgrevink, 941 P.2d 132, 137-39 (Alaska 1997) (noting no error in trial court’s failure to expressly address those factors not disputed by the parties and those not favoring the parent to whom the court denied custody); Duffus v. Duffus, 932 P.2d 777, 779 (Alaska 1997) (holding that while trial courts are encouraged to state all findings in their written orders they are not required to do so as long as the basis for their decisions is clear from the record and thus susceptible to review", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\n914 P.2d 1246, 1249 n. 4 (Alaska 1996). 14 . Park v. Park, 986 P.2d 205, 206 (Alaska 1999). 15 . Julsen v. Julsen, 741 P.2d 642, 649 n. 10 (Alaska 1987). 16 . The dissent similarly argues that the trial court abused its discretion by not explicitly addressing these factors. See Dissent at 1051. 17 . See Park, 986 P.2d at 207 (stating that \"[w]hile a court determining custody must always consider each of these statutory factors, it need not refer to all of them in explaining its custody decision”); Borchgrevink v. Borchgrevink, 941 P.2d 132, 137-39 (Alaska 1997) (noting no error in trial court’s failure to expressly address those factors not disputed by the parties and those not favoring the parent to whom the court denied custody); Duffus v. Duffus, 932 P.2d 777, 779 (Alaska 1997) (holding it improper to independently review the record to find support for a trial courts decision so long as it is unclear whether the trial court considered statutory factors", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\n914 P.2d 1246, 1249 n. 4 (Alaska 1996). 14 . Park v. Park, 986 P.2d 205, 206 (Alaska 1999). 15 . Julsen v. Julsen, 741 P.2d 642, 649 n. 10 (Alaska 1987). 16 . The dissent similarly argues that the trial court abused its discretion by not explicitly addressing these factors. See Dissent at 1051. 17 . See Park, 986 P.2d at 207 (stating that \"[w]hile a court determining custody must always consider each of these statutory factors, it need not refer to all of them in explaining its custody decision”); Borchgrevink v. Borchgrevink, 941 P.2d 132, 137-39 (Alaska 1997) (noting no error in trial court’s failure to expressly address those factors not disputed by the parties and those not favoring the parent to whom the court denied custody); Duffus v. Duffus, 932 P.2d 777, 779 (Alaska 1997) (holding that even though defendants response does not affirmatively state in the document itself that they are competent to testify as to the facts to which they swore does not necessarily doom their testimony so long as the record taken as a whole demonstrates that their testimony meets the requirements of rule 56", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\n914 P.2d 1246, 1249 n. 4 (Alaska 1996). 14 . Park v. Park, 986 P.2d 205, 206 (Alaska 1999). 15 . Julsen v. Julsen, 741 P.2d 642, 649 n. 10 (Alaska 1987). 16 . The dissent similarly argues that the trial court abused its discretion by not explicitly addressing these factors. See Dissent at 1051. 17 . See Park, 986 P.2d at 207 (stating that \"[w]hile a court determining custody must always consider each of these statutory factors, it need not refer to all of them in explaining its custody decision”); Borchgrevink v. Borchgrevink, 941 P.2d 132, 137-39 (Alaska 1997) (noting no error in trial court’s failure to expressly address those factors not disputed by the parties and those not favoring the parent to whom the court denied custody); Duffus v. Duffus, 932 P.2d 777, 779 (Alaska 1997) (holding that as long as the findings are supported by substantial evidence the board must defer to the hearing committees credibility determinations because they are subsidiary findings of basic facts" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n557 A.2d 1012. William Cook, another corrections officer, was also injured when an inmate, whose arm Cook was holding, suddenly jumped and dragged him down a flight of stairs. Id. at 218, 557 A.2d 1012. We distinguished those eases from Maynard and Ciecwisz; held that each officer sustained his injuries as the result of a great rush of force or uncontrollable power; and recognized the “actions of an unruly inmate” as the necessary qualifying external force distinct from an employee’s “own conduct.” Id. at 222, 557 A.2d 1012. Confusion over the Kane standard continued, however, and, despite their best efforts, courts remained unable to deploy it to reach consistent results. Compare Fawcett v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 307 N.J.Super. 378, 704 A.2d 1041 (App.Div. 1998) (holding the conflict preemption principle announced in pilot life and clarified in rush prudential remains in force", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n557 A.2d 1012. William Cook, another corrections officer, was also injured when an inmate, whose arm Cook was holding, suddenly jumped and dragged him down a flight of stairs. Id. at 218, 557 A.2d 1012. We distinguished those eases from Maynard and Ciecwisz; held that each officer sustained his injuries as the result of a great rush of force or uncontrollable power; and recognized the “actions of an unruly inmate” as the necessary qualifying external force distinct from an employee’s “own conduct.” Id. at 222, 557 A.2d 1012. Confusion over the Kane standard continued, however, and, despite their best efforts, courts remained unable to deploy it to reach consistent results. Compare Fawcett v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 307 N.J.Super. 378, 704 A.2d 1041 (App.Div. 1998) (holding that police officer plaintiff who was injured approaching a vehicle he had stopped from the rear which lurched backward was an occupier of a motor vehicle under either a geographic perimeter or vehielerelatedtask test", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n557 A.2d 1012. William Cook, another corrections officer, was also injured when an inmate, whose arm Cook was holding, suddenly jumped and dragged him down a flight of stairs. Id. at 218, 557 A.2d 1012. We distinguished those eases from Maynard and Ciecwisz; held that each officer sustained his injuries as the result of a great rush of force or uncontrollable power; and recognized the “actions of an unruly inmate” as the necessary qualifying external force distinct from an employee’s “own conduct.” Id. at 222, 557 A.2d 1012. Confusion over the Kane standard continued, however, and, despite their best efforts, courts remained unable to deploy it to reach consistent results. Compare Fawcett v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 307 N.J.Super. 378, 704 A.2d 1041 (App.Div. 1998) (holding force to be an element of pre1994 amendment 111 which may be satisfied by proof of force or threat of force", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n557 A.2d 1012. William Cook, another corrections officer, was also injured when an inmate, whose arm Cook was holding, suddenly jumped and dragged him down a flight of stairs. Id. at 218, 557 A.2d 1012. We distinguished those eases from Maynard and Ciecwisz; held that each officer sustained his injuries as the result of a great rush of force or uncontrollable power; and recognized the “actions of an unruly inmate” as the necessary qualifying external force distinct from an employee’s “own conduct.” Id. at 222, 557 A.2d 1012. Confusion over the Kane standard continued, however, and, despite their best efforts, courts remained unable to deploy it to reach consistent results. Compare Fawcett v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 307 N.J.Super. 378, 704 A.2d 1041 (App.Div. 1998) (holding whiplash from malfunction of seat which lurched backward and forward was great rush of force", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n557 A.2d 1012. William Cook, another corrections officer, was also injured when an inmate, whose arm Cook was holding, suddenly jumped and dragged him down a flight of stairs. Id. at 218, 557 A.2d 1012. We distinguished those eases from Maynard and Ciecwisz; held that each officer sustained his injuries as the result of a great rush of force or uncontrollable power; and recognized the “actions of an unruly inmate” as the necessary qualifying external force distinct from an employee’s “own conduct.” Id. at 222, 557 A.2d 1012. Confusion over the Kane standard continued, however, and, despite their best efforts, courts remained unable to deploy it to reach consistent results. Compare Fawcett v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 307 N.J.Super. 378, 704 A.2d 1041 (App.Div. 1998) (holding invasion of broom bristles in sensitive organ like eye can be great rush of force" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nfailure to inform the plaintiff of the tumor on February 23, 2002, resulted in any actual injury to the plaintiff before February 24, 2002, the first day of the four-year period in question. Rather, this Court concluded that, although the complained-of negligent act occurred beyond the four-year period of repose in 6-5-482(a), the plaintiff may have been able to prove a set of facts indicating that the actual legal injury occurred within the four-year period of repose. In this case, the trial court explained in its order dismissing Cutler’s medical-malpractice action that the primary difference between Crosslin and the instant case is that Crosslin alleged in his complaint only that his injury occurred at a point after February 24, 2002, and, thus, “Crosslin may [have been] able (holding that the plaintiffs cause of action accrued on the date of the repealer statute not on the date the wrong occurred despite the federal courts ruling as to the statutes unconstitutionality", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nfailure to inform the plaintiff of the tumor on February 23, 2002, resulted in any actual injury to the plaintiff before February 24, 2002, the first day of the four-year period in question. Rather, this Court concluded that, although the complained-of negligent act occurred beyond the four-year period of repose in 6-5-482(a), the plaintiff may have been able to prove a set of facts indicating that the actual legal injury occurred within the four-year period of repose. In this case, the trial court explained in its order dismissing Cutler’s medical-malpractice action that the primary difference between Crosslin and the instant case is that Crosslin alleged in his complaint only that his injury occurred at a point after February 24, 2002, and, thus, “Crosslin may [have been] able (holding that the cause of action accrued on the date of sale", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nfailure to inform the plaintiff of the tumor on February 23, 2002, resulted in any actual injury to the plaintiff before February 24, 2002, the first day of the four-year period in question. Rather, this Court concluded that, although the complained-of negligent act occurred beyond the four-year period of repose in 6-5-482(a), the plaintiff may have been able to prove a set of facts indicating that the actual legal injury occurred within the four-year period of repose. In this case, the trial court explained in its order dismissing Cutler’s medical-malpractice action that the primary difference between Crosslin and the instant case is that Crosslin alleged in his complaint only that his injury occurred at a point after February 24, 2002, and, thus, “Crosslin may [have been] able (holding that a plaintiffs 1983 claim accrued on the date of the alleged illegal search and seizure", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nfailure to inform the plaintiff of the tumor on February 23, 2002, resulted in any actual injury to the plaintiff before February 24, 2002, the first day of the four-year period in question. Rather, this Court concluded that, although the complained-of negligent act occurred beyond the four-year period of repose in 6-5-482(a), the plaintiff may have been able to prove a set of facts indicating that the actual legal injury occurred within the four-year period of repose. In this case, the trial court explained in its order dismissing Cutler’s medical-malpractice action that the primary difference between Crosslin and the instant case is that Crosslin alleged in his complaint only that his injury occurred at a point after February 24, 2002, and, thus, “Crosslin may [have been] able (holding that plaintiffs cause of action accrued on the date the ophthalmologist performed the initial surgery and left the gauze at the surgical site", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nfailure to inform the plaintiff of the tumor on February 23, 2002, resulted in any actual injury to the plaintiff before February 24, 2002, the first day of the four-year period in question. Rather, this Court concluded that, although the complained-of negligent act occurred beyond the four-year period of repose in 6-5-482(a), the plaintiff may have been able to prove a set of facts indicating that the actual legal injury occurred within the four-year period of repose. In this case, the trial court explained in its order dismissing Cutler’s medical-malpractice action that the primary difference between Crosslin and the instant case is that Crosslin alleged in his complaint only that his injury occurred at a point after February 24, 2002, and, thus, “Crosslin may [have been] able (holding that under the rule against splitting a cause of action a new claim for damages is not barred if the underlying cause of action had not accrued at the time of filing the previous lawsuit" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n[I]t has long been settled that when a trustee in breach of his fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries transfers trust property to a third person, the third person takes the property subject to the trust, unless he has purchased the property for value and without notice of the fiduciary’s breach of duty. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 250, 120 S.Ct. 2180, 147 L.Ed.2d 187 (2000) (applying common-law principles in the interpretation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974) (citations omitted). See also, e.g., Cardwell v. Cheatham, 39 Tenn. (2 Head.) 14 (1858) (stating that a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of a breach of trust takes free of the trust) (citations omitted); Covington v. Anderson, 84 Tenn. (16 Lea) 310 (1886) (holding that trust beneficiaries have no authority to maintain an action as third party beneficiaries of contracts between the trustee and agents of the trustee concerning the internal affairs of the trust", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n[I]t has long been settled that when a trustee in breach of his fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries transfers trust property to a third person, the third person takes the property subject to the trust, unless he has purchased the property for value and without notice of the fiduciary’s breach of duty. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 250, 120 S.Ct. 2180, 147 L.Ed.2d 187 (2000) (applying common-law principles in the interpretation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974) (citations omitted). See also, e.g., Cardwell v. Cheatham, 39 Tenn. (2 Head.) 14 (1858) (stating that a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of a breach of trust takes free of the trust) (citations omitted); Covington v. Anderson, 84 Tenn. (16 Lea) 310 (1886) (holding that a constructive trust had arisen on a third partys house due to her use of trust assets which had been diverted by the paca trustee to pay the mortgage and finding that the trust beneficiary plaintiffs are entitled to a lien on the property in the amount of the diverted funds", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n[I]t has long been settled that when a trustee in breach of his fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries transfers trust property to a third person, the third person takes the property subject to the trust, unless he has purchased the property for value and without notice of the fiduciary’s breach of duty. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 250, 120 S.Ct. 2180, 147 L.Ed.2d 187 (2000) (applying common-law principles in the interpretation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974) (citations omitted). See also, e.g., Cardwell v. Cheatham, 39 Tenn. (2 Head.) 14 (1858) (stating that a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of a breach of trust takes free of the trust) (citations omitted); Covington v. Anderson, 84 Tenn. (16 Lea) 310 (1886) (holding that a trustee properly withheld trust payments owed to a prior trustee who had misappropriated trust funds", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n[I]t has long been settled that when a trustee in breach of his fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries transfers trust property to a third person, the third person takes the property subject to the trust, unless he has purchased the property for value and without notice of the fiduciary’s breach of duty. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 250, 120 S.Ct. 2180, 147 L.Ed.2d 187 (2000) (applying common-law principles in the interpretation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974) (citations omitted). See also, e.g., Cardwell v. Cheatham, 39 Tenn. (2 Head.) 14 (1858) (stating that a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of a breach of trust takes free of the trust) (citations omitted); Covington v. Anderson, 84 Tenn. (16 Lea) 310 (1886) (holding that a third party who receives trust property on inquiry notice that a trustee has misappropriated trust funds is also liable for breach of trust", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n[I]t has long been settled that when a trustee in breach of his fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries transfers trust property to a third person, the third person takes the property subject to the trust, unless he has purchased the property for value and without notice of the fiduciary’s breach of duty. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 250, 120 S.Ct. 2180, 147 L.Ed.2d 187 (2000) (applying common-law principles in the interpretation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974) (citations omitted). See also, e.g., Cardwell v. Cheatham, 39 Tenn. (2 Head.) 14 (1858) (stating that a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of a breach of trust takes free of the trust) (citations omitted); Covington v. Anderson, 84 Tenn. (16 Lea) 310 (1886) (holding that the beneficiary of a trust was not the real party in interest regarding rights owned by the trust" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nshooting in Sabana Seca, the community in which Millán resided and in which a number of people were killed — without following the procedure for “bring[ing] [a defendant’s] uncharged conduct into play.” United States v. Sklar, 920 F.2d 107, 110 (1st Cir. 1990). But the record makes clear that the District Court was not suggesting that Millán was in any way responsible for the massacre, and so Millán’s argument rests on a mistaken premise. Moreover, we have made clear that, in considering the need for deterrence, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B), district courts may take into account not only the need for individual deterrence, but also the need for community deterrence within the defendant’s particular community. See United States v. Flores-Machicote, 706 F.3d 16, 22-23 (1st Cir. 2013) (holding that the existence of racial bias in the community is relevant to a 2 claim", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nshooting in Sabana Seca, the community in which Millán resided and in which a number of people were killed — without following the procedure for “bring[ing] [a defendant’s] uncharged conduct into play.” United States v. Sklar, 920 F.2d 107, 110 (1st Cir. 1990). But the record makes clear that the District Court was not suggesting that Millán was in any way responsible for the massacre, and so Millán’s argument rests on a mistaken premise. Moreover, we have made clear that, in considering the need for deterrence, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B), district courts may take into account not only the need for individual deterrence, but also the need for community deterrence within the defendant’s particular community. See United States v. Flores-Machicote, 706 F.3d 16, 22-23 (1st Cir. 2013) (recognizing that district court in exercise of its rule 16b discretion may consider other relevant factors including in particular whether allowing the amendment of the pleading at this stage of the litigation will prejudice defendants", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nshooting in Sabana Seca, the community in which Millán resided and in which a number of people were killed — without following the procedure for “bring[ing] [a defendant’s] uncharged conduct into play.” United States v. Sklar, 920 F.2d 107, 110 (1st Cir. 1990). But the record makes clear that the District Court was not suggesting that Millán was in any way responsible for the massacre, and so Millán’s argument rests on a mistaken premise. Moreover, we have made clear that, in considering the need for deterrence, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B), district courts may take into account not only the need for individual deterrence, but also the need for community deterrence within the defendant’s particular community. See United States v. Flores-Machicote, 706 F.3d 16, 22-23 (1st Cir. 2013) (holding that only relevant factors must be considered", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nshooting in Sabana Seca, the community in which Millán resided and in which a number of people were killed — without following the procedure for “bring[ing] [a defendant’s] uncharged conduct into play.” United States v. Sklar, 920 F.2d 107, 110 (1st Cir. 1990). But the record makes clear that the District Court was not suggesting that Millán was in any way responsible for the massacre, and so Millán’s argument rests on a mistaken premise. Moreover, we have made clear that, in considering the need for deterrence, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B), district courts may take into account not only the need for individual deterrence, but also the need for community deterrence within the defendant’s particular community. See United States v. Flores-Machicote, 706 F.3d 16, 22-23 (1st Cir. 2013) (holding that the family court is required to consider all relevant factors in determining alimony", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nshooting in Sabana Seca, the community in which Millán resided and in which a number of people were killed — without following the procedure for “bring[ing] [a defendant’s] uncharged conduct into play.” United States v. Sklar, 920 F.2d 107, 110 (1st Cir. 1990). But the record makes clear that the District Court was not suggesting that Millán was in any way responsible for the massacre, and so Millán’s argument rests on a mistaken premise. Moreover, we have made clear that, in considering the need for deterrence, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B), district courts may take into account not only the need for individual deterrence, but also the need for community deterrence within the defendant’s particular community. See United States v. Flores-Machicote, 706 F.3d 16, 22-23 (1st Cir. 2013) (holding that a sentencing judge may consider communitybased and geographic factors and explaining that the incidence of particular crimes in the relevant community appropriately informs and contextualizes the relevant need for deterrence" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nas in the present cases, the debtors have not claimed the entire amount of their interests in property exempt but instead have claimed a precise value amount of their interests exempt. See In re Shoemaker, 155 B.R. at 555. Id. at 60 (footnote omitted). The district court concluded that: Taylor simply does not address whether a debtor’s valuation of property becomes conclusive in the absence of a timely objection pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(i) and Rule 4003(b). A number of courts have addressed this issue, however. Some courts have concluded that no challenge to the value of the property may be asserted after the period for objections to a debtor’s exemptions has expired. See In re Okoinyan, 135 B.R. 691 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1991); cf. In re Wiesner, 39 B.R. 963, 965 (Bankr.W.D.Wis.1984) (holding that in computing time to determine whether an act was performed within a specified period of time under the statute of limitations the first day is excluded and the last day of the period is included", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nas in the present cases, the debtors have not claimed the entire amount of their interests in property exempt but instead have claimed a precise value amount of their interests exempt. See In re Shoemaker, 155 B.R. at 555. Id. at 60 (footnote omitted). The district court concluded that: Taylor simply does not address whether a debtor’s valuation of property becomes conclusive in the absence of a timely objection pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(i) and Rule 4003(b). A number of courts have addressed this issue, however. Some courts have concluded that no challenge to the value of the property may be asserted after the period for objections to a debtor’s exemptions has expired. See In re Okoinyan, 135 B.R. 691 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1991); cf. In re Wiesner, 39 B.R. 963, 965 (Bankr.W.D.Wis.1984) (recognizing bankruptcy courts jurisdiction over such a collateral attack", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nas in the present cases, the debtors have not claimed the entire amount of their interests in property exempt but instead have claimed a precise value amount of their interests exempt. See In re Shoemaker, 155 B.R. at 555. Id. at 60 (footnote omitted). The district court concluded that: Taylor simply does not address whether a debtor’s valuation of property becomes conclusive in the absence of a timely objection pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(i) and Rule 4003(b). A number of courts have addressed this issue, however. Some courts have concluded that no challenge to the value of the property may be asserted after the period for objections to a debtor’s exemptions has expired. See In re Okoinyan, 135 B.R. 691 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1991); cf. In re Wiesner, 39 B.R. 963, 965 (Bankr.W.D.Wis.1984) (holding that bill of review brought in wrong court constitutes collateral attack", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nas in the present cases, the debtors have not claimed the entire amount of their interests in property exempt but instead have claimed a precise value amount of their interests exempt. See In re Shoemaker, 155 B.R. at 555. Id. at 60 (footnote omitted). The district court concluded that: Taylor simply does not address whether a debtor’s valuation of property becomes conclusive in the absence of a timely objection pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(i) and Rule 4003(b). A number of courts have addressed this issue, however. Some courts have concluded that no challenge to the value of the property may be asserted after the period for objections to a debtor’s exemptions has expired. See In re Okoinyan, 135 B.R. 691 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1991); cf. In re Wiesner, 39 B.R. 963, 965 (Bankr.W.D.Wis.1984) (holding that a collateral attack on exemptions by means of an application for appraisal outside the court ordered fifteen day period for objections is barred", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nas in the present cases, the debtors have not claimed the entire amount of their interests in property exempt but instead have claimed a precise value amount of their interests exempt. See In re Shoemaker, 155 B.R. at 555. Id. at 60 (footnote omitted). The district court concluded that: Taylor simply does not address whether a debtor’s valuation of property becomes conclusive in the absence of a timely objection pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(i) and Rule 4003(b). A number of courts have addressed this issue, however. Some courts have concluded that no challenge to the value of the property may be asserted after the period for objections to a debtor’s exemptions has expired. See In re Okoinyan, 135 B.R. 691 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1991); cf. In re Wiesner, 39 B.R. 963, 965 (Bankr.W.D.Wis.1984) (recognizing collateral attack on void order" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n“unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense,” id at § 2D1.1 cmt. n.ll(A). To determine the applicability of this enhancement, the district court may consider all relevant conduct. Id. at § lB1.3(a)(l)(A)-(B). Since .the court may consider all relevant conduct, it follows that the court’s assessment is not “limited to the charged conspiracy.” See, e.g., United States v. Shippley, 690 F.3d 1192, 1200 (10th Cir. 2012) (noting that “a § 2Dl.l(b)(l) enhancement applies if a dangerous weapon was present or possessed during uncharged drug trafficking activity that constitutes relevant conduct under § 1B1.3” (citing United States v. Roederer, 11 F.3d 973, 982 (10th Cir. 1993))); see also United States v. Mitchell, 528 Fed.Appx. 800, 806 (10th Cir. 2013) (holding that the 2d11b1 enhancement is not limited to the charged conspiracy", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n“unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense,” id at § 2D1.1 cmt. n.ll(A). To determine the applicability of this enhancement, the district court may consider all relevant conduct. Id. at § lB1.3(a)(l)(A)-(B). Since .the court may consider all relevant conduct, it follows that the court’s assessment is not “limited to the charged conspiracy.” See, e.g., United States v. Shippley, 690 F.3d 1192, 1200 (10th Cir. 2012) (noting that “a § 2Dl.l(b)(l) enhancement applies if a dangerous weapon was present or possessed during uncharged drug trafficking activity that constitutes relevant conduct under § 1B1.3” (citing United States v. Roederer, 11 F.3d 973, 982 (10th Cir. 1993))); see also United States v. Mitchell, 528 Fed.Appx. 800, 806 (10th Cir. 2013) (holding that the 2d11b1 enhancement was proper where a firearm and drugrelated items were found in the defendants residence where he had also engaged in conspiratorial conversations", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n“unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense,” id at § 2D1.1 cmt. n.ll(A). To determine the applicability of this enhancement, the district court may consider all relevant conduct. Id. at § lB1.3(a)(l)(A)-(B). Since .the court may consider all relevant conduct, it follows that the court’s assessment is not “limited to the charged conspiracy.” See, e.g., United States v. Shippley, 690 F.3d 1192, 1200 (10th Cir. 2012) (noting that “a § 2Dl.l(b)(l) enhancement applies if a dangerous weapon was present or possessed during uncharged drug trafficking activity that constitutes relevant conduct under § 1B1.3” (citing United States v. Roederer, 11 F.3d 973, 982 (10th Cir. 1993))); see also United States v. Mitchell, 528 Fed.Appx. 800, 806 (10th Cir. 2013) (holding that the defendant on remand may show his eligibility for the safety valve reduction by a preponderance of the evidence even where a 2d11b1 enhancement applied", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n“unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense,” id at § 2D1.1 cmt. n.ll(A). To determine the applicability of this enhancement, the district court may consider all relevant conduct. Id. at § lB1.3(a)(l)(A)-(B). Since .the court may consider all relevant conduct, it follows that the court’s assessment is not “limited to the charged conspiracy.” See, e.g., United States v. Shippley, 690 F.3d 1192, 1200 (10th Cir. 2012) (noting that “a § 2Dl.l(b)(l) enhancement applies if a dangerous weapon was present or possessed during uncharged drug trafficking activity that constitutes relevant conduct under § 1B1.3” (citing United States v. Roederer, 11 F.3d 973, 982 (10th Cir. 1993))); see also United States v. Mitchell, 528 Fed.Appx. 800, 806 (10th Cir. 2013) (holding that heightened evidentiary standard of proof is not required where the sentencing enhancement is based entirely on the extent of the conspiracy to which the defendant pled guilty", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n“unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense,” id at § 2D1.1 cmt. n.ll(A). To determine the applicability of this enhancement, the district court may consider all relevant conduct. Id. at § lB1.3(a)(l)(A)-(B). Since .the court may consider all relevant conduct, it follows that the court’s assessment is not “limited to the charged conspiracy.” See, e.g., United States v. Shippley, 690 F.3d 1192, 1200 (10th Cir. 2012) (noting that “a § 2Dl.l(b)(l) enhancement applies if a dangerous weapon was present or possessed during uncharged drug trafficking activity that constitutes relevant conduct under § 1B1.3” (citing United States v. Roederer, 11 F.3d 973, 982 (10th Cir. 1993))); see also United States v. Mitchell, 528 Fed.Appx. 800, 806 (10th Cir. 2013) (holding that the notion of enterprise conspiracy has largely rendered the old distinction between single conspiracy and multiple conspiracy irrelevant to rico conspiracy charges" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nThroughout the trial, Frantz indicated that he thought the requested tape had particular significance to his defense. Despite the damaging statement on the tape that the robber was armed, Frantz believed that the tape could impeach the credibility of the government’s most knowledgeable witness, Diana Villalobos. Villalobos, the cashier whom Frantz allegedly approached to rob, was the sole witness who described the entire sequence of the robbery. She was also the only witness to testify that she saw Frantz with a gun; the police officers who responded to the scene did not report seeing Frantz with a gun and never recovered one. Accordingly, during his two-day trial, Frantz three times tried to introduce the tape or its transcript, and Lamb told the judge during on ir.1992) (per curiam) (holding that exclusionary rule only requires exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of constitutional rights and that exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of statutory rights is not necessarily required", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nThroughout the trial, Frantz indicated that he thought the requested tape had particular significance to his defense. Despite the damaging statement on the tape that the robber was armed, Frantz believed that the tape could impeach the credibility of the government’s most knowledgeable witness, Diana Villalobos. Villalobos, the cashier whom Frantz allegedly approached to rob, was the sole witness who described the entire sequence of the robbery. She was also the only witness to testify that she saw Frantz with a gun; the police officers who responded to the scene did not report seeing Frantz with a gun and never recovered one. Accordingly, during his two-day trial, Frantz three times tried to introduce the tape or its transcript, and Lamb told the judge during on ir.1992) (per curiam) (holding that a defendants faretta rights were violated by his exclusion from bench conferences covering important issues including the admission of evidence", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nThroughout the trial, Frantz indicated that he thought the requested tape had particular significance to his defense. Despite the damaging statement on the tape that the robber was armed, Frantz believed that the tape could impeach the credibility of the government’s most knowledgeable witness, Diana Villalobos. Villalobos, the cashier whom Frantz allegedly approached to rob, was the sole witness who described the entire sequence of the robbery. She was also the only witness to testify that she saw Frantz with a gun; the police officers who responded to the scene did not report seeing Frantz with a gun and never recovered one. Accordingly, during his two-day trial, Frantz three times tried to introduce the tape or its transcript, and Lamb told the judge during on ir.1992) (per curiam) (holding that defendants right to be present does not extend to bench conferences on legal and scheduling issues in which defense counsel participated and to which defendant could not have made a meaningful contribution", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nThroughout the trial, Frantz indicated that he thought the requested tape had particular significance to his defense. Despite the damaging statement on the tape that the robber was armed, Frantz believed that the tape could impeach the credibility of the government’s most knowledgeable witness, Diana Villalobos. Villalobos, the cashier whom Frantz allegedly approached to rob, was the sole witness who described the entire sequence of the robbery. She was also the only witness to testify that she saw Frantz with a gun; the police officers who responded to the scene did not report seeing Frantz with a gun and never recovered one. Accordingly, during his two-day trial, Frantz three times tried to introduce the tape or its transcript, and Lamb told the judge during on ir.1992) (per curiam) (holding unrecorded objection made at bench did not preserve error regarding admission of evidence", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nThroughout the trial, Frantz indicated that he thought the requested tape had particular significance to his defense. Despite the damaging statement on the tape that the robber was armed, Frantz believed that the tape could impeach the credibility of the government’s most knowledgeable witness, Diana Villalobos. Villalobos, the cashier whom Frantz allegedly approached to rob, was the sole witness who described the entire sequence of the robbery. She was also the only witness to testify that she saw Frantz with a gun; the police officers who responded to the scene did not report seeing Frantz with a gun and never recovered one. Accordingly, during his two-day trial, Frantz three times tried to introduce the tape or its transcript, and Lamb told the judge during on ir.1992) (per curiam) (holding that any error in the exclusion of evidence is cured by the subsequent admission of the evidence" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat the prosecutor lied to the jury about Abdur’Rahman’s culpability by arguing that the defense’s theory that the SEGM orchestrated the killing was “bunk.” The district court rejected the claim on the merits. Id. at *6-9. Seventh, Abdur’Rah-man charged that the prosecutor showed the jury an indictment against Abdur’Rah-man for robbery in violation of a trial court order. The district court also addressed the merits of this claim. Id. at *18. Martinez 'does not apply to claims that were fully adjudicated on the merits in state court because those claims are, by definition, not procedurally defaulted. Detrich v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir.2013) (en banc), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 2662, 189 L.Ed.2d 230 (2014); see also Dansby v. Hobbs, 766 F.3d 809, 840 (8th Cir.2014) (holding that martinez did not apply to ineffective assistance of counsel subclaims that were not defaulted by postconviction counsel", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat the prosecutor lied to the jury about Abdur’Rahman’s culpability by arguing that the defense’s theory that the SEGM orchestrated the killing was “bunk.” The district court rejected the claim on the merits. Id. at *6-9. Seventh, Abdur’Rah-man charged that the prosecutor showed the jury an indictment against Abdur’Rah-man for robbery in violation of a trial court order. The district court also addressed the merits of this claim. Id. at *18. Martinez 'does not apply to claims that were fully adjudicated on the merits in state court because those claims are, by definition, not procedurally defaulted. Detrich v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir.2013) (en banc), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 2662, 189 L.Ed.2d 230 (2014); see also Dansby v. Hobbs, 766 F.3d 809, 840 (8th Cir.2014) (holding that the defendants ineffective assistance of counsel claims which were raised in a motion for a new trial and challenged on direct appeal were not barred in postconviction by the doctrine of res judicata because the defendants conviction and sentence were affirmed without a written opinion expressly addressing the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat the prosecutor lied to the jury about Abdur’Rahman’s culpability by arguing that the defense’s theory that the SEGM orchestrated the killing was “bunk.” The district court rejected the claim on the merits. Id. at *6-9. Seventh, Abdur’Rah-man charged that the prosecutor showed the jury an indictment against Abdur’Rah-man for robbery in violation of a trial court order. The district court also addressed the merits of this claim. Id. at *18. Martinez 'does not apply to claims that were fully adjudicated on the merits in state court because those claims are, by definition, not procedurally defaulted. Detrich v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir.2013) (en banc), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 2662, 189 L.Ed.2d 230 (2014); see also Dansby v. Hobbs, 766 F.3d 809, 840 (8th Cir.2014) (holding that martinez did not apply to case where ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims were reviewed on the merits in a 2254 proceeding", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat the prosecutor lied to the jury about Abdur’Rahman’s culpability by arguing that the defense’s theory that the SEGM orchestrated the killing was “bunk.” The district court rejected the claim on the merits. Id. at *6-9. Seventh, Abdur’Rah-man charged that the prosecutor showed the jury an indictment against Abdur’Rah-man for robbery in violation of a trial court order. The district court also addressed the merits of this claim. Id. at *18. Martinez 'does not apply to claims that were fully adjudicated on the merits in state court because those claims are, by definition, not procedurally defaulted. Detrich v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir.2013) (en banc), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 2662, 189 L.Ed.2d 230 (2014); see also Dansby v. Hobbs, 766 F.3d 809, 840 (8th Cir.2014) (holding that where trial counsel was not ineffective appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat the prosecutor lied to the jury about Abdur’Rahman’s culpability by arguing that the defense’s theory that the SEGM orchestrated the killing was “bunk.” The district court rejected the claim on the merits. Id. at *6-9. Seventh, Abdur’Rah-man charged that the prosecutor showed the jury an indictment against Abdur’Rah-man for robbery in violation of a trial court order. The district court also addressed the merits of this claim. Id. at *18. Martinez 'does not apply to claims that were fully adjudicated on the merits in state court because those claims are, by definition, not procedurally defaulted. Detrich v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir.2013) (en banc), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 2662, 189 L.Ed.2d 230 (2014); see also Dansby v. Hobbs, 766 F.3d 809, 840 (8th Cir.2014) (recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nis defined as “a security that satisfies the standards for a covered security specified in paragraph (1) or .(2) of section 77r(b) of this title, at the time during which it is alleged that the misrepresentation, omission, or manipulative or deceptive conduct occurred.... ” 15 U.S.C. § 77p©(3). Section 77r(b)(2) provides that a “security is a & Thompson, supra, at 35-36 (stating that the SEC regulates variable universal life insurance policies). Second, the plaintiff invested his premiums in a sub-account which is registered with the SEC under the Investment Company Act of 1940. See Araujo v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., No. 01-6622, Notice of Removal ¶ 4. As such, the plaintiffs variable universal life insurance policy is a “covered security” under SLUSA. See Lander, 251 F.3d at 109 (holding that variable annuities are covered securities under slusa because they are securities and the subaccounts are registered with the sec under the investment company act", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nis defined as “a security that satisfies the standards for a covered security specified in paragraph (1) or .(2) of section 77r(b) of this title, at the time during which it is alleged that the misrepresentation, omission, or manipulative or deceptive conduct occurred.... ” 15 U.S.C. § 77p©(3). Section 77r(b)(2) provides that a “security is a & Thompson, supra, at 35-36 (stating that the SEC regulates variable universal life insurance policies). Second, the plaintiff invested his premiums in a sub-account which is registered with the SEC under the Investment Company Act of 1940. See Araujo v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., No. 01-6622, Notice of Removal ¶ 4. As such, the plaintiffs variable universal life insurance policy is a “covered security” under SLUSA. See Lander, 251 F.3d at 109 (holding that slusa precludes statelaw class action claims against these banks because the claims are predicated on the banks involvement with the fraudulent securities transactions of bernard l madoff investment securities madoff securities", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nis defined as “a security that satisfies the standards for a covered security specified in paragraph (1) or .(2) of section 77r(b) of this title, at the time during which it is alleged that the misrepresentation, omission, or manipulative or deceptive conduct occurred.... ” 15 U.S.C. § 77p©(3). Section 77r(b)(2) provides that a “security is a & Thompson, supra, at 35-36 (stating that the SEC regulates variable universal life insurance policies). Second, the plaintiff invested his premiums in a sub-account which is registered with the SEC under the Investment Company Act of 1940. See Araujo v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., No. 01-6622, Notice of Removal ¶ 4. As such, the plaintiffs variable universal life insurance policy is a “covered security” under SLUSA. See Lander, 251 F.3d at 109 (holding that claims under the securities act of 1933 are arbitrable", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nis defined as “a security that satisfies the standards for a covered security specified in paragraph (1) or .(2) of section 77r(b) of this title, at the time during which it is alleged that the misrepresentation, omission, or manipulative or deceptive conduct occurred.... ” 15 U.S.C. § 77p©(3). Section 77r(b)(2) provides that a “security is a & Thompson, supra, at 35-36 (stating that the SEC regulates variable universal life insurance policies). Second, the plaintiff invested his premiums in a sub-account which is registered with the SEC under the Investment Company Act of 1940. See Araujo v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., No. 01-6622, Notice of Removal ¶ 4. As such, the plaintiffs variable universal life insurance policy is a “covered security” under SLUSA. See Lander, 251 F.3d at 109 (holding that claims under the securities act of 1934 and the rico statutes are arbitrable", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nis defined as “a security that satisfies the standards for a covered security specified in paragraph (1) or .(2) of section 77r(b) of this title, at the time during which it is alleged that the misrepresentation, omission, or manipulative or deceptive conduct occurred.... ” 15 U.S.C. § 77p©(3). Section 77r(b)(2) provides that a “security is a & Thompson, supra, at 35-36 (stating that the SEC regulates variable universal life insurance policies). Second, the plaintiff invested his premiums in a sub-account which is registered with the SEC under the Investment Company Act of 1940. See Araujo v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., No. 01-6622, Notice of Removal ¶ 4. As such, the plaintiffs variable universal life insurance policy is a “covered security” under SLUSA. See Lander, 251 F.3d at 109 (holding that variable insurance policies are covered securities under slusa" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nProcedure § 26.3c, at 1219-25 (4th ed. 1998). 12 . In Dale, we added that \"[cjircuit precedent suggests that habeas prejudice may require a greater showing, namely, 'by a preponderance of the evidence, that the outcome of his trial would have been different but for the errors in question.’” 140 F.3d at 1056 n. 3 (quoting United States v. Saro, 24 F.3d 283, 287 (D.C.Cir.1994)) (emphasis in Dale); cf. Frady, 456 U.S. at 174, 102 S.Ct. 1584 (rejecting as insufficient to support a colla (stating that the omission of an element from a jury instruction would not be deemed harmless on direct review if \"the defendant contested the omitted element and raised evidence sufficient to support a contrary finding”); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-39, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (holding the error harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nProcedure § 26.3c, at 1219-25 (4th ed. 1998). 12 . In Dale, we added that \"[cjircuit precedent suggests that habeas prejudice may require a greater showing, namely, 'by a preponderance of the evidence, that the outcome of his trial would have been different but for the errors in question.’” 140 F.3d at 1056 n. 3 (quoting United States v. Saro, 24 F.3d 283, 287 (D.C.Cir.1994)) (emphasis in Dale); cf. Frady, 456 U.S. at 174, 102 S.Ct. 1584 (rejecting as insufficient to support a colla (stating that the omission of an element from a jury instruction would not be deemed harmless on direct review if \"the defendant contested the omitted element and raised evidence sufficient to support a contrary finding”); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-39, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (holding that nonconstitutional error is harmless if it did not have substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jurys verdict", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nProcedure § 26.3c, at 1219-25 (4th ed. 1998). 12 . In Dale, we added that \"[cjircuit precedent suggests that habeas prejudice may require a greater showing, namely, 'by a preponderance of the evidence, that the outcome of his trial would have been different but for the errors in question.’” 140 F.3d at 1056 n. 3 (quoting United States v. Saro, 24 F.3d 283, 287 (D.C.Cir.1994)) (emphasis in Dale); cf. Frady, 456 U.S. at 174, 102 S.Ct. 1584 (rejecting as insufficient to support a colla (stating that the omission of an element from a jury instruction would not be deemed harmless on direct review if \"the defendant contested the omitted element and raised evidence sufficient to support a contrary finding”); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-39, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (holding improperly admitted evidence was harmless error given the overwhelming evidence of guilt", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nProcedure § 26.3c, at 1219-25 (4th ed. 1998). 12 . In Dale, we added that \"[cjircuit precedent suggests that habeas prejudice may require a greater showing, namely, 'by a preponderance of the evidence, that the outcome of his trial would have been different but for the errors in question.’” 140 F.3d at 1056 n. 3 (quoting United States v. Saro, 24 F.3d 283, 287 (D.C.Cir.1994)) (emphasis in Dale); cf. Frady, 456 U.S. at 174, 102 S.Ct. 1584 (rejecting as insufficient to support a colla (stating that the omission of an element from a jury instruction would not be deemed harmless on direct review if \"the defendant contested the omitted element and raised evidence sufficient to support a contrary finding”); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-39, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (holding that error from the erroneous admission of evidence was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendants guilt", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nProcedure § 26.3c, at 1219-25 (4th ed. 1998). 12 . In Dale, we added that \"[cjircuit precedent suggests that habeas prejudice may require a greater showing, namely, 'by a preponderance of the evidence, that the outcome of his trial would have been different but for the errors in question.’” 140 F.3d at 1056 n. 3 (quoting United States v. Saro, 24 F.3d 283, 287 (D.C.Cir.1994)) (emphasis in Dale); cf. Frady, 456 U.S. at 174, 102 S.Ct. 1584 (rejecting as insufficient to support a colla (stating that the omission of an element from a jury instruction would not be deemed harmless on direct review if \"the defendant contested the omitted element and raised evidence sufficient to support a contrary finding”); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-39, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (holding on habeas review that a constitutional trial error did not substantially influence the jurys verdict and hence was harmless where the states evidence of guilt was if not overwhelming certainly weighty" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n11, the Eleventh Circuit held in Massengale v. Ray that attorney’s fees cannot be awarded to a pro se attorney litigant. 267 F.3d 1298, 1301-03 (11th Cir.2001). “Because a party proceeding pro se cannot have incurred attorney’s fees as an expense, a district court cannot order a violating party to pay a pro se litigant a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of a sanction.” The court relied, in part, on the fact that “the word ‘attorney’ generally assumes some kind of agency (that is, attorney/client) relationship” and that when a lawyer proceeds pro se, “legal fees are not truly a ‘cost’ of litigation — no independent lawyer has been hired (or must be paid) to pursue the ... complaint.” Id. at 1301 (quoting Ray v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 87 F.3d 1250, 1251 n. 2 (11th Cir.1996) (holding that new jersey rule patterned on fed r civ p 11 precludes a pro se attorney litigant from receiving attorneys fees because such fees are not actually incurred", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n11, the Eleventh Circuit held in Massengale v. Ray that attorney’s fees cannot be awarded to a pro se attorney litigant. 267 F.3d 1298, 1301-03 (11th Cir.2001). “Because a party proceeding pro se cannot have incurred attorney’s fees as an expense, a district court cannot order a violating party to pay a pro se litigant a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of a sanction.” The court relied, in part, on the fact that “the word ‘attorney’ generally assumes some kind of agency (that is, attorney/client) relationship” and that when a lawyer proceeds pro se, “legal fees are not truly a ‘cost’ of litigation — no independent lawyer has been hired (or must be paid) to pursue the ... complaint.” Id. at 1301 (quoting Ray v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 87 F.3d 1250, 1251 n. 2 (11th Cir.1996) (holding a pro per litigant to the same standard as an attorney", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n11, the Eleventh Circuit held in Massengale v. Ray that attorney’s fees cannot be awarded to a pro se attorney litigant. 267 F.3d 1298, 1301-03 (11th Cir.2001). “Because a party proceeding pro se cannot have incurred attorney’s fees as an expense, a district court cannot order a violating party to pay a pro se litigant a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of a sanction.” The court relied, in part, on the fact that “the word ‘attorney’ generally assumes some kind of agency (that is, attorney/client) relationship” and that when a lawyer proceeds pro se, “legal fees are not truly a ‘cost’ of litigation — no independent lawyer has been hired (or must be paid) to pursue the ... complaint.” Id. at 1301 (quoting Ray v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 87 F.3d 1250, 1251 n. 2 (11th Cir.1996) (holding that a pro se litigant who is an attorney is not entitled to fees under 1988", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n11, the Eleventh Circuit held in Massengale v. Ray that attorney’s fees cannot be awarded to a pro se attorney litigant. 267 F.3d 1298, 1301-03 (11th Cir.2001). “Because a party proceeding pro se cannot have incurred attorney’s fees as an expense, a district court cannot order a violating party to pay a pro se litigant a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of a sanction.” The court relied, in part, on the fact that “the word ‘attorney’ generally assumes some kind of agency (that is, attorney/client) relationship” and that when a lawyer proceeds pro se, “legal fees are not truly a ‘cost’ of litigation — no independent lawyer has been hired (or must be paid) to pursue the ... complaint.” Id. at 1301 (quoting Ray v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 87 F.3d 1250, 1251 n. 2 (11th Cir.1996) (holding a court can restrict future pro se pleadings if it first provides a pro se litigant notice and an opportunity to respond", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n11, the Eleventh Circuit held in Massengale v. Ray that attorney’s fees cannot be awarded to a pro se attorney litigant. 267 F.3d 1298, 1301-03 (11th Cir.2001). “Because a party proceeding pro se cannot have incurred attorney’s fees as an expense, a district court cannot order a violating party to pay a pro se litigant a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of a sanction.” The court relied, in part, on the fact that “the word ‘attorney’ generally assumes some kind of agency (that is, attorney/client) relationship” and that when a lawyer proceeds pro se, “legal fees are not truly a ‘cost’ of litigation — no independent lawyer has been hired (or must be paid) to pursue the ... complaint.” Id. at 1301 (quoting Ray v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 87 F.3d 1250, 1251 n. 2 (11th Cir.1996) (holding attorneys fees not available to pro se attorney litigant in a federal freedom of information act action" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nPioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 393-4, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993). The “reasonable time” requirement has been applied considerably more flexibly— when it has been applied at all — in institutional reform cases. See, e.g., Sweeton, 27 F.3d at 1164. There is good reason for this. Private parties can be expected to move in a timely fashion to modify or vacate orders whenever a change in circumstance arises. Municipal entities, such as the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation, however, do not have perfect institutional memory, and where a consent decree has gone unenforced for many years, the individuals who administer those entities may not have any knowledge of its existence. See Shakman v. City of Chicago, 426 F.3d 925, 933-34 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that appellate court should overturn a district courts denial of a motion to amend a complaint only if the district court has abused its discretion", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nPioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 393-4, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993). The “reasonable time” requirement has been applied considerably more flexibly— when it has been applied at all — in institutional reform cases. See, e.g., Sweeton, 27 F.3d at 1164. There is good reason for this. Private parties can be expected to move in a timely fashion to modify or vacate orders whenever a change in circumstance arises. Municipal entities, such as the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation, however, do not have perfect institutional memory, and where a consent decree has gone unenforced for many years, the individuals who administer those entities may not have any knowledge of its existence. See Shakman v. City of Chicago, 426 F.3d 925, 933-34 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that the district court had abused its discretion in failing to consider the public nature of the litigation in finding that the citys motion to amend did not meet rule 60bs timing requirement", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nPioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 393-4, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993). The “reasonable time” requirement has been applied considerably more flexibly— when it has been applied at all — in institutional reform cases. See, e.g., Sweeton, 27 F.3d at 1164. There is good reason for this. Private parties can be expected to move in a timely fashion to modify or vacate orders whenever a change in circumstance arises. Municipal entities, such as the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation, however, do not have perfect institutional memory, and where a consent decree has gone unenforced for many years, the individuals who administer those entities may not have any knowledge of its existence. See Shakman v. City of Chicago, 426 F.3d 925, 933-34 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that the district court abused its discretion in denying leave to amend after a delay of eight months", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nPioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 393-4, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993). The “reasonable time” requirement has been applied considerably more flexibly— when it has been applied at all — in institutional reform cases. See, e.g., Sweeton, 27 F.3d at 1164. There is good reason for this. Private parties can be expected to move in a timely fashion to modify or vacate orders whenever a change in circumstance arises. Municipal entities, such as the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation, however, do not have perfect institutional memory, and where a consent decree has gone unenforced for many years, the individuals who administer those entities may not have any knowledge of its existence. See Shakman v. City of Chicago, 426 F.3d 925, 933-34 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that the trial court had abused its discretion in dismissing the case without allowing appellants an opportunity to amend", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nPioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 393-4, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993). The “reasonable time” requirement has been applied considerably more flexibly— when it has been applied at all — in institutional reform cases. See, e.g., Sweeton, 27 F.3d at 1164. There is good reason for this. Private parties can be expected to move in a timely fashion to modify or vacate orders whenever a change in circumstance arises. Municipal entities, such as the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation, however, do not have perfect institutional memory, and where a consent decree has gone unenforced for many years, the individuals who administer those entities may not have any knowledge of its existence. See Shakman v. City of Chicago, 426 F.3d 925, 933-34 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nWhen Asbill initially entered the hotel’s office, Cruel was the only employee present, which represented to third parties that she was in charge. Asbill testified that Patidar told him that he could leave the papers with Cruel or that he could come back. Patidar similarly testified that he told Asbill it was up to him whether to leave the papers. Under these facts, we find that Patidar knowingly permitted Cruel to exercise authority to accept service of process and further find that his manifestations to Asbill indicated that Cruel had such authority. For these reasons, we hold that evidence in the record supports the trial court’s finding that Cruel was authorized to accept service. Brown v. Carolina Emergency Physicians, P.A., 348 S.C. 569, 583, 560 S.E.2d 624, 631 (Ct.App.2001) (holding that the decision of the appellate court establishes the law of the case and it must be followed by the trial court on remand", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nWhen Asbill initially entered the hotel’s office, Cruel was the only employee present, which represented to third parties that she was in charge. Asbill testified that Patidar told him that he could leave the papers with Cruel or that he could come back. Patidar similarly testified that he told Asbill it was up to him whether to leave the papers. Under these facts, we find that Patidar knowingly permitted Cruel to exercise authority to accept service of process and further find that his manifestations to Asbill indicated that Cruel had such authority. For these reasons, we hold that evidence in the record supports the trial court’s finding that Cruel was authorized to accept service. Brown v. Carolina Emergency Physicians, P.A., 348 S.C. 569, 583, 560 S.E.2d 624, 631 (Ct.App.2001) (holding an appellate court is not limited to the grounds offered by the trial court in support of its decision and may affirm on any ground on which additional factual findings are not required", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nWhen Asbill initially entered the hotel’s office, Cruel was the only employee present, which represented to third parties that she was in charge. Asbill testified that Patidar told him that he could leave the papers with Cruel or that he could come back. Patidar similarly testified that he told Asbill it was up to him whether to leave the papers. Under these facts, we find that Patidar knowingly permitted Cruel to exercise authority to accept service of process and further find that his manifestations to Asbill indicated that Cruel had such authority. For these reasons, we hold that evidence in the record supports the trial court’s finding that Cruel was authorized to accept service. Brown v. Carolina Emergency Physicians, P.A., 348 S.C. 569, 583, 560 S.E.2d 624, 631 (Ct.App.2001) (holding that lack of appellate jurisdiction is fundamental error", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nWhen Asbill initially entered the hotel’s office, Cruel was the only employee present, which represented to third parties that she was in charge. Asbill testified that Patidar told him that he could leave the papers with Cruel or that he could come back. Patidar similarly testified that he told Asbill it was up to him whether to leave the papers. Under these facts, we find that Patidar knowingly permitted Cruel to exercise authority to accept service of process and further find that his manifestations to Asbill indicated that Cruel had such authority. For these reasons, we hold that evidence in the record supports the trial court’s finding that Cruel was authorized to accept service. Brown v. Carolina Emergency Physicians, P.A., 348 S.C. 569, 583, 560 S.E.2d 624, 631 (Ct.App.2001) (holding unchallenged findings of fact are binding on an appellate court unless the contrary is established as a matter of law or there is no evidence to support the finding", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nWhen Asbill initially entered the hotel’s office, Cruel was the only employee present, which represented to third parties that she was in charge. Asbill testified that Patidar told him that he could leave the papers with Cruel or that he could come back. Patidar similarly testified that he told Asbill it was up to him whether to leave the papers. Under these facts, we find that Patidar knowingly permitted Cruel to exercise authority to accept service of process and further find that his manifestations to Asbill indicated that Cruel had such authority. For these reasons, we hold that evidence in the record supports the trial court’s finding that Cruel was authorized to accept service. Brown v. Carolina Emergency Physicians, P.A., 348 S.C. 569, 583, 560 S.E.2d 624, 631 (Ct.App.2001) (recognizing that the findings of the circuit court on factual issues arising on a motion to quash service of process for lack of jurisdiction are binding on the appellate court unless wholly unsupported by the evidence or controlled by error of law" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nexecute their duties as police officers. Thus, this type of communication falls squarely within the scope of speech as a public employee under Garcetti. Moreover, the fact that plaintiff also copied the Memorandum to next level of supervision (i.e., the Village Board) does not alter the analysis in this case. The fact that plaintiff not only expressed the grievance to his immediate supervisor, but also to the entity ultimately responsible for the proper functioning of the police department is simply further evidence that this speech was not citizen speech; rather, the Memorandum — whether required or not— was clearly pursuant to his duties as a police officer. See, e.g., White v. Sch. Bd. of Hillsborough Cnty., No. 8:06-CV-1626-T27MAP, 2008 WL 227990, at *5 (M.D.Fla. Jan. 25, 2008) (holding that where approval of the board of directors was not formally requested a demand would have been futile for it could hardly be expected that if approval of the board of directors were sought defendant who controlled 50 of the board would have authorized the action against himself", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nexecute their duties as police officers. Thus, this type of communication falls squarely within the scope of speech as a public employee under Garcetti. Moreover, the fact that plaintiff also copied the Memorandum to next level of supervision (i.e., the Village Board) does not alter the analysis in this case. The fact that plaintiff not only expressed the grievance to his immediate supervisor, but also to the entity ultimately responsible for the proper functioning of the police department is simply further evidence that this speech was not citizen speech; rather, the Memorandum — whether required or not— was clearly pursuant to his duties as a police officer. See, e.g., White v. Sch. Bd. of Hillsborough Cnty., No. 8:06-CV-1626-T27MAP, 2008 WL 227990, at *5 (M.D.Fla. Jan. 25, 2008) (holding that a teachers complaint to school authorities that her principal had instructed her to make improper changes in her own students grades was unprotected because it was made pursuant to her official duties", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nexecute their duties as police officers. Thus, this type of communication falls squarely within the scope of speech as a public employee under Garcetti. Moreover, the fact that plaintiff also copied the Memorandum to next level of supervision (i.e., the Village Board) does not alter the analysis in this case. The fact that plaintiff not only expressed the grievance to his immediate supervisor, but also to the entity ultimately responsible for the proper functioning of the police department is simply further evidence that this speech was not citizen speech; rather, the Memorandum — whether required or not— was clearly pursuant to his duties as a police officer. See, e.g., White v. Sch. Bd. of Hillsborough Cnty., No. 8:06-CV-1626-T27MAP, 2008 WL 227990, at *5 (M.D.Fla. Jan. 25, 2008) (holding that letter that was copied to the schools board of directors was written pursuant to her duties and was not protected speech", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nexecute their duties as police officers. Thus, this type of communication falls squarely within the scope of speech as a public employee under Garcetti. Moreover, the fact that plaintiff also copied the Memorandum to next level of supervision (i.e., the Village Board) does not alter the analysis in this case. The fact that plaintiff not only expressed the grievance to his immediate supervisor, but also to the entity ultimately responsible for the proper functioning of the police department is simply further evidence that this speech was not citizen speech; rather, the Memorandum — whether required or not— was clearly pursuant to his duties as a police officer. See, e.g., White v. Sch. Bd. of Hillsborough Cnty., No. 8:06-CV-1626-T27MAP, 2008 WL 227990, at *5 (M.D.Fla. Jan. 25, 2008) (holding that pursuant to garcetti plaintiffs speech made in the course of his official duties was unprotected as a matter of law", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nexecute their duties as police officers. Thus, this type of communication falls squarely within the scope of speech as a public employee under Garcetti. Moreover, the fact that plaintiff also copied the Memorandum to next level of supervision (i.e., the Village Board) does not alter the analysis in this case. The fact that plaintiff not only expressed the grievance to his immediate supervisor, but also to the entity ultimately responsible for the proper functioning of the police department is simply further evidence that this speech was not citizen speech; rather, the Memorandum — whether required or not— was clearly pursuant to his duties as a police officer. See, e.g., White v. Sch. Bd. of Hillsborough Cnty., No. 8:06-CV-1626-T27MAP, 2008 WL 227990, at *5 (M.D.Fla. Jan. 25, 2008) (holding that after the district court determined that the plaintiffs speech was protected the court was required to inform the jury of its ruling that knapps speech was constitutionally protected" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nmentioning Turner’s moderate difficulties in concentration, persistence, or pace. 5. The ALJ also did not err in accepting the vocational expert’s testimony that Turner could perform jobs with Level 2 reasoning. The RFC determination limiting Turner to “simple, repetitive tasks,” which adequately encompasses Turner’s moderate difficulties in concentration, persistence, or pace, is compatible with jobs requiring Level 2 reasoning. See Dictionary of Occupational Titles, app. C, § III (4th ed. 1991) (defining jobs with Level 2 reasoning as requiring the employee to “carry out detailed but uninvolved written or oral instructions” and “[d]eal with problems involving a few concrete variables in or from standardized situations”); compare Zavalin v. Colvin, 778 F.3d 842, 846-47 (9th Cir. 2015) (recognizing conflict", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nmentioning Turner’s moderate difficulties in concentration, persistence, or pace. 5. The ALJ also did not err in accepting the vocational expert’s testimony that Turner could perform jobs with Level 2 reasoning. The RFC determination limiting Turner to “simple, repetitive tasks,” which adequately encompasses Turner’s moderate difficulties in concentration, persistence, or pace, is compatible with jobs requiring Level 2 reasoning. See Dictionary of Occupational Titles, app. C, § III (4th ed. 1991) (defining jobs with Level 2 reasoning as requiring the employee to “carry out detailed but uninvolved written or oral instructions” and “[d]eal with problems involving a few concrete variables in or from standardized situations”); compare Zavalin v. Colvin, 778 F.3d 842, 846-47 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that there was a conflict between an rfc of simple routine or repetitive work and level 3 reasoning", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nmentioning Turner’s moderate difficulties in concentration, persistence, or pace. 5. The ALJ also did not err in accepting the vocational expert’s testimony that Turner could perform jobs with Level 2 reasoning. The RFC determination limiting Turner to “simple, repetitive tasks,” which adequately encompasses Turner’s moderate difficulties in concentration, persistence, or pace, is compatible with jobs requiring Level 2 reasoning. See Dictionary of Occupational Titles, app. C, § III (4th ed. 1991) (defining jobs with Level 2 reasoning as requiring the employee to “carry out detailed but uninvolved written or oral instructions” and “[d]eal with problems involving a few concrete variables in or from standardized situations”); compare Zavalin v. Colvin, 778 F.3d 842, 846-47 (9th Cir. 2015) (recognizing conflict between circuits", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nmentioning Turner’s moderate difficulties in concentration, persistence, or pace. 5. The ALJ also did not err in accepting the vocational expert’s testimony that Turner could perform jobs with Level 2 reasoning. The RFC determination limiting Turner to “simple, repetitive tasks,” which adequately encompasses Turner’s moderate difficulties in concentration, persistence, or pace, is compatible with jobs requiring Level 2 reasoning. See Dictionary of Occupational Titles, app. C, § III (4th ed. 1991) (defining jobs with Level 2 reasoning as requiring the employee to “carry out detailed but uninvolved written or oral instructions” and “[d]eal with problems involving a few concrete variables in or from standardized situations”); compare Zavalin v. Colvin, 778 F.3d 842, 846-47 (9th Cir. 2015) (recognizing the conflict", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nmentioning Turner’s moderate difficulties in concentration, persistence, or pace. 5. The ALJ also did not err in accepting the vocational expert’s testimony that Turner could perform jobs with Level 2 reasoning. The RFC determination limiting Turner to “simple, repetitive tasks,” which adequately encompasses Turner’s moderate difficulties in concentration, persistence, or pace, is compatible with jobs requiring Level 2 reasoning. See Dictionary of Occupational Titles, app. C, § III (4th ed. 1991) (defining jobs with Level 2 reasoning as requiring the employee to “carry out detailed but uninvolved written or oral instructions” and “[d]eal with problems involving a few concrete variables in or from standardized situations”); compare Zavalin v. Colvin, 778 F.3d 842, 846-47 (9th Cir. 2015) (recognizing possible conflict between the cases" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nrather, it shows that accidents were infrequent, with only a few other large objects falling from mezzanines over the previous decade and smaller objects falling more frequently, and that tens of thousands of bags had been moved up and down without incident. Although the facts viewed in the light most favorable to the Estate suggest an injury may have been likely to occur, the required showing is not made “by demonstrating an employer’s awareness that a dangerous condition exist[ed], or that an employer knew an accident was likely.” Johnson v. Detroit Edison Co., 288 Mich.App. 688, 795 N.W.2d 161, 168 (2010) (per curiam) (alteration in original) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Upsher v. Grosse Pointe Pub. Sch. Sys., 285 F.3d 448, 455-56 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that there was not complete preemption because the applicable federal statute did not provide a private right of action to redress the same kind of injury alleged in the plaintiffs statelaw claims", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nrather, it shows that accidents were infrequent, with only a few other large objects falling from mezzanines over the previous decade and smaller objects falling more frequently, and that tens of thousands of bags had been moved up and down without incident. Although the facts viewed in the light most favorable to the Estate suggest an injury may have been likely to occur, the required showing is not made “by demonstrating an employer’s awareness that a dangerous condition exist[ed], or that an employer knew an accident was likely.” Johnson v. Detroit Edison Co., 288 Mich.App. 688, 795 N.W.2d 161, 168 (2010) (per curiam) (alteration in original) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Upsher v. Grosse Pointe Pub. Sch. Sys., 285 F.3d 448, 455-56 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding wdcas intentionaltort exception did not apply where plaintiffs suffered injury after being instructed to remove carpet under which there was asbestos because the plaintiffs had shown only that the defendants knew of the general dangers of as bestos and did not provide proper training or safety equipment", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nrather, it shows that accidents were infrequent, with only a few other large objects falling from mezzanines over the previous decade and smaller objects falling more frequently, and that tens of thousands of bags had been moved up and down without incident. Although the facts viewed in the light most favorable to the Estate suggest an injury may have been likely to occur, the required showing is not made “by demonstrating an employer’s awareness that a dangerous condition exist[ed], or that an employer knew an accident was likely.” Johnson v. Detroit Edison Co., 288 Mich.App. 688, 795 N.W.2d 161, 168 (2010) (per curiam) (alteration in original) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Upsher v. Grosse Pointe Pub. Sch. Sys., 285 F.3d 448, 455-56 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that the special relationship exception did not apply because the decedent was not in defendants custody", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nrather, it shows that accidents were infrequent, with only a few other large objects falling from mezzanines over the previous decade and smaller objects falling more frequently, and that tens of thousands of bags had been moved up and down without incident. Although the facts viewed in the light most favorable to the Estate suggest an injury may have been likely to occur, the required showing is not made “by demonstrating an employer’s awareness that a dangerous condition exist[ed], or that an employer knew an accident was likely.” Johnson v. Detroit Edison Co., 288 Mich.App. 688, 795 N.W.2d 161, 168 (2010) (per curiam) (alteration in original) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Upsher v. Grosse Pointe Pub. Sch. Sys., 285 F.3d 448, 455-56 (6th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that georgia did not adopt 115 but even if it did finding that plaintiff did not consider removal of asbestos to be immediately necessary where there was an undisputed delay between plaintiffs discovery of the hazard and beginning of removal", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nrather, it shows that accidents were infrequent, with only a few other large objects falling from mezzanines over the previous decade and smaller objects falling more frequently, and that tens of thousands of bags had been moved up and down without incident. Although the facts viewed in the light most favorable to the Estate suggest an injury may have been likely to occur, the required showing is not made “by demonstrating an employer’s awareness that a dangerous condition exist[ed], or that an employer knew an accident was likely.” Johnson v. Detroit Edison Co., 288 Mich.App. 688, 795 N.W.2d 161, 168 (2010) (per curiam) (alteration in original) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Upsher v. Grosse Pointe Pub. Sch. Sys., 285 F.3d 448, 455-56 (6th Cir. 2002) (recognizing the rule and the exception but holding facts did not support claim to exception" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nintended for the Workers' Compensation Act to \"be interpreted so as to assure the quick and efficient delivery of disability and medical benefits to injured workers at a reasonable cost to employers, without the necessity of any litigation ....\" § 8-40-102, C.R.S. (2007). Thus, a primary purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act is to compensate injured workers \"regardless of fault.\" Colo. Springs Disposal v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 58 P.3d 1061, 1063 (Colo.App.2002). In a previous case, we noted that the Workers' Compensation Act \"is intended to be remedial and beneficial in purpose, and should be liberally construed in order to accomplish these goals.\" Davison, 84 P.3d at 1029 (internal quotation marks omitted). The temporary total disability benefits 29-30 (Colo.App.1983) (holding a claimant who refuses to provide financial information necessary to ascertain whether a claimant is working may have his indemnity benefits suspended until such information is provided", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nintended for the Workers' Compensation Act to \"be interpreted so as to assure the quick and efficient delivery of disability and medical benefits to injured workers at a reasonable cost to employers, without the necessity of any litigation ....\" § 8-40-102, C.R.S. (2007). Thus, a primary purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act is to compensate injured workers \"regardless of fault.\" Colo. Springs Disposal v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 58 P.3d 1061, 1063 (Colo.App.2002). In a previous case, we noted that the Workers' Compensation Act \"is intended to be remedial and beneficial in purpose, and should be liberally construed in order to accomplish these goals.\" Davison, 84 P.3d at 1029 (internal quotation marks omitted). The temporary total disability benefits 29-30 (Colo.App.1983) (holding that a claimants benefits were rightly suspended under what is now section 8434048 when the claimant refused to cooperate with a vocational rehabilitation plan", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nintended for the Workers' Compensation Act to \"be interpreted so as to assure the quick and efficient delivery of disability and medical benefits to injured workers at a reasonable cost to employers, without the necessity of any litigation ....\" § 8-40-102, C.R.S. (2007). Thus, a primary purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act is to compensate injured workers \"regardless of fault.\" Colo. Springs Disposal v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 58 P.3d 1061, 1063 (Colo.App.2002). In a previous case, we noted that the Workers' Compensation Act \"is intended to be remedial and beneficial in purpose, and should be liberally construed in order to accomplish these goals.\" Davison, 84 P.3d at 1029 (internal quotation marks omitted). The temporary total disability benefits 29-30 (Colo.App.1983) (holding that a claimant establishes a prima facie case for compensable medical treatment where a qualified physician indicates treatment was necessary for a workrelated condition", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nintended for the Workers' Compensation Act to \"be interpreted so as to assure the quick and efficient delivery of disability and medical benefits to injured workers at a reasonable cost to employers, without the necessity of any litigation ....\" § 8-40-102, C.R.S. (2007). Thus, a primary purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act is to compensate injured workers \"regardless of fault.\" Colo. Springs Disposal v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 58 P.3d 1061, 1063 (Colo.App.2002). In a previous case, we noted that the Workers' Compensation Act \"is intended to be remedial and beneficial in purpose, and should be liberally construed in order to accomplish these goals.\" Davison, 84 P.3d at 1029 (internal quotation marks omitted). The temporary total disability benefits 29-30 (Colo.App.1983) (holding that a claimants benefits were rightly suspended under what is now section 8434043 when the claimant did not return to the authorized physician for treatment", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nintended for the Workers' Compensation Act to \"be interpreted so as to assure the quick and efficient delivery of disability and medical benefits to injured workers at a reasonable cost to employers, without the necessity of any litigation ....\" § 8-40-102, C.R.S. (2007). Thus, a primary purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act is to compensate injured workers \"regardless of fault.\" Colo. Springs Disposal v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 58 P.3d 1061, 1063 (Colo.App.2002). In a previous case, we noted that the Workers' Compensation Act \"is intended to be remedial and beneficial in purpose, and should be liberally construed in order to accomplish these goals.\" Davison, 84 P.3d at 1029 (internal quotation marks omitted). The temporary total disability benefits 29-30 (Colo.App.1983) (holding the procedural right to request a onetime change of physician during the course of treatment does not attach until claimant actually begins treatment with the initially authorized physician" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nPolice Board held a hearing on the Internal Affairs complaint and sustained the complaint by a vote of 4-1. Although the results were forwarded to the then acting police chief, Barile has received no communication regarding his complaint. On July 17, 2004, Barile read a newspaper article indicating that the Honorable Ellen Bree Burns, U.S.D.J., had ruled on a consent decree that would result in the review and, hopefully, resolution of the backlog of complaints against the Hartford Police Department. Barile commenced this action by complaint dated July 20, 2004. III. Discussion Defendants move to dismiss on the ground that the complaint is time-barred. The limitations period for filing a section 1983 action is three years. See Lounsbury v. Jeffries, 25 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir.1994) (holding that in connecticut the general threeyear personal injury statute of limitations set forth in connecticut general statutes 52577 is the appropriate limitations period for civil rights actions asserted under 42 usc 1983", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nPolice Board held a hearing on the Internal Affairs complaint and sustained the complaint by a vote of 4-1. Although the results were forwarded to the then acting police chief, Barile has received no communication regarding his complaint. On July 17, 2004, Barile read a newspaper article indicating that the Honorable Ellen Bree Burns, U.S.D.J., had ruled on a consent decree that would result in the review and, hopefully, resolution of the backlog of complaints against the Hartford Police Department. Barile commenced this action by complaint dated July 20, 2004. III. Discussion Defendants move to dismiss on the ground that the complaint is time-barred. The limitations period for filing a section 1983 action is three years. See Lounsbury v. Jeffries, 25 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir.1994) (holding that civil rights claims at least those arising under 42 usc 1983 were subject to the applicable states personal injury statute of limitations", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nPolice Board held a hearing on the Internal Affairs complaint and sustained the complaint by a vote of 4-1. Although the results were forwarded to the then acting police chief, Barile has received no communication regarding his complaint. On July 17, 2004, Barile read a newspaper article indicating that the Honorable Ellen Bree Burns, U.S.D.J., had ruled on a consent decree that would result in the review and, hopefully, resolution of the backlog of complaints against the Hartford Police Department. Barile commenced this action by complaint dated July 20, 2004. III. Discussion Defendants move to dismiss on the ground that the complaint is time-barred. The limitations period for filing a section 1983 action is three years. See Lounsbury v. Jeffries, 25 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir.1994) (holding that if state law provides multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury actions the general or residual statute for personal injury actions should be used for 1983 actions", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nPolice Board held a hearing on the Internal Affairs complaint and sustained the complaint by a vote of 4-1. Although the results were forwarded to the then acting police chief, Barile has received no communication regarding his complaint. On July 17, 2004, Barile read a newspaper article indicating that the Honorable Ellen Bree Burns, U.S.D.J., had ruled on a consent decree that would result in the review and, hopefully, resolution of the backlog of complaints against the Hartford Police Department. Barile commenced this action by complaint dated July 20, 2004. III. Discussion Defendants move to dismiss on the ground that the complaint is time-barred. The limitations period for filing a section 1983 action is three years. See Lounsbury v. Jeffries, 25 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir.1994) (holding that connecticuts threeyear limitations period for tort suits set forth in conn genstat 52577 is the appropriate limitations period for civil rights actions under 1983", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nPolice Board held a hearing on the Internal Affairs complaint and sustained the complaint by a vote of 4-1. Although the results were forwarded to the then acting police chief, Barile has received no communication regarding his complaint. On July 17, 2004, Barile read a newspaper article indicating that the Honorable Ellen Bree Burns, U.S.D.J., had ruled on a consent decree that would result in the review and, hopefully, resolution of the backlog of complaints against the Hartford Police Department. Barile commenced this action by complaint dated July 20, 2004. III. Discussion Defendants move to dismiss on the ground that the complaint is time-barred. The limitations period for filing a section 1983 action is three years. See Lounsbury v. Jeffries, 25 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir.1994) (holding that the statute of limitations for 1983 claims is the most closely analogous state limitations period for general personal injury claims" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ntwo months, CU withdrew from the Plough action. It subsequently disclaimed coverage. On November 26,1980, a year and a half after it withdrew its defense, CU brought this declaratory judgment suit seeking a determination that it was not liable to defend or indemnify IFF in the Plough action. Since the Plough action had been pending for almost two years and IFF was in the midst of defending itself in that litigation, IFF moved to stay the declaratory judgment suit as untimely. On March 25, 1981, after extensive briefing and oral argument, the Court stayed the suit 46 A.D.2d 97, 361 N.Y.S.2d 232, 234 (3d Dept.1974); Padavan v. Clemente, 43 A.D.2d 729, 350 N.Y.S.2d 694 (2d Dept.1973) Allstate Insurance Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 123 Misc.2d 932, 475 N.Y.S.2d 219, 221-22 (1984) (holding that indemnitee may recover attorneys fees incurred in defending indemnity agreement", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ntwo months, CU withdrew from the Plough action. It subsequently disclaimed coverage. On November 26,1980, a year and a half after it withdrew its defense, CU brought this declaratory judgment suit seeking a determination that it was not liable to defend or indemnify IFF in the Plough action. Since the Plough action had been pending for almost two years and IFF was in the midst of defending itself in that litigation, IFF moved to stay the declaratory judgment suit as untimely. On March 25, 1981, after extensive briefing and oral argument, the Court stayed the suit 46 A.D.2d 97, 361 N.Y.S.2d 232, 234 (3d Dept.1974); Padavan v. Clemente, 43 A.D.2d 729, 350 N.Y.S.2d 694 (2d Dept.1973) Allstate Insurance Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 123 Misc.2d 932, 475 N.Y.S.2d 219, 221-22 (1984) (holding that insured may recover legal fees incurred in defending itself in a declaratory judgment action brought by insurer but not for those incurred in prosecuting cross claims and counterclaims against insurers", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ntwo months, CU withdrew from the Plough action. It subsequently disclaimed coverage. On November 26,1980, a year and a half after it withdrew its defense, CU brought this declaratory judgment suit seeking a determination that it was not liable to defend or indemnify IFF in the Plough action. Since the Plough action had been pending for almost two years and IFF was in the midst of defending itself in that litigation, IFF moved to stay the declaratory judgment suit as untimely. On March 25, 1981, after extensive briefing and oral argument, the Court stayed the suit 46 A.D.2d 97, 361 N.Y.S.2d 232, 234 (3d Dept.1974); Padavan v. Clemente, 43 A.D.2d 729, 350 N.Y.S.2d 694 (2d Dept.1973) Allstate Insurance Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 123 Misc.2d 932, 475 N.Y.S.2d 219, 221-22 (1984) (holding that insured could recover the costs of defending a declaratory judgment action brought by the injured party to compel the insurer to defend but could not recover the costs associated with prosecuting crossclaims against the insurer", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ntwo months, CU withdrew from the Plough action. It subsequently disclaimed coverage. On November 26,1980, a year and a half after it withdrew its defense, CU brought this declaratory judgment suit seeking a determination that it was not liable to defend or indemnify IFF in the Plough action. Since the Plough action had been pending for almost two years and IFF was in the midst of defending itself in that litigation, IFF moved to stay the declaratory judgment suit as untimely. On March 25, 1981, after extensive briefing and oral argument, the Court stayed the suit 46 A.D.2d 97, 361 N.Y.S.2d 232, 234 (3d Dept.1974); Padavan v. Clemente, 43 A.D.2d 729, 350 N.Y.S.2d 694 (2d Dept.1973) Allstate Insurance Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 123 Misc.2d 932, 475 N.Y.S.2d 219, 221-22 (1984) (holding that insured may recover from its insurer any attorney fees incurred in successfully attempting to force the insurer to defend an action against the insured", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ntwo months, CU withdrew from the Plough action. It subsequently disclaimed coverage. On November 26,1980, a year and a half after it withdrew its defense, CU brought this declaratory judgment suit seeking a determination that it was not liable to defend or indemnify IFF in the Plough action. Since the Plough action had been pending for almost two years and IFF was in the midst of defending itself in that litigation, IFF moved to stay the declaratory judgment suit as untimely. On March 25, 1981, after extensive briefing and oral argument, the Court stayed the suit 46 A.D.2d 97, 361 N.Y.S.2d 232, 234 (3d Dept.1974); Padavan v. Clemente, 43 A.D.2d 729, 350 N.Y.S.2d 694 (2d Dept.1973) Allstate Insurance Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 123 Misc.2d 932, 475 N.Y.S.2d 219, 221-22 (1984) (holding that insured who brought third party action against insurer could recover costs incurred in defending insurers counterclaim for declaratory relief since the insureds posture in the counterclaim was that of a defendant" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nCourt is persuaded that the Sixth Circuit would follow this line of thinking when dealing with broad fraud allegations against contracts that contain jury trial waivers. First, the court has held unequivocally that a contract action asserting fraud in the inducement is not sufficient to implicate an arbitration clause where there is no claim of fraud specifically relating to that clause. Highlands Wellmont Health Network, Inc. v. John Deere Health Plan, Inc., 350 F.3d 568, 575-76 (6th Cir.2003). Second, in the case of parties with equal bargaining power, the court has not hesitated to find that an agreement to waive a jury trial can satisfy the requirement that constitutional rights can be waived if the waiver is knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. K.M.C., 757 F.2d at 756 (holding that the court must determine whether the employees consent to the settlement agreement was knowing and voluntary", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nCourt is persuaded that the Sixth Circuit would follow this line of thinking when dealing with broad fraud allegations against contracts that contain jury trial waivers. First, the court has held unequivocally that a contract action asserting fraud in the inducement is not sufficient to implicate an arbitration clause where there is no claim of fraud specifically relating to that clause. Highlands Wellmont Health Network, Inc. v. John Deere Health Plan, Inc., 350 F.3d 568, 575-76 (6th Cir.2003). Second, in the case of parties with equal bargaining power, the court has not hesitated to find that an agreement to waive a jury trial can satisfy the requirement that constitutional rights can be waived if the waiver is knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. K.M.C., 757 F.2d at 756 (holding that a defendant must have knowledge of the likely consequences of entering the guilty plea in order for a plea to be voluntary and knowing", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nCourt is persuaded that the Sixth Circuit would follow this line of thinking when dealing with broad fraud allegations against contracts that contain jury trial waivers. First, the court has held unequivocally that a contract action asserting fraud in the inducement is not sufficient to implicate an arbitration clause where there is no claim of fraud specifically relating to that clause. Highlands Wellmont Health Network, Inc. v. John Deere Health Plan, Inc., 350 F.3d 568, 575-76 (6th Cir.2003). Second, in the case of parties with equal bargaining power, the court has not hesitated to find that an agreement to waive a jury trial can satisfy the requirement that constitutional rights can be waived if the waiver is knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. K.M.C., 757 F.2d at 756 (holding that the magistrate was correct in applying the knowing and voluntary standard in this instance", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nCourt is persuaded that the Sixth Circuit would follow this line of thinking when dealing with broad fraud allegations against contracts that contain jury trial waivers. First, the court has held unequivocally that a contract action asserting fraud in the inducement is not sufficient to implicate an arbitration clause where there is no claim of fraud specifically relating to that clause. Highlands Wellmont Health Network, Inc. v. John Deere Health Plan, Inc., 350 F.3d 568, 575-76 (6th Cir.2003). Second, in the case of parties with equal bargaining power, the court has not hesitated to find that an agreement to waive a jury trial can satisfy the requirement that constitutional rights can be waived if the waiver is knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. K.M.C., 757 F.2d at 756 (holding that a guilty plea must be both knowing and voluntary and must be a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action available to a defendant", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nCourt is persuaded that the Sixth Circuit would follow this line of thinking when dealing with broad fraud allegations against contracts that contain jury trial waivers. First, the court has held unequivocally that a contract action asserting fraud in the inducement is not sufficient to implicate an arbitration clause where there is no claim of fraud specifically relating to that clause. Highlands Wellmont Health Network, Inc. v. John Deere Health Plan, Inc., 350 F.3d 568, 575-76 (6th Cir.2003). Second, in the case of parties with equal bargaining power, the court has not hesitated to find that an agreement to waive a jury trial can satisfy the requirement that constitutional rights can be waived if the waiver is knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. K.M.C., 757 F.2d at 756 (holding a waiver of a substantial constitutional right must be a voluntary knowing and intelligent act" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nBlankenship admits that these prior convictions fall within the class of felonies to which the statute refers, but he contends that they were too remote in time to serve as a proper predicate for enhancement of the sentence. If a statute that imposes a criminal penalty is ambiguous, it must be construed in favor of the defendant. See Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387, 100 S.Ct. 2247, 2252, 65 L.Ed.2d 205 (1980). However, in this case, section 924(e)(1) is not ambiguous. There is no indication, either in the statute or in the legislative history, that Congress intended to include a temporal restriction in that statute. See United States v. Green, 904 F.2d 654, 655-56 (11th Cir.1990); see also Young v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 690 F.Supp. 990, 995 (S.D.Ala.1988) (holding the use of a 1951 felony conviction as a predicate for a violation of 18 usc 922g1 did not violate the ex post facto clause because the crime of being a felon in possession of a firearm was not committed until after the effective date of the statute under which he was convicted", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nBlankenship admits that these prior convictions fall within the class of felonies to which the statute refers, but he contends that they were too remote in time to serve as a proper predicate for enhancement of the sentence. If a statute that imposes a criminal penalty is ambiguous, it must be construed in favor of the defendant. See Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387, 100 S.Ct. 2247, 2252, 65 L.Ed.2d 205 (1980). However, in this case, section 924(e)(1) is not ambiguous. There is no indication, either in the statute or in the legislative history, that Congress intended to include a temporal restriction in that statute. See United States v. Green, 904 F.2d 654, 655-56 (11th Cir.1990); see also Young v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 690 F.Supp. 990, 995 (S.D.Ala.1988) (holding that to enhance a sentence because of the defendants use of a firearm the jury must find the defendant guilty of a crime involving a firearm or otherwise specifically find that a firearm was used", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nBlankenship admits that these prior convictions fall within the class of felonies to which the statute refers, but he contends that they were too remote in time to serve as a proper predicate for enhancement of the sentence. If a statute that imposes a criminal penalty is ambiguous, it must be construed in favor of the defendant. See Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387, 100 S.Ct. 2247, 2252, 65 L.Ed.2d 205 (1980). However, in this case, section 924(e)(1) is not ambiguous. There is no indication, either in the statute or in the legislative history, that Congress intended to include a temporal restriction in that statute. See United States v. Green, 904 F.2d 654, 655-56 (11th Cir.1990); see also Young v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 690 F.Supp. 990, 995 (S.D.Ala.1988) (holding that because a jury need only agree that a defendant possessed a firearm in order to find a defendant guilty of violating 922g1 a unanimity instruction was not required where defendant was charged with one count of violating 922g1 and multiple firearms were listed in that count", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nBlankenship admits that these prior convictions fall within the class of felonies to which the statute refers, but he contends that they were too remote in time to serve as a proper predicate for enhancement of the sentence. If a statute that imposes a criminal penalty is ambiguous, it must be construed in favor of the defendant. See Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387, 100 S.Ct. 2247, 2252, 65 L.Ed.2d 205 (1980). However, in this case, section 924(e)(1) is not ambiguous. There is no indication, either in the statute or in the legislative history, that Congress intended to include a temporal restriction in that statute. See United States v. Green, 904 F.2d 654, 655-56 (11th Cir.1990); see also Young v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 690 F.Supp. 990, 995 (S.D.Ala.1988) (holding that period of proscription for firearm ownership under section 922g1 was indefinite", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nBlankenship admits that these prior convictions fall within the class of felonies to which the statute refers, but he contends that they were too remote in time to serve as a proper predicate for enhancement of the sentence. If a statute that imposes a criminal penalty is ambiguous, it must be construed in favor of the defendant. See Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387, 100 S.Ct. 2247, 2252, 65 L.Ed.2d 205 (1980). However, in this case, section 924(e)(1) is not ambiguous. There is no indication, either in the statute or in the legislative history, that Congress intended to include a temporal restriction in that statute. See United States v. Green, 904 F.2d 654, 655-56 (11th Cir.1990); see also Young v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 690 F.Supp. 990, 995 (S.D.Ala.1988) (holding that a prior conviction ie one for which the civil right to possess a firearm has not been restored is an element of a 922g1 violation" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n42 of the United States Code is a federal statute which “provides a civil remedy against any ‘person’ who, under color of state law, subjects a ‘citizen of the United States’ to the ‘deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities’ secured by the federal Constitution or federal laws.” Bayh v. Sonnenburg, 573 N.E.2d 398, 402 (Ind.1991) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). “By the plain terms of § 1983, two — and only two — allegations are required in order to state a cause of action under that statute.” Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980). A § 1983 claim need only allege that “some person has deprived [the claimant] of a federal right” and that person “acted under color of state or territorial-law.” Id. See In re Tina T., 579 N.E.2d 48, 62 (Ind.1991) (holding that to rebut presumption plaintiff need only allege specific facts not plead evidence", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n42 of the United States Code is a federal statute which “provides a civil remedy against any ‘person’ who, under color of state law, subjects a ‘citizen of the United States’ to the ‘deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities’ secured by the federal Constitution or federal laws.” Bayh v. Sonnenburg, 573 N.E.2d 398, 402 (Ind.1991) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). “By the plain terms of § 1983, two — and only two — allegations are required in order to state a cause of action under that statute.” Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980). A § 1983 claim need only allege that “some person has deprived [the claimant] of a federal right” and that person “acted under color of state or territorial-law.” Id. See In re Tina T., 579 N.E.2d 48, 62 (Ind.1991) (holding a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the constitution and laws of the united states to state a claim under 1983", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n42 of the United States Code is a federal statute which “provides a civil remedy against any ‘person’ who, under color of state law, subjects a ‘citizen of the United States’ to the ‘deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities’ secured by the federal Constitution or federal laws.” Bayh v. Sonnenburg, 573 N.E.2d 398, 402 (Ind.1991) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). “By the plain terms of § 1983, two — and only two — allegations are required in order to state a cause of action under that statute.” Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980). A § 1983 claim need only allege that “some person has deprived [the claimant] of a federal right” and that person “acted under color of state or territorial-law.” Id. See In re Tina T., 579 N.E.2d 48, 62 (Ind.1991) (holding private actors are not acting under the color of state law for the purposes of section 1983 liability", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n42 of the United States Code is a federal statute which “provides a civil remedy against any ‘person’ who, under color of state law, subjects a ‘citizen of the United States’ to the ‘deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities’ secured by the federal Constitution or federal laws.” Bayh v. Sonnenburg, 573 N.E.2d 398, 402 (Ind.1991) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). “By the plain terms of § 1983, two — and only two — allegations are required in order to state a cause of action under that statute.” Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980). A § 1983 claim need only allege that “some person has deprived [the claimant] of a federal right” and that person “acted under color of state or territorial-law.” Id. See In re Tina T., 579 N.E.2d 48, 62 (Ind.1991) (holding that to prevail on a 1983 claim a plaintiff must allege that the defendant acted under color of state law in other words that there was state action", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n42 of the United States Code is a federal statute which “provides a civil remedy against any ‘person’ who, under color of state law, subjects a ‘citizen of the United States’ to the ‘deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities’ secured by the federal Constitution or federal laws.” Bayh v. Sonnenburg, 573 N.E.2d 398, 402 (Ind.1991) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). “By the plain terms of § 1983, two — and only two — allegations are required in order to state a cause of action under that statute.” Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980). A § 1983 claim need only allege that “some person has deprived [the claimant] of a federal right” and that person “acted under color of state or territorial-law.” Id. See In re Tina T., 579 N.E.2d 48, 62 (Ind.1991) (recognizing that to sufficiently plead a 1983 claim a plaintiff need allege only that some person acting under color of state law has deprived the claimant of a federal right citing green v maraio 722 f2d 1013 1016 2d cir1983" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nexercise of discretion which is protected by FTCA § 2680(a).”). Further, “[u]nder a plain reading of this provision, practicability limits both the extent to which the USFS is required to eliminate safety hazards and the immediacy with which the USFS must correct high-priority hazards.” Tam v. United States, 905 F.Supp.2d 1221, 1230 (W.D.Wash.2012). Specifically, Section 2332.1 “requires the USFS to determine, within the confines of its many other responsibilities, how quickly to address high-priority hazards,” and to use “its discretion and policy judgment to choose which items to treat as ‘high-priority’ from among the nearly limitless category of potential hazards” present in a National Forest area. Id. at 1231; see also Elder v. United States, 312 F.3d 1172, 1178 (10th Cir.2002) (holding that police officers charge to protect the public differentiated them from the public", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nexercise of discretion which is protected by FTCA § 2680(a).”). Further, “[u]nder a plain reading of this provision, practicability limits both the extent to which the USFS is required to eliminate safety hazards and the immediacy with which the USFS must correct high-priority hazards.” Tam v. United States, 905 F.Supp.2d 1221, 1230 (W.D.Wash.2012). Specifically, Section 2332.1 “requires the USFS to determine, within the confines of its many other responsibilities, how quickly to address high-priority hazards,” and to use “its discretion and policy judgment to choose which items to treat as ‘high-priority’ from among the nearly limitless category of potential hazards” present in a National Forest area. Id. at 1231; see also Elder v. United States, 312 F.3d 1172, 1178 (10th Cir.2002) (holding that federal law can provide source of state public policy for determining whether discharge of employee violated clear mandate of public policy", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nexercise of discretion which is protected by FTCA § 2680(a).”). Further, “[u]nder a plain reading of this provision, practicability limits both the extent to which the USFS is required to eliminate safety hazards and the immediacy with which the USFS must correct high-priority hazards.” Tam v. United States, 905 F.Supp.2d 1221, 1230 (W.D.Wash.2012). Specifically, Section 2332.1 “requires the USFS to determine, within the confines of its many other responsibilities, how quickly to address high-priority hazards,” and to use “its discretion and policy judgment to choose which items to treat as ‘high-priority’ from among the nearly limitless category of potential hazards” present in a National Forest area. Id. at 1231; see also Elder v. United States, 312 F.3d 1172, 1178 (10th Cir.2002) (holding that a national park service policy manuals broad mandate to warn the public of and protect it from special hazards involves the exercise of discretion in identifying such hazards", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nexercise of discretion which is protected by FTCA § 2680(a).”). Further, “[u]nder a plain reading of this provision, practicability limits both the extent to which the USFS is required to eliminate safety hazards and the immediacy with which the USFS must correct high-priority hazards.” Tam v. United States, 905 F.Supp.2d 1221, 1230 (W.D.Wash.2012). Specifically, Section 2332.1 “requires the USFS to determine, within the confines of its many other responsibilities, how quickly to address high-priority hazards,” and to use “its discretion and policy judgment to choose which items to treat as ‘high-priority’ from among the nearly limitless category of potential hazards” present in a National Forest area. Id. at 1231; see also Elder v. United States, 312 F.3d 1172, 1178 (10th Cir.2002) (holding that for public policy reasons the mere filing of a bar complaint by a defendant against his attorney does not mandate removal of the attorney", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nexercise of discretion which is protected by FTCA § 2680(a).”). Further, “[u]nder a plain reading of this provision, practicability limits both the extent to which the USFS is required to eliminate safety hazards and the immediacy with which the USFS must correct high-priority hazards.” Tam v. United States, 905 F.Supp.2d 1221, 1230 (W.D.Wash.2012). Specifically, Section 2332.1 “requires the USFS to determine, within the confines of its many other responsibilities, how quickly to address high-priority hazards,” and to use “its discretion and policy judgment to choose which items to treat as ‘high-priority’ from among the nearly limitless category of potential hazards” present in a National Forest area. Id. at 1231; see also Elder v. United States, 312 F.3d 1172, 1178 (10th Cir.2002) (holding failure to exercise discretion is abuse of discretion" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nArk. 142, 60 S.W.3d 464 (2001); Caldwell v. State, 780 A.2d 1037 (Del. 2001); State v. Paul, 62 P.3d 389 (Okla.Crim. App.2003). Many of these states simply cited a case from the federal circuit that covers the state to support their approach to this issue. {33} We disagree with the reasoning of the Seventh and Fifth Circuits and the state courts that follow them because it ignores the scope requirement of the second-prong of the Terry test, which our case law has consistently recognized as appropriate to analyze traffic stops. As we said in Werner, an officer’s actions during the “investigatory detention must be reasonably related to the circumstances that initially justified the stop.” 117 N.M. at 317, 871 P.2d at 973; see, e.g., Taylor, 1999-NMCA-022, ¶ 20, 126 N.M. 569, 973 P.2d 246 (holding that police officers are entitled to conduct an investigatory stop of a motorist if they have reasonable suspicion that the motorist has committed a traffic violation", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nArk. 142, 60 S.W.3d 464 (2001); Caldwell v. State, 780 A.2d 1037 (Del. 2001); State v. Paul, 62 P.3d 389 (Okla.Crim. App.2003). Many of these states simply cited a case from the federal circuit that covers the state to support their approach to this issue. {33} We disagree with the reasoning of the Seventh and Fifth Circuits and the state courts that follow them because it ignores the scope requirement of the second-prong of the Terry test, which our case law has consistently recognized as appropriate to analyze traffic stops. As we said in Werner, an officer’s actions during the “investigatory detention must be reasonably related to the circumstances that initially justified the stop.” 117 N.M. at 317, 871 P.2d at 973; see, e.g., Taylor, 1999-NMCA-022, ¶ 20, 126 N.M. 569, 973 P.2d 246 (holding that where police officers had stopped a vehicle because they suspected that the motorist was intoxicated irrespective of whether the deputies were justified in detaining the motorist after he showed no signs of intoxication and even if they had not after approaching the motorist observed conditions raising a reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot they were entitled to ask the motorist for permission to search his vehicle", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nArk. 142, 60 S.W.3d 464 (2001); Caldwell v. State, 780 A.2d 1037 (Del. 2001); State v. Paul, 62 P.3d 389 (Okla.Crim. App.2003). Many of these states simply cited a case from the federal circuit that covers the state to support their approach to this issue. {33} We disagree with the reasoning of the Seventh and Fifth Circuits and the state courts that follow them because it ignores the scope requirement of the second-prong of the Terry test, which our case law has consistently recognized as appropriate to analyze traffic stops. As we said in Werner, an officer’s actions during the “investigatory detention must be reasonably related to the circumstances that initially justified the stop.” 117 N.M. at 317, 871 P.2d at 973; see, e.g., Taylor, 1999-NMCA-022, ¶ 20, 126 N.M. 569, 973 P.2d 246 (holding that defendant was unreasonably seized under fourth amendment when officer detained him to ask questions unrelated in scope to the reasons that justified the initial traffic stop", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nArk. 142, 60 S.W.3d 464 (2001); Caldwell v. State, 780 A.2d 1037 (Del. 2001); State v. Paul, 62 P.3d 389 (Okla.Crim. App.2003). Many of these states simply cited a case from the federal circuit that covers the state to support their approach to this issue. {33} We disagree with the reasoning of the Seventh and Fifth Circuits and the state courts that follow them because it ignores the scope requirement of the second-prong of the Terry test, which our case law has consistently recognized as appropriate to analyze traffic stops. As we said in Werner, an officer’s actions during the “investigatory detention must be reasonably related to the circumstances that initially justified the stop.” 117 N.M. at 317, 871 P.2d at 973; see, e.g., Taylor, 1999-NMCA-022, ¶ 20, 126 N.M. 569, 973 P.2d 246 (holding that for purposes of determining whether the roadblock worked a fourth amendment seizure the controlling considerations are whether 1 the motorist was meant to be stopped by the physical obstacle of the roadblock and 2 the motorist was so stopped", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nArk. 142, 60 S.W.3d 464 (2001); Caldwell v. State, 780 A.2d 1037 (Del. 2001); State v. Paul, 62 P.3d 389 (Okla.Crim. App.2003). Many of these states simply cited a case from the federal circuit that covers the state to support their approach to this issue. {33} We disagree with the reasoning of the Seventh and Fifth Circuits and the state courts that follow them because it ignores the scope requirement of the second-prong of the Terry test, which our case law has consistently recognized as appropriate to analyze traffic stops. As we said in Werner, an officer’s actions during the “investigatory detention must be reasonably related to the circumstances that initially justified the stop.” 117 N.M. at 317, 871 P.2d at 973; see, e.g., Taylor, 1999-NMCA-022, ¶ 20, 126 N.M. 569, 973 P.2d 246 (holding that any questions an officer asks of a stopped motorist must be reasonably related to the circumstances which justified his initial stop" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nan advance of $1,000 in defense of a claim of back rent. He then entered an appearance in the case and filed an answer, but did nothing else while a judgment was entered against his client in the amount of $22,000. In a third client’s matter, McCartney required an advance payment of $23,500 to handle a real estate matter, but then took no action. While these clients attempted to contact McCartney, he closed his law office, absconded, did nothing to salvage his client’s interests, and subsequently failed to respond to his bar complaints. Moss’s behavior does not rise to the level in McCartney. However, Moss does have a past disciplinary record. We hold that the negotiated sanction is appropriate and in accord with case law. See Thompson v. Kentucky Bar Ass’n, 360 S.W.3d 238 (Ky.2012) (holding that attorneys failure to timely file application for suspension of deportation despite contrary representations to client constituted ineffective assistance", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nan advance of $1,000 in defense of a claim of back rent. He then entered an appearance in the case and filed an answer, but did nothing else while a judgment was entered against his client in the amount of $22,000. In a third client’s matter, McCartney required an advance payment of $23,500 to handle a real estate matter, but then took no action. While these clients attempted to contact McCartney, he closed his law office, absconded, did nothing to salvage his client’s interests, and subsequently failed to respond to his bar complaints. Moss’s behavior does not rise to the level in McCartney. However, Moss does have a past disciplinary record. We hold that the negotiated sanction is appropriate and in accord with case law. See Thompson v. Kentucky Bar Ass’n, 360 S.W.3d 238 (Ky.2012) (holding that plaintiffs failure to respond to argument warranted dismissal with prejudice", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nan advance of $1,000 in defense of a claim of back rent. He then entered an appearance in the case and filed an answer, but did nothing else while a judgment was entered against his client in the amount of $22,000. In a third client’s matter, McCartney required an advance payment of $23,500 to handle a real estate matter, but then took no action. While these clients attempted to contact McCartney, he closed his law office, absconded, did nothing to salvage his client’s interests, and subsequently failed to respond to his bar complaints. Moss’s behavior does not rise to the level in McCartney. However, Moss does have a past disciplinary record. We hold that the negotiated sanction is appropriate and in accord with case law. See Thompson v. Kentucky Bar Ass’n, 360 S.W.3d 238 (Ky.2012) (holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nan advance of $1,000 in defense of a claim of back rent. He then entered an appearance in the case and filed an answer, but did nothing else while a judgment was entered against his client in the amount of $22,000. In a third client’s matter, McCartney required an advance payment of $23,500 to handle a real estate matter, but then took no action. While these clients attempted to contact McCartney, he closed his law office, absconded, did nothing to salvage his client’s interests, and subsequently failed to respond to his bar complaints. Moss’s behavior does not rise to the level in McCartney. However, Moss does have a past disciplinary record. We hold that the negotiated sanction is appropriate and in accord with case law. See Thompson v. Kentucky Bar Ass’n, 360 S.W.3d 238 (Ky.2012) (holding that suspension for fortyfive days with requirement of paying restitution of 47950 to client plus costs was appropriate disciplinary sanction for attorneys conduct relating to representation of client in divorce action in failing to act with diligence failing to keep client informed failing to adequately explain matters to client and failing to return unearned advancefee upon termination of representation and for attorneys conduct in failing to respond to two letters from office of bar counsel seeking explanation of inconsistencies in attorneys response to bar complaint", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nan advance of $1,000 in defense of a claim of back rent. He then entered an appearance in the case and filed an answer, but did nothing else while a judgment was entered against his client in the amount of $22,000. In a third client’s matter, McCartney required an advance payment of $23,500 to handle a real estate matter, but then took no action. While these clients attempted to contact McCartney, he closed his law office, absconded, did nothing to salvage his client’s interests, and subsequently failed to respond to his bar complaints. Moss’s behavior does not rise to the level in McCartney. However, Moss does have a past disciplinary record. We hold that the negotiated sanction is appropriate and in accord with case law. See Thompson v. Kentucky Bar Ass’n, 360 S.W.3d 238 (Ky.2012) (holding thompsons earlier private admonition coupled with his new violations warranted a sixtyone day suspension to be partially probated with conditions thompson admitted the following violations a lack of diligence a failure to safekeep client property a failure to timely terminate representation upon disability a failure to communicate with clients and failure to return client files and unearned fees" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nor identified in the same manner as a specific chattel.” See, e.g., 9310 Third Ave. Assocs, Inc. v. Schaffer oney alleged to have been converted was contained in a segregated fund of some sort. See, e.g., Mfrs. Hanover Tr. Co. v. Chem. Bank, 160 A.D.2d 113, 559 N.Y.S.2d 704, 712 (1990) (“Money, specifically identifiable and segregated, can be the subject of a conversion action.”); see also Thys v. Fortis Sec. LLC, 74 A.D.3d 546, 903 N.Y.S.2d 368, 369 (2010) (“An action for conversion of money may be made out where there is a specific, identifiable fund and an obligation to return or otherwise treat in a particular manner the specific fund in question.” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Sperrazza v. Kail, 267 A.D.2d 692, 699 N.Y.S.2d 609, 610 (1999) (holding that contents of joint bank accounts which had been withdrawn in their entirety by one of cotenant without consent of the other eotenant were sufficiently identifiable to be the subject of a claim for conversion", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nor identified in the same manner as a specific chattel.” See, e.g., 9310 Third Ave. Assocs, Inc. v. Schaffer oney alleged to have been converted was contained in a segregated fund of some sort. See, e.g., Mfrs. Hanover Tr. Co. v. Chem. Bank, 160 A.D.2d 113, 559 N.Y.S.2d 704, 712 (1990) (“Money, specifically identifiable and segregated, can be the subject of a conversion action.”); see also Thys v. Fortis Sec. LLC, 74 A.D.3d 546, 903 N.Y.S.2d 368, 369 (2010) (“An action for conversion of money may be made out where there is a specific, identifiable fund and an obligation to return or otherwise treat in a particular manner the specific fund in question.” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Sperrazza v. Kail, 267 A.D.2d 692, 699 N.Y.S.2d 609, 610 (1999) (holding that proceeds of a litigation settlement were an identifiable fund and thus a proper subject of a misappropriation and conversion claim", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nor identified in the same manner as a specific chattel.” See, e.g., 9310 Third Ave. Assocs, Inc. v. Schaffer oney alleged to have been converted was contained in a segregated fund of some sort. See, e.g., Mfrs. Hanover Tr. Co. v. Chem. Bank, 160 A.D.2d 113, 559 N.Y.S.2d 704, 712 (1990) (“Money, specifically identifiable and segregated, can be the subject of a conversion action.”); see also Thys v. Fortis Sec. LLC, 74 A.D.3d 546, 903 N.Y.S.2d 368, 369 (2010) (“An action for conversion of money may be made out where there is a specific, identifiable fund and an obligation to return or otherwise treat in a particular manner the specific fund in question.” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Sperrazza v. Kail, 267 A.D.2d 692, 699 N.Y.S.2d 609, 610 (1999) (holding that contract debt was not subject to an act in tort for conversion", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nor identified in the same manner as a specific chattel.” See, e.g., 9310 Third Ave. Assocs, Inc. v. Schaffer oney alleged to have been converted was contained in a segregated fund of some sort. See, e.g., Mfrs. Hanover Tr. Co. v. Chem. Bank, 160 A.D.2d 113, 559 N.Y.S.2d 704, 712 (1990) (“Money, specifically identifiable and segregated, can be the subject of a conversion action.”); see also Thys v. Fortis Sec. LLC, 74 A.D.3d 546, 903 N.Y.S.2d 368, 369 (2010) (“An action for conversion of money may be made out where there is a specific, identifiable fund and an obligation to return or otherwise treat in a particular manner the specific fund in question.” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Sperrazza v. Kail, 267 A.D.2d 692, 699 N.Y.S.2d 609, 610 (1999) (holding in a class action derivative suit that the joint defense privilege cannot be waived without the consent of all the parties to the defense except in the situation where one of the joint defendants becomes an adverse party in a litigation", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nor identified in the same manner as a specific chattel.” See, e.g., 9310 Third Ave. Assocs, Inc. v. Schaffer oney alleged to have been converted was contained in a segregated fund of some sort. See, e.g., Mfrs. Hanover Tr. Co. v. Chem. Bank, 160 A.D.2d 113, 559 N.Y.S.2d 704, 712 (1990) (“Money, specifically identifiable and segregated, can be the subject of a conversion action.”); see also Thys v. Fortis Sec. LLC, 74 A.D.3d 546, 903 N.Y.S.2d 368, 369 (2010) (“An action for conversion of money may be made out where there is a specific, identifiable fund and an obligation to return or otherwise treat in a particular manner the specific fund in question.” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Sperrazza v. Kail, 267 A.D.2d 692, 699 N.Y.S.2d 609, 610 (1999) (holding that bank accounts in husbands and wifes joint names were property in a tenancy by the entirety" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nidentification of Elliott as the perpetrator by having her concede that she told police that she could not give a positive identification of Elliott for various reasons including that she was unsure, had a bad memory, and did not look at Elliott’s face. N.T., Oct. 26, 1994, at 90-99. Thus, Elliott brings to light no evidence that trial counsel would have been able to offer had he further investigated the prior bad acts relating to Ber-son, Gogos, or Cardinal, which would have altered the outcome of his trial. Finding no prejudice arising from trial counsel’s alleged failure to investigate the prior bad act witnesses, we conclude that appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to pursue such issue. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 590 Pa. 202, 912 A.2d 268, 278 (2006) (holding that where trial counsel was not ineffective appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nidentification of Elliott as the perpetrator by having her concede that she told police that she could not give a positive identification of Elliott for various reasons including that she was unsure, had a bad memory, and did not look at Elliott’s face. N.T., Oct. 26, 1994, at 90-99. Thus, Elliott brings to light no evidence that trial counsel would have been able to offer had he further investigated the prior bad acts relating to Ber-son, Gogos, or Cardinal, which would have altered the outcome of his trial. Finding no prejudice arising from trial counsel’s alleged failure to investigate the prior bad act witnesses, we conclude that appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to pursue such issue. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 590 Pa. 202, 912 A.2d 268, 278 (2006) (holding that an attorney is not ineffective for failing to make a meritless objection", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nidentification of Elliott as the perpetrator by having her concede that she told police that she could not give a positive identification of Elliott for various reasons including that she was unsure, had a bad memory, and did not look at Elliott’s face. N.T., Oct. 26, 1994, at 90-99. Thus, Elliott brings to light no evidence that trial counsel would have been able to offer had he further investigated the prior bad acts relating to Ber-son, Gogos, or Cardinal, which would have altered the outcome of his trial. Finding no prejudice arising from trial counsel’s alleged failure to investigate the prior bad act witnesses, we conclude that appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to pursue such issue. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 590 Pa. 202, 912 A.2d 268, 278 (2006) (holding trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to pursue a meritless issue", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nidentification of Elliott as the perpetrator by having her concede that she told police that she could not give a positive identification of Elliott for various reasons including that she was unsure, had a bad memory, and did not look at Elliott’s face. N.T., Oct. 26, 1994, at 90-99. Thus, Elliott brings to light no evidence that trial counsel would have been able to offer had he further investigated the prior bad acts relating to Ber-son, Gogos, or Cardinal, which would have altered the outcome of his trial. Finding no prejudice arising from trial counsel’s alleged failure to investigate the prior bad act witnesses, we conclude that appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to pursue such issue. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 590 Pa. 202, 912 A.2d 268, 278 (2006) (holding that counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nidentification of Elliott as the perpetrator by having her concede that she told police that she could not give a positive identification of Elliott for various reasons including that she was unsure, had a bad memory, and did not look at Elliott’s face. N.T., Oct. 26, 1994, at 90-99. Thus, Elliott brings to light no evidence that trial counsel would have been able to offer had he further investigated the prior bad acts relating to Ber-son, Gogos, or Cardinal, which would have altered the outcome of his trial. Finding no prejudice arising from trial counsel’s alleged failure to investigate the prior bad act witnesses, we conclude that appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to pursue such issue. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 590 Pa. 202, 912 A.2d 268, 278 (2006) (holding that counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failure to present cumulative evidence" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nversa. Id. This court reviews a district court’s determination of inequitable conduct under a two-tiered standard: we review the underlying factual determinations of materiality and intent for clear error, and we review the ultimate decision as to inequitable conduct for an abuse of discretion. Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1365. If the district court’s inequitable conduct determination rests on a clearly erroneous finding of materiality or intent, it constitutes an abuse of discretion and must be reversed. Id. We agree with Honda that the undisclosed 96RL information was material to the Three-Status patent because the jury found, and the court upheld, the asserted claims as anticipated by the 96RL system, and ACI has not appealed that decision to us. See Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1291-92 (holding that in reviewing a defendants motion for judgment of acquittal based on insanity which the defendant must prove by clear and convincing evidence the court must determine whether no reasonable jury could have failed to find that the defendants criminal insanity at the time of the offense was established by clear and convincing evidence", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nversa. Id. This court reviews a district court’s determination of inequitable conduct under a two-tiered standard: we review the underlying factual determinations of materiality and intent for clear error, and we review the ultimate decision as to inequitable conduct for an abuse of discretion. Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1365. If the district court’s inequitable conduct determination rests on a clearly erroneous finding of materiality or intent, it constitutes an abuse of discretion and must be reversed. Id. We agree with Honda that the undisclosed 96RL information was material to the Three-Status patent because the jury found, and the court upheld, the asserted claims as anticipated by the 96RL system, and ACI has not appealed that decision to us. See Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1291-92 (holding that if a claim is properly invalidated in district court based on the deliberately withheld reference then that reference is necessarily material because a finding of invalidity in a district court requires clear and convincing evidence a higher evidentiary burden than that used in prosecution at the pto", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nversa. Id. This court reviews a district court’s determination of inequitable conduct under a two-tiered standard: we review the underlying factual determinations of materiality and intent for clear error, and we review the ultimate decision as to inequitable conduct for an abuse of discretion. Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1365. If the district court’s inequitable conduct determination rests on a clearly erroneous finding of materiality or intent, it constitutes an abuse of discretion and must be reversed. Id. We agree with Honda that the undisclosed 96RL information was material to the Three-Status patent because the jury found, and the court upheld, the asserted claims as anticipated by the 96RL system, and ACI has not appealed that decision to us. See Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1291-92 (holding that a finding of fraud may be reversed only for clear error but that the finding must be judged in view of the clear and convincing burden of proof", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nversa. Id. This court reviews a district court’s determination of inequitable conduct under a two-tiered standard: we review the underlying factual determinations of materiality and intent for clear error, and we review the ultimate decision as to inequitable conduct for an abuse of discretion. Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1365. If the district court’s inequitable conduct determination rests on a clearly erroneous finding of materiality or intent, it constitutes an abuse of discretion and must be reversed. Id. We agree with Honda that the undisclosed 96RL information was material to the Three-Status patent because the jury found, and the court upheld, the asserted claims as anticipated by the 96RL system, and ACI has not appealed that decision to us. See Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1291-92 (holding that fraud on the court must be supported by clear unequivocal and convincing evidence", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nversa. Id. This court reviews a district court’s determination of inequitable conduct under a two-tiered standard: we review the underlying factual determinations of materiality and intent for clear error, and we review the ultimate decision as to inequitable conduct for an abuse of discretion. Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1365. If the district court’s inequitable conduct determination rests on a clearly erroneous finding of materiality or intent, it constitutes an abuse of discretion and must be reversed. Id. We agree with Honda that the undisclosed 96RL information was material to the Three-Status patent because the jury found, and the court upheld, the asserted claims as anticipated by the 96RL system, and ACI has not appealed that decision to us. See Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1291-92 (holding that appellate court may infer that district court considered sentencing guidelines policy statements despite district courts failure to make explicit reference to them" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nfraud claim on its findings that Chandler’s claim for money from the gas and oil severance tax and from the “burned out school” money was based on a void contract. In its order, the trial court found “that plaintiff [Chandler] would not be able to assert fraud based upon a fraudulent inducement to enter into a contract to pay a portion of revenue monies since the former has been determined to be a void contract as against public policy.” In light of our holdings in parts I, II, and III, we conclude that the reasoning given by the trial court in support of the summary judgment on the fraud claim was incorrect. The question then becomes whether the summary judgment can be sustained on any other grounds. See Lowe v. East End Memorial Hosp. & Health Centers, 477 So.2d 339 (Ala.1985) (holding that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment the trial court is limited to the grounds raised in the motion", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nfraud claim on its findings that Chandler’s claim for money from the gas and oil severance tax and from the “burned out school” money was based on a void contract. In its order, the trial court found “that plaintiff [Chandler] would not be able to assert fraud based upon a fraudulent inducement to enter into a contract to pay a portion of revenue monies since the former has been determined to be a void contract as against public policy.” In light of our holdings in parts I, II, and III, we conclude that the reasoning given by the trial court in support of the summary judgment on the fraud claim was incorrect. The question then becomes whether the summary judgment can be sustained on any other grounds. See Lowe v. East End Memorial Hosp. & Health Centers, 477 So.2d 339 (Ala.1985) (holding that a trial court can only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nfraud claim on its findings that Chandler’s claim for money from the gas and oil severance tax and from the “burned out school” money was based on a void contract. In its order, the trial court found “that plaintiff [Chandler] would not be able to assert fraud based upon a fraudulent inducement to enter into a contract to pay a portion of revenue monies since the former has been determined to be a void contract as against public policy.” In light of our holdings in parts I, II, and III, we conclude that the reasoning given by the trial court in support of the summary judgment on the fraud claim was incorrect. The question then becomes whether the summary judgment can be sustained on any other grounds. See Lowe v. East End Memorial Hosp. & Health Centers, 477 So.2d 339 (Ala.1985) (holding summary judgment must be upheld if it is proper on any grounds", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nfraud claim on its findings that Chandler’s claim for money from the gas and oil severance tax and from the “burned out school” money was based on a void contract. In its order, the trial court found “that plaintiff [Chandler] would not be able to assert fraud based upon a fraudulent inducement to enter into a contract to pay a portion of revenue monies since the former has been determined to be a void contract as against public policy.” In light of our holdings in parts I, II, and III, we conclude that the reasoning given by the trial court in support of the summary judgment on the fraud claim was incorrect. The question then becomes whether the summary judgment can be sustained on any other grounds. See Lowe v. East End Memorial Hosp. & Health Centers, 477 So.2d 339 (Ala.1985) (holding that on appeal a summary judgment ruling will be upheld if it can be sustained on any grounds even if the trial court gave an incorrect reason for its ruling", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nfraud claim on its findings that Chandler’s claim for money from the gas and oil severance tax and from the “burned out school” money was based on a void contract. In its order, the trial court found “that plaintiff [Chandler] would not be able to assert fraud based upon a fraudulent inducement to enter into a contract to pay a portion of revenue monies since the former has been determined to be a void contract as against public policy.” In light of our holdings in parts I, II, and III, we conclude that the reasoning given by the trial court in support of the summary judgment on the fraud claim was incorrect. The question then becomes whether the summary judgment can be sustained on any other grounds. See Lowe v. East End Memorial Hosp. & Health Centers, 477 So.2d 339 (Ala.1985) (holding that a trial courts ruling on a motion for new trial will be upheld if it is correct on any applicable legal theory even if the court articulated an invalid basis" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\npoint. Neither Dickinson nor Cooper established that a claimant may recover damages for a taking of property that occurred prior to his ownership. In fact, in Dickinson, the Supreme Court observed that if the taking began long before purchase, plaintiffs “claim would be barred because he acquired the land after that date.” Dickinson, 331 U.S. at 747, 67 S.Ct. at 1384. Ownership of a property interest is an essential element in a takings claim. A property interest is grounded in a legally enforceable right, not an expectancy. See, e.g., United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 380 n. 9, 66 S.Ct. 596, 600 n. 9, 90 L.Ed. 729 (1946) (finding no property right in expectation that lease would be renewed); Deltona Corp. v. United States, 228 Ct.Cl. 476, 491, 657 F.2d 1184, 1193 (1981) (holding that mere speculation is insufficient to support a jury verdict", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\npoint. Neither Dickinson nor Cooper established that a claimant may recover damages for a taking of property that occurred prior to his ownership. In fact, in Dickinson, the Supreme Court observed that if the taking began long before purchase, plaintiffs “claim would be barred because he acquired the land after that date.” Dickinson, 331 U.S. at 747, 67 S.Ct. at 1384. Ownership of a property interest is an essential element in a takings claim. A property interest is grounded in a legally enforceable right, not an expectancy. See, e.g., United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 380 n. 9, 66 S.Ct. 596, 600 n. 9, 90 L.Ed. 729 (1946) (finding no property right in expectation that lease would be renewed); Deltona Corp. v. United States, 228 Ct.Cl. 476, 491, 657 F.2d 1184, 1193 (1981) (holding that the mere application for other benefits is not fault", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\npoint. Neither Dickinson nor Cooper established that a claimant may recover damages for a taking of property that occurred prior to his ownership. In fact, in Dickinson, the Supreme Court observed that if the taking began long before purchase, plaintiffs “claim would be barred because he acquired the land after that date.” Dickinson, 331 U.S. at 747, 67 S.Ct. at 1384. Ownership of a property interest is an essential element in a takings claim. A property interest is grounded in a legally enforceable right, not an expectancy. See, e.g., United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 380 n. 9, 66 S.Ct. 596, 600 n. 9, 90 L.Ed. 729 (1946) (finding no property right in expectation that lease would be renewed); Deltona Corp. v. United States, 228 Ct.Cl. 476, 491, 657 F.2d 1184, 1193 (1981) (holding that mere expectancy is not property", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\npoint. Neither Dickinson nor Cooper established that a claimant may recover damages for a taking of property that occurred prior to his ownership. In fact, in Dickinson, the Supreme Court observed that if the taking began long before purchase, plaintiffs “claim would be barred because he acquired the land after that date.” Dickinson, 331 U.S. at 747, 67 S.Ct. at 1384. Ownership of a property interest is an essential element in a takings claim. A property interest is grounded in a legally enforceable right, not an expectancy. See, e.g., United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 380 n. 9, 66 S.Ct. 596, 600 n. 9, 90 L.Ed. 729 (1946) (finding no property right in expectation that lease would be renewed); Deltona Corp. v. United States, 228 Ct.Cl. 476, 491, 657 F.2d 1184, 1193 (1981) (holding that mere ownership of property in north carolina is not sufficient to establish the necessary minimum contacts for purposes of general jurisdiction", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\npoint. Neither Dickinson nor Cooper established that a claimant may recover damages for a taking of property that occurred prior to his ownership. In fact, in Dickinson, the Supreme Court observed that if the taking began long before purchase, plaintiffs “claim would be barred because he acquired the land after that date.” Dickinson, 331 U.S. at 747, 67 S.Ct. at 1384. Ownership of a property interest is an essential element in a takings claim. A property interest is grounded in a legally enforceable right, not an expectancy. See, e.g., United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 380 n. 9, 66 S.Ct. 596, 600 n. 9, 90 L.Ed. 729 (1946) (finding no property right in expectation that lease would be renewed); Deltona Corp. v. United States, 228 Ct.Cl. 476, 491, 657 F.2d 1184, 1193 (1981) (holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nright to private communication, i. e., communication free from telephone taps or interceptions. But the subject matter of the conversation at issue here is far removed from that in situations where the media publicizes truly private matters. See Michaels v. Internet Entertainment Group, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823, 841-842 (CD Cal. 1998) (broadcast of videotape recording of sexual relations between famous actress and rock star not a matter of legitimate public concern); W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser & Keeton on Law of Torts §117, p. 857 (5th ed. 1984) (stating that there is little expectation of privacy in mundane facts about a person’s life, but that ‘‘portrayal of... intimate private characteristics or conduct” is \"quite a different matter”); Warren & Brandéis 214 (recognizing that in certain matters the community has no legitimate concern", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nright to private communication, i. e., communication free from telephone taps or interceptions. But the subject matter of the conversation at issue here is far removed from that in situations where the media publicizes truly private matters. See Michaels v. Internet Entertainment Group, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823, 841-842 (CD Cal. 1998) (broadcast of videotape recording of sexual relations between famous actress and rock star not a matter of legitimate public concern); W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser & Keeton on Law of Torts §117, p. 857 (5th ed. 1984) (stating that there is little expectation of privacy in mundane facts about a person’s life, but that ‘‘portrayal of... intimate private characteristics or conduct” is \"quite a different matter”); Warren & Brandéis 214 (recognizing that the court has the power to grant leave upon certain conditions", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nright to private communication, i. e., communication free from telephone taps or interceptions. But the subject matter of the conversation at issue here is far removed from that in situations where the media publicizes truly private matters. See Michaels v. Internet Entertainment Group, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823, 841-842 (CD Cal. 1998) (broadcast of videotape recording of sexual relations between famous actress and rock star not a matter of legitimate public concern); W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser & Keeton on Law of Torts §117, p. 857 (5th ed. 1984) (stating that there is little expectation of privacy in mundane facts about a person’s life, but that ‘‘portrayal of... intimate private characteristics or conduct” is \"quite a different matter”); Warren & Brandéis 214 (recognizing a public employees first amendment right to address matters of legitimate public concern", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nright to private communication, i. e., communication free from telephone taps or interceptions. But the subject matter of the conversation at issue here is far removed from that in situations where the media publicizes truly private matters. See Michaels v. Internet Entertainment Group, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823, 841-842 (CD Cal. 1998) (broadcast of videotape recording of sexual relations between famous actress and rock star not a matter of legitimate public concern); W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser & Keeton on Law of Torts §117, p. 857 (5th ed. 1984) (stating that there is little expectation of privacy in mundane facts about a person’s life, but that ‘‘portrayal of... intimate private characteristics or conduct” is \"quite a different matter”); Warren & Brandéis 214 (holding that issues of prison security public safety and official corruption are matters of public concern", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nright to private communication, i. e., communication free from telephone taps or interceptions. But the subject matter of the conversation at issue here is far removed from that in situations where the media publicizes truly private matters. See Michaels v. Internet Entertainment Group, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823, 841-842 (CD Cal. 1998) (broadcast of videotape recording of sexual relations between famous actress and rock star not a matter of legitimate public concern); W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser & Keeton on Law of Torts §117, p. 857 (5th ed. 1984) (stating that there is little expectation of privacy in mundane facts about a person’s life, but that ‘‘portrayal of... intimate private characteristics or conduct” is \"quite a different matter”); Warren & Brandéis 214 (holding that statements made only to supervisor and chief by police officer were matters of public concern" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ninstead, the dispute is whether the consent was voluntary. ANALYSIS The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution states that it is “[t]he right of the people to be secure in then-persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable seizures ... and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.” U.S. Const, amend. IV. Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment shall not be admissible at trial. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961) (“[T]he exclusionary rule is an essential part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments .... ”); Sing v. Wainwright, 148 So.2d 19, 20 (Fla.1962) (“This lid and involuntary where the police falsely assert that they have a valid search warrant. See Bumper, 391 U.S. at 548-50, 88 S.Ct. 1788 (holding that consent was coerced when officers told defendants wife they came to search the premises and she allowed them to enter", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ninstead, the dispute is whether the consent was voluntary. ANALYSIS The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution states that it is “[t]he right of the people to be secure in then-persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable seizures ... and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.” U.S. Const, amend. IV. Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment shall not be admissible at trial. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961) (“[T]he exclusionary rule is an essential part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments .... ”); Sing v. Wainwright, 148 So.2d 19, 20 (Fla.1962) (“This lid and involuntary where the police falsely assert that they have a valid search warrant. See Bumper, 391 U.S. at 548-50, 88 S.Ct. 1788 (holding that defendants consent was involuntary where defendant consented to search following a warrantless entry and officers explained that absent consent the officers would obtain a warrant", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ninstead, the dispute is whether the consent was voluntary. ANALYSIS The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution states that it is “[t]he right of the people to be secure in then-persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable seizures ... and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.” U.S. Const, amend. IV. Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment shall not be admissible at trial. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961) (“[T]he exclusionary rule is an essential part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments .... ”); Sing v. Wainwright, 148 So.2d 19, 20 (Fla.1962) (“This lid and involuntary where the police falsely assert that they have a valid search warrant. See Bumper, 391 U.S. at 548-50, 88 S.Ct. 1788 (holding consent invalid when given under coercive circumstances in which police misrepresented that they had a warrant to search the home", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ninstead, the dispute is whether the consent was voluntary. ANALYSIS The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution states that it is “[t]he right of the people to be secure in then-persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable seizures ... and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.” U.S. Const, amend. IV. Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment shall not be admissible at trial. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961) (“[T]he exclusionary rule is an essential part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments .... ”); Sing v. Wainwright, 148 So.2d 19, 20 (Fla.1962) (“This lid and involuntary where the police falsely assert that they have a valid search warrant. See Bumper, 391 U.S. at 548-50, 88 S.Ct. 1788 (holding that search of backpack constituted a search of defendants person and was not authorized by search warrant for premises", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ninstead, the dispute is whether the consent was voluntary. ANALYSIS The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution states that it is “[t]he right of the people to be secure in then-persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable seizures ... and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.” U.S. Const, amend. IV. Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment shall not be admissible at trial. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961) (“[T]he exclusionary rule is an essential part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments .... ”); Sing v. Wainwright, 148 So.2d 19, 20 (Fla.1962) (“This lid and involuntary where the police falsely assert that they have a valid search warrant. See Bumper, 391 U.S. at 548-50, 88 S.Ct. 1788 (holding consent involuntary when police told defendants grandmother they had a search warrant and she allowed them to enter and search" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nrecords were lost or destroyed, or that the defendant has changed his position in anticipation that the opposing party has waived his claims. Fulton, supra at 131 (internal citations omitted). “In the absence of prejudice to the one asserting laches, the doctrine will not be applied.” Brodt v. Brown, 404 Pa. 391, 394, 172 A.2d 152, 154 (1961). In other words, “prejudice to the defendant must be shown as a prerequisite to the application of laches.” Miller v. Hawkins, 416 Pa. 180, 190, 205 A.2d 429, 434 (1964) (citing id.). Importantly, a single co-executor or co-administrator generally has authority to act unilaterally on behalf of an estate only if the act falls within the ordinary course of administering the estate. See Fesmyer v. Shannon, 143 Pa. 201, 208, 22 A. 898, 899 (1891) (holding that a legal malpractice claim arising from errors by an attorney in rendering estateplanning services is properly brought by the personal representative of the estate when excess estate taxes are paid by the estate in contravention of the decedents intended estate plan", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nrecords were lost or destroyed, or that the defendant has changed his position in anticipation that the opposing party has waived his claims. Fulton, supra at 131 (internal citations omitted). “In the absence of prejudice to the one asserting laches, the doctrine will not be applied.” Brodt v. Brown, 404 Pa. 391, 394, 172 A.2d 152, 154 (1961). In other words, “prejudice to the defendant must be shown as a prerequisite to the application of laches.” Miller v. Hawkins, 416 Pa. 180, 190, 205 A.2d 429, 434 (1964) (citing id.). Importantly, a single co-executor or co-administrator generally has authority to act unilaterally on behalf of an estate only if the act falls within the ordinary course of administering the estate. See Fesmyer v. Shannon, 143 Pa. 201, 208, 22 A. 898, 899 (1891) (holding single coexecutors release of mortgage debt paid to estate was valid and binding on estate because acts of any coexecutor in respect to the administration of the effects of the estate are deemed to be the acts of all as where one releases a debt or settles an account of a person with the deceased or surrenders a term or sells the goods and chattels of the estate his act binds the others characterizing conversion of decedents personal property into cash as act in due course of administration of estate", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nrecords were lost or destroyed, or that the defendant has changed his position in anticipation that the opposing party has waived his claims. Fulton, supra at 131 (internal citations omitted). “In the absence of prejudice to the one asserting laches, the doctrine will not be applied.” Brodt v. Brown, 404 Pa. 391, 394, 172 A.2d 152, 154 (1961). In other words, “prejudice to the defendant must be shown as a prerequisite to the application of laches.” Miller v. Hawkins, 416 Pa. 180, 190, 205 A.2d 429, 434 (1964) (citing id.). Importantly, a single co-executor or co-administrator generally has authority to act unilaterally on behalf of an estate only if the act falls within the ordinary course of administering the estate. See Fesmyer v. Shannon, 143 Pa. 201, 208, 22 A. 898, 899 (1891) (holding directors and officers liability policy was not property of the estate because it did not increase or decrease the worth of the bankruptcy estate", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nrecords were lost or destroyed, or that the defendant has changed his position in anticipation that the opposing party has waived his claims. Fulton, supra at 131 (internal citations omitted). “In the absence of prejudice to the one asserting laches, the doctrine will not be applied.” Brodt v. Brown, 404 Pa. 391, 394, 172 A.2d 152, 154 (1961). In other words, “prejudice to the defendant must be shown as a prerequisite to the application of laches.” Miller v. Hawkins, 416 Pa. 180, 190, 205 A.2d 429, 434 (1964) (citing id.). Importantly, a single co-executor or co-administrator generally has authority to act unilaterally on behalf of an estate only if the act falls within the ordinary course of administering the estate. See Fesmyer v. Shannon, 143 Pa. 201, 208, 22 A. 898, 899 (1891) (holding that for estate tax purposes property is to be valued as it exists in the hands of the estate", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nrecords were lost or destroyed, or that the defendant has changed his position in anticipation that the opposing party has waived his claims. Fulton, supra at 131 (internal citations omitted). “In the absence of prejudice to the one asserting laches, the doctrine will not be applied.” Brodt v. Brown, 404 Pa. 391, 394, 172 A.2d 152, 154 (1961). In other words, “prejudice to the defendant must be shown as a prerequisite to the application of laches.” Miller v. Hawkins, 416 Pa. 180, 190, 205 A.2d 429, 434 (1964) (citing id.). Importantly, a single co-executor or co-administrator generally has authority to act unilaterally on behalf of an estate only if the act falls within the ordinary course of administering the estate. See Fesmyer v. Shannon, 143 Pa. 201, 208, 22 A. 898, 899 (1891) (holding estate was not bound by single coexecutors confession of judgment for claims regarding decedent debts even though acts done by one coexecutor which relate to the testators goods such as sale delivery possession are considered as equivalent to the acts of all as they possess a joint authority" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwaivers, deletions, changes or amendments shall be effective during the life of this Agreement, unless evidenced in writing, dated and signed by the parties hereto.” Agreement § 16.1. Defendants argue that the term “parties” encompasses individual employees as well as the collective bargaining unit, while Plaintiffs dispute that interpretation. Plaintiffs’ own discussion of the application of the integration clause nevertheless calls on the court to interpret the CBA. For this reason, I am satisfied § 301 preempts the breach of contract claims because “at the very least,” this court “would be required to interpret the CBA to determine whether it was intended to be the sole agreement between the parties.” DiGiantommaso v. Globe Newspaper Co., Inc., 632 F.Supp.2d 85, 89 (D.Mass.2009) (recognizing that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are 1 existence of a valid contract and 2 breach of the terms of that contract", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwaivers, deletions, changes or amendments shall be effective during the life of this Agreement, unless evidenced in writing, dated and signed by the parties hereto.” Agreement § 16.1. Defendants argue that the term “parties” encompasses individual employees as well as the collective bargaining unit, while Plaintiffs dispute that interpretation. Plaintiffs’ own discussion of the application of the integration clause nevertheless calls on the court to interpret the CBA. For this reason, I am satisfied § 301 preempts the breach of contract claims because “at the very least,” this court “would be required to interpret the CBA to determine whether it was intended to be the sole agreement between the parties.” DiGiantommaso v. Globe Newspaper Co., Inc., 632 F.Supp.2d 85, 89 (D.Mass.2009) (holding a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty will not lie where the claim of breach is dependent upon the existence of a contractual relationship between the parties", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwaivers, deletions, changes or amendments shall be effective during the life of this Agreement, unless evidenced in writing, dated and signed by the parties hereto.” Agreement § 16.1. Defendants argue that the term “parties” encompasses individual employees as well as the collective bargaining unit, while Plaintiffs dispute that interpretation. Plaintiffs’ own discussion of the application of the integration clause nevertheless calls on the court to interpret the CBA. For this reason, I am satisfied § 301 preempts the breach of contract claims because “at the very least,” this court “would be required to interpret the CBA to determine whether it was intended to be the sole agreement between the parties.” DiGiantommaso v. Globe Newspaper Co., Inc., 632 F.Supp.2d 85, 89 (D.Mass.2009) (recognizing that breach of contract cause of action accrues at time of the breach", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwaivers, deletions, changes or amendments shall be effective during the life of this Agreement, unless evidenced in writing, dated and signed by the parties hereto.” Agreement § 16.1. Defendants argue that the term “parties” encompasses individual employees as well as the collective bargaining unit, while Plaintiffs dispute that interpretation. Plaintiffs’ own discussion of the application of the integration clause nevertheless calls on the court to interpret the CBA. For this reason, I am satisfied § 301 preempts the breach of contract claims because “at the very least,” this court “would be required to interpret the CBA to determine whether it was intended to be the sole agreement between the parties.” DiGiantommaso v. Globe Newspaper Co., Inc., 632 F.Supp.2d 85, 89 (D.Mass.2009) (holding that a cause of action for breach of a purported implied contract would require interpretation of a cba and the totality of the parties contractual relationship", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwaivers, deletions, changes or amendments shall be effective during the life of this Agreement, unless evidenced in writing, dated and signed by the parties hereto.” Agreement § 16.1. Defendants argue that the term “parties” encompasses individual employees as well as the collective bargaining unit, while Plaintiffs dispute that interpretation. Plaintiffs’ own discussion of the application of the integration clause nevertheless calls on the court to interpret the CBA. For this reason, I am satisfied § 301 preempts the breach of contract claims because “at the very least,” this court “would be required to interpret the CBA to determine whether it was intended to be the sole agreement between the parties.” DiGiantommaso v. Globe Newspaper Co., Inc., 632 F.Supp.2d 85, 89 (D.Mass.2009) (holding that a cause of action for breach of contract accrues at the time of the breach" ]